Between Colonialism And Cold War: The Indonesian War Of Independence In World Politics, 1945-1949 by Lessmeister, Irene
 0	  
 
 
BETWEEN COLONIALISM AND COLD WAR: 
THE INDONESIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE  
IN WORLD POLITICS, 1945-1949 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Cornell University 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
by 
Irene V. Lessmeister 
August 2012 
 0	  
 
 
 
   
   
i 
ABSTRACT 
 
BETWEEN COLONIALISM AND COLD WAR: THE INDONESIAN WAR OF 
INDEPENDENCE IN WORLD POLITICS, 1945-1949 
 
Irene V. Lessmeister, Ph.D. 
 
Cornell University 2012 
 
 
This dissertation examines the Indonesian war of independence: the process by which 
the archipelago formerly known as the Netherlands East Indies decolonized between 
1945 and 1949. Based on extensive archival research, it investigates this revolutionary 
struggle through the lenses of Indonesian, Dutch, British, Australian, and American 
policymakers, diplomats, military leaders, and officials. The project synthesizes foreign 
relations and domestic political history, highlights the agency of individual leaders on 
all sides, and places the war in its international context. It asks why it took the 
Netherlands government, faced with an immediate postwar Indonesian desire for 
independence, four years to recognize this inalienable right. 
 Three sets of questions guide this inquiry: the first revolves around the central 
actors, their motivations, and their definition of national interests; the second centers 
on domestic considerations, political culture, and party and electoral politics; the third 
focuses on the realities of the international system and rising Cold War climate. In 
particular, the project examines the role of Lieutenant Governor-General Hubertus 
van Mook, his personal ambitions, his doomed federal policy to incorporate Sukarno’s 
 
   
   
ii 
Republic into a “United States of Indonesia” and “Netherlands-Indonesia Union,” 
and his complicated relationship with Dutch policymakers in The Hague and British 
and American government officials and diplomats in London, Washington, and 
Jakarta.  
 The dissertation maintains that the conflict’s often-overlooked early phase was 
one during which a peaceful solution might still have been found. This window of 
opportunity was at its widest at the signing of the preliminary Linggadjati Agreement 
in November 1946, but closed as the Dutch moved towards the first of two large-
scale military offenses in the summer of 1947. In some contrast to the existing 
English-language literature, the study also argues that it was not American-induced 
financial pressures that caused Netherlands planners to capitulate in 1949, but rather 
the intensifying Republican guerilla warfare and the withdrawal of support by 
previously pro-Dutch Indonesian federalists that finally lead to a sense of moral and 
military defeat in the archipelago.
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1 
Introduction 
 
On December 27, 1949, Dutch Queen Juliana and Prime Ministers Willem Drees and 
Mohammad Hatta signed the document that transferred sovereignty over the 
Indonesian archipelago from the Netherlands to the United States of Indonesia. “No 
longer do we stand partially opposed to one another,” the Queen told those gathered; 
“we have now taken our stations side by side, however much we may be bruised and 
torn carrying scars of rancor and regret.” A note on the official program cautioned the 
few participants of the sober ceremony, which took place behind closed doors at the 
royal palace in Amsterdam, not to sing when the anthems played.1  
 The following day, hundreds of thousands of jubilant Indonesians lined the 
streets of Jakarta when President Sukarno returned to the city by plane from 
Yogyakarta. He made a short speech that was continually interrupted by cheers and 
applause from the tumultuous crowd, calling on his audience to treat the Dutch, from 
now on, as honored guests in the country. “Sekali merdeka!” he exclaimed; “once free, 
always free!”2   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  “Indonesia Becomes Nation in Ceremony in the Netherlands,” New York Times, 28 December 1949, 
1; Speech Queen Juliana, 27 December 1949, in: S.L. van der Wal, P.J. Drooglever and M.B.J. Schouten 
(eds.), Officiële Bescheiden Betreffende de Nederlands-Indonesische Betrekkingen 1945-1950 (hereafter NIB,) 20 volumes 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971-1996), XX, appendix IV. An English translation of the speech appeared 
in the New York Times on 28 December 1949 (page 5). 
2  “Indonesia Throng Acclaims Sukarno,” New York Times, 29 December 1949, 12. 
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 Only four years earlier, during the late summer of 1945 when the Japanese 
regime in the islands was crumbling, Sukarno, Mohammad Hatta, and Sutan Sjahrir 
had boldly proclaimed Indonesian independence and vowed to strive for “100% 
merdeka” (freedom) from the colonial Dutch. The Netherlands government in The 
Hague, in turn, had flatly rejected the right of Indonesians to immediate self-
determination and sworn to keep the islands within the Kingdom, arguing that it was 
impossible to negotiate with radical “Quislings” and Japanese collaborators.   
In December 1949, the transfer of sovereignty nevertheless officially ended a 
protracted period of violent struggle and laborious diplomacy in the Indonesian 
archipelago. Within the relatively short stretch of time between 1945 and 1949, 
therefore, a marked transition had taken place. Self-government for the inhabitants of 
the colony became not only a topic that the Dutch had to take notice of – it became 
an irrefutable reality. In fits and starts, Netherlands policymakers and administrators 
had come to the realization that their attempts at re-imposing colonial control could 
not succeed. When we consider the attitudes of 1945 and compare the two 
remarkably different scenes above, we have to wonder: How did this change come 
about? And how could the Dutch have thought they could ever stop the complete 
decolonization of Indonesia? Why did they even try? 
The subject matter of this dissertation is the Indonesian war of independence: 
the painful and drawn-out process by which the archipelago formerly known as the 
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Netherlands East Indies decolonized between 1945 and 1949. The topic has 
fascinated scholars for six decades. Ironically, the early work was conducted in the 
United States rather than the Netherlands; American scholars were the first to tackle 
the subject in an in-depth way starting in the early 1950s.3 Australian and European 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 In the United States, scholarly work on Indonesia took off when the public’s growing sympathy for 
the Republican struggle and the government’s need for unbiased, firsthand knowledge of the strategic 
significance, political structures, economic potential, and recent historical background of the archipelago and 
the larger region fostered the establishment of government and institution-supported Southeast Asia 
programs at several college campuses, including Cornell and Yale. In the 1950s, researchers in these 
groundbreaking multi-disciplinary programs used not the outdated concepts from traditional Oriental studies 
centers, but applied sociological, anthropological, and political science methods. Within these area-specific 
centers of study, Indonesia came to the forefront through the personal experiences and strong sympathies of 
its leading scholars: Harry J. Benda at Yale and George McT. Kahin at Cornell. The former spent part of the 
Second World War in a Japanese prisoner camp and finished his dissertation, later published as The Crescent 
and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945, in 1955; the latter witnessed firsthand 
the later years of the Indonesian revolution, published his classic study Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press) in 1952, and became the first director of the Cornell Modern Indonesia 
Project (CMIP) in 1954. Under their leadership, the study of Southeast Asian languages also became of prime 
importance, as did the encouragement and funding of Indonesian scholars publishing on the revolution. See, 
for instance: Idrus Nasir Djajadiningrat, The Beginning of the Indonesian-Dutch Negotiations and the Hoge Veluwe 
Talks (Ithaca: Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, 1958); Deliar Noer, The Rise and Development of the 
Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia during the Dutch Colonial Period, 1900-1942 (Ithaca: Dissertation, 1963). 
 In the late 1960s and 1970s, restrictions in government funding as well as scholars’ disillusionment 
with both the Vietnam War and events in Indonesia, where 1965 saw mass killings and a coup by General 
Suharto, caused a change of direction in research on the archipelago away from Western assumptions and 
models. Benedict R. O’G. Anderson and Benda in particular made waves. They focused not on the elite or 
the Dutch-Indonesian conflict as a whole, but rather investigated internal Indonesian conflicts and tensions 
between, for instance, policies of diplomasi and perjuangan, and paid attention to the social rather than national 
revolution taking place in the islands. See: Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-
1946 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971); Benda, “Democracy in Indonesia,” Journal of Asian Studies 23, 3 
(1964), 449-456. At the same time, scholars began zooming in on particular time periods and on regional and 
local events rather than on national happenings. See, for instance: John Smail, Bandung in the Early Revolution, 
1945-1946: A Study in the Social History of the Indonesian Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Press, 
1964); Audrey R. Kahin (ed.), Regional Dynamics of the Indonesian Revolution: Unity from Diversity (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1985). 
 From the 1990s onward, researchers have again widened their focus. “Trendy” subjects in the recent 
literature on the decolonization of Indonesia include, for instance, the late colonial period, the role of the 
army and militant groups, and the influence of both Islam and Indonesian communist parties as political 
agents. See, for instance: Rudolf Mrázek, Sjahrir: Politics and Exile in Indonesia (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program 
at Cornell University, 1994); Robert Cribb, The Late Colonial State in Indonesia: Political and Economic Foundations 
of the Netherlands Indies, 1880-1942 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1994); Cribb, Gangsters and Revolutionaries: the Jakarta 
People’s Militia and the Indonesian Revolution, 1945-1949 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991); Salim Said, 
Genesis of Power: General Sudirman and the Indonesian Military in Politics, 1945-1949 (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1991); M.C. Williams, Communism, Religion, and Revolt in Banten (Athens: Ohio 
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researchers outside the Netherlands soon followed.4 During the first decades 
immediately following Indonesian independence, however, the Dutch seemed too 
traumatized by the “loss” of the archipelago to produce much notable scholarship. 
The debate on these dark yet decisive pages in Dutch history was not truly ignited in 
the Netherlands until the 1980s, with many groundbreaking works published only in 
the 1990s and 2000s.5  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
University Center for International Studies, 1990); William H. Frederick, Visions and Heat: The Making of the 
Indonesian Revolution (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002). Sadly, particularly seeing the continued revelation 
of new source material on Indonesia, recent U.S. Department of Education budget cuts are set to hit 
Southeast Asian flagship centers hard, with the study of critical language programs especially vulnerable. 
4  A brief list of the most important publications by Australians illustrates trends in research similar to 
those in the United States: Anthony Reid, The Indonesian National Revolution, 1945-1950 (Hawthorn: Longman, 
1974); Reid, The Blood of the People: Revolution and the End of Traditional Rule in Northern Sumatra (Kuala Lumpur: 
Oxford University Press, 1979); J.D. Legge, Sukarno: A Political Biography (New York: Praeger, 1972); Susan 
Abeyasekere, One Hand Clapping: Indonesian Nationalists and the Dutch, 1939-1942 (Clayton: Centre of Southeast 
Asian Studies at Monash University, 1976); John Ingleson, Road to Exile: The Indonesian Nationalist Movement, 
1927-1934 (Singapore: Heinemann Educational Books, 1979); Margaret George, Australia and the Indonesian 
Revolution (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1980); Richard Chauvel, Nationalists, Soldiers, and Separatists: 
The Ambonese Islands from Colonialism to Revolt, 1880-1950 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1990); Anton Lucas, One Soul 
One Struggle: Region and Revolution in Indonesia (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1991). 
 In Europe, the picture has been somewhat different, despite two early publications by German-born 
Indonesia scholar Bernhard Dahm (Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1969); History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970)). British historians have 
been mostly concerned with the end of the British Empire in Southeast Asia, and focused their treatments of 
Indonesia on the role of Lord Mountbatten’s Southeast Asia Command (SEAC) during the early years of the 
revolution. See, for instance: Nicholas Tarling, Britain, Southeast Asia, and the Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1950 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); A.J.F. Doulton, The Fighting Cock, Being the History of the 23rd 
Indian Division, 1942-1947 (Aldershot: Gale & Polden, 1951); P. Dennis, Troubled Days of Peace: Mountbatten and 
South East Asia Command, 1945-46 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987); P. Ziegler, Mountbatten (New York: 
Knopf, 1985).  
 
5   An exceptional early publication is C. Smit’s De Indonesische Quaestie: De Wordingsgeschiedenis der 
Souvereiniteitsoverdracht (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1952). De Excessennota: Nota betreffende het Archiefonderzoek naar de 
Gegevens omtrent Excessen in Indonesië Begaan door Nederlandse Militairen in de Periode 1945-1950, a report 
commissioned by the Dutch government in 1969 and compiled largely by then civil servant at the Dutch 
Ministry of Justice and later historian Cees Fasseur, details the crimes committed by Netherlands forces while 
attempting to suppress the Indonesian revolution. Its first publication went relatively unnoticed; it was not so 
much a study of the behavior of Netherlands forces in the Indonesian archipelago as a stocktaking of 
available source material. The last and Indonesia-focused volume of Lou de Jong’s seminal and popular series 
on the Kingdom of the Netherlands during the Second World War (Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede 
Wereldoorlog, (The Hague: SDU)) was published in 1988. Controversial in its criticism of The Hague’s neo-
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This study investigates the subject through the lenses of Dutch, Indonesians, 
British, Australians, and Americans. The project synthesizes diplomatic and domestic 
political history, and highlights the agency of individual leaders on all sides. Based on 
archival research in Washington, D.C., The Hague, Jakarta, and London, it attempts 
to examine and explicate one of the first momentous postwar independence struggles.  
The questions this project raises, and the methodology it uses to answer them, 
differ from those prominent in most of the recent scholarship in the field of foreign 
relations history. During the last two decades, studies in the discipline of diplomatic 
history have undergone a marked change in subject. Although it takes note of the new 
approaches and fresh insights, this dissertation to some extent returns to enduring 
questions that have stayed with us throughout the years because they remain 
important and controversial.  
 During the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, diplomatic historians were 
accused, both from within the field and outside of it, of being too conventional and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
colonial policy during the revolution, it did much to reignite the scholarly debate in Dutch circles. Influential 
publications from the 1990s and 2000s include: M. Kuitenbrouwer in his The Netherlands and the Rise of Modern 
Imperialism: Colonies and Foreign Policy, 1870-1902 (New York: Berg, 1991); P.M.H. Groen, Marsroutes en 
Dwaalsporen: Het Nederlands Militair-Strategisch beleid in Indonesië, 1945-1950 (The Hague: SDU, 1991); Lambert 
Giebels, Soekarno: Nederlandsch Onderdaan, 1901-1950 (Amsterdam: Bakker, 1999); H.W. van de Doel, Afscheid 
van Indië: De Val van het Nederlandse Imperium in Azië (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 2001); E.B. Locher-Scholten in 
Sumatran Sultanate and Colonial State: Jambi and the Rise of Dutch Imperialism, 1830-1907 (Ithaca: Southeast Asia 
Program at Cornell University, 2003). With the exception of the publication of the long-overdue biography of 
General Simon Spoor (Jaap de Moor, Generaal Spoor: Triomf en Tragiek van een Legercommandant (Amsterdam: 
Boom, 2011)), it has been relatively quiet in the last few years, but the recent call by three renowned Dutch 
research institutes for new and deeper research into the questionable practices of Netherlands forces 
stationed in Indonesia during the revolution (see De Volkskrant, 19 June 2012) should result in a wave of 
fresh scholarship in the coming decade. 
For a good overview of the historiography, see also: N. Bootsma, “The Discovery of Indonesia: 
Western (non-Dutch) Historiography on the Decolonization of Indonesia,” Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en 
Volkenkunde 151, 1 (1995), 1-22. 
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too elite-centered. The traditional outlooks and scopes of established scholars such as 
John Lewis Gaddis and Walter LaFeber, critics charged, were insular and restricted; 
they focused too much on dead white males while too often centering their stories on 
power relationships. Foreign relations scholars, in other words, were said to be behind 
the times, producing scholarship not nearly as exciting or relevant as the new social, 
“bottom-up” history that had quickly become all the rage with hot new works focused 
on issues of gender, culture, and language. Post-modernist researchers in the discipline 
had become concerned with, as diplomatic historian Melvyn P. Leffler notes, 
“discourses rather than subjects, structures rather than actions, process rather than 
agency, the construction of meaning rather than the definition of experience.”6 
 These charges on the field of foreign relations history, to the extent that they 
are legitimate, should today no longer be great cause for concern. Diplomatic history 
has evolved into a field that is currently often called “international history.” In the last 
two decades, diplomatic historians have turned to new approaches, new subjects, and 
new methodologies that have resulted in exciting waves of fresh scholarship. Rather 
than emphasizing structural forces in foreign relations, researchers now regularly 
focus on contingency, human agency, and the international arena, centering their 
inquiries on questions related to rhetoric, race, art, and identity, for example. This 
proliferation of activity is linked directly to a focus on multilingual research in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6  Melvyn P. Leffler, “Presidential Address: New Approaches, Old Interpretations, and Prospective 
Reconfigurations,” Diplomatic History 19 (Spring 1995), 173.  
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variety of archives around the world that relatively recently opened their previously 
tightly shut doors to scholars. In short, as then-president of the American Historical 
Association Eric Foner said in his presidential address of 2001, foreign relations 
historians today “are a natural center of enquiry into relations between nations, 
cultures, movements, and people.”7   
Diplomatic and international historians have combined these fresh approaches 
and studies of contemporary issues with their traditional attention to power, politics, 
and the state. As Michael Hunt has also argued, any international history will still 
necessarily have to consist “of units of study broken down along national or cultural 
lines.” International history will thus be “not the negation of but the fruitful 
engagement with nationally or culturally organized histories.”8 The state, in other 
words, will remain central to scholars in the field. This suggests that the question as to 
where policy ultimately comes from will be answered by all foreign relations historians 
with at least some reference to the state, either as a functional unit in the international 
system of global forces, or as the site where domestic considerations feed into foreign 
policymaking. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7  Eric Foner quoted in: Thomas W. Zeiler, “Just Do It! Globalization for Diplomatic Historians,” 
Diplomatic History 25 (Fall 2001), 530. Some of the most exciting recent scholarship includes: Odd Arne 
Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006); Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of 
Anticolonial Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Mark Atwood Lawrence, Constructing 
Vietnam: The United States, Europe, and the Making of the Cold War in Indochina (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2004); Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-
Cold War Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).  
8  Michael H. Hunt, “The Long Crisis in U.S. Diplomatic History: Coming to Closure,” Diplomatic 
History 16 (January 1992), 133-34. 
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This dissertation maintains that even as historians widen their frame of 
reference and explore new themes, they should affirm that states matter, that 
individuals matter, that on occasion a mere handful of people can still hold the power 
to make policy. At the same time, the project is sympathetic to the clear trend in the 
field of history toward scholarship written more and more in an interdisciplinary 
fashion and from an international perspective. Indeed, the topic of this dissertation is 
particularly conducive to a study of that kind. The struggle between Indonesian 
nationalists and Dutch colonial authorities after the end of the Second World War had 
a wide scope; foreign policy makers and diplomats in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, The Hague, 
London, Canberra, Washington, and New York actively took part in the search for a 
solution to the conflict, sometimes acting independently, sometimes working in 
concert with the newly established United Nations. This study thus aspires to seize 
the opportunity and integrate new approaches and insights to sharpen old 
interpretations. 
To frame some of the major themes and questions at the heart of this 
dissertation, we might reach again for the Queen’s 1949 speech. “It is a privilege to 
perform this act of transfer as it stands in history,” she said, “or rather, in the face of 
God, who knows why this going together in freedom was not achieved sooner, nor 
later, and who knows the failing of generations.” The overarching queries, in other 
words, are: In the face of an immediate and overwhelming Indonesian desire for 
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independence, why did it take the Netherlands and Netherlands Indies governments 
more than four years not only to recognize the inevitable transfer of sovereignty, but 
also to acknowledge it as an inalienable right? Were there real moments of 
opportunity when an amicable settlement of the conflict might have been effected, 
and if so, why and how did policymakers, planners, administrators and negotiators 
failed to grasp them? Narrowed down further, we can distinguish three sets of 
questions or directions that the dissertation attempts to investigate in a manner that 
forges bridges between them and unites them organically. 
 The first set of questions revolves around the most central individual actors in 
this dissertation, their motivations and agency, and their definition of their nation’s 
interests. To what extent did Lieutenant Governor-General Hubertus van Mook’s 
personal ambitions have an effect on events? How did Sutan Sjahrir’s perception of 
the Dutch-Indonesian conflict factor in? To what extent is Sukarno’s personality 
relevant? Did Willem Schermerhorn and Louis Beel’s experience as Netherlands 
Prime Ministers color their views once they arrived in Indonesia to fulfill a different 
role? In what way did the slumbering crisis of authority between policymakers in The 
Hague and bureaucrats in distant Jakarta influence the process? What other rational or 
irrational attitudes, on the part of military leaders, for example, mattered? How did 
foreign observers perceive the legitimacy of the Republic and its leadership in 
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Yogyakarta, and how did they judge the ability of the Dutch to effect a peaceful and 
orderly transition?  
 The second set of questions centers on domestic considerations and political 
culture. How did party and electoral politics in the Netherlands influence decision-
making? What was the role of the Dutch colonial self-image, of the national sense of 
“mission” or “calling,” of the existing values and practices in imperial policies? How 
did the struggle to formulate a unified Indonesian identity energize the Republican 
leadership in Yogyakarta, and what was the effect of the conflicts within and between 
burgeoning political parties and politicians in the islands? What interest groups were at 
play in the various states? How did moments of crisis steer events? And what was the 
role of public opinion in Britain and the United States?  
 The third and final set of questions revolves around the realities of the 
international system in which both the actors and states figured; we have to look 
outward as well as inward. How did direct Dutch-Indonesian negotiations and state-
to-state relations, between Britain and the Netherlands, and between the Republic and 
India, for instance, influence the course of events? What was the role of the 
interactions that took place in the Security Council of the still young United Nations? 
How did both the Dutch and Republicans legitimate their struggle in the international 
arena? How did the American government project its enormous power to force the 
parties to find a settlement? And how did increasing economic interdependence and 
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rising Cold War tensions lead to a growing sense of urgency among policymakers in 
Washington regarding the need to find a solution to the conflict in the Indonesian 
archipelago?  
In my research for this dissertation, I have used secondary sources extensively. 
I also relied heavily on Dutch, British, American, Australian, and Indonesian primary 
source material; intelligence reports, newspaper articles, and, most importantly, 
correspondence by politicians and high-ranking governmental officials regarding 
policymaking on Indonesia and Southeast Asia, some collections of which have been 
vastly underused by historians.9  
In the United States, the archives in the Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. 
Truman Presidential Libraries and Stanley K. Hornbeck’s papers at the Hoover 
Institution contained small bundles of useful material. The U.S. State Department 
archives at the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, 
Maryland were indispensable. In the United Kingdom, the National Archives at Kew 
contain a positive wealth of information. The Arsip Nasional (National Archive) in 
Jakarta holds Indonesian papers. It can be difficult for researchers to gain access, and 
the collection of documents reflecting high level policymaking is very small compared 
to the almost overwhelming mountains of material in Britain or the Netherlands, but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9  Among these are: De Ontwikkeling van de Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlands-Indië, 1917-1942 
(Groningen: H.D. Tjeenk Willink, 1975-1982); De Volksraad en de Staatkundige Ontwikkeling van Nederlands-Indië: 
Een Bronnenpublikatie, 1891-1942 (Groningen: J.B. Wolters, 1965); and Officiële Bescheiden Betreffende de Nederlands-
Indonesische Betrekkingen 1945-1950, a magnificent twenty-volume collection. I also relied heavily on the Dutch 
Foreign Ministry’s publication of documents on the meetings and proceedings at the United Nations Security 
Council in New York: Indonesië in de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties (The Hague: SDU, 1947-1950). 
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an increasingly better organization of the sources present and helpful staff members 
make the Indonesian archives a possible treasure trove for scholars who read the 
language (and have time to spare). 
 
 The dissertation is organized chronologically. Chapter 1, Occupation and 
Opportunity, examines the years 1940 until 1945. In zooming in both on wartime 
developments in the Indonesian archipelago and the debate on imperialism and the 
future of the Dutch Indies in The Hague, London, and Washington, it foreshadows 
the divergent perceptions of the coming revolution and conflict in the islands.  
Chapter 2, Revolution and Reconquest, investigates the last four months of 1945, or 
the period that immediately followed the Japanese surrender and Sukarno and Hatta’s 
proclamation of independence. In highlighting the role of Admiral Lord Mountbatten, 
his Southeast Asia Command (SEAC), and their six-week delay in reaching the 
islands, the chapter argues that the existence of a brief political and military vacuum in 
the archipelago crucially shaped all events that followed; by the end of 1945, it was 
clear that there would be no smooth and orderly transition from wartime to peacetime 
in Indonesia.  
Chapter 3, Negotiation, looks into the important and often overlooked early 
period of diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict. It leads up to the initialing of the 
Linggadjati Agreement in November of 1946, and assesses this signing as an 
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opportunity that was tragically but predictably lost. In positing this view, the chapter 
also sets out this study’s focus on the troubled relationship between the Netherlands 
government in The Hague, the Commission General it sent to Jakarta to assist in 
finding a solution and, most importantly, Lieutenant Governor-General Hubertus van 
Mook.  
Chapters 4 and 5, On the Way to War and International “Interference,” zoom in on 
events from early 1947 until the summer of 1948, and specifically examine the 
growing international interest and intervention in the conflict. They do so especially 
through the lens of the United Nations Good Offices Committee, dispatched to the 
archipelago after the first major Dutch military offensive against the Indonesian 
Republic in the summer of 1947. Throughout, these chapters aim to show that 
although few policymakers and officials in The Hague and Jakarta realized it at the 
time, the euphemistically labeled “police action” and its aftermath made Indonesia’s 
complete independence from the Netherlands an inevitability – despite Dutch efforts 
to present both nationalists in Yogyakarta and the world at large with political fait 
accompli through the unilateral formation of a pro-Dutch federative United States of 
Indonesia.  
Finally, Chapter 6, Combat and Capitulation, examines the parties’ inexorable 
move toward a second large-scale war. It also investigates the momentous political 
developments on the ground in Indonesia in mid 1948, Washington’s resultant shift in 
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thinking, and the role of the new Netherlands representative in Jakarta. This chapter 
argues that the Netherlands government finally capitulated in the spring and summer 
of 1949 not strictly speaking because of the clinking of the American moneybag or a 
peak in international involvement, but because The Hague’s Indonesian allies in the 
islands finally confronted the Dutch and sided with Republicans, and because 
Netherlands army forces in the archipelago increasingly faced a military quagmire. 
In short, my dissertation aims to challenge the standard one-sided national 
narratives of the Indonesian revolution, be they Indonesian, Dutch, British, or 
American. Instead, it traces the divergent perceptions of the protracted struggle in the 
archipelago within the various domestic contexts, and examines the different ways in 
which actors then placed it within the emerging international discourse on 
decolonization. The study ultimately intends to demonstrate that what finally lead to 
the establishment of an independent United States of Indonesia in 1949 was not, as 
most other historians have argued, the growing threat from policymakers and 
planners in Washington to cease financial aid to the Netherlands, but rather factors 
beyond austere economic considerations.   
This project investigates the conservative decades leading up to the Second 
World War, the swift and crushing defeat of Dutch forces in 1942 and the rise of an 
Indonesian independence movement during the Japanese occupation of the islands, 
and most importantly the difficult to capture but material mindset, motives, and 
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miscalculations of Netherlands and Netherlands Indies politicians, administrators, and 
military leaders. It illustrates the latter with close-up examinations of both Lieutenant 
Governor-General Hubertus van Mook’s stillborn plans for an Indonesian federation 
and army General Simon Spoor’s underestimation of the appeal of nationalism among 
the people and the determination of Republican troops to resist the forceful re-
imposition of colonial control. It reveals, finally, that the actual pressures that caused 
the Dutch to capitulate were not so much related to financial calculations but to a 
sense of moral and military defeat. In arguing so, the dissertation also makes clear that 
the question “might things have gone differently?” should ultimately be answered with 
references to the persons in power and the political cultures that persisted; sadly, no 
other course of events is imaginable. 
A final note should be made here on the spelling and terms used in this study. 
Throughout, I use the modern English spelling of names and places, which most 
often corresponds with the newer official spelling in Indonesia: Jakarta instead of 
Djakarta, Sukarno instead of Soekarno, etc. Where locations have changed name since 
the start of the revolutionary period, I will note both the Dutch and Indonesian name 
(e.g. Buitenzorg became Bogor, Celebes became Sulawesi). Although Indonesian 
nationalists renamed the archipelago’s capital and referred to it as Jakarta from 1945 
on, Dutch officials and the international community continued to use the colonial 
name Batavia until the official transfer of power in 1949. As a recognition of the fact 
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that Indonesia became independent in August 1945, not December 1949, I will use 
Jakarta when describing events after the declaration of independence. The terms 
Indonesia, Dutch East Indies, and Netherlands East Indies are applied somewhat 
interchangeably, although I aim to mostly use the former when referring to the 
archipelago after August 1945, and the latter two when describing the region up until 
that time, or as a way of referring to it as the Dutch government did during the years 
of the Indonesian revolution.   
Before contemplating the years 1945-1949, however, let us begin our story by 
taking a closer look at Dutch colonial policy and the Indonesian archipelago during 
the first four decades of the previous century. It is here that we find early traces of 
both independence movements in the islands as well as the patronizingly superior 
attitude of Netherlands and Netherlands Indies politicians and administrators that 
would become so influential for the course of the conflict later. This historical context 
will thus not only introduce us to some of the main characters of the dissertation, but 
indeed form its foundations. 
*             *             * 
 
At the turn of the 19th century, the Dutch had ruled the Indonesian archipelago for 
almost three centuries. At first they had done so primarily through the vehicle of the 
privately owned Dutch East India Company. With commercial rather than territorial 
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goals in mind, it had established footholds on Java, Sumatra, and the Moluccas and 
used them to trade and collect revenues. Between 1850 and 1880, as European 
imperial powers shifted the focus of their colonial policies and started dividing up not 
only Southeast Asia but also Africa into spheres of influence, ringing in what scholars 
have called the era of high colonialism, control of the Netherlands government over 
the indigenous peoples of the East Indies still did not extend much beyond the 
metropolitan centers. Rather than join in on the scramble for Africa, however, the 
Dutch focused on keeping and further developing the Indies. As this required 
consolidating their rule in the outer regions or buitengewesten of the colony, this task in 
itself included territorial expansion and was a form of imperialism, as Maarten 
Kuitenbrouwer has convincingly shown.10  
With the century drawing to a close, the character of Dutch policy in the 
archipelago began to change. Illustrative of this shift was the popular reception of the 
colonial novel titled Max Havelaar, written by a mid-rank administrator in the Indies 
named Eduard Douwes Dekker under the pseudonym “Multatuli,” and first published 
in 1860. The story featured a European civil servant, pictured as a noble and just 
messenger of prosperity and civilization, who worked to protect the people of the 
East Indies from the indigenous rulers who suppressed and abused them. This figure 
became the ideal of young civil servants from the Netherlands, who felt they were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10  M. Kuitenbrouwer, The Netherlands and the Rise of Modern Imperialism: Colonies and Foreign Policy, 1870-
1902 (New York: Berg, 1991), 366-367. 
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being called to the Indies to carry out the noble task of “raising” the inhabitants of the 
islands by establishing centralized administrative-bureaucratic states and tightening 
their rule in the region. The gradual embrace of this belief by Dutch political parties 
and the public at large resulted in the new and, so it was described, more enlightened 
“ethical policy.”  
Central to this program, which was adopted by Christian, liberal, as well as 
socialist parties and which was seen as the Dutch version of the British “white man’s 
burden,” was the notion of guardianship; Netherlands Indies officials were to improve 
the welfare of the indigenous population, and cultivate the minds of the people in the 
archipelago to gently guide them on the path toward eventual independence. This was 
a significant step forward from the previously held belief that the colonial relationship 
between the Netherlands and the Indies could, and should, last indefinitely. As the 
liberal politician Conrad Th. van Deventer argued in his article “Een Eereschuld” (A 
Debt of Honor) in a 1899 issue of the popular magazine De Gids (The Guide), the 
Netherlands was morally obligated to repay the millions it had taken from the territory 
in profits. It should do so by investing in the agriculture, infrastructure, and 
educational and health care systems in the Indies. Colonies had to be administered 
rather than ruled or, worse, exploited. The duty of the Dutch therefore was not to 
depart from the archipelago and leave the indigenous peoples to their “tyrannical” 
rulers, but to stay, win their trust, promote prosperity through social reform, and 
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slowly but steadily prepare them for self-government. Besides lifting the economic 
circumstances of the population, this would also lead to an increased feeling of 
solidarity between the Dutch and the peoples of the Netherlands East Indies, Van 
Deventer predicted.11  
In practice, however, the ethical policy contained internal contradictions that 
resulted in violent resistance and increased paternalism. Indonesians were expected to 
listen patiently and passively to the teachings of Netherlands officials, and although 
they were supposed to begin making up a larger share of administrative personnel, the 
growing specialization of bureaucracy made it difficult for any but those of Dutch 
origin to acquire positions of real significance. Rather than being paid back a debt of 
honor, the archipelago was moreover made to pay for or borrow the funds necessary 
for the planned investments.  
Administrative expansion and consolidation of the colony’s buitengewesten meant 
establishing Dutch control over local rulers and elites in these outer territories. As a 
model for this “pacification,” Netherlands Indies administrators used the Aceh War 
(1873-1913) and Lombok expedition (1894), two examples of the violent subjugation 
of indigenous people in the islands.  
A third notable effect of the “ethical policy” was the creation of an educated 
elite that was becoming ever more dissatisfied with its circumstances and frustrated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11  C. Fasseur, De Weg naar het Paradijs. En Andere Indische Geschiedenissen (Amsterdam: B. Bakker, 1995), 
40-47. 
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with the Dutch. Those Indonesians that were now attending high schools and 
universities in the Indies, or receiving schooling in Europe, were exposed to Western 
ideas and ideals, and to political conditions that included civil liberties and democratic 
government. When they returned, they found that it was impossible to get a 
meaningful job and further advance themselves; their own constricting colonial 
society, as Harry Benda has argued, could not absorb them. As the new measures 
created a split society, a growing feeling of solidarity came into existence not between 
the Dutch and the Indonesians, as Van Deventer had hoped, but rather among the 
victims of repression, and aimed against the colonizers. A modern mass movement of 
Indonesian nationalism emerged, the first concrete example of which was the Budi 
Utomo, a Javanese political organization established by indigenous intellectuals in 1908 
with the goal of furthering popular education. The relatively progressive Governor-
General of the East Indies Alexander W.F. Idenburg maintained that the people of 
the Netherlands should rejoice in these changing circumstances; it was a natural 
consequence of the fact that Indonesians were beginning to think more deeply about 
themselves and their surroundings, he noted in 1913, and the Dutch had wanted it 
so.12 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12  H.J. Benda, “Decolonization in Indonesia: The Problem of Continuity and Change,” in: Continuity and 
Change in Southeast Asia: Collected Journal Articles of Harry J. Benda (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia 
Studies, 1972), 218; George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1952), 48-52; Governor-General Alexander W.F. Idenburg to A. Kuyper, 4 July 1913, in: S.L. van der 
Wal (ed.), De Opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlands-Indië. Een Bronnenpublikatie (Groningen: J.B. 
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The tumultuous year 1918 brought American President Woodrow Wilson’s 
pledges to reform the traditional imperial structures, the root cause of the world war, 
he believed, and the fierce attacks of the socialist parliamentarian Pieter Jelles 
Troelstra on the position of the young Dutch Queen Wilhelmina. Both sent rumors 
of a revolution flying in the colonial archipelago, and it was under these nervous 
circumstances of social unrest that the new Governor-General, J.P. van Limburg 
Stirum, installed the Volksraad (“People’s Council”). Although supreme legislative 
power would continue to rest with the States General in The Hague, this institution 
was to advise the administration in Batavia. It was to have a partly representative 
character and give the population of the islands a voice in their government. Only a 
fourth of its sixty members were Indonesian and elected by the few people in the 
Indies who were allowed to vote, however; colonial officials appointed the rest. In the 
speech with which he opened the Volkraad’s first meeting, Van Limburg Stirum 
nevertheless emphasized that the Dutch task was an altruistic one.13 In November, 
when news reports describing the volatile situation in the Netherlands created a big 
sensation in the Indies and the Governor-General grew increasingly pessimistic, he 
went a step further; he promised, albeit vaguely, to take measures that would bring 
about a “new relationship” between the government in The Hague and the Volksraad 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13  Speech Governor-General J.P. van Limburg Stirum at the installation of the Volksraad, 19 May 1918, 
in: S.L. van der Wal (ed.), De Volksraad en de Staatkundige Ontwikkeling van Nederlands-Indië. Een Bronnenpublikatie, 
(hereafter Volksraad), Volume I (Groningen: J.B. Wolters, 1964-1965), p. 599-600; H.W. van den Doel, 
Afscheid van Indië: De val van het Nederlandse imperium in Azië (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 2000), 28. 
 
   
   
22 
in the Indies. He installed a committee to study political reforms, and when its 
chairman J.H. Carpentier Alting finally presented its report in June 1920 the latter 
made several far-reaching suggestions that would shift the center of colonial policy 
making from the Dutch political capital to Batavia.14 
For many Netherlands politicians these proposals went too far. Conservatives 
increasingly believed that it was dangerous to think the peoples of the Indies equal to 
the Dutch and soon capable of self-government. Only much later and within the 
structure of the kingdom should the archipelago attain a kind of self-governance, 
many argued; in the near future, the Dutch must not abandon their calling. The result 
of this important shift in thinking in the 1920s was a flurry of colonial legislation 
aimed at decentralization and the establishment of a maze of local and regional 
councils in the Indies. As the autocratic Netherlands Indies administrators remained 
in place, however, the limited influence Indonesians could exercise in these councils 
hardly satisfied their aspirations. The promised change instead had the effect of 
strengthening the position of the Governor-General, still appointed by the Dutch 
crown, vis-à-vis the government in The Hague. The Volksraad, meanwhile, remained 
a relatively powerless institution without any real legislative function, and served 
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mostly, as Cees Fasseur and Robert McMahon have shown, as a forum “for the airing 
of political views and economic grievances.”15  
Convinced that the ethical policy took the relationship between the 
Netherlands and the Indies in the wrong direction, and under the belief that a slacking 
of the bond between the two could result only in disaster, the Governor-Generals of 
the 1920s took an increasingly hard line with Indonesian nationalists. Andries C.D. de 
Graeff underlined that every self-respecting government should fight any movement 
out to destruct the current order.16 Like his predecessor Dirk Fock, Governor-
General De Graeff shelved previous plans for economic modernization and political 
participation in favor of a more conservative policy. Increasing emphasis on allegedly 
insurmountable cultural differences between the western mind and eastern spirit 
justified, in the minds of many, a virtually permanent colonial relationship. De Graeff 
severely repressed radical nationalist organizations such as the Partai Komunis Indonesia 
(Indonesian Communist Party, or PKI), founded in 1920 by a Western-educated 
teacher by the name of Tan Malaka. The PKI demanded immediate and complete 
independence from the Netherlands and refused to cooperate with its colonial 
administration. In late 1926 and early 1927, the movement launched a poorly planned 
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defeat. The Dutch arrested thousands of suspected PKI supporters and eventually 
interned hundreds of them in a penal colony in Boven-Digoel, one of the most 
remote areas of the archipelago located on the island of New Guinea.17 
In July 1927, a young and dynamic leader named Sukarno nevertheless founded 
another independence movement. The son of a Javanese teacher and a Balinese 
woman, Sukarno was born in Surabaya in 1901 and educated first at the Dutch high 
school in that city and later at the technical university in Bandung. His education led 
him to explore Western culture and study political thinkers such as Voltaire, 
Rousseau, Marx, Lenin, and the American founding fathers. While at school, he 
established a debating club and became interested in politics.18 Convinced of the need 
for a nationalist party that connected with the masses and refused to cooperate with 
the colonial administration or take seats in the Volksraad, which he labeled a “golden 
cage,” Sukarno created the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI).  
The PNI quickly became the most important organization in the Indies; its 
membership rapidly grew to more than 10,000. Its founder set out to shake the power 
of the colonial regime by bringing to life a more conscious and determined mass 
movement with clear leadership and direction. The PNI held its first national three-
day conference in Surabaya in May 1928. In the year that followed, Sukarno traveled 
around Java and gave speech after speech. Concentrating his efforts on the 	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Indonesian youth, he presented his audiences with historical analyses of imperialism, 
focused on the theme of education and “Indonesia Merdeka” (Free Indonesia), and 
avoided questions that could result in discord and division among his following. An 
idea would lead to a belief, he predicted, and a belief would lead to power; out of a 
national spirit, he said, would be born a national will, and out of a national will a 
national deed.19  
An uneasy Governor-General De Graeff at this point wrote a remarkably 
prophetic note to his colleagues in the Netherlands, whom he felt mistaken in the 
belief that firm action would keep the situation in the colony under control. He 
warned them that the Dutch public underestimated the nationalists, and that the 
government should make itself no illusions about where the loyalty of Indonesians 
truly lay. His lonely voice identified a “clear and present danger,” though he admitted 
himself unsure about how to meet it, and foresaw an intensifying struggle that the 
Netherlands would lose in the end. Alarmed, The Hague ordered authorities in 
Batavia to outlaw the PNI and arrest its leader in December 1929.20  
Sukarno’s trial took place in Bandung in 1930. He spoke in his own defense 
and gave a two-day marathon performance, during which his speech ranged “from 
highly theoretical exposition to detailed legal argument” and he moved “from 
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passionate oratory to [the reading of] tedious excerpts from his authorities.” As a 
propaganda occasion it served its purpose; Sukarno’s plea was later published and 
widely read under the title “Indonesia Accuses!” The undisputed leader of the nationalist 
movement was found guilty of disturbing the political order and attempting to 
overthrow the established administration, however, and sentenced to four years in 
prison.21 
When he was released from jail early in December 1931, Sukarno resumed his 
political activities by turning once again to the masses. He immediately went on a tour 
through Java, explaining to his audience that the applause he received from the 
thousands who came to see him was not for him as a person, but rather for the 
symbol of a free Indonesia. The public revered Sukarno and saw him as a rallying 
point.22 The old PNI, meanwhile, had been revived into what was now called the PNI-
Baru (New PNI). Its leaders were Mohammed Hatta and Sutan Sjahrir, two 
Indonesian nationalists who had been educated in the Netherlands, where they had 
joined the political organization of Indonesian students Perhimpunan Indonesia. They 
believed that the population of the islands first had to be taught self-respect and self-
worth before the ideal of a free nation could be achieved. Indonesians did not yet 
place enough trust and faith in their own abilities and power, Hatta noted, “and must 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21  Legge, 116-117; Kahin, 91-92. 
22  Legge, 125. 
 
   
   
27 
be pulled from the rut that is deep resignation.”23 The restyled PNI, in other words, 
envisioned the road to independence to be longer and less spectacular than Sukarno, 
and in July 1932 the latter joined a new political party similar to the old PNI: the Partai 
Indonesia or “Partindo.” Within a year, 20,000 members had flocked to it.24  
The conservative B.C. de Jonge, meanwhile, had succeeded De Graeff as 
Governor-General. He dryly noted that he had not been appointed by the Queen to 
discuss independence; “One does not casually chat with someone whose throat one 
wishes to cut about how and when the operation is to take place.” The conversations 
taking place at the public meetings of nationalist organizations he dismissed as “tall 
talk.”25 Of the opinion that Sukarno was a troublemaker who had simply been 
released from jail too early, the Governor-General ordered his rearrest in August 
1933. This time, Sukarno was exiled to the outer island of Flores without a trial. 
Although he was later moved to Bengkulu in southwest Sumatra, he would remain a 
political prisoner until 1942. The Dutch then turned their attention to the new PNI 
and its leaders. Hatta and Sjahrir were arrested in February 1934 and shipped first to 
Boven-Digoel and later to the tiny island of Banda in the east of the archipelago. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23  Mohammad Hatta, 9 March 1928, in: Verspreide Geschriften (Amsterdam: C.P.J. van der Peet, 1952), 
279-280. 
24  Dahm, 158; Doel 45; Legge 128. 
25  Governor-General B.C. De Jonge in his opening speech at a conference for administrators in 
Malang, 23 October 1933, in: Ontwikkeling, IV, no. 15. 
 
   
   
28 
They, too, would stay in forced exile until 1942. Partindo, meanwhile, died a quiet 
death in 1936; the new PNI suffered a similar fate soon after.26 
In September 1936, A.W.L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer, a man who 
had never been to the Indies, succeeded De Jonge as Governor-General. By then, the 
Dutch government in The Hague and the Netherlands Indies authorities in Batavia 
had reason to think they had successfully repressed the nationalist movement. 
Whereas the turn of the 19th century had brought the conviction that Indonesia was to 
be gradually prepared for independence, by the 1930s the notion of perpetual ties 
between the colony and its motherland and the belief that the Dutch could, and 
should, stay in Southeast Asia indefinitely had overtaken it. The Netherlands colonial 
policy was once again, and more than ever, legalistic, unrealistic, and unimaginative.  
 
At the moment we begin our story, even those relatively progressive souls who 
envisioned Indonesians eventually governing themselves felt there was still too much 
to do to hasten the arrival of any form of independence. While the British in India 
and the Americans in the Philippines continued to carry out reforms that resulted in, 
for instance, the Government of India Acts of 1919 and 1935, the 1916 Jones Act, 
and the Tydings-McDuffie Act in 1934, shortsighted politicians in The Hague, 
convinced that their colleagues in London and Washington were naive and ill-advised, 
steered Dutch colonial policy in a different direction. In the run-up to another world 	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war, therefore, the East Indies increasingly took the shape of an anxiety filled police 
state in which Dutch planners and administrators repressed nationalist movements. 
As the administration of the Indies grew more autocratic and complex, it at the 
same time became more difficult for the Dutch to imagine themselves no longer part 
of it - the power, depth, and inevitability of nationalist sentiment in the archipelago 
thus went unrecognized.27 This we will continue to see occurring as we shift our focus 
to the years of the Indonesian revolution, and the rejection of the so-called Sutardjo 
petition in the 1930s already illustrates it. Introduced in July 1935 by one of the 
moderately nationalist members of the Volksraad, a body that had, after all, the right 
to petition the government, the document modestly proposed an imperial conference 
to discuss the ultimate reaching of some form of Indonesian independence within the 
structure of the Netherlands kingdom. Characteristically of the Dutch government, as 
we will see in the chapters to follow, it took the Governor-General, the cabinet in The 
Hague, and eventually the Queen until 1938 to reject the proposal: accepting the 
petition would be comparable to opening a sluice without knowing what would flow 
through, or how and when one would ever be able to close it.28 
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Chapter 1 
Occupation and Opportunity: May 1940 - August 1945 
 
“The Netherlands Indies must be restored – and 
something within me tells me that they will be.”29 
 
                  Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1942 
 
 
On May 10, 1940, Hitler’s armies overran the Netherlands. Grossly outnumbered and 
by far the weaker, Dutch troops could not resist the German forces; a mere five days 
after the invasion they surrendered. The royal family headed by Queen Wilhelmina 
had escaped to London two days previous; government officials had followed a day 
later. This evacuation meant that although the metropole of the Netherlands empire 
had fallen, its authority abroad had been safeguarded; because the Dutch cabinet still 
functioned freely, the Indies were not quite an orphan colony.   
Those in the archipelago followed events in the mother country closely. The 
American Consul-General in the Netherlands Indies capital of Batavia, Erle R. 
Dickover, assured planners in Washington that in the city all was quiet, the highest 
colonial authorities having informed him they anticipated “no political disturbances” 
as a result of the Dutch surrender.30  
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The changed circumstances did not prompt the Governor-General in the 
Indies to seek closer cooperation with Indonesian nationalists. On the contrary, after 
the fall of the Netherlands A.W.L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer, a self-
confident but coolly reserved diplomat who upon his appointment in 1936 had been a 
complete stranger to the archipelago, grew convinced that making concessions would 
be a sign of weakness that conflicted with Dutch interests. Determinedly refusing to 
discuss future reforms to the colony’s position within the Netherlands Kingdom, he 
announced in a speech on the radio that the international political status of the Indies 
would remain unchanged, and underlined the willingness and ability of his 
administration to stay in place despite the chaos in Europe.31  
Netherlands Minister of the Colonies Charles 
Welter, who had stated his belief that “sudden 
shocks” to the imperial system were highly 
undesirable, was supportive of the Governor-
General’s opinion.32 Welter’s senior assistant W.G. 
Peekema was more worried about the future of the 
colony, however, especially after the Dutch 
surrender to the Germans and the flight of the 
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government and royal family to England. He was convinced that the Dutch could no 
longer impose policies on the Indies and that the voice of Indonesians themselves 
would soon become of paramount importance. In August, Peekema proposed a 
postwar imperial conference where Netherlands officials, Netherlands Indies 
administrators, and moderate Indonesians might discuss developments in the 
archipelago and deliberate on reforms.33 A persuaded Welter agreed, but Van 
Starkenborgh Stachouwer flatly rejected the proposal. The Governor-General was 
unwilling to make even the smallest of concessions; afraid of raising the level of 
anxiety among the Dutch in the Indies, he told Peekema and Welter that they were 
moving too quickly.34 He did, however, install a small committee named after its 
chairman Frans Visman, which was to collect information on political developments 
and desires in the Indies and give advice once the time had come to give it.  
Little did Dutch policymakers and Netherlands Indies administrators expect 
that their cherished self-image of enlightened, benevolent, and efficient but judicious 
colonizers would be shattered and exposed as a myth in the events that followed. This 
chapter examines the years 1940 until 1945, and zooms in both on developments in 
the archipelago and the debate on imperialism and the future of the Dutch Indies in 
The Hague, London, and Washington. In particular, it investigates the period of the 	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Japanese occupation of the islands, its apparent similarities to the centuries of Dutch 
rule, pointed out also by Shigeru Sato and Benedict Anderson, and the growth of 
Indonesian nationalism.35 As such, this chapter foreshadows the Dutch perceptions of 
the leaders of the independence movement as “collaborators.”   
 
Its natural resources such as oil, tin, and rubber catapulted the archipelago into 
an area of interest to both Japan and the United States. As a result, the Netherlands 
East Indies government over the course of 1940 and 1941 increasingly had to juggle 
outside pressures and demands.36 As Tokyo pushed for additional exports of oil and 
gasoline and a new trade agreement, Washington tried to prevent the shipping of 
strategic materials to Japan.37 Questions about an American embargo against Japan 
were swirling by the time a Japanese economic mission arrived in Batavia in mid 
September 1940. The Dutch negotiators acquiesced to what it deemed reasonable 
demands, but tried to oppose any further concessions to the Japanese.38 The 
Netherlands East Indies government was both hesitant to cut exports to Japan, lest it 
should provoke aggression, and at the same time hoping for some indication that in 	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the event of an attack, the islands would be protected by the American fleet. 
Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles noted, however, that there was “nothing for 
the [State] Department to do in the immediate future.”39  
 In April of 1941, Welter and his colleague Eelco N. van Kleffens, the Dutch 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, visited Southeast Asia. Agreeing with the Governor-
General that contact with Indonesian nationalists was out of the question and that no 
significant reforms to the political structure of the colony could be proposed while the 
Netherlands was occupied, the two nevertheless convinced a reluctant Van 
Starkenborgh Stachouwer of the need to officially announce a postwar imperial 
conference.40 Of primary concern, however, was the obtainment of reassurances from 
the British and Americans to aid in the defense of the Indies in the event of a 
Japanese attack.  
This had become especially important after the Soviet Union and Japan signed 
a neutrality pact in mid April, giving the latter a free hand to move southward. During 
a press conference in Batavia, Van Kleffens stated that he had found the Americans 
“keenly aware” of the situation precarious of the Netherlands Indies.41 Aware though 
they may have been, the United States refused to publicly commit itself to defend the 
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islands from military aggression. Washington did not want to play into the hands of 
extremists in Tokyo, and was of the opinion that it had already warned the Japanese 
not to threaten the peace in the Pacific.42 Secretary Hull reaffirmed this belief some 
months later when he announced that he considered an official statement regarding 
the joint defense of the Netherlands East Indies “a statement too challenging [and] 
too threatening.”43  
In early summer the Dutch government in London and the Netherlands Indies 
administration in the archipelago requested the Americans to send a special mission to 
Batavia and undertake a general survey of the national defenses of the islands, as it 
would help determine what aid might be made available to the Indies. Believing that 
this would aggravate the tense situation in the region, the State Department dismissed 
the plan.44 Although the Land-Lease agreement had committed the United States to 
aiding and supplying the Allied nations, and the Netherlands East Indies had followed 
the American lead in a Japanese oil embargo, Dutch policymakers therefore suspected 
that the United States prioritized the European theater over the Far East, and 
remained uncertain about the length to which Roosevelt would go to save the Indies.45  
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On August 14, the American President and British Prime Minister Churchill 
made public the Atlantic Charter they had signed on board the cruiser Augusta days 
previous. The momentous occasion made little impression on Dutch politicians in 
London, however. Although it meant the future of the Netherlands empire would to a 
large extent depend on the attitude Washington took toward the rights of colonial 
peoples, and the Charter developed the American commitment to eradicate what it 
believed to be an outdated system by calling for the “right of all peoples to choose the 
form of government under which they will live,” Dutch wartime Prime Minister Pieter 
S. Gerbrandy called it a “weak piece,” and Van Kleffens told his British colleague 
Anthony Eden he “did not think it meant very much.”46 The government in Batavia 
was similarly underwhelmed. A large group of Indonesians in the Volksraad officially 
requested Netherlands East Indies authorities to give a reaction to the Charter, and to 
explain what the consequences of its sentiments were for the Indies. After confirming 
his interpretation with Welter in London, Van Starkenborgh replied that the 
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declaration did not apply to the Netherlands and its colony in Asia because it did not 
“directly concern the internal affairs of long-standing empires.”47 
When the Visman Committee that had been installed the previous year finally 
produced its report on public opinion in the archipelago in December 1941, it 
admitted that the war in Europe, the occupation of the Netherlands, and the isolation 
of the archipelago had increased the sense of national consciousness in the Indies. 
This development was limited to the elite, however; the “underdeveloped masses,” 
Visman and his colleagues claimed, were uninterested in political matters that they 
could not comprehend. The Committee maintained it had found no indication that 
the people of the Indies wished to break the bond with the Netherlands. Making 
recommendations or proposals for far-reaching future reforms was therefore out of 
the question, the report concluded.48  
The Visman Committee had conducted interviews with over a hundred people 
to come to these conclusions, but had seen no reason to question influential 
indigenous leaders such as Sukarno, Mohammad Hatta, or Sutan Sjahrir, who, as we 
have seen in Chapter 1, had been interned and exiled, or any other Indonesian 
nationalists. Indeed, officials had communicated with the far-sprung regions of the 
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archipelago merely through written letters exchanged with Dutch officials in those 
islands.  
 
Japan’s military might erupted in full force after the attack on the American 
fleet at Pearl Harbor in December 1941. The Netherlands East Indies had long been 
vulnerable to attack; Japan relied on the archipelago’s oil fields and petroleum industry 
for its regular supply of fuel. “Without the Indies,” Time proclaimed, “Japan [would] 
never have all the oil, rubber, and tin she needs, nor the power and prestige she thinks 
she needs to be a great empire.”49 In early 1942, Japanese troops began occupying 
parts of the Netherlands East Indies: first Celebes (now Sulawesi) and the northeast 
of Borneo (Kalimantan). In late February, the Japanese defeated the Allied fleet in the 
Battle of the Java Sea, and Imperial Army troops landed on Java’s north coast. They 
encountered little resistance; even with British, Australian, and American military aid, 
the Dutch position was hopeless. On March 8 the existence of the Netherlands East 
Indies essentially came to an end with the final surrender of its authorities to the 
Japanese.  
The imperial army booked successes throughout Southeast Asia; it drove the 
British out of Hong Kong, Malaya, and, assisted by the radical Independence Army 
led by nationalist Aung San, Burma. Singapore had fallen in February. India had 
declared war on Japan after the attack on Pearl Harbor, but Mahatma Gandhi’s call 	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for immediate independence would soon launch the “Quit India” civil disobedience 
movement. The French colonial administration in Indochina had stayed in place only 
because its Governor-General Jean Decoux was a representative of the Vichy 
government that collaborated with the Nazis in Europe. 
The Netherlands government in London had instructed local colonial 
administrators not to abandon their posts. Governor-General Van Starkenborgh, 
especially, was told to continue his work. An early evacuation of the Governor-
General and his team would signify not only to enemy forces but also to the 
archipelago’s population, senior official Peekema advised Prime Minister Gerbrandy, 
“an abandonment of the Indies.” The quick defeat of the Dutch military and the rapid 
crumbling of its colonial regime in Southeast Asia nevertheless left Indonesians 
astonished.50 
A dozen Netherlands Indies administrators were ordered from Bandung, the 
last Dutch stronghold, to Australia, where they were to look after the interests of the 
islands and prepare for the restoration of the colony in the postwar period. The group 
included, among others, senior civil servant Charles O. van der Plas, Vice-Admiral in 
the navy Conrad E.L. Helfrich, and army officer in the Netherlands Forces 
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Intelligence Service Simon H. Spoor. Sukarno, Hatta, and Sjahrir, on the other hand, 
would spend the war in the archipelago.51  
The man leading the group of evacuated Netherlands Indies policymakers and 
military men was Hubertus J. van Mook. Born in Semarang, a city in central Java, in 
1894, Van Mook was the only child of a Dutch couple that had moved to the Indies 
as teachers. His studies, first in chemistry and later 
in “Indology,” which prepared candidates for civil 
service in the Dutch colony, he had completed in 
the Netherlands. In 1918 he returned to the 
archipelago, married, had two children, and 
embarked on a successful career as an 
administrator. Endlessly energetic and a supporter 
of the Dutch ethical policy, he was a man convinced 
of his talents, but not inclined to trust others or 
work with them closely.52 In November of 1941 he 
had succeeded Welter as Minister of the Colonies, 
and the following January he had moreover been appointed Lieutenant Governor-
General of the Netherlands East Indies. With Governor-General Van Starkenborgh 	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now in the hands of the Japanese occupiers, just as more than 40,000 soldiers from 
the Royal Netherlands Indies Army (Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger or KNIL) as 
well as hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children of Dutch or European 
origin, Van Mook had become the highest-ranking Netherlands Indies official outside 
the archipelago.  
 
The Dutch knew they would have to rely on the American military to 
painstakingly reconquer the many islands that made up the Netherlands East Indies. 
Apart from Sumatra, the liberation of which was the responsibility of the British, the 
archipelago was counted in the South West Pacific Area commanded by General 
Douglas MacArthur. In the United States, however, the quick capitulation of the East 
Indies government and the lack of resistance by the population had left a stark 
impression. Mere days before the fall of the islands, in late February, Roosevelt 
delivered an anti-imperialistic radio speech in which he declared the right of people to 
choose their own government applicable to the whole world.53 Undersecretary of 
State Welles echoed these sentiments in May, seemingly leaving no doubt about the 
policy of the United States when he announced: “the age of imperialism has ended.” 
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The principles of the Atlantic Charter, he stated, “must be guaranteed to the world – 
in all oceans and in all continents.”54  
The Netherlands leaders in London, who had so coolly dismissed the Charter, 
was becoming uneasy with and at times offended by the condemnations of the 
colonial system that reached them from the United States. At the same time, however, 
they were self-assured about its management of the Indies; had not the Dutch “ethical 
policy,” politicians asked, illustrated since the beginning of the 20th century the 
willingness of the Netherlands government to work slowly but steadily toward 
eventual self-government for the archipelago?  
Over the course of 1942, the Dutch nevertheless decided to step up their 
efforts to influence American public opinion in their favor in order to avoid strains 
with the United States over its Asian interests. The government-in-exile and the 
Dutch ambassador in Washington, Alexander Loudon, tried to commit American 
planners to the postwar restoration of Dutch sovereignty in the Indies. In a letter to 
Netherlands Queen Wilhelmina in April, President Roosevelt reassured the Dutch, 
saying: “when and if [Germany is defeated] the combined power of the United 
Nations will not take long to drive the Japanese back into their own islands. The 
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Netherlands Indies must be restored – and something within me tells me that they 
will be.”55 
One politician particularly sensitive to the American perception of the 
Netherlands and its East Indies policy was Van Mook. In contrast to his colleagues in 
the Dutch government in London, most of whom saw imperial Britain as their natural 
ally in colonial matters, the Lieutenant Governor-General was keenly aware of the 
influence of American public opinion on the imperial question and foresaw the large 
role the United States would play in the ultimate Pacific settlement. A 1941 article in 
Time described him as “a big, burly, blond Dutchman” who had “a sharp, broad mind 
and a sense of humor,” an administrator “of very liberal ideas,” and “American in 
outlook.” The 46-year-old Van Mook spoke English with an American accent, 
“[played] golf, and [smoked] Camels.”56   
Van Mook was not reassured when Dutch decision makers in London argued 
that the American undersecretary’s prediction about the end of empire had been made 
in a strictly personal capacity and had been directed to the British and especially the 
French rather than the Dutch. Ambassador Loudon had spoken very bluntly to 
Secretary Hull about the constant “propaganda” in the United States regarding 
imperialism. Such irresponsible statements that held up the Indies “as a horrible 
example of imperialism,” he complained, displayed a lack of real knowledge about the 	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situation.57 Van Mook took to heart Loudon’s proposal that the Dutch government 
give the Americans something more concrete than the abstract suggestion of a 
postwar consultative imperial conference.58 Formulating their plans for the Indies in a 
more constructive and positive tone, the Lieutenant Governor-General believed, 
might convince the United States government to pledge aid and assistance to the 
postwar Dutch restoration in the archipelago. 
Before Wilhelmina’s scheduled visit to the United States, during which she 
planned to spend time at President Roosevelt’s estate in Hyde Park, New York, Van 
Mook, Van Kleffens, and Gerbrandy therefore briefed the Queen on Welles’ 
inflammatory speech. Although “legally speaking the United States had nothing to do 
with this question,” they advised her, the Dutch government might soothe America’s 
ruffled feathers by giving a clear and well-timed indication of its “understanding of 
the new age.”59  
During the first official meeting between the Queen, the president, and Van 
Kleffens, the subject of the Indies was left untouched.60 A few days later, however, 
Roosevelt spoke with Van Kleffens and Loudon and pressed for an announcement 
regarding Dutch postwar goals for the archipelago. The Queen did so, albeit only in 	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vague terms, when she held a speech before the U.S. Congress in early August. She 
referred again to preparations for a conference and stated that no definitive decision 
could be made with both the Netherlands and its colony in Asia occupied. After she 
arrived back in London in the late summer, however, she decided that more needed to 
be done.61  
A small group of Dutch politicians was instructed to carefully look at what a 
statement on the future of the Indies might say. In September, Peekema wrote what 
would become a prophetic memorandum. The government must assume, he argued, 
that upon liberation of the East Indies the Indonesians would in principle be free. 
Dutch colonial policy had since the early 20th century aimed, he explained, at a gradual 
transfer of powers to the Indies. The logical endpoint of this process, Peekema 
reasoned, should be complete independence in the not too distant future. Although 
the war had put a chink in the cable, the Dutch must make themselves no illusions; 
the course of events after the war would be influenced as much by the government’s 
actions as by the desires of the people in the Indies. All the Dutch could do, Peekema 
concluded, was to make the option of a continuing voluntarily bond with the 
Netherlands as attractive as possible for nationalists in the archipelago.62  
Van Mook was more optimistic, and dismissed Peekema’s note as fatalistic; if 
the Dutch government accepted a priori the right of Indonesians to independence, he 	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argued, it would quickly lose control of the gradual and moderate process toward 
decolonization it had in mind. Although he admitted that the Japanese invasion had 
likely affected the population’s image of the Dutch as untouchable, the Lieutenant 
Governor-General maintained that the wartime suffering on both fronts would 
strengthen the bond between the Dutch and Indonesians. When he summarized his 
advice to Gerbrandy in early October, therefore, he insisted that the peoples of the 
Indies desired only equal status within the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and 
recommended a limited reformation of the governmental structure. Appointing an 
Indonesian ministry under the continued supervision of the Governor-General, and 
renewing the Volksraad into a parliament with an Indonesian majority, Van Mook 
predicted, would satisfy even the more radical nationalists.63 
When the Dutch Council of Ministers discussed these proposals in mid 
October, the members of the cabinet saw little in the Lieutenant Governor-General’s 
plans for an Indonesian ministry and parliament. Minister of Justice Johannes R.M. 
van Angeren declared that the Indies’ right to self-determination interfered with 
Dutch sovereignty. Minister of the Interior Hendrik van Boeyen saw matters in an 
even simpler light; describing Indonesians as children, he claimed that the Dutch had 
obligations to “raise” them, and could not let them down. Prime Minister Gerbrandy 
said he expected “nothing but accidents” from Van Mook’s suggestions.64  
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Dutch planners eventually agreed that the Queen in her address would speak of 
the possibility to “reconstruct the Kingdom on the solid foundation of complete 
partnership.” It was decided, too, that she should mention that “no political unity nor 
national cohesion [could] continue to exist which [were] not supported by the 
voluntary acceptance and the faith of the great majority of the citizenry.” She would 
emphasize the will and ability of both the people of the Netherlands and the East 
Indies for “harmonious and voluntary cooperation.” The government in London 
furthermore deemed it crucial that the Queen include in her speech a line that made it 
clear that it was as yet “neither right nor possible” to define the precise form of the 
political reconstruction. Wilhelmina went on the radio in London in the evening of 
December 6, 1942, almost exactly one year after the attack on Pearl Harbor, and 
announced that a “round table conference,” symbolizing the equality of the partners, 
would be held after the war.65 Dutch and East Indies delegates would advise on a new 
structure of the kingdom, in which matters of foreign policy and defense would be 
decided on jointly, and Indonesians would become responsible for the archipelago’s 
internal affairs. She thereby vaguely implied, without discussing the exact content of 
the reforms or indicating a date by which they would be implemented, that the Dutch 
government would grant increasing powers of self-rule to Indonesians. 66  
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During a dinner for the American press at the Dutch embassy in Washington 
on the eve of the Queen’s speech, Van Mook gave journalists “off the record” 
comments. The speech could merely outline the proposed political reconstruction in 
the Indies, he explained, because detailed plans and suggestions at the present 
moment “would only make the people in the occupied territories resent the fact that 
they were being discussed over their heads and without their participation.”67  
The activities of “the people in the occupied territories,” meanwhile, were 
invisible to the Lieutenant Governor-General. As intelligence missions had been a 
fiasco, Van Mook’s temporary administration in Australia was forced to rely on 
Japanese radio broadcasts and a handful of accounts from eyewitnesses who had 
managed to flee the archipelago for information. Although the former clearly 
indicated a new wind was sweeping through the colony, Netherlands Indies officials 
stubbornly maintained that by far the larger part of the Indonesian population 
remained loyal to the Dutch.68 
 
The fundamental aim of the new administration in the Indonesian archipelago, 
as Shigeru Sato explains, was the “Japanization” of Indonesian society: the 
construction of “an economic and social structure that would withstand the stress of 	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war, and at the same time [enable] the maximum mobilization of human and natural 
resources for the war effort.”69 This strategy included the definitive destruction of the 
Western presence and influence in the Indies. Batavia was renamed Jakarta, and had 
become a city in which Dutch could no longer be spoken in public. Dutch signs were 
removed from roads, shops, hotels, and restaurants. The Japanese calendar and Tokyo 
time were established in the islands. Governor-General Van Starkenborgh 
Stachouwer, his civil servant staff, and all teachers, doctors, judges, and lawyers of 
European descent were interned. All Dutch were forced to move to “protected” parts 
of large cities, which would eventually grow into civilian internment camps. From 
these camps the Dutch population of the Indies had no view of what was happening 
or of what had come to replace their paradise lost. All colonial memories were erased, 
every imperial symbol done away with. 
The internment of the Dutch and Eurasian population opened up thousands of 
administrative jobs. Although the Japanese took over most of the high level positions, 
the educated class of Indonesians saw a rise in their socio-economic status over the 
course of 1942. The new administration believed that prematurely encouraging 
nationalist movements should be avoided, however. The local committees that had 
sprung up in the wake of the Japanese invasion were told that all political activities 
were disbanded, for instance.  
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By April, the Japanese propaganda bureau in Java had established the so-called 
“AAA Movement,” referring to the slogan that Japan was “Asia Cahaya, Asia 
Pelindung, and Asia Pemimpin,” or the Light of Asia, the Protector of Asia, and the 
Leader of Asia. When the Japanese did not involve any prominent Indonesian 
nationalists in the movement it failed to attract a large following, and they were forced 
to quietly dissolve the unsuccessful organization in October. This taught the 
authorities that if they were to win the population of the archipelago for their cause, 
they would have to work with popular leaders who could attract the masses. Sukarno’s 
reputation as a nationalist and demagogue had been well established before his 
disappearance from the political arena in 1934. If he could be convinced to swear 
loyalty to the new regime, the Japanese thought, Sukarno might be able to rally 
Indonesians behind the Japanese war effort. In July, they took him out of exile in 
Sumatra and brought him to Jakarta.70  
 In January 1943, the Japanese Prime Minister Hideki Tojo announced before 
the Diet in Tokyo that both Burma and the Philippines, also occupied by Imperial 
Army forces, would soon be granted a limited form of independence. To the deep 
disappointment of Sukarno and Hatta, no such plans were in the making for Java and 
the rest of the Indonesian archipelago. As Theodore Friend and Bernhard Dahm 
explain, Indonesian nationalists thus learned that eventual independence was not “a 
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reward for good behavior, but an expedient against danger.” The circumstances of the 
war, in other words, dictated to what extent the Japanese felt they needed the support 
of independence movements and were willing to give in to their demands for 
increased power and authority to spread their ideas and stir up support.71 
 The Japanese tried to win the sympathy and cooperation of the Indonesian 
people through the establishment of the Pusat Tenaga Rakjat (“Center of People’s 
Power”), or Putera. During its first mass meeting in Jakarta in the spring of 1943, the 
audience tore down the statue of Dutch East India Company pioneer and national 
hero Jan Pieterszoon Coen, after which Sukarno addressed the hundreds of thousands 
of people who had gathered. In a passionate tone he spoke of Indonesian nationalism 
and its link to the Japanese ideal of pan-Asianism. If only they would all work 
together, he said, they could eradicate European imperialism in all of Asia. Hatta 
added that Indonesia had been freed from Dutch domination, and never again wanted 
to be colonized.72 
Putera was not an independent organization, however, and as such did not 
provide much opportunity for nationalist leaders to obtain political gain or executive 
power. It was governed by rules framed by the Japanese authorities, and they were 
determined not to let it attain the character of an independence movement. Putera 
was only allowed to produce and spread propaganda that explicitly supported the 	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Japanese war effort. Because Indonesians could take little initiative, enthusiasm for the 
movement soon dwindled, and it was disbanded less than a year after its 
establishment.73  
In the hope of staying in clear control of any mass movement, the Japanese 
called into life two paramilitary organizations. Lieutenant-General Kumakichi Harada, 
Commander of the Japanese 16th Army in Java, established the Keibodan (“Vigilance 
Corps”) as an auxiliary police force, and the Seinendan (“Home Guard”) as a labor 
service movement made up of Indonesians in their late teens and twenties. These 
movements, though unarmed and often used as merely a cheap labor force, did 
expand to include significant numbers. It ensured numerous young Indonesians were 
trained in combat and indoctrinated with Japanese anti-Western ideas.74 
 At an Imperial Conference in Tokyo in late May, the Japanese leadership 
decided to change its offensive strategy in the war, which was going increasingly bad 
for them, to a defensive strategy. In another attempt to mobilize the densely 
populated Indonesian archipelago, Prime Minister Tojo announced that the 
inhabitants of the islands would henceforth be allowed to participate in their local 
administrations. This promise was crystallized in the establishment of the “Central 
Advisory Council” (Chuo Sangi-in) in late 1943. Headed by Sukarno and functioning as 
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a consultative body, the Council appeared to function somewhat like the colonial 
Volksraad. Because the Japanese appointed most of its 43 members and decided on 
its agenda it had merely an air of self-government. In his opening speech Sukarno 
therefore stated that the Council could only be a first step toward the much larger 
goal that he and his fellow Indonesians wanted to see realized.75  
 In Java, the Japanese decision to allow local military groups led to the creation 
of the Tentara Sukarela Pembela Tanah Air or “Homeland Defense Volunteer Army,” 
better known as Peta. October saw the start of the Japanese training of Peta officers, 
who in turn recruited and instructed the regular soldiers. Many young Javanese joined, 
lured by the promise of decent pay and food. At the same time, Japanese officials 
began rounding up millions of Indonesians to be employed as romushas, or “economic 
soldiers.” These laborers worked in often deplorable conditions to build airfield strips, 
lay train tracks, pave roads, and work in coalmines.76  
But a new disappointment for the nationalists came in early November, when 
Tokyo hosted a Greater-Asia conference. Whereas China, the Philippines, Thailand, 
and Burma were all represented, the Indonesian islands had not been asked to send 
even an observer. Sukarno and Hatta were soon after invited for a long trip to Japan, 
however, during which they met with Emperor Hirohito.77  
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Nevertheless, the Japanese occupation had so far not brought the Indonesian 
nationalists the freedom or advances they had hoped for. The new authorities had 
swiftly done away with all Dutch colonial remnants, spoken of lofty anti-imperialistic 
ideals, promised pan-Asian greatness, and made some symbolic gestures, but in 
practice the nationalist movement in the archipelago had been made to serve the 
purposes and goals of the Japanese war and propaganda machine. To Indonesians in 
the countryside, the Japanese regime increasingly brought poverty, hunger, and 
repression similar to that of the colonial Dutch administration; the Japanese pan-
Asian “Co-Prosperity Sphere,” as Sato notes, increasingly resembled a “Co-Poverty 
Sphere.” As the tide of the war turned against them, however, the realization dawned 
on Japanese policymakers in Tokyo that the Indonesian nationalist movement was a 
force to be taken into consideration.78   
 
Despite its lack of substantive concessions, the Queen’s December radio 
address, which in any case had been meant primarily for American consumption, 
seemed to have accomplished its goal of diffusing tensions between the Netherlands 
government and the State Department. Ambassador Loudon reported to Van 
Kleffens that Roosevelt had called it a “very good and important speech” deserving of 
reading, and that Hull had referred to it as an example of “good statesmanship and 	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good practical sense.” With few exceptions it had been well received by the American 
press, too. Time Magazine, for example, noted that whereas mightier democracies 
“continued pussyfooting on postwar plans,” the Queen’s speech had made clear that 
the Dutch intended to give “bone, meat, and flavor” to the Atlantic Charter.79 
Because all signals indeed pointed to the storm of American anti-imperialism having 
subsided, especially where it concerned the Dutch, Netherlands planners in London 
advanced no new initiatives beyond the vague promise of a postwar conference. For 
the remainder of the war, they instead continually referred to the Queen’s speech 
when faced with detailed questions or anti-colonial criticism.80  
Minister of the Colonies and Lieutenant Governor-General Van Mook, 
however, remained restless. During a trip to the United States in July 1943, his 
telegrams to the government in London expressed concern. Roosevelt’s exact attitude 
to the future of the Dutch colonial empire was unknown though did not appear to be 
unfavorable, he reported, Congress was too divided to form an opinion, and the 
people of the United States as a whole were uninformed. Believing American support 
essential to the restoration of Netherlands Indies authority in the archipelago, yet 
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unable to obtain any direct statements or promises concerning the future, Van Mook 
left Washington in low spirits.81   
 
In the U.S. capital, meanwhile, policymakers planning for the postwar period 
attempted to find a compromise that lay between immediate independence for 
colonial territories and complete restoration of the European empires. The 
establishment of an international trusteeship scheme through the soon to be 
established United Nations Organization, they argued, was an option that allowed the 
Netherlands, France, and Britain to gradually grant independence to their colonies 
while increasingly linking the territories to the open market. When Secretary Hull 
presented the scheme to Roosevelt, he recommended that colonial administrations 
provide indigenous populations with opportunities to advance their general welfare, 
allow them a larger share in local government, and set dates by which independence 
would be achieved.82  
When the President met with Queen Wilhelmina again in 1943 and discussed 
with her the future of the European empires, he pressed the point that it would be 
American arms liberating the colonies. He did not mention international trusteeship 
for the Indies, however, and settled for the Queen’s equivocal promise that the Dutch 
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government would grant Indonesians greater powers of self-rule.83 The American 
president had been reassured, in other words, partly as a result of his private talks and 
correspondence with Queen Wilhelmina, partly because of the speech she had given, 
and partly perhaps because of his Dutch ancestry, that the policy plans of Netherlands 
officials included a gradual liberalization of imperial rule leading to eventual self-
government. Roosevelt considered the Dutch, in contrast to the French, liberal 
colonists sincerely committed to reforming past abuses.84 Roosevelt therefore 
increasingly held up the Queen’s conciliatory promises as a model for the other 
colonial powers to imitate. While he could often be heard enthusiastically advocating 
the concept of international trusteeship in public, then, he remained vague and 
inconsistent when it came down to discussing the concrete specifics of the plan with 
Dutch policymakers. This allowed the latter, as they had previously done with the 
Atlantic Charter, to continue to count the Netherlands “exempt” to the trusteeship 
scheme.85  
 
In February 1944, General MacArthur and Van Mook negotiated a preliminary 
but significant civil affairs agreement. It outlined the procedures to be adopted as 
American forces liberated parts of the Indonesian archipelago, and promised that the 	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full sovereignty of the Netherlands government would be restored to the area as soon 
as the military situation permitted it. In Brisbane, meanwhile, the Dutch authorities 
established a training school for civil servants for ultimate duty in the Indies, and in 
April, “Camp Columbia” on the outskirts of the city became the headquarters of the 
Netherlands-Indies Civil Administration (NICA). This Allied organization was at the 
disposal and under the command and responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, and 
served as the link between the Netherlands Indies government and allied command. 
NICA officials would accompany the forces liberating the Indies, MacArthur and Van 
Mook agreed, and take up the task of reestablishing the administrative apparatus in 
the islands.86 
The provisional civil affairs agreement alarmed Asian experts in Washington, 
however, who increasingly feared that upon the surrender of the Japanese, Indonesian 
nationalists would be more likely to consider themselves reconquered by the Dutch 
than liberated by the Allies. The State Department’s Office of Far Eastern Affairs 
therefore objected to American lives being sacrificed on behalf of European 
imperialism. The Office of European Affairs, in contrast, where most considered the 
Dutch an enlightened imperial power, was inclined to promise a restoration of 
colonial sovereignty.87 This disagreement within the State Department on what the 
postwar policy of the United States in Southeast Asia should be deepened over the 	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course 1944, and was caused partly by a lack of credible intelligence about wartime 
developments in the Indies.   
 One of only a handful of diplomats that the State Department depended on 
for information on the situation in the occupied Indonesian archipelago was Consul-
General Walter A. Foote, who had worked in Southeast Asia for more than a dozen 
years when the war broke out, and who had fled with Netherlands Indies 
administrators to Australia when the Japanese invaded Java. In 1942, Foote had told 
Secretary Hull that in his opinion, the indigenous peoples in the Indies were “docile, 
essentially peaceful, contented” and “happy […] in their bamboo huts and in their rice 
fields.” The great masses were “entirely apathetic towards the question of 
independence,” the Consul-General noted.88 Van Mook, he said, was known in the 
islands as “the Churchill of the Indies.” In 1944, Foote repeated his conviction that 
Indonesians were “nearly completely apathetic towards all public questions which 
[did] not originate in or concern directly the affairs of their kampongs or desas.” They 
respected “white man,” he argued, and “admired the efficiency and integrity of the 
average Dutch official.” “They are not ready for independence and will not be so for 
many years to come,” Foote concluded his rather skewed analysis.89  
Both Secretary of State Hull and Undersecretary Welles held relatively liberal 
views, however, and worked to induce the European colonial powers to adopt 	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progressive ideas about “dependent peoples” and their state of readiness for self-
government. Welles thought that a continuation of the old imperial structures would 
“seriously endanger the peace and stability of all of the Far East.” Taken by the 
Queen’s speech and the promises Dutch officials had made, however, he was 
“inclined to believe that this problem [had] probably been solved already.” If the 
Netherlands and Netherlands Indies authorities faithfully carried out their pledges, 
“any question of international trusteeship in their case should not arise,” he noted.90 
Asianists such as Laurence Salisbury, deputy assistant chief of the Division of 
Far Eastern Affairs and later acting chief of the small Division of Southwest Pacific 
Affairs, his successor Abbot Low Moffat, and less influential Southeast Asia expert 
Kenneth P. Landon were considerably more farsighted than their senior and 
traditional-minded colleagues in the European wing, who had always taken the lead 
on any proposed action in colonial matters. They argued that the civil affairs 
agreement MacArthur and Van Mook had made undermined plans for the trusteeship 
scheme, and held that the United States should play no role in the restoration of the 
Dutch colonial empire. Without a strong intimation that the United States wished to 
see a progressive improvement in the rights of indigenous peoples, Salisbury reasoned 
in a memo to Hull, the attitude in Asia would become one of increasing mistrust. The 
United States must obtain from the Netherlands government “definite commitments” 
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regarding the political and economic status of Indonesians, he advised, as well as a 
promise for the liberalization of the colonial economic policies toward third parties.91 
The latter was important, for policymakers in Washington were not just 
convinced they were advancing the universal goals of democracy, liberty, and justice; 
American national interests included economic interests. Revitalizing the global 
economy a key design, and the colony an important supplier of valuable commodities, 
during the final years of the war the belief took hold in Washington that the task of 
restoring trade could best be done under stable Dutch leadership and efficient 
management, as long as the Netherlands government steered clear of any forms of 
protectionism and allowed American economic development and financial investment 
in the archipelago.  
As the United States agreed in the late summer of 1944 to start training and 
equip a 7,000-man strong Netherlands marine brigade for action in Southeast Asia, 
Moffat summarized his concerns in memorandum that Hull forwarded to the 
president. Given increasing nationalist sentiments and years of intense Japanese anti-
imperial propaganda, Moffat began, it was imperative for the United States to secure 
the goodwill of the peoples of Asia. Many American and allied lives could be saved if 
the British, French, and Dutch made a “dramatic and concerted announcement” 
regarding the future of their colonies in the region. These statements would have to 
clearly outline steps and include specific dates for independence or complete self-	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government. “Failure of the Western powers to recognize the new conditions and 
forces in Southeast Asia” and attempts to reestablish outdated imperial regimes, he 
warned ominously, would almost certainly lead to “serious social and political 
conflict” and perhaps to an “ultimate [unification] of Oriental opposition to the 
West.”92 
In the case of the Netherlands East Indies, Moffat predicted that the 
population of the territory would view men like Sukarno and Hatta as nationalists 
fighting for the political advancement of their peoples rather than as the collaborating 
opportunists that emerged from Dutch portrayals. Indonesian leaders would use the 
political concessions they gained from the Japanese as bargaining tools vis-à-vis the 
returning Dutch. “Western observers tend to lag behind in assessing the appeal of the 
idea of political independence among the masses in Asiatic countries,” the prescient 
expert explained. When Moffat and his colleagues urged their superiors to think long-
term, however, they had something different in mind than did President Roosevelt, 
who in February 1945 stated at a press conference that he believed large parts of the 
Indonesian archipelago to be “hundreds of years” away from independence.93 Not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92  Abbot Low Moffat to Hull, 8 September 1944, RG 59, 856D.01/10-544, NARA; Gerlof D. Homan, 
“The United States and the Indonesian Question, December 1941-December 1946,” Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 
93 (1980), 45.  
93  Moffat to Hull, Oct 4, 1944, RG 59, 856D.01/10-444, NARA; Louis, 29-30, 424; Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, 23 February 1945, in: Complete Presidential Press Conferences of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Volumes 23-25 
(New York: Da Capo Press, 1972), 71-73. For similar reports from Asianists, see: 6 January 1945, 
“Imperialism versus an Enlightened Colonial Policy in the Area of the South East Asia Command,” RG 59, 
Southeast Asia US Policy 1946-1946, Records of the Philippine and Southeast Asia Division, Regional Affairs 
Subject Files; 26 March 1945, RG 59, Southeast Asia US Policy 1946-1946, Records of the Philippine and 
Southeast Asia Division, Regional Affairs Subject Files, NARA. 
 
   
   
63 
long after, Edward R. Stettinius, the new Secretary of State, signed the Dutch-
American Civil Affairs Agreement that MacArthur and Van Mook had provisionally 
agreed upon the previous year.94  
Where Asianists in Washington argued that the interests of the United States 
should push it in the direction of alignment with colonized territories, Europeanists at 
the same time held that the administration’s overarching objective was to keep the 
harmony in the Western alliance. “We could not press [the colonial powers] too far,” 
Hull observed, “in view of the fact that we were seeking the closest possible 
cooperation with them in Europe. We could not alienate them in the Orient and 
expect to work with them in Europe.” As increasingly strained relations with the 
Soviets meant he could no longer afford disputes about colonialism to threaten 
collaboration between the United States and its allied imperial powers, Roosevelt 
postponed final decisions and avoided a confrontational policy debate on the future 
of the European empires.95  
 
By the time of his death on April 12, then, Roosevelt had left his successor an 
ambiguous anti-imperial legacy and a confused policy for the dismantling of the 
European colonial powers, in which the case of the Dutch East Indies featured as 
perhaps the most complex. The Netherlands government had reason to assume that 
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the Americans would help restore Dutch sovereignty in the East Indies, and that it 
could last indefinitely. It is not surprising that when the United Nations conference 
took place in San Francisco in late April, the Dutch showed more boldness than 
Washington planners had expected. Lieutenant Governor-General Van Mook, Time 
reported, “brushed aside” a suggestion that the new international organization might 
become involved in the political reconfiguration of the Indies and the Netherlands 
Kingdom. The Dutch, Van Mook stated, preferred “direct discussions” with 
Indonesians.96 
These discussions would be based on only very general outlines, predicted 
Kenneth P. Landon in May 1945, mere weeks after the liberation of the Netherlands 
and German surrender in Europe. The Dutch postwar plans meant little in practical 
terms, and the new Netherlands government headed by labor party leader Willem 
Schermerhorn, like the governments that had preceded it, regarded the Dutch 
possessions as a private preserve. The events in years to come would illustrate the 
accuracy of Landon’s warning that the Dutch “resented bitterly any “outside” trespass 
in matters of [internal colonial] policy.”97 
As the Combined Chiefs of Staff prepared to remove the Indies from 
American military jurisdiction and transfer the archipelago to the British, making Lord 	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Mook’s vision of the future of the Netherlands East Indies and its relations with the Netherlands, see his 
address delivered before the members of the Institute of Pacific Relations in San Francisco on 18 May, 1945: 
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97  Kenneth P. Landon, 18 May 1945, RG 49, 856D.00/5/13/1945, NARA.   
 
   
   
65 
Mountbatten’s South East Asia Command (SEAC) responsible for the liberation of 
the islands, a policy paper prepared by the Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew 
outlined the complicated strategic dilemma President Truman’s administration found 
itself in: “A problem for the United States is to harmonize, so far as possible, its 
policies in regard to two objectives: increased political freedom for the Far East and 
the maintenance of the unity of the leading United Nations in meeting this problem.” 
By the summer of 1945, the United States had found a temporary solution for this 
problem in its effective isolation from involvement in colonial matters. Although it 
still affirmed its belief in the rights of all peoples to eventual independence, the 
government at the same time intimated that in the case of the Netherlands East 
Indies, it was not unthinkable that the peoples in the archipelago would be happy to 
see the Dutch return, or at least, when compared to the Japanese occupation, view 
that return as “the lesser of two evils.” Thus, it was anticipated and desired, but not 
demanded, that the Dutch implement changes in the Indies.98 
Where the Americans trusted rather patiently that the Schermerhorn 
government and the Indonesian nationalists would be able to work things out 
peacefully, politicians in The Hague and Netherlands Indies administrators in 
Australia were hoping for a complete restoration of Dutch authority in the islands. 
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They were desperately out of touch with the reality that their prestige and power in 
the colony had been damaged beyond repair, however. The belief that the 
Netherlands ranked as a great power only while in possession of its colonies was 
firmly planted in the minds of the Dutch; wartime Prime Minister Gerbrandy went as 
far as asserting that without the East Indies, the people of the Netherlands would find 
themselves “[pauperized] on their few acres in a corner of Europe.”99    
 
Tens of thousands of miles away, the Queen’s December 1942 speech went 
unnoticed in the territory to which it was designed to apply, as listening to long-range 
shortwave radio broadcasts was strictly banned. If they had been able to hear it, 
however, Indonesian nationalists would have been sorely disappointed with her 
refusal to recognize outright their right to self-determination. In the archipelago, 
nationalist sentiment had become ever more palpable. On the break of defeat, the 
Japanese administration had decided to allow the population of the islands to hold 
political meetings and fly the red-white Indonesian flag. More and more Indonesians 
had appeared in important posts, and the Central Advisory Council headed by 
Sukarno began to resemble a cabinet. During the late summer of 1945, Tokyo once 
again tried to rally the people by establishing an “Investigating Committee for the 
Preparation of Independence,” which in August officially became the “Indonesian 
Independence Preparatory Committee” (PPKI). Sukarno was appointed chairman, 	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and Hatta vice-chairman. The Japanese finally agreed to schedule the transfer of 
authority to the Indonesians and proclaim the nation’s independence on August 24.100 
 The Indonesian nationalist movement achieved significant goals during the 
period of Japanese occupation. The military and paramilitary formed a material basis 
of strength. The system of local administrative councils, in which for the first time 
Indonesians now held positions of real power, provided a political framework. The 
extended use of the Indonesian language had increased the sense of unity among 
millions of people spread far and wide. The swift collapse of Dutch colonial authority 
in 1942 had discredited the Western power, fostered the aspirations of local 
nationalists, and encouraged the emergence of a military elite and re-emergence of an 
exiled political leadership. While Indonesian identity and unity were being 
consolidated and strengthened, the war was also a time of unprecedented hunger and 
deprivation for the population of the archipelago.  
The Japanese occupation, which had displaced not a legitimate indigenous 
regime but an already unstable and troubled imperial bureaucracy, can therefore be 
seen as a catalyst that had speeded up processes started in the first four decades of the 
century; though the Japanese had given ground to nationalists grudgingly, they had 
created conditions that would soon become the foundation for a national revolution. 
Sukarno, especially, had been brought back to the centre of political life as the formal 
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and most influential representative of the Indonesian people, and had pushed his own 
claim to leadership while spreading and intensifying the cause of independence.101  
Sukarno’s ascent to power naturally caused contemporaries, and historians 
since, to ponder the extent to which the Indonesian leader was a collaborator, and to 
what extent he responded to the situation brought into being by the Japanese 
occupation and manipulated it to advance his goal of an independent archipelago. 
Kahin is of the opinion that Sukarno supported Japan only to the minimum extent 
necessary, whereas Legge and Giebels believe he went further; his pro-Japanese 
attitude was born not only out of mere opportunism, they maintain, but also out of 
admiration. Drawing contrasts between Sukarno and Hatta, who only sporadically 
voiced outright support for the Japanese, and Sjahrir, who believed that Indonesians 
should not cooperate with the occupiers at all, indeed leads one to think, rather 
unfashionably, as Harry Benda admitted, that the later president’s collaboration was 
“more than superficial, the result of dire necessity.” But when we consider the 
similarities between the three and a half years of Japanese occupation and the three 
and a half centuries of Dutch rule, and follow Anderson’s advice to view the period 
not merely as an epilogue to the archipelago’s colonial history or an ominous prologue 
to the revolution, but rather as part of Southeast Asian history, the simpler image of 
Sukarno that might be said to emerge from the complexities, and one that became 	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immensely popular in subsequent years, is of him not as a puppet, but as a puppet 
master.102   
As the Japanese surrender seemed imminent, Sukarno, Hatta, and Sjahrir 
realized that the future of Indonesia was linked to the international situation, and 
looked to the Americans rather than the Dutch. They believed there was reason to be 
optimistic. “Does not the Atlantic Charter,” Hatta reasoned, “recognize the right of 
all peoples to live under a government of their own choice?” Did not Americans, 
Sjahrir similarly asked, present themselves as reformers and innovators? “In this fact 
lie possibilities for [Indonesians] to win a new position for ourselves,” the nationalist 
wrote. The end of the war would be “the beginning of their national existence as a 
free people.”103 
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Chapter 2 
 
Revolution and Reconquest: August 1945 - December 1945 
 
          “We can put the baby to sleep provided no one 
outside the house makes a noise .”104 	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   W.R. Patterson, September 1945 
 
 
“We shall be with you shortly,” Lieutenant Governor-General Hubertus van Mook 
promised the men and women in the Netherlands East Indies when he spoke to them 
on the radio on August 15, 1945.105 In Camp Columbia in Brisbane, Australia, Dutch 
and Indonesian civil administration officials had listened to Van Mook saying similar 
reassuring words the evening before: “you must expect to get your marching orders 
soon.”106 Privately, Van Mook was less optimistic about an orderly and swift 
restoration of the Dutch colonial government in the Indies. Just days earlier, in two 
telegrams to Minister of the Colonies J.H.A. Logemann in The Hague, he had 
expressed his concern; in the event of a sudden Japanese surrender, he warned, the 
gross shortage of Allied men and material in the region could prove problematic. 
Although he expected to be able to put to work many of the newly liberated prisoners 	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of war and internees, among whom dozens of administrators and tens of thousands 
of Royal Dutch East Indies Army (Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger or KNIL) 
soldiers, he urged Logemann to arrange for all available manpower and equipment to 
be shipped to Southeast Asia as quickly as possible.107  
During the six weeks that followed 
Van Mook’s promises and pleas, Indonesian 
nationalists and the triumvirate of 
Republican leaders Sukarno, Mohammad 
Hatta, and Sutan Sjahrir would proclaim 
and breathe life into the independent 
Republic Indonesia. This period would 
moreover see the Supreme Allied 
Commander of the South East Asia 
Command (SEAC) Admiral Lord 
Mountbatten grow increasingly worried about the involvement of British and British-
Indian troops in the complicated internal affairs of another country. Dutch 
authorities, finally, spent those days fretting about not being able to land significant 
numbers of soldiers or administrative personnel in the Netherlands East Indies. This 
chapter investigates the last four months of 1945. What were the early attitudes of 
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officials in Jakarta and politicians in The Hague towards the revolution in the islands, 
and how did these set the stage for what would be four difficult years? What was the 
influence of the rapid readjustments in British policy that Mountbatten forced 
Whitehall to make when faced with circumstances beyond his control? And how did 
the young Republic and the Indonesian nationalists who supported it plan to convince 
both friend and foe that their struggle for independence was not to be repressed? 
Throughout, this chapter argues that the existence of a brief political and military 
vacuum crucially shaped the events to follow; by the end of the year, it was clear that 
there would be no smooth and orderly transition from wartime to peacetime in the 
Indonesian archipelago.   
  
“I feel as if I caught something like a big stone in my throat.”108 He had only 
just returned from a visit to the Japanese Asia Headquarters, but the news of Emperor 
Hirohito’s capitulation came as a surprise to Sukarno. He and Mohammad Hatta had 
traveled to Saigon in early August to discuss the preparations for Indonesian 
independence with the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, Count Hisaichi Terauchi.109 As 
we have seen in Chapter 2, the nationalist leaders wished to avoid bloodshed; they had 
spent the last months of the war hoping that a Japanese defeat would occur after a 	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tidy transfer of power to an independent Indonesian regime, and had worked with 
Japanese officials to make this a reality. 
Sutan Sjahrir, the third leading Indonesian nationalist, had continually objected 
to Sukarno and Hatta’s plans, noting that neither the Dutch nor any of the bigger 
allied powers would want to recognize the new Republic if Japanese authorities had 
helped it come into being. He 
demanded instead an immediate 
declaration of independence, to be 
issued without taking into account 
the wishes of the current occupiers. 
Sjahrir was supported in his opinion 
by a large number of politically active 
young Indonesians who were 
similarly disturbed by Sukarno and 
Hatta’s wartime cooperation with the 
Japanese. These pemudas, who during the summer of 1945 had rapidly become an 
influential organized formation of militant leaders of the younger generation, urged 
Sukarno to declare Indonesia independent on August 15, the very day of the Japanese 
	  
....._--_.  
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surrender.110 To push the more cautious statesmen Sukarno and Hatta into immediate 
action, a group of pemudas kidnapped the two the next morning and threatened a mass 
armed uprising. They were released that same evening, after the Japanese Admiral in 
Jakarta, Tadashi Maeda, had announced that his forces would not fight a declaration 
of independence and the two captives had agreed to write a proclamation overnight.111  
Sukarno and Hatta swiftly crafted the declaration at the residence of Admiral 
Maeda and proclaimed the independent Republic of Indonesia in the front yard of 
Sukarno’s residence in Jakarta at 10 am on August 17.  The short declaration, made in 
the name of “all brothers and sisters” of the Indonesian people, was immediately 
broadcast on the radio and telegraph network, and during the next few weeks local 
authorities in the smaller villages on Java spread the message.112 After this, the new 
leadership embarked with great alacrity on the task of constructing a government 
apparatus.  
Within a week of the proclamation, the “Independence Preparatory 
Committee” (Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, or PPKI), hastily established by 
the Japanese on August 7, had convened and declared Sukarno president of the young 
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Republic. Hatta became vice-president. A final draft of the national constitution, 
already largely written during the last month of the occupation, was completed, 
ratified, and then promulgated throughout the archipelago. The PPKI also appointed 
trusted colleagues of Sukarno and Hatta to take control of the various government 
ministries, and set up an administrative blueprint in which the Republic was divided 
into eight regions or provinces, each with a governor appointed by Sukarno and semi-
autonomous sultanates. 
To further cement the government’s 
authority, Sukarno then dissolved the PPKI, 
and replaced it with the “Central Indonesian 
National Committee” (Komité Nasional 
Indonesia Pusat, or KNIP) on August 29. 
This committee had legislative power and 
was to be responsible for advising the 
president and his cabinet of twelve ministers 
on state policy. It was composed of 135 
prominent men chosen by Sukarno and 
Hatta, and represented all shades of nationalist opinion. Because that many 
representatives were unlikely to be able to convene frequently, a smaller body was 
5.	  Sutan	  Sjahrir	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established: the Working Committee of the KNIP, of which Sjahrir became 
chairman.113  
The KNIP set up an auxiliary police force, using the youth organizations 
created by the Japanese as its base. This “People’s Security Force” (Badan Keamanan 
Rakjat or BKR, the precursor of the Tentara Nasional Indonesia or TNI, the Indonesian 
National Army) consisted of autonomous constituent groups and joined the struggle 
by occupying the government buildings of the Japanese authorities.114 Taking some 
direction from the KNIP in Jakarta, dozens of loosely structured national committees 
(Komité Nasional Indonesia, KNIs) sprung up across Java to assist the governors in the 
provinces. Though with no precisely defined tasks as of yet, their very existence 
helped spread the revolution and further galvanized the people of Indonesia into 
action.115 Young Indonesian nationalists in particular embraced the ideal of merdeka 
(freedom). Forming a sort of “wildcat army,” these dedicated, coordinated, and self-
disciplined guerillas had no other goal than to prevent the return of a Dutch colonial 
regime.116 
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After having played a clear advising role in the weeks leading up to the 
declaration of independence, the Japanese military commanders, waiting to surrender 
to Allied victors, found themselves facing a dilemma. Mountbatten’s South East Asia 
Command had explicitly ordered them to maintain not only law and order but also the 
political status quo in Indonesia until the arrival of British troops, whom the nervous 
Japanese, like the feverishly working nationalist leaders, knew would come sooner or 
later.117 While attempting to uphold order among the Indonesian nationalists, they at 
the same time wanted to avoid a head-on collision with the revolution whose spirit by 
now had cities beginning to buzz with excitement. On August 19, Terauchi 
announced that the Japanese would henceforth leave the government of Java in the 
hands of Sukarno.118 
As a result, Japanese policy during the six-week interval between theoretical 
capitulation and physical surrender was uncertain and compromising. Clashes between 
Indonesian nationalists and Japanese authorities over the control of government 
buildings and weapons increased during September, with considerable areas of the 
cities of Jakarta, Surabaya, and Semarang beginning to pass to Indonesian armed 
groups.119 By the end of that month, the new government had been consolidated and 
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given visible institutional form, and the red-white Republican flag was flown from 
almost all public buildings in Java.120 
Indonesian nationalists, recognizing the temporary political and military 
vacuum that would evaporate with the arrival of Allied troops, had taken the initiative 
and seized control, setting up a functioning and relatively stable new government 
during a period of emergency and chaos. This shocked not only the many Dutch and 
Eurasian internees who were beginning to leave Japanese imprisonment camps to 
return to their prewar homes, but also the Allied forces.121 When British troops finally 
landed in the Netherlands East Indies on September 29 and reliable reports of internal 
conditions began to reach Brisbane, London, Washington, and The Hague, the 
outside world was astonished, and the Netherlands government displeased. 
This bewilderment was in large part due to a general inability to gather 
sufficient unbiased intelligence in the Japanese-occupied East Indies. Only a small 
handful of Indonesia specialists worked in the U.S. State Department’s Research and 
Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and they had been 
producing reports without being able to rely on actual contacts in the islands. Analysts 
based their findings on information from Dutch “experts” on the Indonesian 
archipelago: Westerners who had lived in the East Indies before the occupation and 	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were spending the war Australia, where they fed “facts, insights, and frequently 
fantasies about the situation of the Netherlands East Indies” to British and American 
officials who were stationed there.122 Most could not imagine that the people of the 
Indies did not look forward to their return, and they had spent the war attempting to 
convince the American foreign policy establishment of the enduring affection of 
Indonesians toward their colonial masters.   
Early in the war, as we have seen in Chapter 2, General Douglas MacArthur’s 
Southwest Pacific Area Command (SWPA) had assumed the responsibility of 
liberating the entire Indonesian archipelago except Sumatra. An alteration in the 
Allied command structure made at the Potsdam Conference at the end of July 1945, 
however, transferred this responsibility from the Americans to British Admiral Lord 
Mountbatten and his South East Asia Command. The origins of this decision lay 
partly in the longstanding wish at Whitehall to assume a greater share of strategic 
decisions in Southeast Asia, even as Attlee’s Foreign Affairs Secretary Ernest Bevin 
feared this might overburden the British economy. American officials, initially 
opposed to any changes, had come around to the idea in the summer of 1944. The 
Dutch were only nominally consulted. Divisions in the Netherlands government 
between Lieutenant Governor-General Van Mook, who had realized that the 
Americans were better equipped than the British, and wartime Prime Minister Pieter 
S. Gerbrandy, of the opinion that the British were more likely to stand up for an allied 	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colonial power, had prevented the Dutch from making a clear argument either way. 
The consequential decision to transfer the task of liberating the Netherlands East 
Indies from the Americans to the British was thus made mere weeks before the 
Japanese surrender.123 
During the three-week interval between the announcement of the transfer of 
the Netherlands East Indies to SEAC and the collapse of the Japanese, the 
Netherlands government complained that it had not been consulted. Van Mook noted 
that this was another example of the way the smaller powers had been ignored during 
the war. Fearing that everything that had been agreed upon with General MacArthur 
under the lend-lease program now would have to be renegotiated with Mountbatten, 
which he assumed would lead to severe delays in shipping well-equipped Dutch 
troops and administrators to the Netherlands East Indies, he urged his colleagues in 
The Hague to discuss Dutch interests in Southeast Asia with British and American 
representatives.124  
For the American government, which as we have seen had played both sides of 
the colonial issue during the war, the transfer meant not only that more resources 
would become available for the fight against Japan, but also that the country would 
avoid direct involvement in the restoration of the old colonial powers. After the 	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Japanese surrender, most planners in Washington felt there was no military reason for 
the United States to continue to involve itself actively in the affairs of SEAC, and 
there was every political reason to remain aloof from the chaos that might soon erupt 
in Southeast Asia. 
For the British, the transfer came at a time when the government in London 
was beginning to question whether it had the necessary resources to take on this task 
of considerable magnitude. Besides the Dutch East Indies, SEAC’s expanded theater 
of operations now also included Thailand (Siam) and the southern half of Indochina. 
Another 70 million people and 750.000 square miles of land area were to be liberated 
by the British in the Indonesian archipelago alone. In spite of this, SEAC’s top 
priority remained the swift occupation of the British colonies of Malaya and 
Singapore. Beyond those territories, Mountbatten was planning to capture a handful 
of strategic locations such as Saigon, Bangkok, Hong Kong, Jakarta, and Surabaya.125  
In July, a new Labour government had been brought into power in Britain with 
Clement Attlee’s resounding victory over Winston Churchill’s Conservative Party. The 
new Prime Minister and his cabinet promised to rebuild the war torn country and 
institute social reform. The generally forward thinking Attlee nevertheless believed 
that the British Empire was an institution and power for good in the world. The 
primary influences on policymaking in Whitehall were therefore the wish to recover 
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Britain’s colonies in Southeast Asia and the importance of good relations with 
neighbors in Western Europe, especially in the face of American criticism on 
imperialism. Bevin agreed that in order to keep her position of influence in postwar 
Southeast Asia, Britain should support other European colonial powers in 
reestablishing their authority in the region’s colonies.126  
That the British had no moral objections to the restoration of Dutch rule in the 
Indies became clear also when the two nations made a “civil affairs” agreement on 
August 24. This agreement outlined the principles that would govern questions of 
civil administration and jurisdiction in the Netherlands Indies territory liberated by 
Allied forces under SEAC. Bevin reassured the Netherlands ambassador in London, 
underlining that the arrangements in no way affected Dutch sovereignty in the Indies; 
it was agreed that the Netherlands Indies government would “resume as rapidly as 
practicable full responsibility for the civil administration” of the archipelago.127  
In the Netherlands, a government consisting of a national cabinet “for 
restoration and renewal” had been in power since late June 1945. It was a royal 
cabinet, meaning it had come into existence through appointment by the Queen 
rather than general elections. New Prime Minister Willem Schermerhorn, an 
intellectual from a protestant family of farmers and a member of what the following 
year would become the labor party PvdA, led this government together with the 	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matter-of-fact administrator Willem Drees, who was of the same political orientation, 
as the Minister of Social Affairs. Minister of Overseas Territories in this cabinet was 
J.H.A. Logemann, a progressive man who before the war had been professor of law in 
what was then known as Batavia, and a good friend of Lieutenant Governor-General 
Van Mook. When Schermerhorn presented his government on June 27 and unfolded 
his plans for the future of the Netherlands East Indies, he announced that he and his 
colleagues would continue with the preparations for an “Imperial Conference” 
(Rijksconferentie) as announced by Queen Wilhelmina in her radio address of December 
7, 1942. 
 
The Japanese capitulation came on the exact day that the transfer of the 
Netherlands East Indies to the British was made official. The first Allied troops, 
however, were not scheduled to land in Java until late September or early October. 
Lieutenant Governor-General Van Mook’s first reports mentioning the proclamation 
of the Republic Indonesia arrived in The Hague on August 20, when he indicated to 
Logemann that intelligence information told him, erroneously, so he later discovered, 
that the Japanese Commander-in-Chief had made the declaration, and that it was he 
who had appointed Sukarno and Hatta. Van Mook did not expect the establishment 
of the Republic to cause many problems for the occupation forces, as the “so-called 
Sukarno government” was set up by collaborators and without popular support, and 
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would be dissolved by Allied troops immediately after their arrival. His main concern 
was instead the plight of the newly liberated prisoners or war and internees. Some 
100,000 of them in Java alone were concentrated in areas around Jakarta, Buitenzorg 
(Bogor), Bandung, Semarang, Magelang, and Surabaya, in urgent need of care, 
protection, and eventually, evacuation.128   
Although suspecting the British high command of setting the wrong priorities 
and anxious for Dutch officials to arrive in the East Indies as soon as possible, the 
Netherlands government exhibited little apprehension about the political and military 
consequences of the impending vacuum in the Indonesian archipelago.129 No sooner 
than on August 30 did the Netherlands government form a research committee to 
find out and report on “what opinions lived in the Indies.”130 It took Prime Minister 
Schermerhorn even longer to explicitly raise concerns regarding the difficulties in the 
Dutch Indies and the quandary in which the Netherlands could find itself if the 
British government did not commission Mountbatten to take action against the 
Republic Indonesia.131 
In early September, Van Mook traveled to Kandy in Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), to 
meet Mountbatten at the latter’s headquarters. Although the British commander was 	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already aware of the existence of what he had called in his diary a “local resistance 
movement in Java […] which [would] require very careful handling,” the discussion 
between the two focused on the manner in which Dutch authority would be restored 
in the Netherlands East Indies.132 In his reports to the Supreme Commander, the 
Lieutenant Governor-General outlined the Japanese sponsorship of the Indonesian 
administration and Sukarno’s collaboration during the occupation, summarizing the 
new Republic as “a one man government along Japanese lines” and “a puppet 
regime.”133 Van Mook was not deliberately attempting to deceive his superiors, as the 
Republic had certainly come about with Japanese assistance, but his emphatic 
insistence that it was doubtful whether it had any large following at all illustrates the 
Lieutenant Governor-General’s patronizing attitude and limited understanding of 
Indonesian nationalist sentiment.  
Van Mook suggested that British troops carefully avoid dealings with “Sukarno 
cum suis,” and that Mountbatten instead reinforce the responsibility of the Japanese 
military to maintain the status quo in the archipelago. Even a purely indirect and de 
facto recognition of this “last-minute organization,” he noted, would create “the 
greatest difficulties and bring confusion in the minds of all law-abiding 
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Indonesians.”134 Van Mook called upon Mountbatten to issue a general directive that 
the Republic Indonesia was not to be recognized. The latter, unable to “entirely 
divorce himself from his British nationality,” declined. Afraid that a political statement 
in his own name would commit His Majesty’s Government, and realizing that the 
British were likely to be faced with a similar situation in French Indochina, the 
commander instead told Terauchi that the Japanese would be held responsible for the 
maintenance of law and order until the occupation forces arrived. He moreover urged 
the Dutch government to issue a public statement relating to the internal political 
situation in the East Indies.135 
During the month of September, it slowly became evident to the Dutch that 
the situation in the Netherlands East Indies was more serious than had been expected. 
They continued to be carefully optimistic, supposing that limited but decisive Allied 
action would quell the revolution. On September 15 two cruisers, the British HM 
Cumberland and the Dutch HM Tromp, moored in the docks of Jakarta for a 
preliminary visit ahead of the landing of British troops, which was scheduled for the 
end of the month. On board were Mountbatten’s Rear Admiral W.R. Patterson and 
Netherlands Indies administrator Charles O. van der Plas, a senior civil servant and 
former Governor of East Java who had worked with Van Mook in Brisbane during 
the war, and who was expected to make preparatory arrangements for the arrival of 	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Dutch Indies administrative personnel. After speaking with former internees and 
prisoners of war, Van der Plas reported to Van Mook that the effect of Japanese anti-
Dutch propaganda, especially on the younger generation, had been underestimated, 
and that Republican flags could be seen flying everywhere he went. He hoped that 
with a timely arrival of troops, however, and the arrest and isolation of leading 
nationalists, the fire of the revolution could be swiftly extinguished.136 Patterson in his 
reports to Mountbatten similarly noted that the circumstances had been different than 
foreseen. He too, nevertheless confidently concluded that the British could “put the 
baby to sleep provided no one outside the house [made] a noise.”137 That a real 
revolution was taking place in Java neither Van der Plas nor Patterson seemed to 
appreciate. 
 
Mountbatten, however, was about to reassess events in the archipelago. The 
reports he sent to the British Chiefs of Staff in London at the end of September 
would influence policymaking in a way that severely affected Dutch-British relations. 
On September 26, the commander received disturbing information from his wife 
Edwina, who after a tour of some of the prison camps in the Indies had met 
Lieutenant-Colonel Laurens van der Post. Van der Post was a British intelligence 
officer from South Africa who had spent the war as an internee on Java, from where 
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he had tried as best as he could to follow political events in the archipelago. He told 
Lady Louis Mountbatten about a functioning indigenous government in Indonesia 
that received broad support from the population. When she relayed this information 
as well as her own eyewitness testimony to her husband, he formulated a new Allied 
policy and summoned Van der Plas to Singapore to discuss with him what he had 
heard.138 Mountbatten made clear that there was only one option open to the 
Netherlands government, and that was for the Dutch to initiate talks with Sukarno 
and Hatta. When Van der Plas protested that his colleagues in The Hague would 
surely object, the commander’s unequivocal reply was: “I am telling you that you will 
be gambling away the Indies.”139  
Within hours, the meeting between the two had triggered a major policy 
debate. Both Mountbatten and Van der Plas sent urgent telegrams to Van Mook in 
Brisbane. The former told the Lieutenant Governor-General that he now believed the 
situation in Java to be “very different” from what had been believed. The lack of 
contact between the Dutch authorities and the Indonesian nationalists was 
aggravating the trouble, and to avoid bloodshed it was imperative for the Dutch to 
meet with all political leaders on the island. Mountbatten bluntly suggested that the 
Netherlands government issue an immediate pronouncement for “some degree of 
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independence” for its colony in Southeast Asia, including a time by which that status 
would be attained.140  
Van der Plas in his telegram to Van Mook relayed the same meeting, adding 
that the Supreme Commander had made it clear that Britain would on no account be 
drawn into internal troubles of the Dutch, and “British soldiers would not be used for 
putting down any revolts or riots.” The decision, he warned, had been an irrevocable 
one. At Mountbatten’s urging, Van der Plas further told the Lieutenant Governor-
General that he would go ahead and begin discussions with all influential Indonesians, 
including Sukarno and Hatta, unless he received an order to the contrary.141 
 An alarmed Van Mook in turn cabled Van der Plas, Mountbatten and The 
Hague. The first he told that the British position made the Dutch subject to 
“unlimited blackmail” and that discussions with Indonesian nationalists were only 
possible on the basis of an official recognition of the legal Dutch government, and 
non-recognition of the Republic.142 Van Mook then told Mountbatten he “[did] not 
fully understand” his position on the reoccupation of Java. He was willing to have 
discussions with non-extremist political leaders, but not with the collaborators 
Sukarno and Hatta, he said, and only as long as that did not imply direct or indirect 
recognition of the Republic, since that would leave no base for discussion at all. He 
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also repeated to Mountbatten his conviction that “resolute action” could prevent 
complete chaos.143   
In a third hastily composed telegram the Lieutenant Governor-General 
informed Logemann, Schermerhorn, and Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Eelco N. 
van Kleffens that he believed the British were backing out of the previously agreed 
upon “civil affairs” arrangement; they would merely restore law and order in the 
archipelago to the extent that it was necessary to disarm the Japanese and protect 
released internees until the Dutch arrived. To do so, Mountbatten’s troops were 
instructed only to occupy strategic areas in the cities of Jakarta and Surabaya. The 
British, in other words, would not intervene in political matters, arrest nationalist 
leaders, or disband the government of the Republic. The Dutch were completely 
reliant on the British, Van Mook warned, and although decisive action might still quell 
the revolution, talks with a select group of moderate Indonesian leaders might be 
necessary to create order. The Lieutenant Governor-General ended his telegram with 
the suggestion that a declaration on the future of the Dutch East Indies be made by 
the Netherlands government, promising the Indonesians an equal partnership within 
the Kingdom and an independent government, a status to be reached in 25 years 
time.144  
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 Shocked and dismayed by Van Mook’s news, Logemann, Schermerhorn and 
Van Kleffens, currently in London for a meeting with the British government, 
announced to the press that they objected to Van der Plas meeting with Sukarno, and 
had advised him not to make decisions in this regard without their explicit 
authorization.145 They then reminded Foreign Secretary Bevin of the Allied promise 
“that every inch of the Kingdom of the Netherlands would be given back to Queen 
Wilhelmina.” The Sukarno government in Java was not the outcome of a spontaneous 
and widespread popular movement, as Mountbatten might have begun to believe, but 
represented a Japanese attempt to continue the war in the Netherlands East Indies 
under another guise, they argued.146 
 The urgent situation in the Indonesian archipelago led to an emergency 
meeting of the Dutch cabinet on September 29. At this meeting was also present the 
Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies, Dutch nobleman A.W.L. Tjarda 
van Starkenborgh Stachouwer. Interned by the Japanese when the islands fell in 
March of 1942 and only recently liberated by the Russians from a prisoner of war 
camp in the Chinese city of Shenyang (Mukden), Stachouwer knew little about the 
internal conditions or political reality in the Dutch colony. He nevertheless asked the 
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Prime Minister to implore the British to keep their word, and to principally refuse to 
negotiate with the “unprincipled Quisling” Sukarno.147  
 The situation got even worse for the Dutch the next day. Just before leaving 
with his troops for Jakarta, outspoken Lieutenant General Sir Philip Christison, Corps 
Commander of the Allied Forces in the Netherlands East Indies, told reporters at a 
press conference in Singapore that the Republican government would not be expelled, 
and that no Dutch troops would be landing because of Indonesian opposition to this 
idea. He also announced his plan to meet with the leaders of the nationalist 
movement to try and bring them together at a round table conference with Dutch 
representatives.148 Christison’s words were a rather liberal translation of the directive 
he had received from Mountbatten not 48 hours earlier, in which the Supreme 
Commander had ordered him “to avoid clashes with the local population and to 
refrain from intervening in political matters.” Upon hearing of the press conference, 
however, Mountbatten at once sent new instructions to Christison, who, so the 
supreme commander reassured the Dutch, “no doubt had been misquoted.” 
Christison was to issue an immediate correction that stated that SEAC recognized 
only the Dutch government in the Netherlands East Indies, that Dutch troops would 
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come as soon as they were ready, and that he would of course bring a Dutch 
representative when he met with Indonesian leaders to discuss future negotiations.149  
 Van Mook, however, had already telegraphed Mountbatten to say that he could 
“hardly believe” that this gesture, which in his eyes amounted to de facto recognition of 
the Republic Indonesia, was made with his consent and without previous notice to the 
Dutch.150 Mountbatten in turn repeated that the British were “willing to help the 
Netherlands government to its lawful position,” but at the same time insisted that his 
forces could not “get involved in civil war as a consequence of an internal policy 
which seems unsuitable to them.” Increasingly uneasy with the difficult situation in 
which he found himself, Mountbatten then urged the British Chiefs of Staff: could 
not the matter of whether Sukarno and his associates truly were untrustworthy 
collaborators or rather suitable representatives be ironed out with the Netherlands 
government? Pessimistic about the chance of the Dutch and the British seeing eye to 
eye on this, however, he stated to his superiors that in his opinion, non-intervention 
would be the only safe course to pursue “both from the point of view of [the British] 
position in the Far East and of world opinion.”151  
Christison was also subjected to a great deal of criticism and recrimination in 
the Netherlands, where the Dutch government, infuriated and disappointed, sent a 	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statement to the press saying it refused to have discussions with “the so-called 
Sukarno government,” describing the Republican president as a man “with fascist 
tendencies” who had “systematically preached hatred against the Allies,” and “who 
may have certain demagogic gifts, but who had proved to be a mere opportunist in 
choosing the means to attain his end.” Any negotiations should be carried out with 
moderate Indonesians only, and the continuing unity of the Kingdom would be the 
foundation for such discussions, the statement concluded.152  
   
The arrival of British troops and reinforcements in Jakarta on September 29 
marked the start of what the Dutch later called the Bersiap period.153 Combined with 
the return of internees to their homes and the steady deterioration of Japanese 
authority, the build up of a British military presence before the actual arrival of Dutch 
troops created chaotic, volatile, and often violent conditions. Local groups of pemudas, 
who began to obtain weapons and organize themselves in late August, grew hostile 
toward white residents, all of whom they saw as adversaries. Revolutionary 
propaganda, which could be seen around the city of Jakarta not only in Indonesian 
but also in English, so that the arriving Allied troops could read it as well, became 
aggressive. Murder, kidnapping, looting, the ambushing of supply columns, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152  Declaration, 3 October 1945, in: NIB, I, p. 221-222, note 3.  
153  “Bersiap” in Indonesian means “get ready” or “get prepared.” It was the battle cry of the Indonesian 
revolution, aimed at mustering the population to “wake up” and prepare to fight. The Bersiap period is 
generally understood to refer to the period between August 1945 and late 1946.   
 
   
   
95 
intimidation, and “numerous acts of barbarism” were the order of the day, 
Mountbatten reported to London.154 
A violent confrontation between the armed nationalists and the Dutch 
appeared increasingly inevitable, especially since trigger-happy soldiers from the Royal 
Dutch East Indies Army, released from prison camps and back in uniform, also 
reorganized and took it upon themselves to forcefully restore law and order in the 
absence of Dutch authority. British Major General H.E. Pyman, who visited Java in 
early October, came away disturbed by the behavior of both these troops and former 
internees. They were acting “like reactionary exiles or neurotic prisoners of war and 
internees,” he wrote in his diary. “The former,” he went on, “[refused] to admit that 
Indonesians did declare their independence and assumed power on August 17, the 
latter [were] hysterically frightened that they [would] all be massacred” unless 
something was done at once.155 The first major clash came on September 19 in 
Surabaya in east Java, where a group of rowdy and belligerent Dutchmen raised the 
red-white-blue flag above Hotel Orange, which had been designated as Allied 
headquarters. The limited Japanese police force present was helpless and could not 
stop angry pemudas from storming in and tearing the blue band off the piece of cotton, 
leaving an improvised Republican red-white flag instead. The “flag incident” cost one 
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person his life, and was heavily mythologized afterwards as a landmark incident in the 
Indonesian revolution.156  
In early October, nationalists started rounding up Dutch and Indo-European 
civilians suspected of preparing and aiding the return of the Netherlands Indies 
colonial regime, and hundreds of them were imprisoned, tortured, or killed. On the 
other side, soldiers from the Dutch East Indies Army carried out atrocities, too, 
arresting those Indonesians they believed were leading the revolution. During this 
period, the cities of Bandung, Semarang, Magelang, and Surabaya became scenes of 
heavy fighting between Republican forces, Dutch soldiers, and the Japanese military. 
Suspected anti-revolutionaries included not only the white population, but also those 
groups that had traditionally been seen as loyal to the Netherlands government: 
Chinese Indonesians, Christian Indonesians, and Indonesians from Ambon, for 
example.157 
 The consequences of the violence of the Bersiap period are difficult to 
overestimate. The perceived wrongdoing of the nationalists hardened political and 
public opinion in the Netherlands, where most people found it almost impossible to 
imagine the reality of the situation in the East Indies. The Dutch were themselves 
severely punishing those who had collaborated with the German regime, and in their 
eyes the unrecognized and illegal Republic of Indonesia and its “Quisling” leaders 
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Sukarno and Hatta were solely to blame for the chaos.158 On the other side, 
Indonesian leadership attempted to unify the new Republic and its people under the 
revolutionary spirit, while at the same time attempting to regulate the chaos and quell 
the violence that impeded international recognition of that Republic. In pleading 
letters to General Christison and Brigadier General King, in charge of Jakarta, 
Sukarno and Hatta underlined that the Indonesian “quarrel” was only with the Dutch. 
The latter had lost face, owed their foothold to British support, and were trying to 
“recover lost prestige,” the politicians argued in the hope that London would clarify 
its position regarding the Indonesian struggle for independence.159  
 
After six weeks of having to look passively on from the sidelines in Australia or 
Singapore, and of reporting on the political, economic, and military conditions in the 
East Indies to his colleagues in The Hague without being able to assess the situation 
with his own eyes, Van Mook finally arrived at Jakarta’s airport on October 2. After 
reuniting with his wife and children, who had spent the war in a Japanese internment 
camp, he moved into the deserted palace of Governor-General Tjarda Van 
Starkenborgh-Stachouwer. There he surrounded himself with other newly liberated 
Dutch as well as officials he had brought from Brisbane. Immediately he took to 
writing to The Hague about what he had encountered in Jakarta. The situation in the 	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city was unimaginable, he noted, correctly, in the opening sentence of his first 
telegram. The administration of the whole town was in the hands of nationalists, 
something that the British troops present, wishing to stay neutral and lacking 
sufficient strength in numbers and material, had decided to accept. Among the Dutch 
Van Mook detected an atmosphere of tension and disappointment. “If everything 
weren’t so dramatic, it would have reminded me of an operetta,” he remarked dryly.160 
The first long telegram detailing the political situation on Java the Lieutenant 
Governor-General sent to The Hague on October 6. There was reason, he warned, to 
be concerned; although the masses were concerned with daily matters and longed for 
the old days, intellectuals and “semi-intellectuals,” as well as the population in the 
cities, was actively supporting the revolution.161 In his reports to the Dutch 
government Van Mook began making distinctions between “moderate” and 
“extremist” Indonesian nationalists. Extremists, the label he put also on Sukarno and 
Hatta, were to be dealt with forcefully and not to be negotiated with under any 
circumstances. Moderates, he advised Minister Logemann, could be worked with once 
the Dutch had restored law and order and reclaimed authority.162  
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Although the nationalist movement in Indonesia did indeed include a large 
variety of people with different motives, the one goal they had in common was the 
ideal of complete independence from the Netherlands. Administrators and officials, 
who for decades had described Indonesians as “passive people” who were generally 
peaceful-minded and little interested in political affairs, failed to see that in the eyes of 
the population, once the Republic had been established, the internal issue of 
collaboration was a moot point. The Dutch image of the revolution was one in which 
a small group of aggressive and extremist leaders sought to stir up the masses and 
motivate them towards action. Van Kleffens’ words illustrated this top-down 
perspective when he said that there existed in the archipelago a very small nucleus of 
“misguided” political aspiration, which was accompanied by “an outburst of 
hooliganism and opportunistic license” on the part of people who “[enjoyed] 
themselves in an orgy of demonstration, unlawful exercise of self-assumed and self-
directed authority.”163  
The Indonesian people, however, were not but recipients of the nationalist 
message. The spread of the revolution was not a one-way street, even as charismatic 
figures such as Sukarno utilized national symbols, the vernacular press and the radio, 
leaflets and pamphlets, speeches and slogans to appeal to the heterogeneous 
population of the islands. Large numbers of mobilized pemudas were pushing the 	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leaders of the independence movement not to compromise their ideal of “100% 
merdeka,” for instance, as we will see also in chapters to come. In reality, then, even 
those Van Mook labeled “moderates” were unlikely to compromise their dream for 
the meager promises the Dutch government was willing to make with regards to the 
future of Indonesia: increased independence in internal affairs, with no clear timeline 
for this to be accomplished but with a return of some form of colonial administration. 
Van Mook’s distinction was a wistful sign of the wishful thinking both Netherlands 
Indies and Dutch politicians engaged in during the last months of 1945. 
  
The Dutch felt abandoned by the British, whom they had counted on for 
support after they took over the responsibility for the restoration of law and order in 
the archipelago from the Americans in late July. By virtue of the fact that the British 
and Dutch governments had been wartime allies, decisionmakers in The Hague 
anticipated their colleagues in London to sympathize with their point of view, not 
push them to negotiate with “collaborators” like Sukarno. And had not the British 
colonial government, after Mahatma Gandhi’s call for immediate independence in 
August of 1942, imprisoned for the remainder of the war practically the entire Indian 
National Congress? That the British had neither the capacity, nor, increasingly, the 
will to assist the Dutch in the manner and to the extent expected did not dissuade the 
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Netherlands leadership from its point of view, nor did the presence of a viable and 
broadly supported nationalist government on the ground in Indonesia.164  
 On October 4 Minister of Foreign Affairs Van Kleffens again went to London, 
and, accompanied by the Dutch ambassador in Britain, Edgar Michiels van 
Verduynen, visited Foreign Secretary Bevin. Announcing his regret to have to discuss 
this “painful” subject, Van Kleffens told his colleague of the deep disappointment and 
discontent of both the Dutch government and the Dutch public with the British. 
After urging Bevin to speed up the transportation of Dutch troops to the Netherlands 
East Indies, he concluded by stating that, if anything happened to the former 
internees in the archipelago, he would have to hold the British accountable. Bevin, 
perplexed and embarrassed, according to Van Kleffens’ memorandum about the 
conversation, was eager to stress that he was doing everything he could to assist the 
Dutch.165  
  The straightforward directive that the British government had issued for its 
forces, namely, to disarm the Japanese and release prisoners while not getting 
involved in local politics or confrontations between the Indonesians and the Dutch, 
proved unworkable once it became clear that a functioning Republican government 
had been installed before their arrival. There was no clear British policy regarding 
Indonesia, and no easy answer to the question whose law and order it was, precisely, 
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that SEAC had to restore and protect. As a result of this lack of direction from 
London, Mountbatten and his political assistant Esler Dening were left to themselves 
to interpret what they saw and make suggestions to Whitehall. On October 5, Dening 
gave his opinion on the independence movements in Asia more broadly. Advising his 
superiors that the nationalists should be treated “with sympathy and understanding” 
in order to avoid “the end of Europe in Asia,” he nevertheless called them “half-
baked” and, if treated in the proper manner, “not very terrifying.” With regard to the 
Dutch, whose present attitude he did not find encouraging, Dening called on his 
colleagues to “stand no nonsense,” noting that it was British troops who were 
liberating the territories, and it was the British taxpayer who was paying for it.166   
Frustrated with the inadequate and unclear instructions from London, 
Mountbatten on that same day wrote a memo outlining the two major courses he 
considered open to the British. The first option was to continue with the limited 
policy goals of disarming the Japanese, releasing their prisoners, and maintaining law 
and order within key areas such as Jakarta and Surabaya. This would mean occupying 
just those regions while leaving the responsibility for the rest of the archipelago to the 
Dutch. Option two was to take over responsibility for law and order throughout the 
country. In this case, Mountbatten explained, the British must either pressure the 
Dutch to come to an arrangement with the Indonesians so that the three groups could 	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work in amity, or be willing to significantly expand the number of British forces. 
Although he did not give a recommendation either way, Mountbatten told his 
superiors that in his opinion, the military implications of the second course would be 
“most serious.”167 In the late afternoon of October 10, the British Defense 
Committee met and instructed Mountbatten to limit his task to Japanese disarmament 
and humanitarian relief.168  
That same day, Mountbatten and Christison met with Van Mook and Van der 
Plas in Singapore. The Lieutenant Governor-General charged that recent British 
actions had been interpreted by Indonesian nationalists, among whom pemudas 
“comparable to the Hitler Jugend,” as a recognition of what he again described as a 
“fascist” and “terrorist” Republican government. The long delay in re-occupation, 
Van Mook accused, had rapidly deteriorated a situation which had “contained 
dangerous elements but which would not, in itself, have been serious if quick action 
could have been taken.” Mountbatten replied by stating that it was the particular 
desire of the British government not to allow British, and especially British-Indian 
forces to become involved in the internal affairs of other countries; leaders of the 
independence movement in New Delhi, where the British had begun negotiations 
about dominion status for India, strongly protested the use of these forces to suppress 
Indonesian nationalism. Mountbatten assured Van Mook, however, that he was doing 
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everything in his power to expedite the arrival of Dutch forces in Java. The 
repudiation of Van der Plas’s conciliatory broadcast of September 29 by his own 
government in the Netherlands, Mountbatten in turn accused the Dutch, had wrecked 
his plan for friendly discussions with the Indonesian Republic.169  
Genuine Dutch efforts to reach some form of agreement with the nationalists, 
the commander argued, were an essential prerequisite to any change of policy he 
might be able to persuade the British government to take. “Working on [Van Mook] 
like mad” during the dinner that followed the meeting, Mountbatten further told the 
Lieutenant Governor-General that Sukarno and Hatta were “the right men with 
whom to deal.” When the group parted at the end of the evening, it was agreed that 
the Dutch would initiate a discussion with such political leaders as Van Mook deemed 
necessary, and that Mountbatten would ask the British government to broaden his 
directive so as to be able to provide a greater measure of military support.170 In the 
days that followed, Van Mook attempted to stop his government from out rightly 
opposing talks with Sukarno. In a personal letter to Logemann, Van Mook advised 
that it might be best not to condemn Sukarno and the independence movement in 
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words that were too strong. Most of all, he warned, the moderate and extremist 
nationalists should not be treated with the same brush.171  
In his response the minister nevertheless forbade Van Mook to talk to Sukarno 
or other “irreconcilables,” assuring him, too, that the Dutch government was not 
afraid of the negative British reaction to this stance. Anti-British sentiment in the 
Netherlands was growing, Logemann stated boldly.172 In a packed meeting of the 
Dutch Lower Chamber in the early afternoon of October 16, the minister openly 
spoke of his disappointment with the “questionable” decision of the British to occupy 
only Jakarta and Surabaya, and reassured parliamentarians that talks with Sukarno 
were out of the question. All future discussions would have to be based on the 
Queen’s December 1942 speech, which had made clear already that the old colonial 
regime would not return but that changes would have to be made in mutual 
agreement. After ending his speech by saying that the Netherlands would act 
forcefully to restore order, security, and prosperity, and that the Indies were blessed to 
be part of the Dutch Kingdom, Logemann was lauded with applause.173  
In Jakarta, meanwhile, Van Mook attempted to initiate a conversation with 
moderate nationalists, and held a press conference to announce this decision. When 
Reuters reported that the Dutch were prepared to negotiate with any and all 	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Indonesian leaders, the Dutch government quickly corrected this impression, insisting 
that it believed there must have been a misunderstanding as it had explicitly ruled out 
talks with Sukarno.174 Relations between Van Mook and The Hague thus became 
increasingly strained when it appeared that the Lieutenant Governor-General was 
ignoring instructions and pretending to have been given the authority to meet with 
any Indonesian nationalist. The British added they were greatly disappointed that Van 
Mook’s discretion had been fettered in this way, especially since their forces were 
scheduled to expand their positions and occupy the cities of Buitenzorg (now Bogor), 
Bandung, Semarang, and Surabaya in the days that followed.175  
But the Indonesians were also being pressed. In the second half of October, 
Dening admitted to London that support for the Republic was “very widespread and 
of a nature to be almost frightening.”176 He still believed, however, that it would be 
“unwise to exaggerate the strength and depth” of the Indonesian independence 
movement; “if sympathetically handled” it was “not sufficiently potent to constitute a 
menace.” Nevertheless, he had concluded, there was little doubt that nobody in the 
Indies wanted “the old gang” back, and there was “far too much evidence” of a “die-
hard and uncompromising spirit” among Netherlands Indies officers and officials. 
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Only categorical orders from The Hague, Dening ominously warned, would “prevent 
them from putting into practice their conviction that shooting is the cure.”177  
On October 23, Mountbatten’s adviser met informally with Sukarno, Hatta, 
and the Republican politicians leading the newly established Indonesian government 
departments. Dening explicitly stated he was not an intermediary between the Dutch 
and the Indonesians; the purpose of the meeting was solely to explain the attitude and 
actions of the British forces in Java. He echoed what the Dutch had been telling the 
British, namely that the Republic had been set up with the help of the Japanese as an 
endeavor to create trouble for the Allies. As such, he explained, it was “unlikely to 
find favor in the world.” He pressed upon Sukarno, whom he had described only ten 
days previous as “no very significant figure,” to use his influence with the 
revolutionaries to prevent violent clashes. If the extreme nationalist elements were not 
controlled, he argued, the Republican leadership would “earn universal 
condemnation.” The Netherlands government truly wished to implement internal 
reforms that met the legitimate aspirations of Indonesians, Dening concluded.178 A 
day after his meeting with Republican politicians, he who had advised Netherlands 
Indies officials to use “tact” with Indonesians reported to London that he felt he had 
“bullied [them] as far as [his] conscience would allow.” Some of the Indonesian 
suspicions toward the Dutch were not entirely unfounded, he again told his 	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colleagues; the Dutch resisted “the truth that the East [had] changed and changed 
radically as a result of the war.”179  
Van Mook believed that their meeting with Dening had made the Indonesians 
more willing to negotiate with the Dutch. Because of the growing tensions and 
dangers, the Lieutenant Governor-General once more explained to Logemann, it was 
imperative that the Dutch government declared the guidelines that would form the 
basis of such negotiations. As it would be obvious who would accept and who would 
decline these foundations, such an announcement could moreover serve to separate 
the Indonesian extremists from the moderates, Van Mook thought. He had gradually 
come to the realistic conclusion that excluding Sukarno from discussions a priori 
would inevitably lead to a fruitless meeting, but suggested to privately make it known 
to Sukarno that he was unacceptable as a negotiator in the hope that he would not 
come.180 The first direct meeting between the Dutch and Indonesians took place on 
October 31 at the house of General Christison. Present were Van Mook, Van der 
Plas, and P.J.A Idenburg (the former head of the Lieutenant Governor-General’s 
cabinet), and, on the Indonesian side, Hatta, the aged political adviser and long-time 
nationalist Haji Agus Salim, Sjahrir’s colleague and Minister of Defense Amir 
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Sjarifuddin, and, despite Van Mook’s scheme to exclude him, Sukarno. The parties 
exchanged views during a quiet conversation but achieved little of substance.181   
 
The British nevertheless regarded the meeting as a major breakthrough. From 
the Dutch point of view, however, Van Mook had committed nothing less than 
treason. In his memorandum to Logemann, sent only hours after the discussion had 
taken place, the Lieutenant Governor-General explained that Sukarno’s presence had 
been inevitable. The lack of contact between the Dutch and Republicans, so he wrote, 
had resulted in a breakdown of insight and understanding. His impression was that 
the Indonesian leaders were suspicious of Dutch intentions but trapped in an impasse, 
as the British kept them responsible for any violent acts committed by the extreme 
flank of the movement. In the superciliously paternalistic tone typical of him, he 
added that the level of “independent thought” the nationalists exhibited had surprised 
him, though it could be explained, he admitted, by their having been forced by the 
circumstances of the war to go their own way for three and a half years.182 In yet 
another telegram to Logemann the next day, Van Mook stated that it had been a 
tactical mistake on the part of the Dutch to concentrate on Sukarno as a collaborator; 
it had driven moderate nationalists into an anti-Dutch corner. None of the 
Indonesians in attendance, he underlined, had been aggressive or rude, and the 
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conversation had, without hesitation, taken place in “very good” Dutch. He had 
always insisted that the meeting served as a mere “orientation,” and had emphasized 
that the continued existence of the Republic was impossible.183   
But in The Hague, Prime Minister Schermerhorn insisted that Van Mook had 
acted without authorization. His cabinet even advocated firing the Lieutenant 
Governor-General, but realized that the circumstances prevented this course of 
action; Van Starkenborgh-Stachouwer, of the opinion that no concessions whatsoever 
should be made to the Indonesians and disagreeing with what he saw as a far too 
accommodating Dutch policy, had already asked to be relieved of his duties, and the 
Netherlands government could not do without both men.184 After Van Kleffens sent 
out a press declaration in which it was made clear that Van Mook had acted against 
the explicitly stated wishes of the government, both Logemann and Schermerhorn 
proceeded to London, where Queen Wilhelmina was, to discuss with her Van Mook’s 
future. The Lieutenant Governor-General, meanwhile, was sent a telegram that 
instructed him to immediately break off all contact with Sukarno.185 
Schermerhorn and Logemann also visited Bevin, who declared himself 
“distressed” about the reaction of the Dutch government to Van Mook’s meeting, 
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and feared it would have repercussions on the course of events in Indonesia.186 The 
British politician stressed that the Dutch should not be “stubborn” by wanting to 
return to 1939 rather than look forward to 1946. Bevin reasoned that what could have 
been done in August was no longer possible in October, and that in January it would 
not be possible to accomplish what could still be achieved in October.187 Dening was 
similarly afraid that the Netherlands government might “wreck” the negotiations and 
thereby put British troops in danger. “They may be entitled to jeopardize their own 
position but they are not entitled to jeopardize ours,” he wrote.188 The Queen was no 
more eager to dismiss Van Mook. Apart from the fact that a replacement would be 
difficult to find, she did not want the Lieutenant Governor-General, although he had 
made a severe mistake, to have to resign at this moment of peril. The cabinet could 
react in any way it pleased, she stated, but it could not fire him.189  
Van Mook himself, however, threatened to quit if he did not receive the 
support of the government and be allowed to meet with Sukarno. In a number of 
frustrated and desperate telegrams to Logemann, in which he again underlined that no 
one in the Netherlands could imagine the current conditions in Indonesia, he laid out 
the weak position of the Dutch.190 On November 6, the Minister of the Colonies 
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finally gave Van Mook permission to meet with Sukarno. In a long personal letter to 
the Lieutenant Governor-General he tried contextualize the extremely negative Dutch 
response to his inclusion of Sukarno in the negotiations. The national pride of the 
people, Logemann said, was deeply hurt by the revolution in the Indies. The stories 
about the suffering of the Dutch internees had created an atmosphere and psychology 
in which Sukarno had become a symbol of the injustice that had been brought upon 
the Netherlands. As far as the Dutch government could see, Van Mook had made a 
180-degree turn without warning when he agreed to meet with him, Logemann 
explained.191  
 
Meanwhile, in Surabaya in east Java especially, the British military was in 
trouble. The young nationalists and local Republican army in the city had defeated the 
Japanese in early October, and had taken hold of large stockpiles of weapons. A note 
had been delivered to the office of the Japanese resident that said that the time had 
arrived for Indonesians to “run every aspect of the government;” all administrative 
functions would now be under their control, and all matters of concern to the Allies 
must be negotiated with them.192 British Brigadier General A.W.S. Mallaby, under the 
impression that, because there were no Dutch officials present to complicate matters, 
bringing law and order to Surabaya would be a relatively straightforward task, led his 
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4,000 men strong 49th Indian Infantry Brigade into the harbor of Surabaya on 
October 25. Once in the city, however, he was unable to ignore that Indonesians 
controlled it and had to be negotiated with. He tentatively agreed with them that his 
troops were there solely to disarm and evacuate the Japanese, and let the Indonesians 
keep the weapons they had already acquired.193  
Three days later, however, the situation got out of hand. Tens of thousands of 
Republican troops and nationalists who saw the arrival of the British as a sign of the 
impending return of a Dutch colonial administration started attacking their posts in 
the city, setting fire to buildings and killing some 250 British Indian troops.194 Mallaby 
signaled for support from Jakarta, where Sukarno was asked to try and control the 
mass of angry people in Surabaya. During the morning of October 29, after arriving in 
the city on a British plane, Sukarno spoke over the radio and asked the population to 
stop the attacks, describing their influence on the success of the revolution as “a grain 
of arsenic in a clear glass of water.”195 The next day a ceasefire was signed, and the 
British agreed to withdraw to the harbor. Scattered fighting continued, however, and 
when Mallaby himself tried to enforce the armistice he was killed by a mass of people 
who stopped his vehicle and started firing.196  
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Christison demanded that those guilty of the murder surrender to the British 
army. To show that he was serious, he ordered the complete 5th Indian Division to 
Surabaya. In a proclamation sent out on October 31, the commander threatened to 
“bring the whole weight of [his] sea, land, and air forces and all the weapons of 
modern war against them until they [were] crushed.”197 In a letter to the Hague, Van 
Mook dejectedly stated that the British had first ruined the situation by appearing 
weak and unresolved, and now blamed the Dutch for the difficult position they found 
themselves in.198 Sukarno again had to be called upon to order his countrymen to lay 
down their arms. During the ceasefire that followed, the British evacuated large 
numbers of Dutch internees as well as their own wounded men, and reinforced their 
position by bringing in more troops and material. On November 9, they sent the 
Republican authorities in Surabaya an impossible ultimatum. If all armed Indonesians 
did not surrender within 24 hours, the 5th Division would open hostilities. Instead of 
preparing to surrender, the nationalists in the city prepared to fight. The battle that 
started the next day would last until late November. The important lesson it taught 
the British, so Van der Post later noted, was that Indonesian nationalism “was not a 
shallow, effeminate, intellectual cult but a people-wide, tough and urgent affair.”199 
The Battle of Surabaya was a symbolic rallying cry of “hysterical ferocity” that made 
clear that the military power and determination of Republicans was considerable. 	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Fierce fighting was moreover also breaking out in Semarang and Magelang in central 
Java, where thousands of Dutch internees were waiting to be evacuated and small 
groups of British troops were trying to keep order. The Allied position on the island 
was rapidly weakening.200  
These worrying developments did not go unnoticed by the Australian 
government in Canberra. As part of Mountbatten’s South East Asia Command, 
Australian troops had liberated the island of Borneo and the eastern parts of the 
Indonesian archipelago relatively effortlessly over the course of the previous months. 
Netherlands Indies administrators had quickly followed these forces and reestablished 
Dutch authority; they had soon consolidated their position and controlled, despite 
some resistance most notably in south Celebes (Sulawesi), most of the region. As 
such, the post surrender situation in Java was at first not of great interest to the 
Australian government, as Margaret George also notes.201 As the prospects in Java 
became gloomy, however, the leadership in Canberra moved from its previously 
neutral position to one of open sympathy for the Republican cause. “In view of the 
vital Australian interests in a satisfactory and enduring settlement, guarantee of 
political stability, social progress, and our own military security in the area,” officials 
from the Department of External Affairs warned the Foreign Office in London in 
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early November, “we shall now consider our attitude more tenable.” The best hope of 
a compromise solution, the Australian government noted, lay in negotiations between 
the Indonesians and the Dutch, the latter of whom were advised to take independence 
movement very seriously.202  
 
Van Mook, meanwhile, spent early November outlining a new policy. The 
continued fights in Java and the difficulties the British encountered made him realize 
that the Indonesian nationalists were in a much better position, and received much 
broader support, than anyone had previously thought. To restore Dutch authority in 
the Indies, at least 75,000 troops would be necessary, he calculated. That was many 
more than were currently available, and many more, too, than could reasonably be 
expected to be brought over from the Netherlands in time to make a difference. This 
led Van Mook to conclude that it was impossible for the Netherlands to reoccupy the 
whole of the archipelago using only its own forces. The Hague, he reasoned, should 
adjust its military and strategic goals, accommodating both the British and the 
different circumstances in the various parts of the archipelago.203 Perhaps it was best 
to give up on Java for the time being, he reasoned, and instead focus on the 
reoccupation of the islands of Bangka and Belitung (Billiton), the Riau Islands, 
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Borneo (today Kalimantan), and the eastern islands of Indonesia, where the fire of the 
revolution had not yet set the sky ablaze. The current failures on Java meant the 
prestige of the Dutch in these outer regions was at risk of crumpling. It would be 
relatively easy to restore Netherlands Indies authority in those economically important 
and more benevolent regions, Van Mook explained to Logemann, and successes there 
would give a much-needed boost to Dutch morale.204 
 The Lieutenant Governor-General called in two of the most prominent Dutch 
military leaders to discuss his proposals. Van der Post later described Lieutenant 
General Ludolph H. Van Oyen, Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Netherlands 
Indies Army, as a “handsome ripened air-force officer” who was universally disliked 
by his countrymen, and said of Admiral Conrad E. Helfrich that he “had never been 
known to voice a political opinion more subtle or progressive than: “Shoot the 
lot.””205 Helfrich and Van Oyen, both of whom had been stationed in the 
Netherlands Indies at the time of the Japanese invasion but avoided capture, were 
archconservative representatives of the old colonial guard, unable to accept that new 
conditions made it necessary to reevaluate older policies. They were of the opinion 
that the uncontrolled Javanese “bands of thugs,” as they called them, would be easily 
put down by forceful action, and that ninety percent of the population of the 
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archipelago was pro-Dutch and would not resist.206 “When dealing with native rabbles 
the most profitable way is to hit immediately and hit hard,” Helfrich explained to 
Mountbatten during a SEAC meeting in early December.207 The officers believed that 
once law and order were restored in Java, peace and quiet would return to the whole 
of the archipelago; they believed the policy proposed by Van Mook amounted to 
abandonment and appeasement and was therefore “unacceptable.”208 
 Helfrich and Van Oyen were immensely disliked by the British, who questioned 
the abilities of the high-ranking wiseacres. Even Van Mook told Logemann he had 
found them too old and sentimental, and not resourceful or imaginative enough to 
provide him with clear insight.209 The Lieutenant Governor-General therefore also 
asked the opinion of Van der Plas, the Dutch troop commander on West Java Major 
General W. Schilling, and his aide P.J.A. Idenburg, who had spent the war in a 
Japanese prison camp. All three believed the people of Java did not wish to see the 
Dutch colonial authorities return, and came to the conclusion that a large-scale 
military solution to the political problems was impossible. In a lengthy memo to Van 
Mook, Idenburg opined that given the weak position of the Dutch, an inflexible 
attitude would be a serious mistake. He told his supervisor that the Republic was 
supported by intellectuals, extremists, young people, and a conglomerate of 
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“developed” people who had been infected by the others. It was of no relevance, 
Idenburg argued, that the Indonesian leaders themselves found it difficult to manage 
and direct the nationalist feelings of the population; a revolution had succeeded, he 
said, once the masses had been moved and the existing authorities had lost control of 
the situation. The Dutch should proclaim their intent to “renew” rather than 
“restore” in the East Indies, he advised, especially with an eye to international 
opinion.210 Van der Plas pointed out to Van Mook that the Dutch government’s hope 
to keep the conflict from attracting worldwide scrutiny and criticism was little more 
than “wishful thinking.” The situation in Indonesia would be discussed in the United 
Nations, he cautioned, and this would have negative consequences for the 
Netherlands.211 General Schilling looked at Van Mook’s problems from a military 
standpoint, stated that a quick defeat of Indonesian nationalism seemed impossible, 
and posed the question whether the Dutch public was prepared to take on the task of 
waging a long war to restore colonial authority in the Indies. Reoccupying the whole 
archipelago, he concluded, would surmount the powers of the Dutch.212  
 All three advised Van Mook that the Dutch had to try to find a political 
solution to the conflict in the Netherlands East Indies. Strengthening colonial 
authority in places other than Java would solidify the Dutch position at the 
negotiation table, they agreed. The debate in Dutch policy circles regarding the long-	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term military, political, and strategic goals therefore took a turn. On November 25, 
Van Mook informed Logemann that a drawn-out war would place an “unacceptable 
burden” on the Netherlands. Were the Dutch and Indonesians, like two tired and 
increasingly exhausted boxers, to continue the fight round after round without an end 
in sight, the spectacle would moreover be ended in a drastic manner through the 
involvement of the international community, Van Mook analogized.213 The Lieutenant 
Governor-General instead proposed the idea of a federal construction; an Indonesian 
“commonwealth” or “United States of Indonesia” would enhance the authority of the 
Dutch in the rest of the archipelago, while Republicans could shape the 
administration in Java. This federal Indonesia would then, after a transition period, be 
given the status of equal and self-governed partner of the Netherlands while 
remaining within the Kingdom. The Dutch could continue to play a role in Southeast 
Asia that would bring prestige to the Netherlands in the eyes of the world, Van Mook 
concluded.214  
In Jakarta, meanwhile, Sukarno had appointed Sutan Sjahrir as Prime Minister. 
The President remained the ceremonial head of state, and although Sukarno stepped 
out of the limelight, he retained the right to dismiss ministers or to fall back upon the 
provisions of the original constitution, which if needed could grant him all powers of 
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government.215 Sjahrir’s quiet demeanor and perceived integrity during the war, when 
he had refused to cooperate with the Japanese administration, made him a far more 
suitable negotiator to the Dutch than the flamboyant Sukarno. The Western-educated, 
refined Sjahrir and his new cabinet of ministers moreover fit with the Republic’s 
purpose to seek international acceptance, while the Prime Minister’s popularity with 
the young pemudas at the same time helped forge a sense of national unity. The Dutch, 
despite labeling Sjahrir “gifted” and “courageous” and describing the ministers in his 
cabinet as “moderate” and “of excellent intelligence,” remained cautious. In late 
November, for instance, the BBC aired a broadcast in which Logemann was quoted 
as having said that the Dutch were prepared to use force in order to maintain the 
Netherlands East Indies as part of the Kingdom.216  
Schermerhorn and his ministers discussed the possibility of changing course in 
Indonesia just before Christmas 1945, after Van Mook had arrived in the Netherlands 
to further explain his proposals. Although the two had recently found themselves at 
loggerheads more often than usual, Logemann supported his friend, emphasizing that 
Indonesia, in the end, must be able to determine its own fate. Some of the minister’s 
colleagues, most notably Minister of Finance Pieter Lieftinck, took exception to this. 
It was not clear, the opposition argued, which moderate Indonesians would be open 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215 For more on the KNIP, see: P.J. Drooglever, “The KNIP and Internal Politics within the Republic 
Indonesia, as Seen by Dutch Observers,” Konferensi Internasional Revolusie Nasional, Jakarta, July 1995.  
216  Notes of Van Asbeck’s (Van Mook’s assistant) journey to Jakarta, 10-30 November, in: NIB, II, no. 
111; McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War, 106-107; Dennis, 147. 
 
   
   
122 
for discussions with the Dutch. And within the proposed Indonesian federation, what 
exactly would remain of the role and influence of the Netherlands? Van Mook had 
neglected to mention to Republicans, Lieftinck argued, that the unity of the Kingdom 
came first and foremost. He had focused too much on the need for separation and 
too little on the possibility of a continued connection, others said. The principle 
question, Van Mook responded, was whether the Dutch government wished the 
Indies to remain subordinate to the Netherlands, or whether it would allow the 
colony, after a transition period of perhaps 25 to 30 years, to choose its own course. 
Logemann added that the Dutch must free themselves of the assumption that they 
had a say in this matter at all; the struggle of the Indonesian nationalists, Logemann 
and Van Mook argued together, had during the last four months become a worldwide 
symbol for the ideology laid down in the Atlantic Charter.217  
 
 Although the revolution in Indonesia constituted the first major challenge to 
the administration’s plans for postwar Southeast Asia, few Americans lay awake 
thinking about the issue in late 1945. A State Department paper had nevertheless 
recognized the problem the United States would soon come to face: how was it to 
harmonize the two policy objectives of increased political freedom for the Far East 
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and the maintenance of the unity of the leading United Nations?218 The transfer of the 
responsibility for the liberation of the Netherlands East Indies from MacArthur to 
Mountbatten in July 1945 had allowed the United States to focus on the war with 
Japan. It also enabled policymakers in Washington to steer clear of committing 
America to the position of mediator between the colonial powers and European allies 
on the one hand, and the developing nations fighting for self-determination on the 
other. After the Japanese surrender, in other words, the United States had been able 
to remain aloof from the controversies surrounding the reoccupation of Southeast 
Asia. American eyes fixed instead on Europe, which after a sober calculation was 
determined to be the area of priority. Despite the warnings of a few astute State 
Department officials that the war would lead to intensified nationalist sentiment, as 
we have seen in Chapter 2, most in government circles were not prepared for the 
intensity of the nationalist rebellions throughout Southeast Asia nor the establishment 
of a popular local government in Indonesia.219  
In the early phase of the revolution, Indonesian nationalists had been inspired 
by traditional American ideals such as freedom, democracy, and self-determination; 
many of the statements and slogans scrawled on the walls of public buildings in 	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Jakarta and Surabaya were in English, proclaiming their fight one “for [their] 
inalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” for instance.220 The 
Dutch were worried about American intentions, suspecting that the real objective of 
the United States was “to elbow them out in order to take over their economic 
stakes.”221 The Netherlands government need not have been concerned. Apart from 
politely urging the colonial powers to pledge eventual self-government for the 
indigenous peoples of Southeast Asia, the United States provided no tangible support 
to the revolutionary nationalists. Also, since no American troops were involved in the 
liberation of the territory, news coverage of the increasingly violent conflict in the 
Netherlands East Indies was minimal. The New York Times tellingly misspelled Sutan 
Sjahrir and Sukarno’s names as late as October 1945.222    
Under the lend-lease program, however, the Netherlands received large 
amounts of American arms that had been brought over to the region for use in the 
Allied assault on Japan. When the Dutch began to deploy them as they saw fit, and 
perhaps as a way to make it appear as if they enjoyed full American backing, the 
Truman administration disassociated itself; in mid October, Secretary of State James 
F. Byrnes ordered that all United States insignia be removed from American 
equipment in Indonesia, since “a use of [material] marked in any way to identify the 
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United States with activities of the user might be misunderstood.” This gesture did 
little to stem growing Indonesian misgivings about Washington supplying the Dutch 
with the arms and resources that made their anti-revolutionary efforts possible.223 
 Around the same time the director of the State Department’s Office of Far 
Eastern Affairs, John Carter Vincent, caused a stir in his lecture to the Foreign Policy 
Association in New York when he hinted at an American offer to mediate in the 
conflict between the Dutch government and the Indonesian nationalists. “It is not our 
intention,” he stated, “to assist or participate in forceful measures for the imposition 
of control by the territorial sovereigns,” he said, but the United States would be 
“prepared to lend […] assistance, if requested to do so, in efforts to reach peaceful 
agreements.” Sukarno, appealing to the United States to act as mediator, noted that 
the statement was “in confirmation with [the Indonesian] national aspiration” and 
would “contribute to the establishment of peace and order in the Far East.”224 When 
the Dutch demanded a clarification, Washington policymakers, suspecting that 
Vincent’s remarks had strengthened the Republicans in their stance, replied that the 
Indonesian reference to a declaration from the State Department was an attempt to 
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distort the facts; the speech marked no new departure from old policy, and the United 
States would entertain requests for mediation “only from the territorial sovereign.”225 
 
 It slowly became apparent during the last months of 1945 that the return to 
imperial rule in Southeast Asia as projected by the United States would be neither 
smooth nor orderly, but it would take still longer for American planners, relying on 
only a handful of officials in the Netherlands East Indies, to reassess the changing 
political conditions in the region. When American Consul-General Walter A. Foote, 
who had spent twelve years in the Netherlands East Indies before the war and had 
stayed with the Dutch in exile in Brisbane, arrived back in Jakarta in mid October, his 
sympathy for the Dutch jumped from the pages of his resumed telegrams to 
Washington. As late as December 30, for instance, he made statements similar to 
those made by Van Mook in early October: “ninety-eight percent of people [in 
Indonesia] are apathetic towards politics and want peace above all.”226  
With Southeast Asia not yet considered a likely trouble spot, the United States, 
uncertain and uninformed, was under little pressure to confront the issues raised by 
the dispute in Indonesia. In mid October Abbot Moffat, chief of the State 
Department’s Division of Southeast Asian Affairs, emphasized in a memo to Vincent 	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that it was important to avoid any entanglement in the colonial problems of the 
Dutch “unless essential to protect American security interests from some threat not 
presently visible.” The United States thus continued expecting that the Dutch would 
be wise enough to eventually grant some measure of authority to a West-leaning 
indigenous Indonesian government.227  
Throughout the last months of the year the increasingly harried British 
repeatedly asked the American government for a policy statement regarding the 
situation in Indonesia.228 On December 19, the State Department responded: “The 
United States government has viewed with increasing concern recent developments in 
the Netherlands East Indies,” the announcement read. Urging the Dutch and 
Indonesians to negotiate, it declared the American hope that an agreement could be 
reached between “the Netherlands authorities, as representatives of the territorial 
sovereign, and the Indonesian leaders.” The statement did not mention the principles 
of self-determination or a willingness to mediate in the dispute, but neither did it 
alienate either of the parties.229 
 The British, after months of close cooperation with the Dutch both in the 
Netherlands East Indies and in Europe, were less optimistic about the future. They 
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had initially found it difficult to get a real sense of the Indonesian revolution, and had 
been willing to support a colonial ally. Once the Republican government proved more 
viable than expected politicians in London, however, and at Mountbatten’s urgent and 
influential advise, the government had come to the realization that it did not have the 
means to take on a full scale war. The Indonesian question was doubly complicated 
because it was a matter of “non-British colonial possessions being reclaimed by 
British troops in the name of other masters,”230 something the delicacy of which the 
Dutch failed to grasp when they blamed Whitehall for the collapse of the Dutch 
empire.  
Despite changed circumstances, inflexible Dutch policymakers insisted that the 
British abide by the civil affairs agreement. This accord had envisioned Mountbatten’s 
forces restoring and maintaining law and order “until a lawful government of the 
islands was able to function.” The Netherlands Indies administration, Dutch officials 
argued, was the lawful government.231 They did not appreciate, then, that the Supreme 
Commander’s pragmatic recognition of Sukarno and Hatta as important 
representatives of the nationalist movement and his acceptance of them as leaders 
with clear visions as well as broad support from the population, was an attempt to 
deal with a new reality. Mountbatten believed his forces were under no obligation to 
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reconquer the islands and suppress the Indonesian revolution in order to restore 
Dutch authority, but nevertheless saw his original task widely expanded.232  
Other major headaches were the restoration of law and order in French 
Indochina, Malaya, and Burma, for which Mountbatten’s South East Asia Command 
was also responsible. In Indochina, the revolutionary leader Ho Chi Minh had seen 
the Japanese occupation as an opportunity to end French colonial presence. Much like 
the Indonesian pemudas, the fighters in his Viet Minh independence movement had 
taken over public buildings and weapons from the defeated Japanese, and during the 
second half of August a guerilla army had entered Hanoi. On September 2, Ho Chi 
Minh had proclaimed Vietnam’s independence. As some 200,000 Chinese troops sent 
by Chiang Kai-shek occupied the north of the country to officially accept the 
surrender of Japanese forces, a small Franco-British task force entered Saigon in the 
south. In early October, General Philippe Leclerc arrived with more troops. Over the 
course of the last months of 1945, his orders were to wait for reinforcements, which 
soon arrived in great numbers, before negotiating with Viet Minh officials. In Malaya, 
meanwhile, the population resisted British plans to create a Malayan Union, and 
tensions between Malays and the economically dominant ethnic Chinese were on the 
rise. Burma, finally, had been a major battleground during the war and was devastated. 
Towards the end of the year, with British casualties in Java already numbering over 	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one thousand and a looming danger of military and financial overextension, London 
increasingly hoped that successful negotiations could lead to a quick settlement in the 
Indonesian archipelago.  
This inevitably brought planners in Whitehall into conflict with the Dutch, who 
only grudgingly accepted the inevitability of discussions with Republicans, and 
certainly could not consent to moving forward with what they felt was improper 
haste. While abroad he was accused of being unable to recognize the changed 
conditions of the postwar world, politicians in The Hague regularly branded Van 
Mook too willing to compromise. According to Van der Post, the Lieutenant 
Governor-General could sometimes be found “in the depths of despair, bleary-eyed, 
red-nosed, chain-smoking endless American cigarettes that his trembling hands could 
hardly light” and saying he was going to resign, only to be encountered later in the day 
“rubbing a pair of steadied hands, his eyes cleared and with a smile on his face, 
asserting gleefully that things had never gone better.”233 Upon his return to the 
archipelago, Van Mook had gradually changed his view of the Republic; at first he 
believed it to be nothing but a Japanese puppet regime, but eventually he had to admit 
that it had a genuine following among part of the population. Even as he realized that 
the Dutch government’s attitude towards Sukarno played straight into the hands of 
extremist nationalists, facing the reality of the nature of the Indonesian revolution 
remained difficult. In the years that followed, as we will see in the chapters to come, 	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the Lieutenant Governor-General would maintain his conviction that the Republican 
government was not truly representative of the majority of Indonesians. 
Van Mook was stuck between revolutionary Indonesians and archconservative 
Dutch military men in Jakarta, but found he was most hampered by his colleague 
politicians in The Hague who refused to accept that the Dutch were helpless not only 
because of the lack of men and material, but also because they had lost authority and 
control. Van Mook’s typically Dutch description of the situation in late 1945 seems 
apt: the fragile promise of negotiations, he mused, was like a “small dike of 
cooperation, weak and soggy, in the midst of violently swirling water on both 
sides.”234   
After declaring the independent Republic Indonesia on August 17, Sukarno, 
Hatta, Sjahrir, and other revolutionary leaders faced two challenges. The first was to 
gain international recognition of the Indonesian right to self-determination and the 
legality of the new state, the second was to bring together in spirit 70 million people 
on over 17,000 islands and forge the internal conditions of peace that would allow for 
a functioning governing apparatus to be established. In the first few months after the 
declaration, pursuing both goals simultaneously seemed an almost insurmountable 
task. To the world, the leaders needed to appear calm, composed, diplomatic, and 
unified. To their fellow Indonesians, most notably the large groups of pemudas, this 
attitude made it seem like their ideal of immediate and complete independence from 	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the Netherlands, “100% merdeka,” was being compromised. The change in Indonesian 
leadership in the shape of a cabinet of moderate officials and intellectuals and Sjahrir 
as Prime Minister in mid November, then, gave some hope to all involved.  
After the last meeting between the Dutch and the British in 1945, held at the 
country residence of British Prime Minister Attlee on December 25, the two 
governments issued a joint 
statement that was meant 
to illustrate Dutch 
willingness to enter into 
constructive negotiations 
with the Republicans. On 
that Christmas Day, too, 
Prime Minister Sjahrir sent 
a telegram to President 
Harry Truman in which he expressed the hope that the United States, always having 
been “in the forefront of the fight for liberty, justice, and self-determination,” would 
begin to use its influence to assist the Indonesians in “the greatest struggle for 
national existence.”235 
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Chapter 3 
	  
Negotiation: January 1946 - December 1946 
 
                               “Over there they live under facts and here we live under principles.”236 	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  J.A. Jonkman, November 1946 	  	  
“The Dutch are living in a dream world bounded by their prewar prejudices,” 
Australian representative in Jakarta A.D. Brookes cabled Canberra in May of 1946. 
“In the main their senses are so warped,” he continued, “that although they are a 
[defeated] nation both at home and in the Indies, they seem unable to appreciate and 
recognize the rise of eastern nationalism.”237 Yet as 1945 drew to a close, and the 
Dutch government agreed to resume negotiations with Republicans, planners in 
London and Washington believed that their colleagues in the Netherlands were 
beginning to see reason, and hoped that a swift settlement to the troubles in the 
Indonesian archipelago might be found. Minister of the Colonies J.H.A. Logemann in 
The Hague further fueled this conviction when he publicly admitted that the Dutch 
had been “rowing against the tide” and that the colonial relationship in its present 
form was “outdated.” He realized that the world expected his countrymen to “steer 
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[a] new course,” so Stanley K. Hornbeck, the American ambassador in the 
Netherlands, optimistically reported to Secretary of State James Byrnes in early 
1946.238 
 This chapter examines the crucial early period of negotiations between the 
Dutch and Indonesians, so often glossed over by historians, leading up to the 
initialing of the Linggadjati Agreement in November. To what extent might we argue 
that the year 1946 was when the best opportunities for a peaceful settlement of the 
conflict in the archipelago were missed? How did the policy of Mountbatten in 
Singapore and of Whitehall in London, set on withdrawing British troops from the 
region as soon as possible, influence the course of events? What can the troubled 
relationship between the government in The Hague and its Commission General, sent 
to Jakarta to assist in finding a solution, tell us about Dutch intentions? And what 
were the consequences, both within the archipelago and outside, of Republican Prime 
Minister Sutan Sjahrir’s decision to employ a strategy of diplomacy over armed 
struggle in the search for international recognition? 
 
 In early January of 1946, British Prime Minister Clement Attlee, Foreign 
Secretary Ernest Bevin, and Lieutenant Governor-General Hubertus van Mook 
decided that the essential preliminary for the launch of talks between the Dutch and 	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Indonesians was the establishment of a safe area. Attlee again emphasized that the 
British objectives in the region were limited and included only helping to evacuate 
former prisoners of war and internees and enabling the start of constructive 
negotiations. It was imperative, he stated, that the withdrawal of British troops could 
get underway. The replacement of these forces by properly trained and equipped 
Dutch soldiers was projected to be complete by late 1946.239  
 To assist the parties in their efforts to reach a settlement, Attlee appointed two 
political advisers. He transferred to the archipelago his top diplomat from the British 
embassy in Moscow, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, and announced that Lord Killearn, the 
ambassador to Egypt, would take the post of special commissioner for Southeast Asia 
in Singapore. Supreme Commander Mountbatten was due to leave Singapore and the 
Southeast Asia Command (SEAC) in mid 1946.240 The Dutch government in The 
Hague, meanwhile, was to draft proposals that Van Mook could take back to Jakarta. 
These should clearly outline the boundaries within which the Lieutenant Governor-
General was authorized to negotiate during his talks with Republican Prime Minister 
Sutan Sjahrir. Foreseeing trouble, both the Netherlands ambassador in London, Edgar 
Michiels van Verduynen, and the British ambassador in The Hague, Sir Nevile Bland, 
pressed Bevin to put pressure on the Indonesians. The Dutch cabinet was having a 
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difficult time defending itself in parliament, they argued, where conservative members 
were becoming increasingly critical of the government’s Indonesia policy.241 
On the ground in the archipelago, too, changes were affected in early 1946. To 
the delight and satisfaction of the Dutch, Attlee replaced General Sir Philip 
Christison, who, as we have seen in Chapter 3, upon his arrival in Java had so 
unwisely stated his belief that Van Mook should meet with Sukarno. The Dutch, for 
their part, called back Admiral C.E.L. Helfrich and Commander L.H. van Oyen, 
whose conservative attitudes and unwillingness and incapability to control their 
“trigger happy” troops had made them increasingly unpopular with the British. 
Commander of the Navy A.S. Pinke and army General S.H. Spoor took their posts.242  
 Continuing unrest in Jakarta in the form of Dutch ambushes and raids on 
buildings and offices used by Indonesian nationalists nevertheless led to the relocation 
of the entire Republican government, except Prime Minister Sjahrir, to Yogyakarta in 
Central Java. With no Dutch or British troops present to restrict republican activities, 
independence seemed a reality in this city. Yogyakarta quickly became the center of 
the revolution. Increased freedom meant that President Sukarno, for instance, could 
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go on political speaking tours. It also allowed the political parties of the prewar era to 
be resurrected. The three major parties, the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI), the Partai 
Komunis Indonesia (PKI), and Sjahrir’s Partai Sosialis (PS), supported the principle of 
“100% merdeka:” immediate and complete independence. Sjahrir had to juggle this 
popular demand with Dutch and British pressures for a compromise agreement. The 
Prime Minister had formed his cabinet with an eye toward discussions with the Dutch 
and therefore placed much importance on the image of the young Indonesian 
Republic as a stable democratic society. Not everyone in Yogyakarta backed his policy 
of cooperation and diplomasi, however; Sjahrir was becoming increasingly unpopular 
with radical nationalists, young pemudas, and military groups, most of whom favored a 
violent but quick struggle over prolonged discussions and possible concessions to 
Netherlands East Indies authorities.243  
Despite Sjahrir’s continued insistence that only a Dutch recognition of the right 
of Indonesians to full self-governance could serve as a basis for negotiations, Van 
Mook expressed his belief that a solution could be found.244 Netherlands planners in 
The Hague, however, still found the precarious situation that the Lieutenant 
Governor-General had found himself in after his return to Jakarta in September 1945 
unimaginable. They maintained their argument that the Republic was wholly a 
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Japanese creation and could not possibly find a following among the population of 
the islands. Focusing on Sjahrir’s weak political position and wavering support, they 
reluctantly accepted Van Mook’s most recent proposals. His suggestion to create a 
federal Indonesian state made up of “areas with varying degrees of autonomy” was 
approved only after provisions were made for a 25-year transition period before 
independence. This plan therefore did hardly constitute a new course in the Dutch 
government’s Indonesia policy, and contained few concrete points to offer those 
Republican decisionmakers willing to give Sjahrir’s policy of diplomasi a chance. 
Realizing this, British officials in Southeast Asia were growing skeptical of Dutch 
behavior. Their assumption that the Netherlands would “behave with good sense” 
might have been premature, Mountbatten’s political adviser Esler Dening warned in 
early 1946. To secure the quick settlement that would allow British troops to leave the 
troubled archipelago, perhaps the new United Nations Organization should assume 
responsibility for the area?245  
The international community indeed discussed an intervention. In mid January, 
during the very first session of the Security Council, the delegate for the Ukraine 
indicated he wanted the UN to examine the threat to world peace posed by British 
operations in the Indonesian archipelago. The question was debated again in early 
February, when the Russian representative claimed that the British and Japanese had 
been suppressing an authentic revolt of the Indonesian people against their colonial 	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oppressors. Although unwilling to accept this characterization of his government’s 
policy, and keen to point out that the Dutch were internationally recognized as the 
sovereign power in the territory, Bevin nevertheless promised that British troops 
would withdraw from the region as soon as possible. The motion soundly defeated, 
and criticism of Dutch policy momentarily stifled, pressure for a satisfactory 
settlement nevertheless increased.246 
 
After weeks of lobbying in The Hague, Van Mook returned to the Indonesian 
archipelago in late January. The situation he encountered there did not increase his 
hopes. A large number of Royal Dutch Indies Army troops present had been interned 
in Japanese prison camps during the war and was still weak. They lacked food, 
technical equipment, and reliable lines of communication. Not a day passed without 
small skirmishes or more significant fighting breaking out between Dutch soldiers and 
groups of Indonesian fighters. Oftentimes, the British had to be called in to help 
restore a tense quiet. Talks between the Dutch and Republicans nevertheless resumed 
on February 10 under the watchful eye of diplomat Clark Kerr. 
At this point, the Lieutenant Governor-General unfolded the unimaginative 
proposal drawn up by the Dutch government. It called for the creation of a federal 
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Indonesian state, but it did not mention the Republic per se, and implied continuing 
Dutch control over Indonesian internal and external affairs. A transfer of greater 
powers to Indonesian representatives was to be gradual and remained a prospect only 
for the distant future. In a meeting with the American Consul-General in Jakarta, 
Walter Foote, a disappointed Sjahrir confessed that the proposal was unacceptable to 
the extent that it was impossible for his delegation even to discuss its details. He had 
no hope whatsoever for the negotiations to succeed, the Prime Minister intimated, 
and feared that they might lead to the fall of his government.247    
Privately, Van Mook, too, complained. His colleagues in The Hague and the 
people of the Netherlands, he told Clark Kerr, lacked imagination. The Lieutenant 
Governor-General illustrated his own muddled thinking when he insisted that 
Indonesian nationalists lived in “a dream world of independence,” yet at the same 
time maintained that the only difference between moderate Indonesians and the 
Dutch government in The Hague was “the impossible and the possible way of 
realizing the same ideal.” Echoing Van Mook’s convictions, Clark Kerr warned Sjahrir 
that insisting on an official recognition of the Republic would persuade the world that 
the nationalists were foolish and unreasonable, and moreover would cost them the 
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sympathy they now enjoyed.248 The Prime Minister countered by explaining that many 
in Yogyakarta, among whom President Sukarno and Vice-President Mohammad 
Hatta, were opposed to any form of Indonesian “apprenticeship.”249 
Within days of the reopening of negotiations, then, momentum had dissipated 
and discussions between the Dutch and Republicans were once again bogged down. 
By late February, both Indonesian and Netherlands Indies officials envisaged the 
possibility of bloodshed as their eventual outcome.250 Nationalists in Yogyakarta called 
on Sjahrir to reject Van Mook’s proposals, and not to make any concessions that 
would jeopardize their ideal. With no room to maneuver and increasing domestic 
opposition, the Prime Minister had no option but to resign.251 Despite the fall of his 
government, Sukarno asked Sjahrir to form a new cabinet. When this cabinet was 
announced on March 12, it was clear that both its members and perspectives had 
stayed much the same. Sjahrir himself continued as Prime Minister, having survived, 
as Van Mook described it, an attack on his moderation by “the wilder elements in the 
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interior.”252 The powers of Sjahrir’s second government were increased and clarified, 
and its fresh mandate included discussions with the Netherlands on the basis of 
recognition of the Republic.253  
 Talks between the delegations thus resumed on March 13, when Sjahrir 
officially presented his counterproposal. Rejecting any transitional period or federal 
structure that preceded independence, he instead called for the immediate 
acknowledgement of the right of Indonesians to complete self-determination and the 
sovereignty and integrity of the Republic. He moreover argued for the prompt 
withdrawal of Dutch troops from the archipelago upon the conclusion of an 
agreement.254 Although Van Mook’s directive did not allow him to accept these 
proposals, he told Minister of the Colonies Logemann that he believed Sjahrir 
sincerely wished to come to an agreement and was putting his own position at stake. 
The Indonesian Prime Minister was convinced of the necessity of continued 
cooperation with the Dutch, Van Mook indicated; he was their best chance.255  
 
No easy compromise could be found during the first few months of 1946, 
however. Where the Indonesian delegation underlined that the Republic embodied 
the deeply felt idea and ideal of independence, the Dutch negotiators insisted that 
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even using the word “Republic” would counter resistance and be viewed as 
capitulation in the Netherlands.256  
Fearing a complete deadlock, the Lieutenant Governor-General attempted to 
break this impasse on March 25. During a private meeting with the Indonesian Prime 
Minister, Van Mook produced a draft treaty he had written and that was inspired by 
the agreement the French authorities had recently reached with Ho Chi Minh in 
Vietnam, in which the French recognized the Republic of Vietnam as a free state 
within a Fédération Indo-Chinoise, and Ho Chi Minh’s forces agreed to the return of the 
French army to the region. Van Mook noted that his suggestions did not have the 
weight of an official proposal because no prior consultation with The Hague had 
taken place, and explained that any agreement reached would still have to be discussed 
and approved by the Dutch government. In the hope that it would make subsequent 
talks more fruitful, Van Mook nevertheless proposed that the Dutch would recognize 
the Republic’s de facto authority in Java, except for the zones secured by allied troops. 
In return, the Republic would cease hostilities, join in deliberations to determine the 
future political structure of Indonesia, and commit to cooperation with Netherlands 
and Netherlands Indies authorities to establish a federal Indonesian state, in which the 
Republic would become a partner.257   
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This was, of course, merely a recognition of the current state of events and 
factual reality. The proposal however also signified the reintroduction of the 
Lieutenant Governor-General’s plan of late November 1945. At that time, he had 
suggested to his colleagues in The Hague that the Netherlands government give up 
for the time being trying to reestablish Dutch authority in Java and Sumatra, and 
instead focus on gaining control in the buitengewesten, or outer islands in the 
archipelago. Although obviously eager to push his own design, in adapting the 
Franco-Vietnamese agreement to the situation in the Indies Van Mook showed at 
least some willingness to compromise and be imaginative, two skills he believed most 
politicians in The Hague lacked. The plan also clearly went further than the February 
declaration approved by the Dutch government.258 
 Sjahrir and his aides were interested in Van Mook’s initiative. In their 
counterproposal they settled for a Dutch acknowledgement that the Republic 
exercised de facto authority in parts of the Indonesian archipelago. The Prime Minister 
was willing to make this vital concession because he realized that the offers the Dutch 
had made since the start of the year improved their diplomatic position. In Britain and 
the United States, especially, they had reshaped the view of Netherlands policymakers 
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as reasonable and generous negotiators after all.259 The Indonesian delegation did 
demand of Van Mook that Sumatra be included in the Republic, however. The 
Lieutenant Governor-General agreed to this, and Sjahrir was satisfied.260 
 Van Mook was now to notify the government in The Hague of the draft treaty. 
He proposed that some Indonesian delegates accompany him to the Netherlands to 
inform the Dutch cabinet of the new course in negotiations. Clark Kerr presciently 
remarked that it all seemed almost too good to be true. The inclusion of Sumatra in 
the recognition of the Republic’s de facto authority might become a “severe political 
headache” for the Dutch, the British diplomat predicted. A sense of optimism 
prevailed in Washington, however, as Consul-General Foote reported from Jakarta 
that “much had been achieved” and only “loose ends now [remained] to be tied up at 
The Hague.”261  
 
Van Mook left for Europe on April 4. With him were Mr. Suwandi, Dr. 
Sudarsono, and Mr. A.K. Pringgodigdo, all confidants of Prime Minister Sjahrir. A 
meeting of the Dutch cabinet soon after the delegation’s arrival showed that Clark 
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Kerr’s caution had been well founded; Van Mook’s proposal and the compromise he 
and Sjahrir had reached were unacceptable to the Netherlands government.  
The main objections were twofold. Dutch Prime Minister Willem 
Schermerhorn pointed out that including the island of Sumatra in his government’s de 
facto recognition of the Republic’s authority was out of the question, as there was no 
convincing evidence, he claimed, that Indonesian nationalists had a large following 
there. Although apart from this issue, he found the larger part of Van Mook’s 
proposal not objectionable, its form was problematic. Recognition, he stated, could 
not come in the form of a treaty between the Netherlands and the Republic, because 
the latter was not the lawful authority in the area, and Dutch law stipulated that 
treaties could only be made with sovereign foreign powers. He suggested instead that 
two declarations, simultaneously issued by both parties, could make public any agreed-
upon objectives. Van Mook and Logemann countered that the Dutch must give the 
Indonesians something with which Prime Minister Sjahrir could convince both the 
less-moderate wing in Yogyakarta as well as the people at large.262 
 On April 12, the Dutch Prime Minister and his closest aides left for London to 
confer with British decisionmakers. Prime Minister Attlee agreed with Schermerhorn 
that the “so-called” Republic in Java “could hardly be considered as a government 
capable of sound administration.” Not breathing a word of their rejection of 	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Sumatra’s inclusion in the Republic, the Dutch insisted that their objections to Van 
Mook’s latest proposal were purely a matter of form, not of substance. They were 
confident, they said, that it would be possible to make the plan acceptable to both the 
people of the Netherlands and the people in Indonesia. This was of paramount 
importance, Schermerhorn added, because the situation in Indonesia could not be 
allowed to become the major 
issue in the campaign for the 
first post-war Dutch general 
elections, to be held on May 
17.  
 They then proceeded 
to discuss military matters. 
There were now some 
46,000 British troops in Java, and another small division in Sumatra. By the end of 
May, Attlee explained, there should be 19,000 British and 21,000 Dutch soldiers, the 
latter having replaced more than half of the British troops. By the end of the year, 
40,000 Dutch soldiers would be present, allowing the British to withdraw from the 
archipelago completely. The British Prime Minister promised that his soldiers would 
until then continue to hold the territory they now held, including the largest cities of 
Western Java, as a base from which Netherlands forces could operate if they so 
7.	  London,	  12	  April	  1946	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desired. The Dutch offer of de facto recognition in Java only, in other words, had won 
the government an extended British military commitment.263   
 
This boost led directly to the Dutch negotiators taking a hard line during 
subsequent talks with the Indonesian delegation, which resumed at Hoge Veluwe, a 
secluded holiday resort in the east of the Netherlands, on April 14. The two stumbling 
blocks were the unwillingness of the Netherlands government to acknowledge the 
Republic’s authority in Sumatra, and the conversion of the form of the agreement 
from a treaty to a protocol. The Indonesian representatives quickly pointed out that it 
would be overstepping its mandate and endangering Sjahrir’s government if it 
compromised on these matters. Besides the substance of the agreement, its form was 
important to the Indonesian people too, the delegates stressed. The Dutch countered 
by positing that the difference between a treaty and a protocol was, after all, subtle. At 
the same time, however, Schermerhorn argued he would not be able to call the 
agreement a treaty and expect to receive the support of the Dutch public.264 
 Both parties met thrice more after this initial conversation, but were unwilling 
to alter their standpoints. The Dutch government acknowledged that an Indonesian 
administration and army had a tangible presence in Sumatra, but held firm that they 
could not definitively leave the island in the hands of the Republic. The Van Mook 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263  Sterndale Bennett to Foreign Office, 25 March 1946, Foreign Office 371/F4879, BNA; Record of 
meeting held at Downing Street, 12 April 1946, PREM 8/263, BNA. 
264  Minutes meeting at Hoge Veluwe, 14 April 1946, in: NIB, IV, no. 44. 
 
   
   
149 
proposals already constituted a revolutionary revision of the government’s original 
plan, especially in the minds of those Dutch parliamentarians who disapproved of 
accepting the Republic as a party to any agreement. The Indonesian delegation, in 
turn, had been instructed by Sjahrir to strictly adhere to the draft treaty he had agreed 
upon with the Lieutenant Governor-General and not compromise on the essentials.  
On April 24 then, after merely exchanging widely divergent views, the 
disillusioned Indonesians returned home with nothing more than vivid impressions of 
the Netherlands and its stubborn politicians. At Hoge Veluwe, Dutch negotiators had 
shown a readiness to acknowledge a Republic in Indonesia, but not the Republic of 
Indonesia. It was too little, too late; the Republican delegation was dissatisfied with 
the exclusion of Sumatra, and rightly interpreted the devaluation of the agreement 
from a treaty to a mere protocol as a lower level of political recognition. The British 
fear that a “Dutch propensity for legalistic interpretation” would throw up 
insurmountable obstacles proved justified.265  
 
When we interpret the developments of early 1946, it becomes clear that the 
Netherlands government believed that a Republican “free state” was only acceptable 
in the context of a federative whole that remained under the Dutch crown. When 
Mountbatten mentioned he was going to see Sjahrir for drinks in late April, for 
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instance, the Dutch official he notified of his plan “practically [had] an apoplexy;” the 
Netherlands authorities, in other words, were unduly sensitive about any actions that 
were not blatantly pro-Dutch.266 This attitude greatly frustrated British officials in the 
archipelago and in London, who feared that many of their colleagues in the 
Netherlands envisioned a return to Dutch imperialistic rule in Indonesia, and could 
not be convinced that attempts to trample on the nationalist movement would only 
hinder an agreement being reached. Failure to meet the natural aspirations of 
Indonesians, Attlee was convinced, would only encourage disorder and lose the 
Dutch goodwill.267 
An Indonesian federation would allow the Netherlands to continue to play a 
role in the Indies for decades to come, Van Mook reasoned. But what of the parts of 
that federation that were not Java or Sumatra? Most of the buitengewesten or outer 
islands of the archipelago had been liberated by Australian forces. In Borneo (today 
called Kalimantan) and East Indonesia, the umbrella term Dutch officials used to 
refer to all the islands east of Borneo and of Java (the island groups of Celebes (now 
Sulawesi), the Moluccas (also known as Maluku islands), and the Lesser Sundas), small 
teams of Netherlands Indies administrators had followed the allied troops and with 
relative success reestablished a form of Dutch authority. Although part of the 	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population there was supportive of the Indonesian Republic and sympathetic to its 
aims, the fire of the revolution and news about events in Java and Sumatra had not 
quite spread to these distant islands. Resistance to the restoration of Dutch rule here 
could, with some imagination, be called minimal.268 
 In the early decades of the twentieth century, these remote and less developed 
eastern sections of the archipelago had not seen a powerful nationalist movement. 
Here too, however, the war had left its traces. The Japanese occupiers had removed 
the traditional local leaders through whom the colonial Dutch administration had 
projected its authority to the Indonesian people, and those who had managed to hold 
on to their positions had at least lost power and prestige. As in Java and Sumatra, 
elements reminding the population of the Netherlands Indies authorities had been 
removed from view. As alternatives to colonial rule had manifested themselves, in 
other words, reclaiming Dutch authority would not be straightforward in Borneo or 
East Indonesia either. These parts of the planned federation desired increasing powers 
of self-government as well, even if this did not mean radical independence and the 
complete cutting of any bond with the Netherlands. It did not appear that way to 
Dutch officials in late 1945, however; Van Mook was positive that his federal 
structure would more than satisfy local demands.269  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
268  Djajadiningrat, 65. 
269  Overview of situation in Borneo and East Indonesia, 16 March 1946, in: NIB, III, no. 320; Report of 
visit to the Moluccas by government official, 25 March 1946, in: NIB, III, no. 346; Doel, 152-156. In March 
and April of 1946, a parliamentary commission instated by the Dutch government had made a tour of the 
 
   
   
152 
 
In late April, the British ambassador in The Hague underlined the extent of the 
political deadlock between the Dutch and Indonesians. “The Netherlands 
Government,” he summarized, were “not (repeat not) very forthcoming” about their 
future intentions. In no hurry to make controversial and perhaps irreversible 
decisions, conservative opinion in the Netherlands wished to postpone the debate on 
Indonesia until after the public had voted. Dutch policymakers had got cold feet, 
Bland wrote, “and having let affairs drag on until so near the elections [now wanted 
to] leave it to their successors to take the next big step.” Even after the general 
election, he prophesized, the only options open to the Netherlands government were 
a swift compromise or a lengthy colonial war of destruction.270  
 Progress in negotiations was at a standstill during the late spring. Prime 
Minister Schermerhorn’s interim cabinet had not been elected, but appointed by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Indies. At its head was Max J.M. Van Poll, the “Indies specialist” of the Catholic Party (Katholieke 
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When the commission published its final report mere weeks before the May general election, it repeated the 
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Queen after the German surrender in May 1945. Without a popular mandate, it had 
little room to maneuver or make important decisions on sensitive issues such as the 
conflict in the archipelago. The installation of a new Dutch government, it was 
therefore hoped, might result in more decisive policymaking with regard to the 
conflict in the Netherlands colony. In May 17, the Catholic KVP and labor party 
PvdA became the biggest political parties, each taking approximately 30% of the vote. 
Two smaller protestant parties combined won around 20% of the seats in parliament, 
and the Dutch communist party captured a historic 10%. The issue that had 
dominated the election campaign was not the ongoing unrest in Indonesia, but rather 
the question whether the secular labor party could spectacularly come out on top over 
the established religious parties. It turned out that it could not.  
The future of Indonesia became a central point of contention during coalition 
discussions between the labor party and Catholic KVP. The conservative Catholics 
avidly supported the unity of the kingdom and empire, whereas the progressive social 
democrats advocated the principal right of Indonesians to independence. In the 
government program that the new political leaders of the Netherlands drew up, they 
ultimately settled on a specific pledge to organize a roundtable conference where the 
political future of the archipelago could be discussed. The recognition of an 
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Indonesian Republic, the program made clear, would depend on the willingness of 
nationalist representatives to continue to support the unity of the kingdom.271  
With final discussions on a coalition government still ongoing, no resumption 
of official negotiations between the Dutch and the Republic was in sight. On May 19, 
Van Mook intimated to Sjahrir that the longer the Indonesian Prime Minister delayed 
his acceptance of the Dutch plan for a federation and de facto recognition of the 
Republic’s authority in Java only, the less he would get. Although the proposal he 
then handed over was much the same as the original Dutch plan with which he had 
returned to Indonesia in early February, the Lieutenant Governor-General warned 
that it constituted his final offer. After visiting Yogyakarta and presenting the 
proposal once more to his cabinet, Sjahrir, his optimism already lessened by the 
election victory of the conservative Catholics in the Netherlands, dismissed the plan 
as “a definite step backward.”272 
The situation in the Indonesian archipelago had come dangerously close to a 
breaking point. The Netherlands delegation was dragging its feet in making concrete 
commitments to the Republic and used the time it took to form a new government in 
The Hague to consolidate Dutch control in the outer territories. Indonesian 
representatives, a small majority of whom had desired a peaceful settlement during the 
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early months of 1946, were growing increasingly determined to fight if necessary. As 
the diplomatic climate deteriorated and a steady flow of Dutch troops began replacing 
British forces, many began to think that war was inevitable. In a momentous meeting 
with Van Mook on May 25, Mountbatten, scheduled to leave SEAC and return to 
London before the month’s end, therefore tried to curtail British involvement. His 
two proposals, accepted by the Lieutenant Governor-General, transferred the 
responsibility of all of the Netherlands East Indies except Java and Sumatra back to 
the Dutch by mid July at the latest. After that date, the Supreme Commander 
explained, Netherlands forces would be allowed to conduct whatever military 
operations they saw fit outside of the allied zones in Java and Sumatra, on the strict 
understanding that they could expect no British assistance if things went awry.273 
 
After having consulted the Indonesian government in Yogyakarta about Van 
Mook’s “final offer,” Sjahrir’s counterproposal underlined the absolute need for the 
Dutch to recognize the Republic in the whole of the archipelago. The draft further 
suggested that both sides agree not to extend their military positions or further 
increase their number of troops, and spoke of the Indonesian Republic entering 
voluntarily and as an independent state into an alliance with the Netherlands. 
Although the Prime Minister claimed that this conformed closely to the terms of the 	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draft treaty he had agreed upon with Van Mook at the end of March, the alterations 
and additions reflected a hardening of the Indonesian line. New British Consul-
General Sir Gilbert MacKereth, who had replaced Sir Clark Kerr, nevertheless 
stressed the need to find a solution. The British government, he explained as he 
relayed Sjahrir’s draft agreement to the Lieutenant Governor-General, did not wish to 
become involved as mediators in what was an increasingly embarrassing situation.274  
Van Mook expressed his doubts as to whether the Dutch government would 
even consider the new proposals. “We are at an absolute low-point,” the Lieutenant 
Governor-General sighed in a letter to Logemann, and the current delay caused by the 
cabinet formation in The Hague merely served to paralyze all involved. With the 
announced roundtable conference now only a distant possibility, Van Mook again 
proposed making headway with the federal construction of the relatively peaceful 
parts of the archipelago. To this purpose, he suggested organizing a conference in the 
small hill town resort of Malino in South Celebes, where representatives of the outer 
islands might discuss their political future. Even if he went ahead as planned, the 
Lieutenant Governor-General lamented, the Dutch adherence to “strict 
constitutionalism” might throw a spoke in the wheel.275 
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 In late June, parts of Sjahrir’s secret counterproposal were leaked to the Dutch 
press and it became public knowledge in Indonesia that the Prime Minister would 
accept as the basis for a settlement a Dutch recognition of merely de facto authority, 
and that he would agree to a Republic that comprised only the islands of Java and 
Sumatra. This unleashed an intensified campaign against Sjahrir’s policy of diplomasi, 
which radical nationalists felt betrayed their ideal of “100% merdeka.” A coalition of 
disaffected army leaders, political parties, and radical youth groups wanted to force 
Sjahrir and his cabinet out of power. On June 27, a group of men led by General 
Sudirman, the charismatic and courageous young military commander of the 
Indonesian forces, kidnapped the “traitor” Prime Minister while on a political visit in 
Surakarta (also known as Solo). President Sukarno brusquely declared a state of 
emergency, and, as provided by the Indonesian constitution, assumed all government 
powers. On June 30, the President held a stirring radio speech in which he warned 
that the incident was harmful to the Republican cause, and demanded Sjahrir’s 
immediate release.276 The Prime Minister was promptly let go. Convinced that the 
policy of diplomasi was necessary, and that Sjahrir was the most acceptable person to 
negotiate with the Dutch, Sukarno thus refused to give in to demands that he dismiss 
the Prime Minister’s cabinet and reverse its policy. The failed coup made apparent the 
Republic’s internal divisions, and strengthened Dutch policymakers in their belief that 
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the Republican government was unstable, but Sukarno himself emerged from the 
crisis as a powerful symbol of unity.277  
 
On July 3, a new cabinet was installed in the Netherlands. Prime Minister 
L.J.M. Beel, a Catholic who had never set foot in Southeast Asia, appointed the rather 
verbose J.A. Jonkman from the labor party as his Minister of the Colonies. The latter 
had had a seat in the administrative body of the Indies, the Volksraad, before the war, 
and had spent the war itself in a Japanese prison camp. Schermerhorn later described 
him as containing within him a curious combination of old colonial sentiment and 
progressive politics.278  
The relationship between Van Mook and Jonkman, in contrast to the one the 
Lieutenant Governor-General had maintained with Logemann, was not a warm one. 
In his first meeting with his section chiefs, Jonkman outlined his imperial ambitions 
and defended the Dutch calling in the Indies. The Dutch government must always 
and fully maintain its traditional task in the archipelago, the Minister noted, 
irrespective of the mistakes that might have been made in the past. Confessing 
himself convinced of the good that the colonial Netherlands Indies administration 
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had brought to the islands, Jonkman explained to his subordinates that the 
Netherlands had been a world empire in the past and, notwithstanding the “justified 
and understandable” Indonesian desire for increasing self-reliance and independence, 
must remain one in the future.279  
 Van Mook’s federal Malino conference, meanwhile, started on July 16, just two 
days after the British officially returned the buitengewesten to Dutch authority, and until 
lasted until July 24. During an opening ceremony, the Lieutenant Governor-General 
outlined first in Malay, then in Dutch, the policy of the government in The Hague; the 
Dutch, he stated, wanted to form a self-governing Indonesia as soon as possible, yet 
hoped that the bond between the new state and the Netherlands would continue to 
exist until “the end of days.” The current separation from Java and Sumatra was 
regrettable but artificial, Van Mook went on, but the nationalists might realize from 
the progress made in Malino that peaceful means of cooperation existed, and that 
open discussion could be as fruitful as revolution.280  
 The thirty-nine Indonesian representatives present at Malino had in most cases 
not been democratically elected, however; they had been appointed by local civil 
service officials associated with the Netherlands Indies administration, and the 
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Lieutenant Governor-General himself had made the final selection. It meant that the 
party largely consisted of members of the traditional indigenous elite and feudal 
nobility that the colonial authorities had worked with in the prewar era. This 
aristocracy was not avidly pro-Republican, had generally been supportive of a return 
of Dutch authority, and stood much to lose if nationalists took over in the entire 
archipelago. Republican officials therefore questioned to what extent the participants 
at Malino were representative of the opinions that lived among the Indonesian people, 
and criticized the conference as a marionette-play stage-managed by puppeteer Van 
Mook. Vice-President Hatta remarked in a radio speech broadcast from Yogyakarta 
that the meetings had been brought about with the Indonesian participants from the 
buitengewesten “held at gunpoint.”281 The Republican newspaper Merdeka likened the 
conference to a train that had allowed Indonesians to board, but which moved along a 
track of rails already laid down by the Dutch. It was the participating delegate from 
South Celebes, the later premier of the federal state of East Indonesia Nadjamoeddin, 
however, who voiced the most pointed objections to the Lieutenant Governor-
General’s proposals. In his conference speech before the representatives he called the 
notion that a small country on the North Sea could decide the fate of the vast 
Indonesian archipelago “absurd.” He nevertheless echoed Van Mook’s ideas when he 
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advocated a free federative Indonesian state that would enter voluntarily into a 
relationship with the Netherlands.282 
Most delegates responded similarly to the Lieutenant Governor-General’s 
proposal. Although Van Mook had subtly postponed decisions on sensitive questions 
such as the length of the transition period and the usage of nationalist symbols 
including the red-white Republican flag and the anthem “Indonesia Raya,” he looked 
back on the conference with satisfaction, believing it to have been the first practical 
step toward the development of a federative Indonesia. Disregarding a recent report 
that had described the situation in the outer islands as “controlled unrest,” he chose 
to emphasize the fact that there had been no strong objectives or differences of 
opinion that could not be bridged.283 He urged his colleagues in The Hague to act on 
his achievements, and, pushing ahead, suggested that the next meeting of Indonesian 
federalists could take place in the town of Denpasar on the island of Bali. It was 
imperative, the Lieutenant Governor-General stated emphatically in telegrams to 
Jonkman in late July and early August, that the Dutch government as soon as possible 
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and without reservations acknowledge and affirm the political conclusions drawn at 
Malino.284 
 
It took Minister Jonkman almost three weeks to reply to Van Mook and say 
that the results of the conference at Malino were “acceptable.” The goal of the Dutch 
government, he stressed, could only be to secure some form of permanent 
cooperative bond with Indonesia, and this would not support complete independence. 
During a meeting of the council of ministers in late August, Jonkman repeated that 
the talks at Malino had been merely preliminary, and that the Dutch government had 
yet to deliberate on them.285  
 The delays caused by the formation of the Dutch cabinet had not gone 
unnoticed in the United States, where policymakers became increasingly concerned 
about the conflict in Indonesia and the continued lack of a settlement. After the initial 
Ukrainian request to discuss the matter in the UN Security Council in January, a 
growing number of Russian press and radio comments regarding the situation in the 
archipelago hinted at the possibility that the USSR might try to reintroduce the 
question. In early August, Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson warned both 
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United States wished to avoid the subject again being brought before the international 
body, but that in order to do so the Netherlands government must expedite 
parliamentary action and make a significant public announcement regarding its policy. 
If the Dutch cabinet did not resume negotiations as soon as possible, any measures 
taken to block the Russians in New York “might prove embarrassing,” Acheson 
warned.286 
Increased pressure from both London and Washington, combined with the 
belief that the Netherlands did not have the military capabilities needed for an 
extended campaign or colonial war, resulted in the realization in The Hague that for 
both national and international reasons, a peaceful settlement would have to be 
reached in the Indies. The Dutch government therefore decided to establish an 
official “Commission General,” which would travel to the archipelago to help break 
the current impasse and lighten the Lieutenant Governor-General’s task. At the same 
time, it might function to reign in Van Mook; several members of the new cabinet 
frowned upon the Lieutenant Governor-General’s ambitious initiatives and the 
alacrity with which he was working towards their implementation. Suspecting his 
colleagues in The Hague of exactly these ulterior motives, Van Mook demanded a role 
in the commission as an advising member.287  
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After weeks of debates on its precise instructions and mandate, the 
Commission General was finally appointed on September 2, and left for the 
Indonesian archipelago two weeks later. Although the commission was fully 
authorized to try and reach a settlement, its directive clearly referred to the Queen’s 
speech from December 1942 and to the Dutch declaration of February 10, and 
stipulated that any agreement reached at would have to be voted on by Dutch 
parliament.288 Former Prime Minister Schermerhorn headed the Commission. Its 
other two members were Feike de Boer and M.J.M. van Poll. The former, director of 
the Netherlands Steamship Company and the first postwar mayor of Amsterdam, did 
not belong to any political party but was understood to speak for Dutch industrial 
interests and protestant opinion. The latter had headed an investigatory commission 
to the Indies earlier in the year,289 was an ardent supporter of the unity of empire, had 
previously declared the February 10 declaration unacceptable, and represented the 
Catholic party. When Van Mook gave Lord Killearn the “low down” on the three 
characters, he described Schermerhorn, who had recently professed his frustration by 
comparing Dutch government policy on the Indies to “arriving at any station five 
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minutes late,” as “admirable.” Van Poll, the Lieutenant Governor-General warned the 
British diplomat, was the group’s “problem child.”290 
 As he awaited the arrival of 
the Commission General, Lord 
Killearn reflected on the role of the 
British in the Dutch-Indonesian 
conflict. He hardly supposed, he 
lamented, that they should be used 
“merely as a sort of conductor of the 
overture, and then consigned to the 
outer darkness till the grand finale of the last set,” as the Dutch seemed to prefer. The 
impression the diplomat had formed was that Netherlands Indies officials wanted the 
British to “do all the donkey work and then leave it to them, alone and unaided to 
make a mess of things.” As the moment of the withdrawal of British forces drew near, 
Killearn suspected the Dutch were playing for time on the assumption that when the 
troops had gone, they would be able “to steamroller Indonesian resistance.” This idea 
was not unfounded; during the summer of 1946, the belief that the prospects for a 
political settlement were deteriorating had gained followers in The Hague. During a 
war council meeting in mid June, for instance, those present discussed whether an 	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attack against the Republic was militarily and financially feasible, whether it could be 
justified to the Dutch people, and whether the UN would allow it to take place 
without intervening. Although Van Mook emphatically told Killearn that the 
Netherlands government was “wholly opposed to any policy of force,” and that he for 
one “would be no party to it,” therefore, the truth was that policymakers were at least 
considering a military confrontation.”291  
 
Almost immediately after disembarking in Jakarta, Schermerhorn and his 
colleagues were confronted with the report from yet another, semi-official 
commission. At the invitation of the Indonesian leadership in Yogyakarta, and as an 
attempt to substantiate its claims that the Republican administration’s rule was secure, 
a group led by one of Van Mook’s aides named P.J. Koets had taken an exploratory 
weeklong trip through the interior of Java. As Republican territory had up until then 
been visited by only a few newspaper correspondents, Koets was one of the first in 
the position to make unbiased and accurate estimations of the situation in those 
zones.   
Koets’ reports gave a highly favorable impression of the area. During a meeting 
with press reporters, he described the Republic as a viable reality that was supported 
by the masses. “The general picture we saw,” he summarized, “was that of a society 	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which was not in the course of dissolution but which [was] being consolidated.” This 
clearly contradicted the prevalent Dutch notion that the Indonesian Republic was 
falling apart and that its government had little support among the population. 
Schermerhorn lauded the findings as a turning point and stated they were a solid basis 
for a start to negotiations. Koets’ presentation prompted one attendee at the press 
conference to exclaim: “gentlemen, you have been present at the funeral of the Dutch 
colonial administration.”292 
 In the weeks following, Schermerhorn began to appreciate the problematic 
aspects of the relationship between the Dutch administration in the Indies and the 
government in the Netherlands, and his respect for Van Mook grew accordingly. 
When the Republican delegation intimated that it was considering Sukarno as their 
principal negotiator, the commission was faced with a difficult decision, and one that 
the Lieutenant Governor-General had had to deal with a year previous. Interpreting it 
as a sign that their mission was being taken seriously, the committee members 
realistically decided that meeting the President was unavoidable if any results achieved 
were to be realized. They would try, however, to conduct the first round of 
discussions with other Republican representatives.293 After Sjahrir became Prime 
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Minister of a new Republican cabinet for the third consecutive time in early October, 
Schermerhorn stated he was optimistic about the chances of reaching an agreement 
with the Indonesian nationalists. He did, however, predict that in this strange world 
that seemed to him almost “operetta-like,” there would be “no lack of blood and 
tears” in the process.294 
   
In an improved atmosphere, the Dutch and Indonesian delegations resumed 
formal talks under the chairmanship of 
Lord Killearn. In his opening speech on 
October 7, Sjahrir said he thought both 
parties were “on the threshold of […] a 
solution.” Indonesians were nevertheless 
watchful, he reminded the Dutch 
Commission General. Schermerhorn in turn 
assured the Republican delegation that the 
commission’s extensive powers would make 
it possible to conduct discussions “along 
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direct and straight lines, with clear and simple proposals, without hidden loopholes 
and without reservations.”295 The stakes were high for Sjahrir as well as 
Schermerhorn. The latter noted in his diary that he believed them both to be ahead of 
the populations and governments they represented. This was a potentially dangerous 
but at the same time possibly fruitful situation, he observed.296 
 The first matter on the table was the conclusion of a ceasefire. A balance had to 
be reached between Dutch and British troops on the one hand and Indonesian forces 
on the other. With some 40,000 British soldiers present, all to be withdrawn by 
November 30, Sjahrir’s delegation allowed incoming troops from the Netherlands to 
replace the outgoing British forces, which meant that the number of Dutch troops, 
made up of conscripts from the Netherlands and Royal Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL) 
volunteers, would rise from 55,000 to 91,000. The Republicans, meanwhile, would 
keep what they claimed were an estimated 140,000 soldiers currently in Java as well as 
some 60,000 stationed in Sumatra. By October 14, Schermerhorn signaled to Minister 
Jonkman in The Hague that the two parties had signed a truce. Sjahrir had insisted 
that their present military strength would be considered a maximum, to be reduced as 
the political situation improved. Although the Indonesian Prime Minister privately 
told Killearn that he still saw major hurdles ahead, the first barrier had been broken.297 
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 By the fourth week of October, then, the delegates readied themselves to 
discuss the details of a political agreement. Despite a careful reminder from Minister 
Jonkman’s to the commission that delaying a settlement until after the British 
withdrawal on November 30 might have its benefits, Van Mook suggested to his 
colleagues that they should lay all their cards on the table, clearly setting out their end 
goal from the very beginning. Soon objections could be heard from The Hague. 
Jonkman issued Schermerhorn a warning not to let his commission be hurried. This 
round of negotiations, he said, required much reflection and should not be conducted 
in haste, no matter how much pressure the British put on them.298  
Killearn, who had found Schermerhorn a man of broad outlook and 
enlightened views, had indeed urged both the Commission General and the 
Indonesian Prime Minister to seize the moment. In mid October, he had told Sjahrir: 
“now the ball was rolling so fast, it should be kept in play, especially with two such 
excellent forwards as he and Schermerhorn playing on the same side with their own 
effective technique in passing the ball to one another right up the field. Everyone was 
[…] standing by on the side lines to cheer when they jointly landed it neatly in the 
net,” the British diplomat encouraged. Killearn failed to appreciate, however, that 
forwards generally cannot operate alone, and need their respective teams for support. 
He might be able to coach Sjahrir and Schermerhorn in Jakarta, but a rejection of the 	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tactics by the benches in Yogyakarta and The Hague could only result in a valueless 
victory.299 
Annoyed and offended by the continued cold tone of the minister’s telegrams 
to Jakarta, Schermerhorn assured him in a personal letter that it was the commission’s 
own conviction that an agreement needed to be reached before the end of November. 
This phase would not tolerate incessant hesitation, he argued; it was imperative for the 
international stature of the Netherlands that its government make a generous gesture 
to the Indonesians. The atmosphere in Jakarta was excellent, Schermerhorn added, 
but it seemed that the person editing the minister’s communications from The Hague 
was continually grumpy? If Jonkman wanted a competition in mordacity, the head of 
the commission warned, he would come out the loser. It was time that he showed an 
understanding of the commission’s difficult work; if the “aesthetic aspect” of their 
correspondence did not improve, Schermerhorn threatened, the minister’s telegrams 
might be ignored completely.300 
 
By the fall of 1946, then, the members of the Commission General were 
working towards the definitive solution they believed their instructions called for. 
Schermerhorn presented the Dutch plans to the Indonesian delegation on October 
24. The Netherlands would recognize the Republic in both Java and Sumatra in return 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
299  Killearn to Foreign Office, 15 October 1946, FO 371/F15081, BNA. 
300  Schermerhorn to Jonkman, 25 October 1946, in: NIB, V, no. 317.  
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for the creation of a federative “United States of Indonesia,” of which the Republic 
would be one constituent state. This federation would join the Netherlands into a 
“Netherlands-Indonesia Union,” a body that would oversee areas of common interest 
including foreign relations, defense, and economic and cultural matters. At the head 
of this union would be the Dutch crown.  
For the Republican representatives, who wanted only a temporary political, 
military, and economic bond, the notion of a permanent union was too vague. Was 
this union to become a sort of super state? And why should the Dutch crown head it? 
Fully aware that The Hague would not allow a compromise on this point, the 
commission stated that the question of the crown was a sine qua non. Despite stubborn 
Indonesian objections, Schermerhorn felt that they were very close to a lasting 
solution.301  
It was a case of too much, too fast for Dutch policymakers, however. Jonkman 
complained that the Commission General was straying from its original instructions, 
which, he noted, had specifically mentioned an imperial roundtable conference. The 
council of ministers shared his belief that Schermerhorn was forcing the pace and 
treating the issue of the crown far too lightly, and prompted him to ask for 
clarification. Was the position of the monarch in the new proposals merely 
ornamental? What exact form would the Netherlands-Indonesian Union take? Could 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
301  Minutes meeting Commission General, 28 October 1946, in: NIB, V, no. 328; Bank, 194-198; Doel, 
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the commission members return home and give explanation on these points? 
Jonkman reminded Schermerhorn, too, that the changes to the constitution needed 
for the formation of a new political structure like the Union required a two-thirds 
majority in parliament. He concluded that at best, he could view any draft agreement 
the commission might soon succeed in securing as “a contribution to the current 
discussion,” not as the official or final proposal from the Dutch government.302 
 
Schermerhorn and his colleagues now knew exactly how important the 
Netherlands-Indonesia Union was to the Dutch leadership in The Hague. They 
therefore returned to the negotiation table to try and convince the Republican 
delegation that that Union signified a special bond shared between equals, something 
that was more than a treaty that any two states could sign. They urged them to see the 
crown not as a symbol of Dutch domination, but rather as a stabilizing factor. Sjahrir 
nevertheless insisted that in its current form, the draft agreement would be difficult to 
defend to his people. When he asked Schermerhorn if they could come to an 
agreement without the Netherlands-Indonesia Union, the latter replied simply: “no, in 
that case we go home.” In response to Jonkman’s inquiry, however, the former Prime 
Minister stated emphatically that the commission could not return home until an 	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October 1946, in: NIB, V, no. 318; Commission General to Jonkman, 26 October 1946, in: NIB, V, no. 317; 
Minutes meeting council of ministers, 28 October 1946, in: NIB, V, no. 327; Jonkman to Commission 
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agreement was signed. Schermerhorn also rather sharply told the minister that he was 
doing rather more than merely “contributing to the discussion.”303  
 The most important complaint politicians voiced in The Hague was that 
Schermerhorn presented them with a fait accompli, that he expected them to follow his 
policy “like obedient children,” and that the commission’s work signaled the 
beginning of the end of the Dutch empire. It even seemed to them as if 
Schermerhorn, De Boer, and Van Poll in Jakarta were not so much negotiating with 
the Indonesian delegation, but rather cooperating with the Indonesian delegation in 
its negotiations with the Dutch government. Why, Netherlands policymakers 
wondered, did the commission make such haste when, after months of relative 
weakness, the Dutch position in the archipelago was finally getting stronger? They did 
not call back the commission, however, nor did they explicitly tell it to break off 
discussions.304  
 In early November, Sjahrir spontaneously proposed a meeting between the 
Commission General and President Sukarno and Vice-President Hatta. Jonkman gave 
Schermerhorn permission to continue talks in Cheribon (now Cirebon), a small 
harbor town on the north coast of Java roughly halfway between Jakarta and 
Yogyakarta. In Cheribon, the Republican delegates rejected a Dutch-dominated union 	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Schermerhorn, 84-85, 88-91. 
304  Notes from Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Minister of Foreign Affairs C.G.W.H. Van Boetzelaer 
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headed by the crown. It implied, they argued, a return to the old colonial relationship. 
They preferred the union to be made up of two completely sovereign states that 
entered into it freely. Sukarno moreover stipulated that within the federative United 
States of Indonesia, the Republic’s status could not be lowered to that of an inferior 
province. Any settlement with the Dutch, Hatta summed up, had to be formulated 
such that it was clear what a significant and precious gift the Netherlands was giving 
the people of Indonesia. Schermerhorn, aware that “100 % merdeka” had been his 
discussion partners’ slogan for a year, understood these difficulties.305 
Then, on November 13, after a day of tedious discussions ending in an 
apparent deadlock, a sudden breakthrough occurred at what was to be merely an 
informal meeting over dinner. At Van Mook’s suggestion, Schermerhorn suggested 
that the draft agreement might speak of the Republic as a “sovereign state” rather 
than a “free state.” To his surprise, Sukarno and Hatta could agree to this. Sjahrir, 
who had felt sick and did not attend dinner that evening, had only just gloomily told 
Lord Killearn that his delegation had so far not found any of the commission’s 
formulas acceptable, and that the Dutch possessed “many fine qualities but […] 
[were] sometimes lacking in perspicuity.” The Prime Minister, therefore, was taken 
aback at the news that a basic settlement had been reached without his prior 
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consultation. He raised no major objections to the peculiar course of events, 
however.306 
 The two delegations returned 
to Jakarta and initialed the draft 
agreement of Linggadjati (now 
Linggajati), as it came to be known, 
on November 15.307 Sjahrir, at whose 
house the small ceremony took place, 
reminded those present that the 
agreement was not a “magic key,” and 
Schermerhorn, in turn, told Jonkman that they had reached the best possible 
agreement, but that it was imperative that the Dutch government come to a quick 
decision regarding its acceptability.308 Ambassador Bland signaled London that the 
final ratification of the new relationship between the Netherlands and the proposed 
United States of Indonesia required changes to the constitution and therefore could 
not be expected until 1949. “The Dutch are slow,” he dryly remarked, “but I never 
imagined they would be as slow as that.”309 He nevertheless maintained that the 
Dutch had swallowed much of their pride. The Foreign Office in London agreed with 	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Office, 13 November 1946, FO 371/F16417, BNA. 
307  Linggadjati, a small mountain village close to Cheribon, was where the dinner had taken place. 
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309  Sjahrir quoted in: Mrázek, 332; Bland to Foreign Office, 15 November 1946, FO 371/F16409. 
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Bland on his point regarding Dutch inertia, stating optimistically, however, that the 
draft agreement was “a remarkably interesting and at the same time baffling 
document” in which the Dutch conceded a good deal more than originally 
contemplated.310 
 
 As Schermerhorn, Van Poll, and De Boer made their way to the Netherlands to 
give text and explanation in the hope of securing an official signature on the 
agreement, in the United States, too, the news of the proposed settlement was hailed 
as a 
breakthrough, 
and warmly 
welcomed as a 
fair 
compromise 
and a 
“genuine 
contribution 
to the end of 
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imperialism in Asia.”311 Foreign Affairs Minister C.G.W.H. (“Pim”) van Boetzelaer 
Van Oosterhout, on a visit in Washington, reported that the American press seemed 
convinced that this would be a definitive agreement. Compared to the situation in the 
rest of Southeast Asia, policymakers in the United States noted, the Linggadjati 
Accords offered much hope; in tumultuous Indochina, negotiations between the 
French and Viet Minh had broken down, and in Burma, the main political party 
AFPFL (“Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League”) was demanding immediate 
independence, while in British Malaya, animosity between different ethnic groups and 
opposition to the colonial administration was increasing. The American 
administration hoped that the Dutch would soon follow the example it had set with 
the Philippines, which had been granted its independence, as promised, on July 4.  
Eelco N. van Kleffens, wartime Minister of Foreign Affairs and first Dutch 
representative to the UN Security Council, therefore argued from New York that no 
matter how much the government in The Hague might want to object to the way in 
which the commission had reached the settlement or squabble about its finer points, 
as a whole the agreement was “fully in line with the development of the world.” The 
only alternative to it, he added, had been war. Reminding them that world opinion 
was not, in general, supportive of Dutch actions in Indonesia, he advised his 
colleagues against adopting a tactic that could be explained as “delaying, resisting, or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
311  British ambassador in Washington Lord Inverchapel (Archibald Clark Kerr) to Foreign Office, 30 
November 1946, FO 371/F53834, BNA. 
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backing out.”312 Within days of the initialing of the Linggadjati Agreement, Abbot 
Low Moffat, chief of the U.S. State Department’s Division of Southeast Asian Affairs, 
ominously reported Jonkman to have said that the Dutch government did not yet 
have all the facts, did not yet understand some details of the draft, and thus would not 
immediately decide whether to accept it and present it to parliament for debate. There 
were “extreme difficulties,” the minister had admitted; it would take months, if not 
longer, to try and secure the necessary legislative and constitutional changes.313  
  
The agreement of Linggadjati went too far and had been drafted too quickly for 
most Dutch policymakers to keep up. On November 22, former Minister of the 
Colonies Charles Welter and a group of supporters appealed to Prime Minister Beel 
and his government, arguing that approval of the agreement would signal the end of 
the kingdom of the Netherlands. The proposed union, they stated, had reduced the 
crown to a mere ornament. Over the course of the previous two months, Dutch 
planners had done little but object to the work of the commission. Now, the council 
of ministers decided that the commission’s mandate had only instructed it to resume 
contact with the Indonesian representatives before November 30. Claiming that the 
appearance of an actual draft settlement was unforeseen, the government was left to 	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decide how to interpret that agreement so that a reasonable Dutch influence was 
maintained in the Indonesian archipelago, while also making sure the it remained 
acceptable to the Republicans in Yogyakarta. Even before Schermerhorn and his 
colleagues arrived back in the Netherlands, therefore, Netherlands leaders decided 
they could not sign the Linggadjati draft agreement in its current form.314  
 Those who had been left behind in Jakarta were in a mood of subdued 
expectancy. After a visit with Van Mook, Lord Killearn described him as awaiting the 
outcome with a sense of fatalism, having moved “beyond either emotion or even 
curiosity about the decision in Holland.” The Lieutenant Governor-General’s whole 
life’s work was at stake, the British diplomat commiserated. If the Dutch did not 
approve the agreement the current uneasy truce would be roughly disturbed, and once 
the British troops withdrew the situation would become extremely dangerous. On the 
eve of their departure from the archipelago, strictly separate Dutch and Indonesian 
goodbye parties were held for British forces. At the Republican event, Sjahrir 
underlined the tense atmosphere by thanking the allies for the good work they had 
done, telling them they had “introduced to [the] country […] some attractive traits of 
Western culture” that the Indonesian people had “rarely seen before from white 
people they [knew].”315 
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 In The Hague, the debate on the Linggadjati Agreement exemplified once more 
the chasm that divided those in the Dutch political capital and those in Jakarta and 
even New York. Despite Van Kleffens’ warning that it would lead some to accuse 
Netherlands leaders of not “understanding the lessons of history [nor] the spirit of the 
times,” the cabinet decided that Minister Jonkman and the members of the 
commission would write an explanatory addendum to the draft in order to “elucidate” 
or “dress [it] up” to the point that it included the terms under which the government 
could accept it.316 In the ambiguous amendment the government drew up the 
Netherlands-Indonesia Union acquired the character of a transformed kingdom with a 
more than symbolic crown at its head and far-reaching authority over its member 
states.317 
 The draft agreement of Linggadjati and its surrounding controversies made the 
“Indonesian question” more visible to the Dutch public at large. On December 2, 
wartime Prime Minister Pieter S. Gerbrandy held a radio speech in which he 
compared the current moment with the sense of impending doom he had had on May 
10, 1940, the day the German armies invaded the Netherlands. Comparing the 
settlement to appeasement, describing Sukarno as a collaborator who had betrayed his 
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316  Van Kleffens to Van Boetzelaer van Oosterhout, 28 November 1946, in: NIB, VI, no. 193. 
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people, and invoking the Dutch “calling” in the Indies, he moreover argued that 
without the Indonesian archipelago and its riches, the Netherlands would become an 
impoverished small state on the North Sea. The newly established “National 
Committee for the Maintenance of the Unity of Empire” (Nationaal Committee 
Handhaving Rijkseenheid), headed by Gerbrandy, gathered almost 300,000 signatures for 
a petition to the queen to try and stop the agreement’s ratification. An opinion poll 
showed, however, that despite the noise the increasingly better organized opposition 
was making, many Dutch had not yet made up their mind or were disengaged: 38% 
supported the Linggadjati agreement, 36% was against, and 26% had no opinion. 
Schermerhorn nevertheless made note of an odd mood in the Netherlands. The 
people had no sense of reality, he complained, and believed that their government 
even at this critical juncture still had “twelve different options” to choose from.318   
 In mid December, the amended Linggadjati draft was discussed in a packed 
parliament building. Jonkman opened the debate. He spoke at length and described 
the document before him as the foundation on which a new political structure could 
be built. The Dutch still had a duty and a mission to fulfill in Indonesia, he noted. 
When the leader of the Catholic Party, Carl P.M. Romme, took to the stage he echoed 
many of Jonkman’s sentiments. The Netherlands-Indonesia Union was the current 
kingdom transformed, he explained to his colleagues, and the Indonesian ideal of 
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“100% merdeka” was a “utopia” brought about by an “overworked element” in 
Indonesian society. The smaller protestant parties in parliament argued for the 
restoration of law and order prior to the signing of any agreement that altered the 
structure of the kingdom, and called on the government to focus its efforts on 
organizing the imperial roundtable conference. The until now remarkably 
conservative Jonkman bitingly responded that his government had been forced to 
negotiate without first reestablishing Dutch authority, because previous 
administrations had refused to negotiate when they still had some authority.319  
On December 19, a majority in Dutch parliament made up of members of the 
two coalition parties adopted the expanded Linggadjati Agreement. The smaller 
protestant parties and the communist party voted against it. Schermerhorn, breathing 
a sigh of relief, believed that the government stood a good chance of convincing the 
Republican cabinet to accept it. At the same time, he admitted that it had been almost 
impossible to make his colleagues aware of current Indonesian sentiments. 
Nationalists like Sjahrir, Sukarno, and Hatta were wary of the crown at the head of a 
powerful union, he reasoned privately, because it had been in the name of that 
monarch that they had been exiled during the prewar period; “it reminded them of 
past unpleasantness.”320  
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In Indonesia, meanwhile, an increasingly concerned Van Mook had organized 
the follow-up conference to Malino, which took place in the city of Denpasar on the 
island of Bali from December 7 until December 24. Seventy representatives had 
gathered with the explicit purpose of forming as soon as possible “states of such an 
organization and with such authority, that they could take up their places in the 
federation as full equals to the Republic.” Although most of the delegates were either 
associated with the colonial government or local aristocracy, some again asked the 
Lieutenant Governor-General pressing questions, and although the state of East 
Indonesia was indeed created, the establishment of the state of Borneo had to be 
postponed because non-cooperative and 
pro-Republican parties were stirring up 
trouble in that region. The idea of 
merdeka had evidently gained popular 
appeal in areas other than Java and 
Sumatra, too.321  
 There were problems, also, with the execution of the truce agreement signed 
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Van Mook reported to Jonkman, by a general sense of mistrust about Dutch 
intentions among Indonesians. The establishment of clear demarcation lines had 
failed in Semarang and Surabaya, for instance, leading to trespassing, raids on 
convoys, and kidnappings of Netherlands Indies officials and those who cooperated 
with them. Netherlands forces were carrying out purges in areas of suspected 
“subversive” activity. Tensions increased even further when, on December 26, 
General Sudirman declared on the radio that the Dutch threatened the independence 
of the Republic. He called on his troops to move to the front and ready themselves 
for combat. Van Mook’s suggested solution was for Dutch army commanders to 
unilaterally to put in place demarcation lines. At the same time, however, the 
Lieutenant Governor-General admitted that he sensed in those officers a lust for 
military activity, and a proneness to take rash action. About Sudirman’s speech Van 
Mook complained directly to Sjahrir, warning the Prime Minister about the spirit of 
increasing enmity. He would much regret, he ended, a change in the Republic’s stance 
on cooperation with the Dutch, since it would negate many months’ hard work on 
both sides.322  
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After a year of laborious negotiations, it seemed that the draft agreement of 
Linggadjati had opened the door towards a peaceful settlement between the Dutch 
and the Republicans in the Indonesian archipelago. By late December, however, the 
diplomatic climate again began to deteriorate and the door that had stood ajar was 
quietly closed. The draft agreement initialed in November was a program of 
principles. It had been brought about largely through pressure from the British, who 
for the past year had had the unexpectedly difficult task of tiptoeing through a 
figurative, and increasingly also literal minefield. With limited patience and resources, 
policymakers in London and diplomats in Southeast Asia had tried to make the Dutch 
understand that the war had changed Southeast Asia, and had explained to the 
Republicans that their ideal of “100% merdeka” was unrealistic. The draft agreement of 
Linggadjati, as McMahon rightly indicates, reflected these compromises.323 
 The Dutch government in The Hague, however, was overwhelmed by the 
speed with which the Commission General had set to work. Minister Jonkman 
illustrated the widening gap between Jakarta and The Hague when he stated in a 
meeting with his department aides: “over there they live under facts, and over here we 
live under principles.” 324 Schermerhorn and Van Mook’s reluctant recognition of the 
factual reality that a Republican administration had broad authority and an 
enthusiastic following in important parts of the archipelago had been unavoidable. 
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Most in Netherlands policymaking circles, however, emphasized that structural 
reforms to the status of the Indonesian colony were such a complex matter that it 
would take months if not years to implement them. Throughout 1946 the Dutch 
national character, “with its excess of caution and its deficiency of imagination,” as 
Van Mook later described, “stood in the way of a large gesture that might have given 
the history of the conflict a turn for the better.”325  
In the year that had lapsed since August 1945, Sjahrir remarked on the first 
anniversary of the Indonesian proclamation of independence, “an intensive self-
confidence [had] arisen, and an almost unrestrained belief in actual power.”326 The 
Prime Minister’s own position had nevertheless remained paradoxical, as the more 
radical nationalists in Yogyakarta would have replaced him if he had not been the only 
man with whom the Dutch would negotiate.327 It had been Sukarno who had secured 
the Prime Minister’s release during the crisis in early July, and it had been he who had 
made the draft agreement of Linggadjati possible in mid November. As the American 
State Department reported, the President remained “the key integrating element in the 
Republican political machinery,” capable of swaying the trend of events.328 
Almost twenty years later, Sukarno explained the reasoning behind his sudden 
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Report, Southern Areas, 3480.7, 10 April 1946, NARA.  
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Republic was not yet strong enough to oust the Dutch by force, he argued, a policy of 
diplomasi would allow nationalists to achieve at least part of their ideal peacefully. It 
was a temporary tactic. Did not 80% of the population of the whole archipelago live 
in Java and Sumatra? Did this not mean that within the foreseeable future, a sovereign 
Republic would become the dominant force within the proposed federal state, and 
expand into the entire territory of the former Netherlands East Indies? It was the only 
solution available, Sukarno stated later, though not the best. The Dutch government 
had made the proposals reluctantly, and the Indonesian delegation had accepted them 
in the same manner, acquiescing to the terms so that the Republic could be a free 
nation. “I knew that someday,” Sukarno reflected, “future bargaining sessions would 
demolish [the Linggadjati agreement] and return us to our basic concept of one 
sovereign, independent, unitary Republic.”329 
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Chapter 4 
	  
On the Way to War: January 1947 - September 1947 
 
    “The bleating of the lamb attracts the tiger.”330 	  
     Lord Killearn, July 1947 	  	  
“I do not wish to be alarmist,” British Special Commissioner in Southeast Asia Lord 
Killearn warned the Foreign Office in London in early 1947, “but I was disturbed at 
[the Dutch Commission General’s] pugnacious attitude of mind. […] It is almost as 
though they have come back with marching orders from The Hague to stand no 
nonsense from the Indonesians and insist upon such interpretations and 
modifications of the initialed [Linggadjati] agreement as best suits the Dutch 
palate.”331 Despite this dire warning about the stiffening view of the Netherlands 
government, cautious optimism prevailed in Washington at the turn of the year. In its 
first official press statement on the situation in Indonesia since December 1945, the 
United States government noted that it had “received with gratification” the news of 
the provisional Linggadjati Agreement, characterizing the accords as “evidence of 
high statesmanship” on the part of both the Indonesian and Dutch delegation. 
President Truman, Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and policymakers in the 
European and Southeast Asian bureaus of the State Department believed that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
330  British Special Commissioner in Southeast Asia Lord Killearn to Foreign Office, 12 July 1947, FO 
371/F63605, British National Archives, London (hereafter cited as BNA). 
331  Killearn to Foreign Office, 10 January 1947, FO 371/F63580, BNA.  
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agreement would allow the two parties to work together toward its swift 
implementation, and the United States would “watch with close interest the measures 
undertaken to make it effective.” The accords promised progress, the government 
declaration read, “toward political stabilization and economic rehabilitation of the 
Indies.”332 
 The year 1947, however, would bring not political stabilization and economic 
rehabilitation, but war to the Indonesian archipelago. Instead of cooperating with the 
Republic to establish the federal United States of Indonesia, as the Linggadjati 
Agreement had called for, Dutch policymakers proceeded unilaterally. Over the 
course of the year, a disconcerting gap grew between the Netherlands Indies 
Government personified by Lieutenant Governor-General Van Mook and Prime 
Minister Louis J.M. Beel’s administration in The Hague. This gap was both 
exacerbated and mirrored by the chasm between the American Department of State in 
Washington and United States Consul-General Walter Foote in Jakarta. 
 The disastrous consequence of all this was a Dutch “police action,” a 
euphemistically named operation with the appearances of a colonial war that started in 
the third week of July. Why did the Netherlands and Netherlands Indies governments 
choose such drastic action against Indonesian nationalism? To what extent did friction 
and communication problems within the Republican leadership contribute to this 
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outcome? And what actions did British and American policymakers take or not take 
to try to avoid it? 
 This chapter focuses on events from the beginning of 1947 until the fall of that 
year, and takes a particularly close look at the problematic negotiations for the 
implementation of the Linggadjati Agreement, the changing role of Lieutenant 
Governor-General Van Mook, and the growing interest in the conflict in Washington 
during that period. It critically examines the economic and financial justifications that 
the Dutch gave for their resort to force (and that were accepted more or less 
uncritically by Robert McMahon in his Colonialism and Cold War and by Anthony Reid 
in his The Indonesian National Revolution), as well as the British and American belief that 
the two parties were closer than ever to an agreement when large-scale hostilities 
broke out. The chapter also interprets the shifting and shaky allegiance to Prime 
Minister Sjahrir in the Republic, and the rising importance of other political figures in 
its symbolically powerful center of Yogyakarta. Finally, it investigates the start of a 
period of international intervention in the conflict in the Indonesian archipelago 
through the United Nations. Throughout, it argues that although few Dutch 
policymakers in The Hague and Jakarta realized it at the time, the increasing pressure 
they put on Republican leaders to conform, their resort to force, and the resultant 
awakening of the world to the conflict by the fall of 1947 gave more astute observers 
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increasing certainty about the shape of a solution and the ultimate inevitability of 
complete independence for Indonesia.  
  
From the American point of view, the draft Linggadjati Agreement arrived at in 
November 1946 eliminated the threat of a full-scale colonial war. It paved a peaceful 
way toward Indonesian self-government while at the same time securing continued 
Dutch influence in the archipelago, and any unsettled questions could be worked out 
with mutual good will.333 American officials agreed with the British, however, that 
certain sections of the accords were vague, and that failure to ratify the agreement 
would have serious consequences. Because even a protracted delay might result in 
chaos and cause radical elements in the Republic to seize power, they urged the 
parties to follow through on their commitments.334  
During the previous sixteen months, the United States government had been 
able to remain detached from the complex situation in the Netherlands Indies while 
British troops were in charge of law and order in the archipelago. Policymakers in 
Washington had occasionally called for increased self-government, but had not 	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challenged the Dutch government’s attempts to restore its rule. From the summer of 
1945 until late 1946, in other words, the United States had managed to maintain “the 
appearance of neutrality.” This neutrality, as former chief of the State Department’s 
Division of Far Eastern Affairs and Ambassador to the Netherlands Stanley 
Hornbeck admitted, had effectively worked to the advantage of the Dutch: in the 
conflict between the Netherlands and nationalist forces in the Indonesian archipelago, 
the United States had “attempted to support neither side and yet favored one and 
hoped not to offend the other.” American policymakers had had principles, 
sympathies, and hopes, but had thought it best to “leave the resolving of issues to the 
parties […] most concerned.”335 
 The British government under Prime Minister Clement Attlee, meanwhile, had 
helped negotiate a Dutch-Indonesian settlement mere weeks before the withdrawal of 
its troops on November 30. British disengagement from the brewing conflict in the 
Indonesian archipelago signaled the beginning of a new phase. The power vacuum 
they left behind created the potential for renewed unrest and so presented 
Washington with fresh concerns. In the face of this dilemma, American policymakers 
intensified their calls for a prompt political settlement, economic rehabilitation, and 
stability. Especially in terms of natural resources, the archipelago was “the richest 
jewel of the East,” and could play an important role in the increasingly interdependent 
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world economy, officials noted. In a Dutch-sponsored informational pamphlet, 
Walter Foote proclaimed the region “so important to manufacturing industries 
everywhere that greedy eyes have looked upon it with envy.” The United States, 
hoping for long-term access to resources and materials such as rubber, tin, and 
petroleum, strongly advocated the normalization of commercial relations with 
Indonesia. Unhampered trade and investment of foreign capital through the practice 
of an “open door” policy was an essential predicate for rehabilitation, and against the 
backdrop of increasing tensions between Washington and Moscow, recovery in 
Southeast Asia was closely tied to the stabilization of Western European economies.336  
 
In early 1947, however, it became clear that the Netherlands government would 
only sign and bind itself to its own interpretation of the drafted Linggadjati 
Agreement. Believing the agreement Schermerhorn and Sjahrir had initialed in 
November 1946 too vague and too liberal, policymakers in The Hague composed a 
memorandum to water down the terms of the agreement and accompany the 
proposals, as we have seen at the end of Chapter 4.337 The new goal of the Dutch 
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delegation in Jakarta thus became to try and convince the Republicans to accept the 
amendments to and expanded interpretation of the Linggadjati accords. Their work 
was complicated by reactionary visitors from The Hague such as leader of the 
Catholic Party Carl P.M. Romme, who, the British Consul-General lamented, was 
blocking the way out of the political impasse by peripatetically touring the country “in 
a manner strangely reminiscent of the Mad Hatter, making ill-considered public 
statements encouraging Dutch die-hards and undermining the authority of the 
Commission General.”338  
 The growing difficulties were once more exemplified in March, when Dutch 
troops in Jakarta confiscated the cargo of the ship Martin Behrman, under charter to 
the Isbrandtsen Company in New York, on the grounds that strict new import-export 
regulations decreed by the Netherlands Indies Government in January rendered 
export of commodities from Republican ports illegal. Only with the approval of that 
government could direct trade between these ports and the outside world take place; 
all other activity was to be regarded as the smuggling of produce and products from 
plantations owned by absent Dutch or other Europeans. The State Department in 
Washington had informed the crew of the Martin Behrman of the new embargo while 
the ship was en route to the port of Republican-held Cirebon,339 where it was to take 
in rubber, sugar, and other commodities as a first attempt to establish trade between 	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Indonesian territories and the United States. American policymakers had specifically 
told Isbrandtsen directors that they recognized the authority of the Netherlands 
Indies Government in the entire archipelago.340  
 The United States admitted that the government in Jakarta had acted within its 
legal rights, but was also eager to point out to Dutch administrators that the embargo 
practically paralyzed trade with the Indies. Dutch discriminatory trade policies, 
officials charged, thus prolonged and intensified economic disturbances in the islands 
which in turn deprived the world of valuable commodities. Acheson reminded the 
Dutch government that the United States bore a “large part of the burden of relieving 
world food shortages,” and that its interests ran deeper than the need to acquire 
commodities “for its own purposes.” Unless an amicable settlement was promptly 
found, he added, the attitude of the American public toward the Dutch might well 
turn sour.341 
 Although a settlement eventually allowed the Martin Behrman and its cargo to 
sail for the United States, the incident pointed to a growing concern in Washington. It 
was becoming clear that the Republican government and the mass nationalist 
movement that supported it were not isolated phenomena of concern only to the 
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European colonial powers. Southeast Asia was in turmoil, and the United States, 
interested in stability, wished to see the peoples in the region seek voluntary 
association with Western democratic powers. Since the Indonesian archipelago in 
particular was strategically located and of economic importance, a peaceful political 
agreement that would meet both the natural aspirations of Indonesians while at the 
same time establishing a continued bond with the Dutch was imperative.  
No less important than forging a political agreement was finding a solution to 
the conflicting economic interests of the Republican and Netherlands governments. 
The immediate opening of trade and commerce throughout the region would not only 
rehabilitate Indonesia’s economy, but also strengthen the Republican government’s 
moderate elements, newly appointed Secretary of State George Marshall noted.342 
Eager to prove their moderate intentions, Indonesian policymakers admitted that 
there would be extensive nationalization of industries and public works and utilities, 
but at the same time declared that they would encourage foreign investment and aid 
especially from the United States and Australia. Although fearful of economic 
domination from abroad and opposed to the continuation of special privileges for 
Dutch companies, the Republican leadership thus aimed to present itself as realistic, 
responsible, and non-discriminatory.343  
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Cooperation between the Dutch and the Indonesians was crucial for the 
implementation of the political and economic clauses of the Linggadjati Agreement 
and the establishment of a federal United States of Indonesia. As Charles Wolf and 
George Kahin argue, many on both sides nevertheless doubted that the other party 
was sincere and trustworthy. The Dutch debate on amendments to the agreement had 
made Republican officials especially suspicious about a forced unilateral interpretation 
of the accords. The second problem manifest in the agreement was that it envisioned 
a top-heavy and unbalanced federal state. The United States of Indonesia was to 
remain under the Dutch crown in a so-called Netherlands-Indonesia Union, and the 
three constituent parts that were to make up the federacy were hardly equal. The 
Republican islands of Java and Sumatra together contained 85% of the population and 
still provided 80% of the total import and export trade of the entire archipelago, with 
the other two, East-Indonesia and Borneo, accounting for the rest.344  
 
In March, after months of debate and dozens of questions and explanations 
sent back and forth between the Indonesian delegation and the Dutch Commission 
General, whose three members had been attempting to negotiate a peaceful solution 
to the conflict since their arrival in the archipelago in September 1946, both parties 
were ready to sign the Linggadjati Agreement. Republican Prime Minister Sjahrir 
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warned that if they delayed the act any further, there was a danger of it being “buried 
under interpretative material.”345 And so during a ceremony in Jakarta on March 25, in 
the presence of seventy guests seated under a larger-than-life portrait of the Dutch 
Queen, Lieutenant Governor-General Van Mook, head of the Commission General 
Willem Schermerhorn, and Sutan Sjahrir signed the agreement. Schermerhorn was 
carefully optimistic, expressing his hope that despite the views of radicals on both 
sides, the two parties would follow the road toward peaceful cooperation. Van Mook 
warned that the last eighteen months had raised two and three-foot walls between the 
parties. Sjahrir underlined that the accords were merely a first step. All pointed, in 
other words, to difficulties ahead.346  
 The continued delays in the ratification of the agreement had stiffened 
resistance to the Linggadjati accords in Yogyakarta, too. Indonesian sources tell us 
that the Republican Ministry of Defense, for instance, told Sjahrir that the agreement 
was an example of Dutch “divide and rule” policy, and boldly urged him to reject it.347   
Although Republicans were suspicious about Dutch intentions, a substantial majority 
in the legislative body KNIP (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat or Central Indonesian 
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National Committee) approved the Prime Minister’s signing. This authorization 
expressly excluded the Dutch amendments, however. And so even at its signing, as 
Wolf notes, both parties in effect bound themselves to different interpretations of the 
Linggadjati Agreement.348 Apparent agreement, that is, hid unresolved divergences 
between the two delegations on crucial issues. In the eyes of the Dutch, for instance, 
cooperation implied a continuation of their leadership and responsibility for the entire 
archipelago. For the Republican government the term signified mutual consultation in 
all areas. In The Hague, federalism referred to equal status for all three parts in the 
proposed United States of Indonesia. Indonesian leaders in Yogyakarta expected the 
construction to allow for the Republic to become more influential than the less 
developed, less populous, and less wealthy states of East-Indonesia and Borneo, 
however. President Sukarno, Prime Minister Sjahrir, and the Indonesian cabinet, in 
other words, feared a Dutch “divide and rule” policy.349  
 Difficulties arose almost immediately. Van Mook made no secret of his 
conviction that the Republic was unable to carry the responsibility of nationhood. The 
administrative problems to be solved were appalling, he complained, and Indonesian 
officials were too feeble to effectively organize themselves. Most of all, he later wrote, 
“the [Republic’s] apparatus of law and order was powerless against the lawlessness 
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and the total lack of discipline of the political soldateska and the organized bandits.”350 
Insisting on maintaining Dutch sovereignty over all of the Indies, the Lieutenant 
Governor-General refused to lift the blockade of Republican ports. Despite 
Indonesian expectations and American and British protests, restrictions on foreign 
trade remained in force.351 
 
The most important Dutch complaint heard in the weeks and months after the 
signing of the Linggadjati Agreement was that Indonesian leaders did not appreciate 
the fine distinctions between de facto and de jure recognition and authority. Nationalist 
sparks in Borneo increased, and were inspired, Netherlands officials charged, by 
Republican propaganda advocating unification of the entire archipelago. Violent 
resistance to Dutch rule in South Celebes (now South Sulawesi), where the city of 
Makassar had been designated as the capital of the East Indonesian state and where 
Netherlands Indies authorities claimed the population supported them, led to the 
deployment of special contra-guerilla forces led by second lieutenant Raymond 
Westerling, who had been given carte blanche to quell the revolt. In early 1947, South 
Celebes became the scene of some of the worst excesses committed by Dutch troops 
in the archipelago during the entire revolutionary period; they rounded up villagers, 
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ordered them to point out Republican conspirators, and summarily executed those 
suspected of anti-Dutch activities as well as those unwilling to give information.352 
At the same time, sources tell us that Republican officials in west Java observed 
a different strategy applied widely by the Dutch to get the Indonesian population on 
their side. Although Netherlands Indies troops and administrators displayed a 
“vicious” attitude to pemudas, officials said, they were being “extra nice deliberately” to 
ordinary villagers and farmers in the hope of convincing them that their daily lives 
would be easier under Dutch administration than Republican authority.353 
 
Netherlands Indies 
administrators were also 
indignant about the Republic’s 
attempts to improve its 
international standing by 
fostering independent foreign 
diplomatic relations. In late 
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March, Indian Prime Minister of the interim government Jawaharlal Nehru organized 
the Inter-Asian Conference and invited Republican deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Haji Agus Salim, the aged diplomat and long-time nationalist from West Sumatra.354 
Not much later, an Indonesian delegation traveled to the Middle East to establish 
diplomatic headquarters in Cairo. These actions displayed, according to politicians in 
The Hague, a Republican unwillingness to abide by the terms of the agreement and an 
intent on creating itself as an entity apart from the projected United States of 
Indonesia. In an atmosphere of growing distrust, both parties clung to their original 
viewpoints on the dividing issues in the Linggadjati Agreement. This made a return to 
the negotiating table and swift implementation of the accords virtually impossible.355  
 In the United States, the signing of the agreement came less than two weeks 
after the American president’s famous “Truman Doctrine” speech in which he had 
announced a new foreign policy doctrine that included “[supporting] free peoples who 
are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures […] [and 
assisting them] to work out their own destinies in their own way.”356 The doctrine 
effectively expanded the country’s global commitment, and its rhetoric implied at least 
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symbolic support for Indonesian nationalists. In the weeks following Linggadjati’s 
ratification, then, the United States followed the example Britain, Australia, China, 
India, and a number of Arab states had already set, and extended to the Republic the 
de facto recognition accorded by the Netherlands under Article 1 of the accords.  
When Acheson told Consul-General Walter Foote to proceed to Yogyakarta 
and discuss with Republican leaders matters within the competence of their 
government, however, this irked Dutch policymakers.357 Surely, they said in The 
Hague, the American government understood that the Netherlands remained solely 
and exclusively responsible for the territory until the United States of Indonesia and 
Netherlands-Indonesia Union had been formed? In Article 1 of the Linggadjati 
Agreement, they stipulated to their American colleagues, the Netherlands government 
did not recognize the Republic of Indonesia de facto, but merely recognized the 
government of the Republic as exercising de facto authority over Java and Sumatra. The 
response of State Department officials was to appease the Netherlands government 
on this point, and to indicate to the Indonesians that their recognition of the Republic 
was in full consonance with the Linggadjati Agreement and in no way intended as a 
sign that the United States did not accept Dutch sovereignty in the Indies.358  
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By March 1947, Dutch administrators in The Hague and Jakarta foresaw 
problems implementing their interpretation of the Linggadjati Agreement, and 
ordered plans for a limited military campaign against the Republic to be put together. 
Lieutenant Governor-General Van Mook believed that this might pressure the 
Indonesian delegation to finally sign the agreement. It was crucial, he thought, that his 
colleagues in London and Washington understood that the Dutch continued to want 
to see the agreement implemented. At the same time, Van Mook feared that a military 
campaign might risk the support of moderate Indonesians, and suspected that any 
violent means of repressing nationalism would result in a pointless struggle without 
end. In February, accordingly, Van Mook and the Commission General told Army 
Commander General S.H. Spoor there was as yet no solid basis for the military action 
the latter viewed as necessary and long overdue.359 When despite this pressure the 
implementation of the agreement remained elusive, Van Mook suggested a new tactic. 
Instead of returning to the negotiating table with their already formulated plans, he 
proposed in early April, the Dutch delegation should ask Sjahrir and his aides a series 
of questions, thereby taking away the perception that the Indonesians could merely 
accept or reject proposals, and forcing them to elaborate on their own views and 
commit them to paper.360 
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 Around the same time, however, the Netherlands government was faced with 
an added complication. The Netherlands and Netherlands East Indies were on the 
brink of bankruptcy; the danger line had not only come into sight, it had already been 
passed, Minister of Finances P. Lieftinck warned Prime Minister Beel. Only selling all 
gold supplies in the Bank of Java in Jakarta could keep the Indies going for another 
estimated 2,5 months. The Dutch government needed to take immediate measures. 
Lieftinck recommended asking the United States for a loan. In the meantime, the 
Netherlands government should either bring home some of the almost 120,000 Dutch 
troops stationed across the archipelago, or, he argued pointedly, instruct them to 
occupy those territories that could feed them.361 
 It was clear that any loan from the United States would depend on the 
existence of law and order and certain economic freedoms in the archipelago. A swift 
implementation of the Linggadjati Agreement thus became even more important for 
the Dutch. This realization gave fruit to the idea that negotiations could only make 
progress with a capable and forceful army present in the background, or to put it in 
Spoor’s words, by following Teddy Roosevelt’s advice to “speak softly and carry a big 
stick.”362 During a momentous cabinet meeting on April 22, a belligerent atmosphere 
developed. Minister of War A.H.J.L. Fiévez explained that failure to implement the 	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accords left only three courses of action open to the government: a harsh military 
campaign, the raising of the issue before the United Nations, or a retreat from the 
Indies. The latter two options, he added, were unacceptable. Ministers who opposed 
the large measure of control over Indonesian affairs that the Lieutenant Governor-
General held moreover argued that Van Mook should be replaced. It was decided that 
Prime Minister Beel and Minister of the Colonies J.A. Jonkman would travel to 
Indonesia in early May for a fact-finding mission to determine the possibility of 
“effectuating Linggadjati.” The Netherlands government, Jonkman had concluded by 
the end of the meeting, would “reserve all rights” if this proved impossible.363  
 The mood in Jakarta in early May was dismal. Van Mook was furious about the 
suggestion of his dismissal and frustrated with his indecisive colleagues, and an 
increasingly confident Republican delegation, keenly aware of the precarious financial 
situation the Netherlands found itself in, had so far refused to make concessions to 
the Dutch in order to form the United States of Indonesia.364 Two days before the 
arrival of Beel and Jonkman on May 7, the Commission General concluded that the 
attitude of the Republican delegation was no longer aimed at cooperation, and that a 
limited military campaign might have to start in late June. Until then, the American 
and British governments might help increase the pressure on the Indonesians. As long 	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as the Commission’s proposals to the Republican delegation remained along the lines 
of the Linggadjati accords and the Dutch were seen to attempt implementation, 
failure to reach results would be evidence for the Republican delegation’s 
unwillingness to cooperate, planners in Jakarta believed. This would boost 
international support for a military campaign and undoubtedly force the Indonesian 
government in Yogyakarta to “come down a peg or two,” Van Mook predicted.365 
 When Beel and Jonkman arrived in Jakarta their meetings with administrators 
and the Commission General acquired a 
sense of urgency. Schermerhorn 
immediately made clear to the Prime 
Minister that there could be no question of 
firing Van Mook in the current dire 
circumstances. The Commission General 
and Lieutenant Governor-General then 
pleaded with their guests from The Hague 
to at least consider military action. The disagreements between the Dutch and 
Indonesian delegations, so they explained, were caused by the Republic’s view of itself 
as completely independent and equal to the Dutch government. No one in 
Yogyakarta would accept a foreign central authority. Commander Spoor threatened 	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that an outright rejection of the use of force by Netherlands policymakers would 
make his army a powerless stick against the door during negotiations; the Indonesians 
would realize that theirs was an empty threat, and the Dutch would have to accept 
that they were being blackmailed.366 The Prime Minister, who had never visited Asia 
before, was surprised at the opinion in Jakarta that military action had become all but 
inevitable. Although in principle supportive of a course of action that included a 
military campaign, Beel believed the Indonesian delegation might still be convinced to 
cooperate. Jonkman, too, seemed hesitant. Allied governments, he worried, would see 
a campaign as evidence that the Dutch were intent on waging a colonial war against 
the Republic.367 
By the third week of May, the situation appeared almost hopeless. Van Mook 
and the Commission General insisted on a restoration of law and order and the 
establishment of a transitional federal government to move more swiftly in the 
direction of a United States of Indonesia. At the same time, further pressure for 
restraint and results came from Washington in the form of a forceful reminder that 
although discussions on a financial loan to the Netherlands East Indies had been 
started in 1945, the agreement had not yet been finalized. In view of the recent 
political developments, Secretary of State Marshall noted, Republican representatives 	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as well as representatives from the other constituents of the proposed United States 
of Indonesia should participate in the negotiations. It was crucial that the attitude and 
policies adopted by the Dutch attract foreign capital investment and strengthen the 
moderate elements in the Republican government.368 
 The complete deadlock in Dutch-Indonesian negotiations disturbed the British 
government even more than the American. During a cabinet meeting on May 20, 
Prime Minister Attlee revealed his suspicion that the Dutch intended to resort to 
force. This course of action would have political and economic consequences so 
serious that no efforts should be spared to dissuade them; a likely unsuccessful war of 
re-conquest would not only lead to criticism of the British for having made such a 
situation possible, but also hinder the export of food and raw materials from the 
archipelago and disturb relations with other indigenous populations in Southeast 
Asia.369 As Attlee warned the Dutch ambassador of the dangers of a long military 
campaign, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin suggested that Washington be asked to act 
in concert with London. American policymakers had expressed their concerns about a 
Dutch quagmire in Indonesia, after all, and if the British government stressed that it 
could give the Dutch no assistance for a military campaign and that that campaign 	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could bring to power a more extremist leadership in Yogyakarta, the United States 
might be moved to use its rehabilitation dollars as leverage or perhaps even join 
Britain in offering joint mediation in the conflict.370  
On May 27, the Dutch decided to make what they threateningly called “a final 
effort” to reach a diplomatic accommodation. A long note to the Republican 
delegation proposed the maintenance of Dutch de jure sovereignty over Indonesia until 
January 1, 1949. The whole of the archipelago in the meantime would be ruled by an 
interim federal government made up of seven representatives: one Dutch member, 
one member each for Borneo and East-Indonesia, three Republicans, and one 
representative of the crown with special power of decision. This interim government, 
the Dutch proposed, would supervise the formation of the United States of Indonesia 
while also controlling all of the archipelago’s foreign commerce and conducting its 
foreign relations. In addition, the note called for the creation of a joint police force, 
made up of both Dutch and Indonesian troops and responsible for implementing a 
complete cessation of hostilities and maintaining law and order in the whole of 
Indonesia during the transition period.371 It is important to note that neither the 
Republican recognition of de jure Netherlands authority, nor the establishment of a 
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provisional federal government, nor the formation of a gendarmerie was part of the 
signed Linggadjati Agreement. 
To convince the Republican delegation and President Sukarno to accept the 
proposals, a Dutch delegation proceeded to Yogyakarta. In reporting its findings, this 
delegation described the Republic as a barely functioning “dreamworld,” a 
“revolutionary and amateuristic irreality.” Sukarno’s attitude toward the latest 
proposals was negative; he believed they downgraded the Republic’s status. Beel and 
Jonkman, meanwhile, had returned to the Netherlands. In another important cabinet 
meeting on May 28, they expressed their doubts about the Republican willingness and 
ability to implement the Linggadjati Agreement. According to the Commission 
General, they stated, the time for negotiation was waning and military action might be 
necessary.372   
   
In the late spring of 1947, then, Dutch officials and military commanders 
resumed the plans and preparations for the operations that had been conceived before 
the signing of the Linggadjati Agreement.373 In April 1947, Dutch troops in Java and 
Sumatra numbered some 83,000 men; some 51,000 men, most of them conscripts, 
had been sent from the Netherlands, and 32,000 were KNIL Royal Dutch East Indies 	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Army forces. An estimated 70,000 soldiers in total were ready for operations. They 
were opposed by the more or less regular but poorly equipped volunteer army of the 
Republic, the Tentara Nasional Indonesia or TNI, consisting of about 175,000 men, and 
at least that many Indonesians again fighting in autonomous armed groups and local 
militias not under the control of army officers. Despite the prospect of guerilla 
warfare, Commander Spoor believed that the festering conflict necessitated a decisive 
and violent response and that a swift “pacification of rebellious elements” was 
possible: an attitude more indicative of old-style colonialism than an understanding of 
the new situation.374 
While the Republican delegation considered its official reply to the proposals, 
the British and American governments weighed the usefulness of parallel courses of 
action. As both continued negotiations and a complete withdrawal were unlikely, and 
the Dutch objected to UN involvement, the latest proposals had clearly been designed 
to “smoke out the Republicans and make them face the issues,” British officials 
warned, and their impression was strengthened when on June 2, the Netherlands 
government agreed in principle to the possibility of limited military action. Anxious 
for trade with the archipelago to resume, the government in London appealed to its 
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American counterpart to pressure the Republican delegation to concede. This could 
be done, they thought, by stating publicly that the Dutch plans were reasonable, had 
been offered in good faith, and advanced the timetable for the implementation of the 
Linggadjati Agreement.375 
 As a result of British urging, the State Department’s Divisions of Far Eastern 
Affairs and European Affairs advised Acheson that both a Dutch withdrawal from 
the archipelago and military action ran counter to American interests. The United 
States could be the decisive factor in breaking the dangerous deadlock in Indonesia 
and bring political and economic stability. Although Acheson was concerned over the 
Dutch suggestion of an ultimatum accompanied by the threat of sanctions, he told the 
Netherlands government that the Department of State was “generally sympathetic” 
with the objectives in its proposals, which appeared “reasonable in most respects.” He 
instructed Foote to tell the Republicans that the United States considered the note a 
“timely and valuable opportunity to achieve an essential step forward” and that they 
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“would be well advised to respond promptly in the spirit of good faith and 
compromise.”376  
 In its official reply of June 8, the Indonesian government accepted the 
formation of an interim government but added qualifications and conditions. As 
Kahin states, most Republican political and military leaders had in fact denounced the 
Dutch plans, interpreting them as demands that posed the alternatives of capitulation 
or all-out war.377 The Republic stood on its right of recognition, and desired more 
concrete power during the transition period. It suggested that decisions in the interim 
government be made by majority vote, and argued that the consent of the 
representative of the crown should only be required in matters directly affecting 
Dutch interests. Fearful of Dutch troops gaining access to Republican territory, 
especially its center and stronghold Yogyakarta, the counterproposal moreover 
rejected the formation of a joint gendarmerie, stating that the enforcement of law and 
order in Java and Sumatra was a task for the Republican police force only. The 
Republic was prosperous and peaceful, Sjahrir and his colleagues noted; the terror and 
chaos of which the May 27 proposals spoke took place in Dutch-occupied territories. 
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Although this response hinted that remaining disagreements could be resolved during 
further discussions, Dutch officials were disappointed with it.378   
Not recognizing that Sjahrir, as his biographer Rudolf Mrázek convincingly 
argues as well, was going as far as he could toward meeting their demands without 
committing political suicide, the Dutch interpreted the Republican reply as a bid for 
control, and as a rejection of both Dutch sovereignty during the transition period and 
of permanent Dutch-Indonesian cooperation in the proposed Netherlands-Indonesia 
Union. The American Consul-General in Jakarta and the American Ambassador in 
The Hague importantly supported the Dutch interpretation of Yogyakarta’s response 
as “a carefully prepared attempt to seek power.”379 Van Mook warned The Hague that 
he might soon have to take matters into his own hands in order to create the 
necessary conditions for the implementation of the Linggadjati Agreement. Although 
he underlined the need for American and British support, again acknowledged serious 
doubts as to whether the Dutch had the capacity to fulfill their difficult task, and 
noted that Indonesian resistance to a military campaign should not be underestimated, 
he at the same time optimistically argued that decisive action to restore law and order 
would be welcomed by many in the Republic. By mid June the number of Dutch 
officials in Jakarta who did not want to resort to military action, Schermerhorn noted 
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in his diary, could be “counted on two hands.” What had first been viewed as only 
one option was now considered to be the only option.380  
 At the urging of the British Ambassador in The Hague, the Foreign Office in 
London cabled Washington; the Netherlands government was “increasingly 
despondent” and on the point of deciding that drastic action should be taken. An 
intervention in the form of a joint British-American offer of good offices was all that 
could avert disaster and bring both sides back to the negotiating table.381 The 
American Ambassador in London added to this plea by explaining that Sukarno and 
Sjahrir had gone as far as they could in meeting the Dutch demands without losing 
face.382 But President Truman rejected joint mediation. Secretary of State Marshall 
instead publicly stated that the United States government still hoped that the Dutch 
and the Indonesians would continue their efforts to settle their differences 
peacefully.383 
 This American faith in finding common ground was misplaced, Van Mook 
countered. Although Yogyakarta’s response had clearly indicated a desire for further 
discussion, the Lieutenant Governor-General argued that the Republic had rejected 
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cooperation with the Netherlands outright, and therefore no basis for continued talks 
existed. In mid June, he warned policymakers in the Netherlands that the current 
Dutch position in Indonesia was untenable. A limited military campaign, he explained, 
might end the terror and violence in parts of the Republic.384 Privately, the Americans 
told the Netherlands government that a resort to violence would be self-defeating in 
purpose and have a “serious adverse reaction” on public opinion in the United States. 
Although of the opinion that the Indonesians were sabotaging the Linggadjati 
Agreement and playing for time, Foote advised Sjahrir to resume negotiations on the 
basis of the May proposals.385 The British, meanwhile, still hoped for last-minute 
Indonesian compliance and urged the Dutch to be patient.386  
On June 19, Sjahrir attempted a rapprochement via the radio. The previous 
months had seen a chain of failures and disappointments, Sjahrir noted, but the 
Republican answer to the Commission General had reflected a sincere desire to realize 
the Linggadjati Agreement. Anyone civilized and cultured, he emphatically stated, 
“[had] the duty to stand up against a catastrophic war.”387 The Prime Minister made 
similar overtures in an explanatory memo the next day. The Republican government 
accepted the formation of an interim government by as early as mid July, agreed to 
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discussions on the establishment of a joint police force as well as federal organs to 
conduct foreign relations and economic policy. Sjahrir’s “courageous” gestures, 
Schermerhorn noted in his diary, had reduced the chance of military action from 80% 
at the beginning of the week to 40% at the end. Nevertheless, he warned, “irrational 
elements on both sides” made these percentages somewhat imprecise.388  
The major concessions made by the Indonesian delegation went unrecognized 
in Jakarta, however, where a majority of the Dutch Commission General and Van 
Mook remained unsatisfied. Foote noted that Sjahrir’s communications showed no 
Republican intention to recede from its bid “to dominate all of the Netherlands East 
Indies.” The Lieutenant Governor-General, whom the Dutch cabinet had now 
preemptively authorized to intervene militarily, personally handed The Hague’s final 
ultimatum to the Indonesian Prime Minister on June 23. Fortified by Foote’s 
opinions, he accompanied it with the verbal warning that the large foreign powers 
were growing impatient with the Republic. Although he suspected that Sjahrir had 
acted without the full support of his cabinet and that his position was precarious, Van 
Mook, in his typical patronizing manner, stated that it was high time for the 
government in Yogyakarta to pass from its “emotional revolutionary” phase to a 
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“rational constructive” stage by fully complying with the Dutch offers within four 
days.389 
 When Sjahrir arrived in the Republican capital and revealed the concessions he 
had made, most major political parties withdrew their support. Even the Prime 
Minister’s own Partai Sosialis believed he had gone too far. Sjahrir no longer saw a 
possibility for peaceful compromise and did not think himself the right person to lead 
the Republic if a war broke out; on June 27, the day the deadline for a reply passed, he 
offered President Sukarno his resignation.390 Sukarno responded as he had done after 
the attempted coup d’état of June 1946, detailed in Chapter 4: he declared a state of 
emergency and pulled all powers to himself. He also sent a formal reply to the Dutch 
delegation reiterating the Republic’s agreement in principle, but stating that further 
discussions were needed about a joint police force.391  
 By this time, planners in Washington had difficulty keeping up with events on 
the ground. In memoranda to both Consul-General Foote and the Netherlands 
government, Marshall characterized the latest Dutch ultimatum as a positive 
resumption of talks, positing that substantial progress had been made toward the 
formation of an interim government. On June 26, the Secretary of State urged the 
Dutch not to insist on unanimous voting in the interim government, stated that the 	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Republican demand for fair representation sounded to him like a sound idea, and 
expressed his doubts about the advisability of a joint army. The Dutch, in other 
words, were not to push for Republican acceptance to the extent that it might harm 
the position of moderates and play into the hands of extremists in Yogyakarta.392 On 
that same day, however, Marshall also sent a strongly worded aide-mémoire to the 
Republican delegation, advising it to “cooperate without delay” and warning that in 
the American reading of the Linggadjati Agreement, a clear transition period had been 
envisaged during which the Netherlands retained sovereignty and ultimate authority in 
Indonesia. After the establishment of mutual cooperation along a constructive path, 
he added to both policymakers in The Hague and Yogyakarta, the possibility of 
American financial aid to Indonesia might be discussed.393 
 Although the Dutch claim to complete sovereignty over the entire Indonesian 
archipelago during the transition period had not been included in the original 
Linggadjati Agreement and had made its first appearance only in the May proposals, 
the American government thus clearly backed the unilateral Netherlands 
interpretation of those accords.394 Although Van Mook told The Hague that they had 
come “to the end of a long period of negotiations” with Republican officials who 
“lived in a dream world” and could only be awoken with a “hard shock,” the 	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Lieutenant Governor-General therefore admitted that the American aide-mémoire 
might yet induce the Indonesians to conform. For the moment, he decided, military 
action must be postponed.395 
 
Van Mook’s harsh June 1947 cables to The Hague illustrated both the change 
in his attitude that had taken place during the first half of that year and the widening 
gap between the Netherlands government in The Hague and isolated Netherlands 
Indies officials in Jakarta. Born and bred in the Indies, Cheong argues also, Van Mook 
was attached to the land in a way that was unimaginable to many Dutch policymakers. 
During the war and the first sixteen months after the Indonesian proclamation of 
independence, his opinion that the era of colonialism in its traditional form had ended 
and that a new pattern of organization had to be found made his colleagues regard 
him as an extreme progressive. Jakarta’s actual and symbolic distance from the 
Netherlands had seemed to increase with every passing month. Historians have 
described Van Mook as a pragmatic and “enlightened despot,” impatient with the 
outmoded Dutch system that ruled his Indies from The Hague rather than Batavia. 
Van Mook was an administrator to the bone. His idealism and paternalism led him to 
believe that independence should come with peace and order, not the other way 
around. Indonesians first had to fulfill certain conditions and prove that they could 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
395  Van Mook to Logemann, 27 June 1947, in: NIB, IX, no. 226; Wolf, 124. 
 
   
   
223 
gain experience and would not let the archipelago fall to what he feared would be 
ruination.  
During the first half of 1947, the Lieutenant Governor-General claimed that 
his first priority was the protection of the welfare of the Indonesian people. Van 
Mook was hurt and discouraged by the fact that Republican leaders resisted his one-
sided implementation of the federal structure that had been his brainchild and the 
Linggadjati Agreement that he viewed as his handiwork. They also contributed to his 
stiffening attitude. Reports from the new British Consul-General in Jakarta, J.M.L. 
Mitcheson, support this interpretation. By late June, he told his colleagues in London 
that the Lieutenant Governor-General “[seemed] to wish and almost hope” that 
Sjahrir would fail to convince his cabinet, was convinced that the Republican 
government was divided against itself, and “having lost all patience [had] largely 
engineered [the] new crisis.”396 In later years, Van Mook admitted that in grand 
gestures that appealed “to the heart rather than the head,” the Dutch had failed the 
Indonesians. Where the Dutch had lacked imagination, he wrote, the Indonesians had 
lacked realism. This explanation illustrates the fallacy of his own thinking, his own 
unrealistic convictions, supported and encouraged by his close aides, military 
commanders, and personal friend Walter Foote, that a Dutch resort to force would 
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strengthen the hand of moderates and could convince the Indonesian population to 
cooperate with him.397  
    
And so the stern American message caused the Dutch delegation in Jakarta to 
send another letter to Sukarno on June 29. It asked direct questions: did the Republic 
recognize the authority of the representative of the crown in the interim government? 
Did it agree that it was the proposed federative United States of Indonesia that would 
become sovereign, not the Republic? Did it concede to the organization of federal 
bodies under the interim government, and accept joint responsibility for law and 
order in the territories currently under the Republic’s de facto authority? A final 
response that left “no doubt” about the Republic’s acceptance of these Dutch terms 
was expected within one week.398  
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 On July 5, the answer arrived in the form of a letter from the new Prime 
Minister: Amir Sjarifuddin. Sjarifuddin, who had been 
born in 1907 into Sumatran aristocracy and was educated 
at elite colonial schools and in the Netherlands, was 
decidedly left leaning and had during the war actively 
resisted the Japanese occupation. After the proclamation 
of Indonesian independence, he had joined Sjahrir’s 
Partai Sosialis and become first Minister of Information, 
then Minister of Defense, and eventually Prime Minister. Sjarifuddin’s response to the 
Dutch underlined his belief that progress had been made, and that Washington’s aide-
mémoire showed American support of a continuing exchange of thoughts. The Prime 
Minister further emphasized the Republic’s good faith and willingness to accept every 
Dutch demand. The formation of a joint gendarmerie, he noted, was an issue for 
further discussion.399 The Commission General and Van Mook, however, told The 
Hague that the response was not only “deliberately vague and unclear” and altogether 
below standard, but “the most sickening and slimy product that had so far reached 
them from Yogyakarta.”400 
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Nevertheless, continual pressure from London and Washington to find a 
peaceful solution made it impossible for the Dutch to out rightly reject the latest 
Republican counterproposal. Abbott Low Moffat, who, as we saw in Chapter 2, had 
predicted an American foreign policy dilemma in September 1944, described it once 
again in a long memo in early July of 1947. The American objective with regard to the 
Netherlands East Indies was, he argued, to “secure a settlement of the situation which 
[would] meet the natural aspirations of Indonesian nationalism, and at the same time 
preserve so far as possible for the Netherlands the economic strength which she 
derives from association with the Indies.” Both economically and politically, Moffat 
went on, Indonesia was a country of enormous importance for the United States. 
American policymakers must therefore continue their restraining influence against use 
of force by the Netherlands government, while also urging the Indonesians to 
cooperate.401 The sentiment of this memorandum, however, was at glaring odds with 
Foote’s simultaneous stark warning to Yogyakarta that the American government 
would understand a Dutch resort to force. The Republic would “never get one cent” 
in financial aid if it persisted in its attitude, he threatened; it was “at the brink of a 
precipice, and would not even need a kick in the pants to fall into it, only a slight puff 
of wind.”402  
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In this atmosphere of suspicion and uncertainty, Spoor warned his contact in 
the Netherlands government that his troops at the perimeter, exposed to hostilities 
“day in day out,” were restless and at a breaking point, and that the palaver had to 
end.403 Van Mook again 
informed his colleagues 
in The Hague that the 
Dutch position had 
become untenable.404 
After continued 
discussions between the 
Commission General 
and Prime Minister Sjarifuddin, he decided to make one final effort. He issued a new 
ultimatum on July 15, now demanding an immediate end to the spread of Republican 
propaganda and destruction of property. Van Mook also ordered an end to hostilities. 
These, he had argued for some time, took the shape of Republican forces or 
autonomous local militias carrying out guerilla attacks, ambushes, sabotages, and raids 
on targets both military and civilian in Dutch-occupied territory on Java and Sumatra. 
The Republican government was moreover to call for a broad withdrawal of its troops 
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from the perimeter, and to accept the possibility of a joint police force including 
Dutch troops restoring law and order “where necessary.”405  
 Not more than 30 hours later, Dutch officials intercepted a tense message from 
Yogyakarta that instructed all Republican commanders in the field to ready their 
troops for battle. Without awaiting the official Republican reply, in which the 
Indonesian delegation in any case maintained its stance on the mixed police force, 
Van Mook cabled The Hague.406 No one in Jakarta, he stated bitterly, saw any way 
forward but military action. He proposed that the Netherlands government explain to 
Britain and the United States that it could no longer be bound to the cease-fire agreed 
upon in October 1946 and would retake her freedom of action vis-à-vis the 
Republic.407 The disappointed head of the Commission General Schermerhorn could 
conceive no alternative to action, and agreed with Van Mook. He nevertheless 
professed himself pessimistic about the effectiveness of military action, and feared 
that understanding of Dutch motives abroad would be minimal. Military action might 
well be, he presciently lamented, “the beginning of the end of Dutch activity in the 
area.”408  
 The Netherlands government, “with the utmost reluctance and regret,” Beel 
explained, gave the signal for a military operation to start on July 18. In the early 	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morning of July 21, the Dutch embarked on what they labeled “police measures of a 
strictly limited character” in order to “create conditions […] which would enable the 
principles embodied in the Linggadjati Agreement to come to full fruition.” In Dutch 
parliament, the military offensive was supported by a majority formed by the Catholic 
KVP, the smaller Protestant parties, and, albeit under significant pressure, the 
coalition labor party PvdA. The Communist Party CPN, with only ten out of one 
hundred parliament seats, vocally opposed it.   
Ambassador Baruch informed 
Washington that the Netherlands government 
considered a campaign its only option in view 
of “the threat presented to the islands by […] 
present disorders.” Officials in The Hague had 
assured him they had no designs on the integrity 
of the Republic and remained prepared as 
before to come to terms with the Republican 
leadership.409 Similarly echoing the Dutch point 
of view, the British embassy in The Hague added that the campaign was the result of 
the “lack of good faith” and “dilatory tactics” pursued by the Republican 
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government.410 Prime Minister Beel told the Secretary General of the United Nations 
that he “confidently hoped that circumstances would soon permit [the resumption of] 
constructive cooperation with the Republic.”411 
 The New York Times, until then commenting on the course of events in 
Indonesia only on the back pages of the newspaper, reported the Dutch Prime 
Minister as emphasizing the sincere wishes of his people to “do right” in the 
archipelago. What Beel did not acknowledge was that the Dutch government itself 
was violating the Linggadjati agreement by resorting to force; its Article 17 stated 
specifically that in case of a dispute that could not be resolved by the two delegations, 
a third party with deciding vote would be asked to arbitrate. The Netherlands 
government refused to abide by this arbitration clause, insisting that the dispute fell 
outside of the article’s scope, and that the current operations were not an act of 
aggression.412 
 Observers in the United States and Britain noted that the two sides were closer 
than ever to an agreement when hostilities broke out. As Wolf explains, this is untrue. 
On the surface, it appeared that the Dutch had just about bullied the Republican 
delegation into accepting its interpretation of the Linggadjati Agreement. In reality big 
differences remained, especially regarding the status of the Republic in the eventual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
410  British Embassy in The Hague to Foreign Office, 20 July 1947, FO 371/F9744, BNA. 
411  Taylor, 47.  
412  “Premier addresses Dutch,” New York Times, 21 July 1947, 2; “Dutch troops take key points in java as 
truce crumbles,” New York Times, 21 July 1947, 1; “Dutch State Position,” New York Times, 22 July 1947, 2; for 
full English text of the Linggadjati Agreement, see Wolf, 175-178. 
 
   
   
231 
federation and the say it would have in establishing it. The American aide-mémoire of 
late June had thus merely postponed the inevitable.413  
 
The question of why the Dutch resorted to force is not an easy one to answer. 
McMahon emphasizes the untenable financial situation of the Netherlands. Reid 
similarly underlines that the strategic occupation of producing areas in Republican 
territory could resolve the Dutch crisis by freeing exportable commodities.414 But a 
closer look at the correspondence between Jakarta and The Hague during June and 
July 1947 reveals no such importance placed on the hard facts of the financial 
argument.  
Where this reasoning did have an effect was in the small financial-economic 
circles in the Netherlands. On June 20, for instance, the president of the Dutch Bank 
Suardus Posthuma gave a speech in front of members of the Netherlands society for 
industrial and commercial trade. He emphasized that the nation must strive towards 
the maintenance and restoration of the “Dutch element” in Indonesia, noting he had 
little faith in an economy led by Indonesians themselves. There was a multitude of 
evidence, Posthuma went on, that the large majority of the archipelago’s population 
supported the Dutch in this goal. “We must not let ourselves be paralyzed,” he 
warned, “by quasi-scientific theories about the inevitability of certain historical 
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processes;” the Netherlands possessed power over this process, and should exercise 
that power.415   
These types of arguments played a role only in the background, however; 
Netherlands Indies officials had embarked on a “war, unless…” course around or 
even slightly before the ratification of the Linggadjati Agreement in late March. The 
subsequent delay in the implementation of those accords led to a further erosion of 
trust between the Republican delegation on the one hand and the Commission 
General and Lieutenant Governor-General on the other, but preparations for a 
military campaign had at that point already acquired momentum. The deal was sealed, 
in many ways, during Beel and Jonkman’s visit to the archipelago in late May. 
Impressed with the grave difficulties the Netherlands Indies government was facing, 
the two had returned to The Hague with the firm belief that the Republic was both 
unwilling and unable to cooperate in the implementation of Dutch plans for 
Indonesia. The economic explanations policymakers in The Hague brought up after 
the start of the military campaign, then, were more of a smokescreen than anything 
else.  
 
On July 21, the United States diplomatically professed that it “profoundly 
[regretted]” the discarding of negotiations as a means of achieving a peaceful 	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settlement.416 From Washington, Netherlands Ambassador E.N. van Kleffens 
explained to The Hague the two main American fears: that pacification would fail and 
instead leave no moderates with whom negotiations could be resumed, and that no 
quick economic rehabilitation would follow a cessation of hostilities. President 
Truman would soon be up for reelection, and the importance of domestic political 
imperatives in the American response should not be underestimated. Although the 
government was more favorable to the Dutch than the public at large, the ambassador 
concluded, all hoped for a quick end to the current military action.417  
The British government stated it was unpleasantly surprised, greatly distressed, 
and “keenly disappointed” by the course of events. The Foreign Office warned the 
Dutch that the campaign forced the government to halt all shipments of military 
equipment to the Indies, and again noted that the Dutch action might discredit the 
other Western European colonial powers. Privately officials added their belief that 
although the Dutch might gain initial successes, the long-term political effects would 
prove their resort to force unwise; Netherlands policymakers had “never really 
understood,” they claimed, the change that had come over the situation since the 
occupation of the islands by the Japanese.418 A more accurate assessment of Dutch 
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thinking might state that policymakers in The Hague and Jakarta did not appreciate the 
change, were unwilling to go any further or any faster in their plans for Indonesia than 
they had to, and indeed believed they had gone very fast and very far already. British 
planners, of course, believed that they were doing a much better job in India than the 
Dutch were doing in Indonesia; India and Pakistan were about to become 
independent, but would remain part of the Commonwealth as two separate 
dominions. The intense religious violence and bloodshed that would follow the 
partition, however, showed that London did not quite possess the level of control 
over the decolonization process that it pretended to have. 
When the military offensive started, the British publicly offered their good 
offices to both parties in the conflict. After having been rebuffed by planners in The 
Hague, Bevin became convinced that the only hope of averting disaster was for the 
United States and Britain to jointly induce the Dutch to accept some form of arbitral 
solution.419 But Washington policymakers dismissed Bevin’s idea, noting that the 
Dutch considered the conflict an internal matter and would not agree to outside 
arbitration. Van Kleffens indeed gave this impression when Marshall warned him that 
an “unfriendly” nation might introduce the conflict to the United Nations Security 
Council.420  
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British officials at this point noted that American statements on the conflict 
were confined to merely polite expressions of regret. Ambassador Nevile Bland 
reported from The Hague that his American colleague Herman Baruch had 
uncritically accepted Dutch views in private conversations, considering them 
“perfectly justified in resorting to force.” Mitcheson reported from Jakarta that his 
American colleague Foote had done “a great deal of harm” by openly sympathizing 
with the Dutch. Combined with a Dutch inability or unwillingness to distinguish 
between the personal views of Baruch and Foote and the official view of the 
government in Washington, this might well have led the Netherlands government to 
think that the United States would remain passive. It had caused Van Mook, 
Mitcheson summarized, to “deliberately [and] with flat-footed obstinacy [drive] Sjahrir 
too far in order to break up the Republican front.”421  
Whitehall, in other words, blamed the Americans for not speaking with one 
voice, and for if not encouraging Dutch military action, then at least not objecting to 
it forcefully enough. At the same time, British officials also acknowledged that their 
own actions might have spurred on the Dutch. Special Commissioner in Southeast 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
421  Street, 25 July 1947, FO 271/F10031, BNA; British Ambassador in Washington Sir J. Balfour to 
Foreign Office, 24 July 1947, FO 371/F10031, BNA; Mitcheson to Foreign Office, 27 June 1947, FO 
371/F8697, BNA; Mitcheson to Foreign Office 25 July 1947, FO 371/F10049, BNA; Bland to Foreign 
Office, 25 July 1947, FO 371/F10049, BNA; McMahon, 175-177. Foote, Mitcheson had reported in May, 
had casually stated to him, while waving off Beel and Jonkman on their return to the Netherlands, that he 
personally felt that the Dutch would be justified in using force, that they were only wasting time and money 
with negotiations, and that Washington was beginning to come around to this point of view too. “My U.S. 
colleague,” the Consul-General dryly remarked, “is not famed for accuracy.” See: Mitcheson to Foreign 
Office, 24 May 1947, FO 371/F7055. 
 
   
   
236 
Asia Lord Killearn noted from Singapore that British pressure on the “underdog” 
might well have induced Sjahrir to “overplay his hand.” “The bleating of the lamb 
attracts the tiger,” he mused; the more conciliatory the Indonesians had become 
under British and American pressure, “the more aggressive and bullying […] Van 
Mook and his colleagues.422  
 
Meanwhile, the police measures throughout Java and Sumatra continued. The 
Dutch main objectives were the occupation of strategic parts of Republican territory 
as well as important economic areas. In Java, this meant meeting and eliminating 
Indonesian troops and isolating the Republic. From Jakarta, Bandung, and Buitenzorg 
(now Bogor) the Dutch army overtook West Java, from Surabaya it occupied the East, 
and from Semarang it captured the central regions. In Jakarta, Dutch forces raided the 
offices and buildings of Republican institutions, arresting all those suspected of 
Republican sympathies. They also occupied all Republican ports, including the harbor 
town of Cirebon, host to the meetings that had led to the signing of the Linggadjati 
Agreement. In Sumatra, troops extended Dutch territory from the bridgehead of 
Medan and regained possession of major producing areas including the oil fields in 
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Palembang. Within ten days of the start of the campaign, the Dutch had secured 
control of most of the cities and major towns of both Java and Sumatra.423 
While Dutch troops made quick progress by 
staying on the main roads, the forces of the Tentara 
Nasional Indonesia or Republican army pulled back to 
reorganize for a drawn-out guerilla war. General 
Sudirman led the estimated 175,000 troops in Java 
and Sumatra. Their armament consisted of rifles, 
small arms, machine guns, homemade grenades, and 
land mines, as well as a few dozen Japanese zero 
fighter planes. The TNI was by no means a modern 
or mechanized army like the Dutch, but it could fight 
a long war of attrition and try to obstruct economic rehabilitation in Dutch occupied 
territory. Although Van Mook’s reports to The Hague were optimistic, noting within 
five days of the start of the campaign that more than 50% of the objectives had been 
reached and that minimal enemy resistance had been encountered, he admitted that 
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the fleeing of enemy troops into the mountains and hinterland made it impossible for 
the Dutch to deal with them effectively.424 
 Military and political advisers in Jakarta, meanwhile, turned their attention 
toward Yogyakarta, which had become the center and symbolic fortress of the 
revolution after the Republican government moved there in January 1946, and where 
the absence of Dutch troops and the flying of the red-white Indonesian flag made 
independence seem a reality. During a secret meeting at Spoor’s house on July 24, all 
agreed that stopping short of occupying the Republican capital would mean facing the 
exact same difficulties after the end of the military campaign that had caused it in the 
first place. The outside world, they added, would expect nothing less from the Dutch 
than a decisive victory.425 The main problem in the implementation of the Linggadjati 
Agreement, Van Mook’s aide P.J.A. Idenburg noted two days later, had been the 
Republican aspiration for a unitary state and dominant power within it. Creating 
conditions for cooperation with constructive elements in the archipelago therefore 
required the splitting of the Republic into smaller states comparable in size and 
population to those of East-Indonesia and Borneo. To accomplish this, the current 
government in Yogyakarta needed to be ousted.426 
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 Van Mook and Schermerhorn concurred. They maintained that a relatively 
swift occupation of Yogyakarta (before, the Lieutenant Governor-General advised, 
international intervention could throw a spoke in the wheel) would strengthen the 
Dutch position in the newly occupied territories and would enable those of good will 
to come openly to the Dutch side. Netherlands forces did not need to wipe 
Yogyakarta off the map completely, Schermerhorn added in a tone that hinted he had 
come around to the point of view expounded by Spoor, but simply eliminate “current 
obstinate company.” To the outside world this expansion of the current operation 
could be justified by pointing to the Republic’s lack of authority.427 But when 
policymakers in The Hague deliberated on the request from Jakarta, many believed it 
went too far; the Prime Minister had, after all, publicly insisted that the Netherlands 
government had no designs on the Republic and would leave its center untouched.428 
 
 After the start of the military campaign, world opinion indeed turned against 
the Dutch. Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities President Sukarno had appealed to 
the United States in a radio speech, urging President Truman to exert every effort to 
stop the war in Indonesia. “Just as your American ancestors fought 170 years ago for 
your liberty and independence,” he emphatically told the American public, “so are we 
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country far across the seas, so are we.” He concluded with an appeal to the United 
States to join the British in mediation of the dispute.429 
 Sjahrir, now special adviser to Sukarno, was given the chance to exert his 
diplomatic talents abroad. During the first six months of 1947, the Prime Minister 
from Sumatra had had to face increasing pressures to move himself and the remaining 
government offices from Jakarta to Yogyakarta, where Mrázek argues he was always 
seen as a visitor, a “man coming from abroad.” His final concessions to the 
Commission General before his June 27 resignation had been a far cry from his 
party’s principle of “100% merdeka (freedom),” signaling a policy less heroic and more 
ambiguous than President Sukarno, General Sudirman, and others told the Indonesian 
people they stood for. Sjahrir’s trip to Singapore, India, and eventually New York was 
his first foreign journey since having returned from his studies in the Netherlands in 
1929, and afforded him the opportunity to escape the sometimes-uneasy alliance he 
found himself in back home. On July 22 he arrived in New Delhi with a single piece 
of luggage, looking tired and ill. At the airport he spoke to journalists about the start 
of the Dutch campaign: “at seven o’clock on Monday morning […] I was in 
Yogyakarta. I looked up and saw a number of fighter planes overhead. At first I 
thought they were Indonesian planes, but then I realized that they were so modern 
and so fast they could only be Dutch.” The former Prime Minister indeed seemed 
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disappointed that the Netherlands, a country he had enjoyed spending time in as a 
young man, could not play a more positive role in Indonesia’s future.430  
In soon to be independent India, Prime Minister Nehru had closely followed 
the situation in the archipelago. He had already warned London before the outbreak 
of hostilities that the peoples of Asia would not tolerate war in Indonesia and strongly 
supported the Republicans. In mid July, just a month before the British were due to 
withdraw from the subcontinent and hand over sovereignty, he had urged Bevin to do 
everything in his power to prevent armed conflict.431 During Sjahrir’s brief stop in 
New Delhi while en-route to New York, the former Prime Minister gave an emotional 
speech, saying he had been sent by Sukarno on a mission “to make the world stop the 
colonial war in Indonesia.”432 Two days later Nehru made a strongly worded public 
statement. The “police measures of a strictly limited character”, he argued, were in 
fact a carefully and long-prepared military campaign whose real purpose was to 
“inflict complete military defeat […] and prepare the way for a political settlement 
entirely favorable to the Dutch.” If they wanted, Britain and the United States could 
end the conflict immediately, Nehru added. Unless the two nations take immediate 
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and more effective action, he warned, India would soon have no option but to bring 
the matter before the UN Security Council.433 
Australian officials, who as we saw in earlier chapters viewed their country as 
an important power and partner in the region and believed it could make a positive 
contribution to an ultimate solution, also professed themselves greatly concerned 
about the conflict in Indonesia.434 In Canberra like in New Delhi, Republican 
diplomats appealed to the government “in the name of humanity and in the interests 
of friendship” to do everything it could to bring about an end to Dutch aggression. 
Australia’s good offices would be “deeply and eternally appreciated.” Just days before 
the commencement of the military campaign, Australian Prime Minister J.B. Chifley 
had informed the British that if no peaceful agreement was reached, his country 
would have no recourse but to raise the matter in the Security Council.435   
Contrary to the perception of Netherlands planners, then, the Australian 
leadership believed Republican authorities had demonstrated patience in the face of 
continuous Dutch provocations. American and British urges to Sjahrir’s delegation to 
comply had unduly encouraged the “incomprehensible” Dutch before the outbreak of 
hostilities, and neither nation had demonstrated a willingness to act since, officials in 
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Canberra charged.436 London advised the Australian government against taking action 
in the United Nations; this would give the Soviet Union, which had been casting itself 
as a defender of oppressed colonial peoples in the Security Council, an opportunity to 
intervene and discredit the western powers.437 According to Chifley’s cabinet, 
however, avoiding Dutch embarrassment was “a matter of relatively small importance 
as compared with the very great importance of accepting the challenge put forward by 
Asiatic peoples.” Australian long-term interests, the Prime Minister told Attlee in no 
uncertain terms on July 28, demanded unequivocal action.438 Two days later, the 
Dutch envoy in Canberra reported that the government had decided to refer the 
matter to the Security Council “in the spirit of impartiality” and “solely for the 
purpose of restoring peace.”439 
 The American government was unhappy with this prospect, but believed it 
could prevent it by informing the Dutch that Washington now desired to be helpful 
and asking them if they might accept an offer of mediation by a third power. Dutch 
Ambassador Van Kleffens responded to this query by emphasizing that the police 
measures would be concluded within days, and that at that point in time his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
436  Department of External Affairs to Australian Minister to the Netherlands F.K. Officer, 15 July 1947, 
in: AUS, no. 115; Secretary of Department of External Affairs J.W. Burton to Minister of External Affairs 
H.V. Evatt, 23 July 1947, in: AUS, no. 138.  
437  Addison to Government of Australia, in: AUS, no. 124. 
438  Government of Australia to Addison, 25 July 1947, in: AUS, no. 155; Chifley to Attlee, 28 July 1947, 
in: AUS, no. 174. 
439  Dutch envoy in Canberra P.E. Teppema to Van Boetzelaer Van Oosterhout, 30 July 1947, in: NIB, 
X, no. 78; Teppema to Van Boetzelaer Van Oosterhout, 31 July 1947, in: NIB, X, no. 93; Memorandum 
Chief of Political Affairs Office of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Henri van Vredenburch, 30 July 1947, in NIB, 
X, no. 79. 
 
   
   
244 
government would gladly avail itself of American good offices in order to renew 
consultations with the Republic. The Dutch preferred good offices to mediation, he 
explained, because the latter assumed two equal parties. The unfriendly Australian and 
Indian announcements no longer left the British free and impartial agents, Van 
Kleffens added; the Netherlands government was in fact doing London a favor by not 
asking for its help.440 On July 30, Marshall warned Truman that the UN Security 
Council meeting planned for the following day would put the United States in a 
difficult position. If India or Australia raised the matter of Dutch action in Indonesia, 
as they clearly planned to, U.S. representative Herschel V. Johnson “would not be 
able to support the Dutch position […] nor to oppose the establishment of a UN 
committee” that would investigate the conflict. The Secretary therefore asked the 
President to authorize him to again urge the Dutch to accept American good offices. 
The President agreed, and Van Kleffens was pulled off his plane to New York and 
informed.441 The British government considered this unilateral offer of good offices 
“bad manners and bad faith,” especially because Dutch officials had only just cast 
aside a similar British proposal “like an outworn garment.”442 
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This change in American attitude toward the conflict in Indonesia must be 
seen, as McMahon suggests, from the perspective of a shifting United States grand 
strategy.443 As tensions between Washington and Moscow increased over the course 
of 1946 and 1947 and communists took over in Poland and Hungary, containing the 
USSR became something to be achieved first and foremost in Western Europe. One 
of the first reports produced by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), created by 
Truman with the signing of the National Security Act in late July, assessed the greatest 
danger to American security to be not Soviet military strength and aggression, “but 
the possibility of economic collapse in Western Europe.” To avert this disaster and its 
dangerous political ramifications, the Secretary of State had during a speech at 
Harvard University in early June outlined the administration’s “Marshall Plan,” an 
economic assistance program that proposed large-scale American monetary support 
to help rebuild the devastated European economies and so prevent the spread of 
communism. Negotiations on this reconstruction plan were underway in Paris when 
the Dutch military offensive in Indonesia started.444  
From the American point of view, the British, French, and Dutch economies 
remained inextricably bound up with their colonies. U.S. interests in Indonesia could 
therefore not be separated from American interests in the Netherlands. Stanley 
Hornbeck explained the importance of both the Netherlands and the Indies to the 
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United States; the former were located on the strategically important eastern frontier, 
the latter on the western frontier.445 Continued instability in Southeast Asia severely 
hindered not only the economic rehabilitation of the colonial regions, but also 
economic recovery in Western Europe. The consequence of this belief was the 
acceptance of the motives the Dutch government had given for its military campaign 
in Indonesia. It must be seen, the New York Times also stated in late July and early 
August, as the result not of warlike aggression, but of the necessity of opening ports 
and reviving the trade that would prevent the Netherlands from going bankrupt.446 In 
the late summer of 1947, the main question in front of American policymakers thus 
again became how to reconcile the nation’s “traditional liberal policies” that 
supported self-government for formerly colonial peoples, and its interests in 
“supporting friendly European governments.”447 
 
The UN Security Council debate on the ongoing conflict in Indonesia started 
in Lake Success, NY, on July 31. Both the Indian and Australian representative 
requested swift action, charging the Netherlands with having embarked without 
warning on a large-scale military operation. An urgent and forceful Australian draft 
resolution stated a breach of peace under Article 39 of the United Nations Charter 
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and called for immediate measures to end hostilities. The Australian delegate W.R. 
Hodgson further argued that Dutch troops should be ordered to revert to the original 
positions they had held when hostilities broke out, and that the dispute should be 
submitted to third party arbitration as, he noted, the Linggadjati Agreement had 
provided. Dutch representative Van Kleffens countered with a lengthy oration in 
which he posited that the name “Republic of Indonesia” was misleading, that the 
Republic should not be considered a sovereign state but rather a “political entity to be 
affiliated ultimately with […] two other states [as] part of a federation,” and that the 
conflict in any case was a strictly internal matter not of international concern. On 
August 1 a resolution nevertheless passed with the help of American delegate 
Johnson, who in return for the Dutch acceptance of American good offices had 
insisted that the inconvenient reference to the arbitration article of the Linggadjati 
Agreement be struck out. Resolution 27, which the other Western European colonial 
powers France, Britain, and Belgium had voted against, called upon the two parties to 
cease hostilities and settle their dispute by arbitration or by other peaceful means.448 
On July 31, too, the Netherlands government decided not to authorize Van 
Mook to occupy the Republican center of Yogyakarta. Prime Minister Beel noted that 
the city’s occupation was politically impossible; because the progressive members of 
his cabinet resisted an extension of the offensive, and because it would lead to 	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mounting criticism from abroad, the military operation had to remain a limited 
campaign. Van Mook was instead told to focus on renewed negotiations with the 
Republic.449 
 The Lieutenant Governor-General reluctantly ordered a ceasefire to go in 
effect at midnight on August 4. President Sukarno held a victory speech. The New 
York Times hailed the historic United Nations resolution as the body’s first major 
victory. Great difficulties still remained, however.450 Dutch troops had occupied large 
territories formerly under Republican control, including important sugar, rubber, tea, 
coffee, and oil producing regions. The Netherlands government now considered itself 
responsible for law and order in those areas, and called for continued “purges.” 
Meanwhile, the withdrawn Indonesian army was preparing for a guerilla war. Despite 
the ceasefire, therefore, the fighting did not stop.451   
Van Mook and Spoor were once again unhappy with The Hague. Convinced as 
they were that further negotiations would prove fruitless, they feared that a Dutch 
reluctance to penetrate Yogyakarta would make the Netherlands leadership seem 
weak and insecure. A swift and effective march on the capital, which Van Mook 
claimed everybody expected to take place, would make international criticism subside.452 
Both men moreover continued to believe that large parts of the Indonesian 	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population were willing to cooperate with the Dutch as long as they could be certain 
the “Republican boys with their weapons and terror” would not return. They refused, 
in other words, to give up hope that the Netherlands government would eventually 
agree to the extermination of the “pesthole” Yogyakarta.453  
  
By early August, the results were clear: the UN-ordered ceasefire was 
ineffective. Fighting continued, and the military campaign had strengthened anti-
Dutch feeling in the Republic. Short-wave broadcasts from Yogyakarta, where radios 
were an enormously powerful tool to exert influence and authority over a far-flung 
archipelago with many remote areas, forbade Indonesian administrators in occupied 
territories to cooperate with Dutch officials. Attacks on Netherlands army outposts 
persisted. Destruction of foreign property continued. The Lieutenant Governor-
General explained that this “scorched-earth” policy and the wavering attitude of the 
government in The Hague were decreasing the willingness of the Indonesian people 
to cooperate with Dutch troops, and ordered extensive “mopping up” operations.454 
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 At this point, a group of disgruntled Dutch Indies administrators and military 
commanders appealed directly to Queen Wilhelmina. “Gravely concerned” about the 
current course of events, they argued that the continued existence of the Republic and 
its leadership would inevitably result in the ruination of Java and Sumatra. The only 
way out of the impasse was the swift destruction of extremist elements in Yogyakarta 
followed by the formation of a new government by those willing to cooperate. This 
course of action, they predicted, a large majority of the fearful population would greet 
with joy. In a separate telegram to Minister Jonkman, Van Mook threateningly added 
that unless the Dutch government came to a firm decision, he would be forced to 
either give up his task as impossible or, “like a captain on a ship in need,” take those 
measures necessary to save the land trusted to his care.455  
Beel and Jonkman were tempted to agree to the occupation of Yogyakarta. 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Van Boetzelaer van Oosterhout and Labor Party cabinet 
members, however, doubted whether the occupation of Yogyakarta would solve 
Dutch difficulties, and resolutely disagreed. Van Kleffens shared this view, noting that 
from his reading of newspapers and talks with officials, he was forced to conclude 
that American public opinion was turning against the Dutch, and that an occupation 
of the Republican capital was likely to result in UN sanctions against the Netherlands 
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government.456 For those reasons The Hague decided against Van Mook’s rash 
proposal, cabling the Lieutenant Governor-General to stress the importance of the 
international front and the disastrous effects of economic sanctions.457 
 The leadership in Washington was meanwhile doing everything it could to help 
the Dutch. After having offered The Hague American good offices, Acheson told 
Consul-General Foote to “locate properly authenticated Indonesian Republicans” and 
tell them that the United States was prepared to offer them assistance, too.458 
Sjarifuddin formally accepted this offer, but also demanded the withdrawal of Dutch 
troops and the restoration of full independence to the Republic. The Prime Minister 
moreover asked the United States to persuade the Dutch and UN Security Council to 
dispatch an international arbitration commission to Indonesia. His remark that herein 
lay “the only and final hope of settling [the] dispute by peaceful means” led British 
Consul Mitcheson to observe that the Indonesian response in fact amounted to a 
“polite refusal” of American good offices.459 After a further explanation of the offer’s 
objective of bringing the two parties together to work out an equitable settlement 
without the direct participation of other states, Republican leaders again stated that 
they accepted the American offer in principle but preferred arbitration by the Security 
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Council. This led Foote and Acheson to conclude that, with “little conception” of 
what good offices constituted, the Indonesians had effectively rejected them.460 
 This should not have been a great surprise to policymakers in the American 
capital. President Sukarno had long since realized that a large part of the Republican 
battle had to be fought in the international arena and commenced a skillful war of 
perception. Like a growing number of Indonesians, he believed that eliciting support 
through the United Nations would serve their purpose better than accepting an 
American offer to mediate. Not only had the United States failed to stop the Dutch 
from resorting to force, it had allowed Consul-General Foote’s obvious backing of the 
Dutch position. It is hard to argue against George Kahin’s contention that American 
actions had in recent months directly weakened the Republic’s case vis-à-vis the 
Dutch.461 
 In early August, the Security Council resumed its debate on Indonesia, inviting 
Sjahrir to speak for the Republic. Van Kleffens objected, noting that if the Republic 
was allowed a voice, then representatives from the Republic’s fully co-equal “sister 
states” East-Indonesia and Borneo should also be able to present their views. 
Although he was supported on this point not just by the British, French, and Belgian 
representatives but also by the American delegate, the motion was denied; in contrast 
to the other two states, a majority of Council members agreed, the Republic had de 	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facto recognition and was a party to the dispute.462 In a moving speech on August 14, 
former Prime Minister Sjahrir sketched the historical background of the conflict, 
going back all the way to the establishment of the Dutch East India Company in the 
early 17th century, and argued that the continued presence of Dutch troops on 
Republican territory threatened the existence of the Republic. He asked the Security 
Council to order the withdrawal of these troops to the demarcation lines of the 
October 1946 cease-fire. Since resuming negotiations with one party standing “with a 
pistol pointed at the head of the other” would surely be fruitless, the only method for 
a peaceful and lasting solution would be an international and impartial arbitration 
commission, he concluded.463   
 Although the Netherlands government dismissed Sjahrir’s speech as hostile 
and, in effect, a declaration of war, it was in fact much better received than Van 
Kleffens’s subsequent speech, which observers labeled an “emotional [and] tediously 
legalistic lecture.” During this speech, the Dutch delegate made a counterproposal to 
Sjahrir’s: the establishment of a commission of investigation with three members, one 
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of which would be chosen by the Netherlands, the second by the Republic, and the 
third jointly by the two members already selected.464 
 In Jakarta, Van Mook and Spoor objected to an international investigation 
commission. Both sent The Hague a stream of reports on the ever-deteriorating 
situation in the Indies. A frustrated Spoor stated he was close to convinced that the 
Dutch deserved to lose the archipelago. Republican retaliations to continuing Dutch 
“mopping-up” operations made the Lieutenant Governor-General repeat his threat of 
resignation. Without informing the government in The Hague but nevertheless 
hoping he would in the meantime acquire its support, Van Mook unilaterally decided 
that the occupation of Yogyakarta would commence on the 20th. He was forced to 
delay the operation, however, when Dutch policymakers, fearing that the Lieutenant 
Governor-General might rebel at any moment, ordered him to await the results of the 
next Security Council meeting.465  
 It was at this point that the United States intervened. Ambassador Baruch 
warned the Netherlands government that starting another military campaign ran 
counter to long-term Dutch interests and would be like opening Pandora’s box. He 	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also predicted that an expanded operation would result in enough pressure on the 
United States by other nations to leave its UN representative unable to resist Security 
Council measures against the Netherlands. Van Kleffens again informed The Hague 
of increasing anti-Dutch sentiments. On August 22, American delegate Johnson 
proposed the formation of a non-binding consular commission, importantly adding 
that the United States believed it was the parties themselves, not the United Nations, 
who bore the responsibility for determining the terms of the settlement and the 
method by which it might be reached.466 Beel and Jonkman, realizing by now that the 
Netherlands could not escape foreign intervention in Indonesia, considered this UN 
commission the least threatening proposal yet; it would offer only those services the 
parties themselves requested. They ordered Van Mook to postpone any further action 
against the Republic.467 
 The American fear that a discussion of the Indonesian conflict in the United 
Nations would hinder Washington’s efforts in appearing to be a neutral power was 
justified. As Ruth McVey has pointed out, the Security Council was the perfect stage, 
and Indonesia the perfect case, for the Soviet Union to propagandize against and 
publicly embarrass the Western imperial powers that it claimed were suppressing the 
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sincere aspirations of the peoples of Southeast Asia.468 Delegate Andrei Gromyko 
repeatedly accused the United States of feigning an anti-colonial attitude while really 
attempting to “by-pass” the world organization that was seeking a solution in 
Indonesia. And indeed, the eventual compromise reached and the precedent it set 
benefited Europe’s colonial powers more than it did the newly emerging nations in 
Southeast Asia. While this outcome was a disappointment for Sjahrir, Van Kleffens 
cabled to The Hague that if the Security Council debate was compared to a boxing 
game, the ultimate rejection of binding arbitration meant the Netherlands had “won 
on points.”469  
 Although the American resolution was accepted on August 25, Van Mook and 
Spoor each made a last attempt to acquire the Dutch government’s authorization for 
the occupation of Yogyakarta. This Republic would not honor the ceasefire or 
suddenly accept Dutch plans for the future of the archipelago, Van Mook stated.470 
Spoor complained that the Republic’s continued existence and The Hague’s 
unwillingness to “create conditions for cooperation” forced him into failure.471 
Despite these objections, the Netherlands government finalized its decision not to 
allow the occupation of Yogyakarta. Any solution not supported by the United States 	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had to be rejected on practical grounds, Minister of Social Affairs Willem Drees 
believed. Instead of granting him his wish, the cabinet decided to invite the Lieutenant 
Governor-General to the Netherlands for further discussion. A disappointed Van 
Mook, still of the opinion that the Dutch must continue to try and burst the 
Republic’s bubble, reluctantly agreed.472 
 
By late August of 1947, then, the Dutch had escaped a great danger. Although 
the discussions in the Security Council had led to more sympathy for the position of 
the Republic and had meant the matter could no longer be considered an internal 
affair, the members of the Council had voted against the binding arbitration that 
Sjahrir had argued for. The Dutch soon nominated Belgium, its advocate in colonial 
matters, as their representative for the new commission the American resolution had 
brought into being. The Republic announced Australia as its choice. Unsurprisingly, 
the third strategic spot was then taken by the United States. The Committee of Good 
Offices, as it came to be known, could act only at the request of the warring parties 
themselves. It was likely because of this that Lieutenant Governor-General Van Mook 
maintained his belief that UN “interference” would ultimately come to naught.473 
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 During the early fall, the nearly constant violations of the armistice highlighted 
the diverging Indonesian and Dutch interpretations of the order to cease fire; whereas 
the Republic had instructed its troops to pause hostilities and hold their position, 
Netherlands Indies officials had ordered the Dutch army to proceed with the 
consolidation of its control over the newly occupied territories. With Java and 
Sumatra’s major producing areas now in Dutch hands, the Republic was crippled. Its 
threatened existence in turn led to Indonesian forces opposing Dutch attempts at 
subjugation with increasing amounts of resistance and violence. When the Good 
Offices Commission arrived in the archipelago without having been granted the actual 
powers needed to mediate, it faced the almost insurmountable task of inducing the 
two parties to cooperate with one another in an atmosphere of growing hatred and 
mutual dislike and mistrust. By October 1947, a complete breakdown of the ever 
fragile and mostly unobserved ceasefire seemed likely. 
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Chapter 5 
 
International “Interference”: October 1947 - July 1948 
 
“Militarily the Dutch have presented the [Good Offices] 
Committee and [Security] Council with a fait accompli. They 
are now endeavoring to do the same politically, and it is essential 
that [we] endeavor to check this without delay.” 474 
 
             Thomas K. Critchley, December 1947  
 
 
“Dutch mistakes in Indonesia in the last two years,” Hubertus van Mook told the 
assembled cabinet ministers on a visit to The Hague in early September 1947, “have 
revolved around an inability to make quick decisions.” The Netherlands government 
had been unable to keep up with the swiftly changing circumstances in the 
archipelago, he went on; “extremist [Republican] elements” now intimidated and 
terrorized the Indonesian population in the territories occupied by the Dutch. The 
good news, according to the Lieutenant Governor-General, was that the Republican 
regime in Yogyakarta would likely succumb to internal weaknesses and collapse; in the 
meantime, Netherlands and Netherlands Indies forces could encourage anti-
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Republican resistance and force a swift sanitation, pacification, and consolidation of 
the areas they had occupied during the police action.475 
 The year 1947 had so far brought to the Indonesian archipelago not political 
stabilization and economic rehabilitation, but war. In July, a euphemistically labeled 
“police action” that was in fact a well orchestrated and extensive military campaign 
saw the Dutch aiming to subjugate the Indonesian Republic into submission, and a 
march on the Republican capital of Yogyakarta had only narrowly been avoided when 
the Netherlands policy drew international protests and criticism. By the late summer, 
however, the government in The Hague believed it had escaped the danger of foreign 
“interference” in the conflict in Indonesia. Although debates in the United Nations 
Security Council had led to more sympathy for the position of the Republic and had 
meant the Dutch could no longer present the matter as an “internal affair,” the 
members of the Council had voted against the binding arbitration that Republican 
delegates had argued for.   
On August 4, the Dutch leadership in Jakarta and The Hague and the 
Indonesian leadership in Yogyakarta had in principle agreed to the ceasefire issued by 
the Security Council. In the field, however, the fighting had not ceased. At the end of 
that month, the Lieutenant Governor-General unilaterally declared new demarcation 
lines (the so-called “Van Mook line”) that connected the most advanced Dutch posts 	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in Java and Sumatra. This former Republican territory still held tens of thousands of 
Indonesian troops, which Dutch soldiers aimed to disarm through continued 
“mopping-up” operations. Republican forces in turn aimed to intimidate and deter 
potential cooperators with the Dutch authorities. Van Mook thought that foreign 
interference into the ongoing conflict would likely come to nothing; the diplomats 
currently drafting a ceasefire progress report for a United Nations Consular 
Commission were uninformed men of “generally […] small stature” and prone to 
“losing their heads,” he reassured his colleagues in The Hague, although he admitted 
that further military action would risk serious international repercussions.476  
 Despite the Lieutenant Governor-General’s confidence, the Dutch military 
stopping just short of Yogyakarta had everything to do with increasing interest and 
concern about the Indonesian dispute in the United States, Australia, and the UN. 
The imminent arrival of a Consular Commission reporting on the ceasefire made it 
impossible for Netherlands forces to take advantage of their military superiority and 
destroy the Republican government by marching on its capital, a course of action Van 
Mook had strongly argued for. An August 25 United Nations resolution had 
moreover established a three-member “Good Offices Committee” for Indonesia with 
the goal of finding a lasting solution to the conflict.   
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Republicans requested that Australia represent them on this committee, and the 
Dutch asked Belgium for its support. Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin politely declined 
an invitation for Britain to join as a third party; after multiple unsuccessful attempts at 
bringing peace to the region in 1945 and 1946, his government had decided to stay on 
the sidelines of the conflict. Uneager for the position but unable to refuse, the United 
States then took the last and presumably impartial seat on the committee. President 
Harry Truman nominated Frank Porter Graham, the president of the University of 
North Carolina and an experienced arbitrator in labor disputes. The Belgians selected 
Paul van Zeeland, former Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. Richard C. 
Kirby, a judge at the Australian Commonwealth Court of Arbitration, was to be the 
third representative. From this last delegate in particular the Dutch expected nothing 
but trouble. Netherlands officials labeled the attitude of the Australian representative 
to the UN, Colonel W.R. Hodgson, “rather impetuous,” and accused another 
Australian diplomat of having a “somewhat tactless approach.” Australians in 
Indonesia, the Dutch said, exhibited their naivety by believing that Republican 
politicians in Yogyakarta could still be negotiated with.477 And indeed, the leadership 
in Canberra and its representative on the Good Offices Committee would soon prove 
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how problematic, in the eyes of officials in The Hague and Jakarta, international 
“interference” in the archipelago could be.  
 This chapter focuses on events from the early fall of 1947 until July of 1948. 
How did the summer’s police action influence the political and military strategies of 
the Dutch? What, if anything, might the perilously situated Republican leadership do 
to further its cause? And how did both parties view and try to win over the foreign 
consuls and UN observers about to enter the fray? This chapter critically examines the 
role of the United States, Australia, and the United Nations through the prism of the 
Good Offices Committee in Indonesia, the arduous negotiations between the Dutch 
and Republican delegations for another comprehensive agreement after the failure of 
Linggadjati, and the Netherlands Indies government’s fait accompli policy and unilateral 
formation of a federative United States of Indonesia. It also investigates the views of 
Dutch officials in Jakarta about the “meddling” of foreigners, and the influence of 
these officials on planners in The Hague (something that American historians have 
paid little attention to). Throughout, it argues that this period of the Indonesian 
struggle for independence was one of deception and delay, of negotiations and a new 
agreement that solved nothing -- the two parties in the conflict were living through 
nothing more than a brief and relative calm between two wars.  
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After a hot and violent summer, the six consuls on the Consular Commission 
arrived in Indonesia in September of 1947.478 British Consul-General Francis 
Shepherd reported to the Foreign Office in London that it took some effort to elevate 
the meetings “from a series of cozy chats with “Uncle Billy” [Foote] into rather more 
business-like sessions.” Apart from the enterprising Australian Charles Eaton, 
Shepherd intimated, the lackluster company of consuls resembled to him a set of 
“suet puddings.” His initial impression of the Dutch in the archipelago was that they 
had little realization of what Indonesian independence actually entailed.479  
It soon became clear to the Commission that the military campaign had 
crippled the Republic. Dutch troops occupied all major producing areas and harbors. 
Tens of thousands of refugees had been displaced. The Netherlands government and 
Netherlands Indies authorities believed that time was on their side, while the 
leadership in Yogyakarta depended on prompt and effective action by the United 
Nations for its very survival. 
In investigating the observance of the ceasefire order, the consuls spent most 
of September traveling through Java (visiting the cities of Yogyakarta, Bandung, 
Malang, and Surabaya, for instance) and Sumatra (where they inspected Palembang, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
478  The members on this commission were: Charles Eaton (Consul-General of Australia), Paul 
Vanderstichelen (Consul-General of Belgium), Tsiang Chia-Tung (Consul-General of China), Etienne Raux 
(Consul-General of France), Francis Shepherd (Consul-General of the United Kingdom), and Walter Foote 
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479  British Consul-General Francis M. Shepherd to Foreign Office, 16 October 1947, Foreign Office 
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Padang, Fort-de-Kock (now Bukittinggi), and Medan).480 The leftover Republican 
administrators they found in newly occupied Dutch territory were grudgingly 
cooperating with Netherlands Indies authorities and officers; relying on his 
preponderance of force, Van Mook had ordered all those guilty of subversive actions 
to be imprisoned. Shepherd reported privately to London that in his view, the 
Republican government was “amateurish [and] inefficient” and made up of “charming 
irresponsibles,” but he also believed that “a good deal [had] been learned since July 
20, and what [was] left of the Republic [had] probably gained in solidarity.”481 Against 
this solidarity stood a Dutch policy of “divide and conquer,” as Republican Deputy 
Prime Minister A.K. Gani had called it in his protest of the Van Mook line in the 
Security Council. Only severe economic pressure and intimidation could force 
Indonesian officials to enter into the Dutch Indies government service, he argued, 
underlining that the penetration of Republican territory by Netherlands forces did not 
mean complete occupation and control.482 
 In mid October, the Consular Commission was ready to publish its final report. 
It described the two parties’ lack of confidence in each other’s willingness to carry out 
the ceasefire order, and noted that although the Republican troops had remained in 
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481  Shepherd to Foreign Office, 9 October 1947, Foreign Office Files (FO) 810/4, BNA; Shepherd to 
Foreign Office, 22 October 1947, FO 810/4, BNA. 
482  Deputy Prime Minister A.K. Gani to Chairman United Nations Security Council, 29 September 1947, 
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position since early August, the Dutch were proceeding with what it termed “the 
restoration of law and order.” It stressed the population’s suffering, widespread 
shortages, and banditry. In the interim reports they sent to New York during the first 
half of September, several consuls had said Indonesian administrators were eager to 
see the Netherlands soldiers leave. They had also emphasized feelings of hatred 
toward the Dutch. At the insistence of outgoing American Consul-General and 
staunch supporter of the Dutch Walter Foote, however, the final report in October 
grossly underestimated the number of nationalists as “no more than five percent of 
the population,” who sought “some form of independence” but not necessarily 
supported the present Republic. Most Indonesians recognized, the report moreover 
said, that Dutch assistance in running the country was “essential.”483 
 Despite these declarations of support, the report was a bitter pill for the Dutch 
to swallow. Officials in Jakarta had previously assured The Hague that when they had 
met with the consuls they had been more “interested listeners” than “interrogators,” 
but the report had ultimately turned out clearly partial. In fact, one administrator 
complained, it contained “hardly a single acceptable sentence.” Van Mook helpfully 
repeated to the Netherlands government that the foreign observers were in fact a 
group of irresponsible amateurs; the Australian delegate formed his opinion only after 	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October – November 1947, Appendix II, 81-86; Report Visit Eaton and Raux to Yogyakarta and East Java, 7 
September 1947, in: Indonesië in de Veiligheidsraad, October – November 1947, Appendix I, 74-80; Report Consular 
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“big intakes of alcohol,” and the Frenchman was a “crazy” man who had obviously 
been fooled by the Republic’s façade that, according to the Lieutenant Governor-
General, hid a reality of chaos, terror, and mismanagement.484 Although Yogyakarta’s 
influence on the Indonesian masses had proven strong, Van Mook admitted, it was 
the common people’s fear of Republican reprisals, not hostility toward the Dutch, 
what stood in the way of constructive cooperation with his officials. If the army could 
offer consistent security and protection, he argued, the population would be less 
afraid and more willing to assist them.485  
 In the months after the Dutch military campaign, then, the Lieutenant 
Governor-General’s mind became firmly shut against any other views than those he 
was expressing. His disappointment and frustration about what he labeled “twenty 
months continuous effort to secure honest cooperation from [the Republican 
leadership]” led him to suggest a shift in the focus of Dutch policy in the archipelago. 
The Netherlands and Netherlands Indies governments must do their utmost not to 
feed the Republic’s “illusion of sovereignty,” Van Mook argued, and instead stimulate 
and organize anti-Republican sentiment in areas that could be encouraged to take a 
stand against Yogyakarta. While the Good Offices Commission prepared to begin its 
difficult assignment of finding a permanent solution to the conflict, Dutch 	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Beel, 16 October 1947, in: NIB, XI, no. 176.  
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administrators should move swiftly to aid the population of Indonesia in the 
formation of independent “daerahs” (districts) and “negeras” (states). These small units 
might then serve as counterweights to the Republic within the federative United 
States of Indonesia.486   
Van Mook’s suggestion was to extend the policy already followed in the 
buitengewesten East Indonesia and Borneo, where the Dutch believed the people 
overwhelmingly supported their cause, to Java and Sumatra, where the Republic had a 
large following. A start was made in Bandung, a city eighty miles southeast of Jakarta. 
From 12 until 19 October some fifty delegates discussed the future administration and 
“self-rule” of their region in a “West Java Conference.” Pro-Dutch Indonesian 
administrators, representatives from old aristocratic families, and influential feudal 
lords agreed to reject the regime in Yogyakarta and join the Dutch variant of the 
federal United States of Indonesia. The Lieutenant Governor-General was delighted 
with this result. “Practically the entire population [of West Java], except extremist 
groups,” he cabled to The Hague, wished for the quick restoration of law and order 
and desired constructive cooperation with Dutch rehabilitation efforts.487  
The Good Offices Commission, meanwhile, held its first informal meeting in 
the Blue Mountains outside Sydney on October 20. Although it faced a difficult task, 	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it was merely allowed to “assist” the two delegations by making suggestions, and only 
if requested to do so by one of the parties. The three members moreover were 
required to be unanimous in their proposals.488 American Frank Graham, the Dutch 
noted with some concern, was a progressive idealist: a provincial and stubborn 
intellectual with a fondness for radical organizations, but not unsusceptible to reason. 
They described Paul van Zeeland as a businessman convinced of his own importance 
and wisdom. The Belgian wanted to be the “deus ex machina,” solve the conflict as 
quickly as possible, and return to Europe, something Netherlands officials who 
believed time was on their side recognized as “not in [their] benefit.”489 The youngest 
member by ten years, Australian Richard C. Kirby had been chosen by Prime Minister 
Ben Chifley because he was impartial and would “do the right thing.”490  
After his first 
formal contact with 
the Commission on 
October 27, the 
Lieutenant Governor-
General cabled The Hague with his impression that “the three gentlemen were not 	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prepared to stay [in Indonesia] very long.” Disliking the prospect of resuming 
negotiations with a regime he had publicly labeled “extremist,” Van Mook suggested 
that the Dutch should merely appear to cooperate.491 While waiting for the Good 
Offices Commission to give up on its job, he argued, all their actions must be aimed 
towards promoting the economic “necrosis” of the severely weakened Republic and 
pushing the political development of areas formerly in Republican territory.492 
The first question the Commission needed to answer was the location of the 
negotiations. Republican politicians rejected the Dutch suggestion of Jakarta, because 
it was the political center of the Netherlands Indies administration from which the 
Republican government had moved in early 1946. Van Mook in turn refused to hold 
discussions in Singapore, believing he would be missed in the archipelago and wishing 
as usual to portray the conflict at “internal.” As no land site in or near the Indonesian 
archipelago was agreeable to both parties, Graham suggested that the United States 
government might make available a ship on which to meet.493 By mid November, the 
new American Consul-General in Jakarta, Charles A. Livengood, somberly intimated 
to Washington that everyone’s first hope of the Dutch and Republicans finding a 
solution amongst themselves seemed to offer slim chances. Even the formulation of a 
more effective ceasefire agreement was complex, as Graham and Van Zeeland wanted 	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to recognize the Van Mook line, and Kirby, firmly on the side of the Republic, 
resisted.494 
 Meanwhile, the Dutch stepped up their “mopping-up operations,” as the 
Lieutenant Governor-General had proposed, and intensified their efforts to 
encourage nationalist anti-Republican movements, introducing the latter in 
discussions about Indonesia’s future as speaking for a significant portion of the 
people. The Netherlands delegation so played down the authority and popularity of 
the Republic “both inside and outside the areas controlled by it.” The Indonesian 
leadership in Yogyakarta attempted to convince the Good Offices Committee that the 
Dutch planned to “smother” the Republic through the application of political 
intimidation and economic blockades. In an effort to induce the population to 
cooperate with them, Dutch soldiers moreover committed military atrocities.495 An 
example of these tactics came with an incident in Bondowoso in East Java on 
November 23. When forty-six out of one hundred Indonesian political prisoners died 
from asphyxiation while on a 14-hour transport to Surabaya in three locked wagons, 
an investigation by Dutch army commanders showed that the troops in charge of the 
transport had paid little attention to the situation of the captives and given them no 
food or water. The Republic protested, and in July 1948 several Netherlands officers 	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appeared before a martial court. Most were acquitted on the grounds that they had 
received no clear instructions from superiors on how to handle the prisoners. Only 
the supervisor was sentenced to one month in jail. During the appeal, eight men were 
convicted, and the longest prison sentence was eight months.496 
 
When we look at the last months of 1947, it becomes clear that Lieutenant 
Governor-General Van Mook believed visiting consuls and foreign policymakers had 
little understanding of how the situation in “his” Indies had evolved over the last two 
years. He complained about having had to “tutor” diplomats such as Inverchapel and 
Killearn, politicians such as Schermerhorn, and now the delegates of the Good 
Offices Commission. In turn, these outsiders increasingly described Van Mook and 
his aides as being both “touchy” and out of touch. The atmosphere in Jakarta, they 
stated, was a sensitive one full of nostalgia and suspicion. The Netherlands Indies 
administration was top-heavy; almost all responsibility and power of decision lay in 
the hands of the Lieutenant Governor-General, whose function allowed for not even 
a week’s vacation. He was surrounded by a group of advisers without specific tasks 
and department specialists not consulted about general policy. Overworked and 
isolated, none of them had an eye for what was happening outside of the archipelago. 	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Van Mook’s aide Henri van Vredenburch later said that he reminded him of a solitary 
elephant: big and roughly built, with a strong head, broad shoulders, and heavy neck. 
A lonely figure by nature and profession, the Lieutenant Governor-General was not 
prone to working with others in close confidence. His many good characteristics, Van 
Vredenburch admitted, included seemingly limitless energy, an optimistic spirit, and 
an ability to accept and work around setbacks, but he was also ambitious, 
domineering, and increasingly resentful of the lack of trust The Hague put in him. It 
became clear over the course of 1947 that the important relationship between the 
Lieutenant Governor-General and the Netherlands government had turned uneasy, 
and was marked by a lack of openness and mutual bitterness and irritation. Van Mook 
and his small group of aides regularly left policymakers in the Dutch capital in the 
dark about the course of their policy, radically changing it and then presenting the 
government, ministers complained, with faits accomplis (a phrase repeatedly used in 
relevant correspondence and memoirs). Administrators in Jakarta in turn charged 
those in The Hague with being indecisive.497 
 
By early November, it became clear that the American government was 
reluctant to supply a ship as a neutral site for the discussions between the Good 
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Offices Committee and Dutch and Republican delegations. It would tend to 
overemphasize, British Consul-General Shepherd intimated to London after having 
spoken with a disappointed Graham, that country’s intervention in the Indonesian 
question. The Dutch, not eager for substantive discussions, stipulated that no political 
negotiations could take place until Republican leaders signed a satisfactory ceasefire 
agreement and implemented it effectively. Despite the Good Offices Committee’s 
arrival, Van Mook continued to argue that the dispute with the Republic was an 
internal conflict. Calling together an official “delegation” for the upcoming talks was, 
therefore, “absurd and exceptionally dangerous;” it would give the world the idea that 
the Netherlands government accepted the Republican regime as an equal partner. 
Although the Republicans sent influential politicians such as Prime Minister Amir 
Sjarifuddin and Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Haji Agus Salim to head discussions, Van 
Mook decided he did not want to lead the 
negotiations himself. He instead dispatched his 
trusted colleague Van Vredenburch, and his 
protégé Abdul Kadir Widjojoatmodjo, a pro-
Dutch Netherlands Indies civil servant and 
military officer who had studied in Leiden 
under the influential Dutch scholar of Oriental 
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cultures and languages and colonial adviser Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje. The 
Lieutenant Governor-General told Shepherd “off the record” that he had no 
confidence in the Committee’s efforts and that, frankly, he saw no other solution than 
the Republic’s disintegration. Graham especially, he noted, was too naïve and 
inexperienced in his dealings with “orientals.”498 
 The U.S.S. Renville arrived in Jakarta’s harbor of Tanjung Priok in early 
December. On the eve of the resumption of discussions, Graham stressed to both 
parties that the responsibility of finding an equitable 
solution lay first and foremost with them. He also 
suggested that the Linggadjati Agreement of November 
1946 might serve as a working basis. In the absence of 
concrete Dutch or Indonesian proposals, the two 
delegations were forced to accept this 
recommendation.499 Shepherd pessimistically warned 
London that at the advent of the talks, the general belief 
was that although the negotiations might lead to satisfactory conclusions on paper, 
they would never be implemented.500 
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Between 11 and 19 December the Good Offices Committee met with each 
delegation in informal but unproductive sessions on the Renville’s small deck. Going 
over the Linggadjati Agreement article by article, Van Vredenburch dryly remarked, 
only served to find new areas of disagreement between the two parties. The Dutch 
delegation insisted on explaining the “elucidation” policymakers in The Hague had 
attached to the draft in early 1947; upon the eventual signing of the agreement in 
March, it claimed, the Netherlands government had only bound itself to its own 
interpretation of the accords. According to Van Vredenburch, this meant that the 
minutes of the negotiations leading up to the initialing of the draft agreement in 
November, upon which the Good Offices Committee was basing its questions and 
which the Republican delegation viewed as an integral part of the proposal, “had no 
more than an historical value.”501 
Attempts to quickly hammer out a ceasefire agreement were thwarted by the 
delegations’ divergent viewpoints on the demarcation lines. The Republican leadership 
wanted the Dutch to withdraw to the areas they had occupied at the time of the UN 
ceasefire resolution on August 4, whereas the Dutch held fast to the Van Mook line 
declared on August 29 after extensive consolidation operations.502  
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Political discussions between the Committee and the Dutch delegation focused 
on those articles in the Linggadjati Agreement that described the recognition of the 
Netherlands government of the de facto authority of the Republican government in 
Java and Sumatra. As we have seen in Chapter 5, most outsiders had interpreted this 
as a recognition of the existence of the Republic of Indonesia as a state, even as the 
Netherlands maintained de jure authority over the area. According to Van 
Vredenburch, however, Article 1 merely recognized an opportunity for the 
Republican government to prove its capacity to govern the area concerned, and in no 
way amounted to recognition of a sovereign state or partner equal to the Netherlands. 
The Dutch representative moreover objected to the Good Offices Committee’s 
interpretation of Article 5 as stating the commitment of the two parties to work 
together in the formation of a federative United States of Indonesia. Van 
Vredenburch explained that the Netherlands government was not obligated to seek 
cooperation from the Republic in the formation of the federation’s component states. 
Only in the organization of the joint federal organs, he argued, would the two parties 
aim to work together. The Australian representative astutely observed that this reading 
of the text conveniently gave the Dutch recourse to permit the fragmentation of 
Republican territory. Graham was forced to, in the words of Van Vredenburch, “let 
bygones be bygones” and discard the Linggadjati Agreement as a basis for 
discussion.503 	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 In meetings with the Republican delegation, meanwhile, the Good Offices 
Committee attempted to discover what Yogyakarta’s interpretation of Linggadjati had 
been. Sjarifuddin told Graham and his colleagues that the word “government” in the 
phrase “government of the Republic of Indonesia” had the same weight as it had in 
the phrase “government of the Netherlands.” The Dutch had clearly recognized the 
Republic as a de facto state, he noted. As such it had granted the Republic the right to 
conduct its own foreign relations and to maintain an army, until it would relinquish 
those powers to the federative United States of Indonesia on the proposed date of 
January 1, 1949. The question of de jure sovereignty had been left out of the draft 
agreement, the Indonesian Prime Minister explained, both because each party had 
claimed authority over the whole of Indonesia, and because the Netherlands in any 
case had undertaken to relinquish its claim to de jure authority when the United States 
of Indonesia was established.504 
 In mid December, Dutch Prime Minister Louis Beel and a group of ministers 
arrived in the archipelago to be updated on current developments in person. The 
former was so impressed with the Lieutenant Governor-General’s plans for the 
formation of the federation that he gave an impromptu radio speech. In it he urged 
the Republic to enter the federation at once, threatening that it would otherwise be 
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left out of the creation of a new Indonesia completely.505 The Lieutenant Governor-
General was satisfied the Prime Minister had authorized him to “resume the attack,” 
as he reported to Van Vredenburch, not only against the Republic, but also against the 
Good Offices Committee.506 Van Vredenburch in turn told Shepherd, who was 
already suspicious that the Dutch believed they had matters under control and wished 
to be left alone, that “Sjarifuddin was on his way out, and the Republic was 
finished.”507 
Van Mook thus continued his efforts to organize and encourage anti-
Republican movements throughout the archipelago. This, he thought, might also 
“divert” the attention of foreign observers away from the Republic and towards an 
Indonesian federation.508 In early December, he established the Komite Indonesia Serikat 
(“Committee for a United Indonesia”) and populated it with representatives from 
prospective member states of the federation. From 15 until 20 December, a second 
conference on the future of West Java took place in Bandung. Nearly all 154 delegates 
had been selected by the Dutch, and although the large majority of them was 
Indonesian, half of the total number of delegates was made up of administrators. The 
conference overwhelmingly displayed, in the words of a Dutch official, a “willingness 
to cooperate with the Netherlands Indies Government.” West Java, in other words, 	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was well on its way to becoming a separate negara. This result was no surprise, as the 
likely votes had been counted out beforehand; a local Dutch official had assured Van 
Mook in early December that “presently, the chances were quite safe,” and that he 
would not have hesitated to postpone the conference “had he had another 
impression.”509 The final report drawn up by Dutch civil servants paid little attention 
to the significant fact that a substantial minority of delegates had questioned the 
conference’s level of representativeness, and had moreover suggested that no decision 
could be made about West Java’s future until the negotiations on board the Renville 
were completed.510 
 The Republican delegation, meanwhile, was ringing the alarm bell. In a 
memorandum to the Good Offices Committee, Sjarifuddin objected to the Dutch 
attempts to separate a West Javanese puppet state from the Republic, deplored the 
activities of the Komite Indonesia Serikat, and voiced his concern over the “ultimative 
character” of the Prime Minister’s radio address. The Dutch were circumventing both 
the Committee and the Security Council through delaying tactics while attempting to 
settle the conflict “their way.” The Republic, Sjarifuddin contrasted, remained willing 
to negotiate and cooperate in the formation of an Indonesian federation, and was 
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ready to “accept unconditionally any decision” the UN would take on the 
question.”511  
 Recognizing the stalemate that had developed over the course of December, 
Graham cabled Washington for further instructions. The State Department would 
have to work towards one of two discernable courses of action, since “in questions of 
ultimate sovereignty,” he argued, “there [could] be no compromise.” The first was the 
construction of the United States of Indonesia according to the Dutch plan and under 
the de jure and de facto authority of the Netherlands government. This would involve a 
“reduction” of the Republic. Graham admitted he was reluctant to accept “at face 
value” the good faith of the Dutch, and thought it more likely that the Netherlands 
coveted a federation in which it itself would have the ultimate voice. Continued 
military operations and severe setbacks in the restoration of the archipelago’s 
economy would be the likely results of this course. There might even be another 
revolution, Graham warned. If the United States decided this was the preferred 
outcome, it need only “let nature take its course.” 
The second option, the American explained, was recognition of the Republic’s 
sovereignty and construction of a United States of Indonesia in which that Republic 
would be the dominant element. Unless the Netherlands desired Dutch control over 
Indonesia to be permanent, this prospect would eventually have to be faced, he 
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argued, even if it might temporarily lead to serious factional conflicts within the 
archipelago. If relieved of Dutch economic and military pressure, Graham believed, 
the Republic might be able to “set its house in order without a major crisis.” The 
current leadership of the Republic was as moderate, responsible, and responsive to 
Western ideas as any that were likely to arise in the future,” the American delegate 
concluded, but the State Department would have to exert “maximum pressure” on 
the Netherlands to accept this course of events.512 
 As 1947 drew to a close, then, Graham’s warnings and suspicions lead to 
increasing concern and pessimism in Washington; might the Netherlands government 
think a second military offensive in the archipelago was inevitable? The rather obvious 
Dutch strategy had been to keep the spotlight on the disorders and illegal acts they 
claimed the Republic condoned and encouraged, this allowing the Netherlands 
government to blame a breakdown of the ceasefire on the regime in Yogyakarta.513 
American Undersecretary of State Robert A. Lovett concluded from Graham’s cables 
that Netherlands officials were unwilling to enter into substantive discussions about 
an ultimate solution. Instead of chiding them, however, Lovett recommended that 
Graham try to solve the apparent stalemate by taking a strong position with the 
Republic and urging its leaders to accept the Dutch delegation’s ceasefire demands. In 
return, Van Vredenburch and his aides should accept the Republic’s bona fide 	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assurances that it would do all in its power to prohibit sabotaging activities. The time 
had probably come, the State Department believed, for the United States to “take a 
strong position along these lines to produce a positive effect.”514   
 
On December 21 and 22, the members of the Good Offices Committee 
discussed how to proceed. Van Zeeland underscored the gravity of the impasse, 
noting that a failure to reach a peaceful settlement would reflect badly on both the 
Netherlands and the UN and might mean the end of the Republic. Thomas K. 
Critchley, temporarily replacing Kirby, lacked faith in the Dutch and believed that no 
solution could work unless the aspirations of Indonesians were satisfied. It would be a 
pity, he opined to Canberra, to allow the Republic to go under while the haggling 
continued. Graham, Van Zeeland, and Critchley realized their Committee was at a 
crossroads. They decided to take the initiative, and drafted a conciliatory paper 
inducing both parties to increase their efforts in serious discussions.515 
 The three formulated eight clear but compromised political principles. They 
asked for the Republic to accept the Van Mook line, but at the same time implored 
Netherlands Indies officials to cease the unilateral creation of negaras. A ceasefire 
agreement was to be followed by troop reductions on both sides, and by Dutch 
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withdrawals from all territory occupied since late August. Economic rehabilitation was 
to be given priority. The paper also called for free elections in which Indonesians 
could decide on their relationship to the Republic and the United States of Indonesia. 
Finally, it proposed continued international assistance and observation during the 
transition period. The paper was completed on December 25 and informally delivered 
to the two parties the next day, and as such was soon referred to as “the Christmas 
message.”516 
 Critchley privately professed he “[did] not believe for one moment” that the 
Dutch would accept the proposals. They had presented the world, he said with a 
military fait accompli the previous summer, and “now endeavored to do the same 
politically.” If the Dutch rejected and the Republicans accepted the plan, however, the 
leadership in Yogyakarta would gain an advantage when the Good Offices Committee 
wrote its progress report for the Security Council. Critchley therefore gave the 
members of the Republican delegation detailed instructions, urging them to 
cooperate, but advising them to stress their reluctance to accept the Van Mook line.517  
Graham, meanwhile, was growing increasingly disillusioned with Dutch policy. 
He warned Netherlands officials that they were “doing the right thing in the wrong 
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way,” and should not try to present the Republic with “artificial faits accomplis.”518 Over 
the course of the last few months, the American had come to the conclusion that the 
Republic was the center around which all Indonesians desiring independence would 
rally. Given the superiority of the Netherlands Indies army and the precarious 
position of the Republic, any compromise agreement that ensured the survival of the 
government in Yogyakarta and that the Dutch signed to would be a miracle.519    
 During a meeting between the Good Offices Committee and the Dutch 
decision makers who were visiting the archipelago on December 27, Prime Minister 
Beel reiterated his goal of giving the United States of Indonesia full sovereignty on a 
basis of equality with the Netherlands within the Netherlands-Indonesia Union. With 
the signing of the Linggadjati Agreement, he underlined, Indonesian leaders had 
accepted the idea that sovereignty would be vested in the United States of Indonesia, 
not in its separate member states; the Republican pretention that it was already 
sovereign was therefore unacceptable. During the transition period, the Netherlands 
government aimed to transfer authority to an interim federal government formed by 
Indonesian leaders representing the various member states, Beel explained. With 
regards to the present movements working toward organization of separate political 
units in Java and Sumatra, he ended, these were spontaneous expressions of self-
determination rather than Dutch creations, and his officials had “no right to suppress 
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them.”520 The events that followed, as is shown particularly in Chapter 7, proved the 
Prime Minister’s pronouncement wrong. 
 The Republican representatives took Critchley’s advice and reluctantly accepted 
the plan, noting that although this involved “considerable sacrifice” on their part, they 
viewed it as “an integrated and balanced whole” and “a decisive step toward an 
equitable settlement.”521 The Dutch delegation submitted its response to the 
Committee’s Christmas proposals in the form of an amended and extensive set of 
principles.522 
 The last days of 1947 saw the Good Offices Committee considering this last 
reply. The Dutch flatly refused to withdraw from any territory occupied by 
Netherlands forces during the summer’s military campaign. The delegation’s response 
also threatened that the Dutch would “retake their freedom of action” if the Republic 
did not promptly accept the new offer on the table. Whether this implied extended 
military operations or simply a halt to negotiations, the Committee members could 
not say, but Van Vredenburch’s statement that “this [was] July 15,” a reference to the 
tense days before the start of the police action, certainly sounded ominous.523 The 
Committee therefore revised its original program to something presumably more 
acceptable to the Dutch, and passed it on to the Republican delegation on January 2. 	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Prime Minister Sjarifuddin agreed to meet with his cabinet in Yogyakarta for 
discussion. While awaiting his reply, Graham pessimistically told Washington that the 
two parties were irreconcilable, and that a Dutch move on Yogyakarta seemed 
inevitable. Prime Minister Beel and his colleagues, now on their way back to The 
Hague, had appeared to him “completely confident and untroubled by any prospect 
of international repercussions which might result from a Republican collapse.”524 
Kirby, recently returned to Indonesia from Australia, doubted the Republican 
government would survive acceptance of the counterproposals. He also believed, 
however, that its current position of strangulation left it no choice but to submit. He 
accompanied the members of the Republican delegation to their meeting with 
President Sukarno, Vice-President Mohammad Hatta, and the rest of the cabinet, and 
assisted them in drafting a reply that expressed indignation at the Dutch unilaterally 
submitting inflexible suggestions and an ultimatum. The Republican delegation, if of 
the view it must accept the proposals, might do so in a strongly worded letter to the 
Committee, Kirby suggested, emphasizing that the plans were forced upon the 
Republic while under great military and economic duress. It would now be up to the 
UN Security Council, the Australian ended his brief to Canberra, to show whether it 
had “the guts or even the desire” to stop the Dutch.525  
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The American Undersecretary of State, meanwhile, spent the last days of the 
year drawing up new instructions for Graham. Commending the initiative the Good 
Offices Committee had recently shown in finding an equitable solution to the crisis, 
he stated the Department’s belief that the Committee was and should be “a free agent 
on the spot.” The major considerations of Washington’s policymakers, he 
nevertheless reminded Graham, included the fact that the Netherlands was a strong 
proponent of American foreign policy in Europe. At the same time, however, the 
United States had “long favored self-government or independence for peoples who 
[were] qualified to accept the consequent responsibilities.” Thirdly, American 
economic interests demanded the speediest acceleration of trade between all of 
Indonesia and the rest of the world, as well as the opening up of the archipelago to 
US businesses. The construction of a stable federal United States of Indonesia under 
temporary Netherlands sovereignty seemed consistent with all three principles and 
appeared to offer an adequate degree of continued orderly conditions, Lovett 
argued.526 His recommendation nevertheless showed little appreciation of the slim 
chance that a plan based on three contrary principles offered of being effective or 
even acceptable to two parties with divergent interests.  
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During the first days of 1948, then, the Dutch in Jakarta aimed to once again 
make clear to the Republicans that unless they received an unqualified acceptance of 
their latest proposals, no further discussion was possible. These counterproposals to 
the Good Offices Committee’s Christmas message significantly amended the original 
political principles; no reference was made to the restoration of a Republican civil 
administration, withdrawal of troops, or international observation during the 
transition period, for example. Indeed, no mention was made of the Republic at all.  
 Around the turn of the year, one case in particular underlined the humanitarian 
implications of the recently stiffened Dutch attitude toward the Republic. On 
December 9, in the west Javanese village of Rawagede (now Balongsari), Dutch 
troops left more than four hundred Indonesians, almost the entire male population, 
dead in their search of the suspected center of underground activities. Although the 
Republic officially asked the Good Offices Committee to investigate the case in late 
December, and its January 12 report labeled the Dutch operation “deliberate and 
ruthless,” no criminal investigation was ever conducted.527 
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On January 6, Graham cabled Washington to explain that the political 
principles offered by the Netherlands were so generalized they offered the Republic 
virtually no hope of recovering the status envisaged for them under the Linggadjati 
Agreement “or even any assurance of its continued existence.” The collapse of the 
Republic was imminent, he argued, so in a last attempt the Committee had drawn up a 
set of supplementary principles in the hope these would prove acceptable to both 
parties. Although these additions clearly stated that ultimate sovereignty in Indonesia 
lay with the Netherlands until the Dutch transferred it to the federation, the Republic 
would in the meantime be given the chance to demonstrate the extent of its popular 
support. The latest proposal called for the Republic to be included as a component of 
the United States of Indonesia, in the interim government of which all member states 
of the proposed federation to get “fair” representation, and it proposed for plebiscites 
to be held within six months to a year from the signing of a political agreement. The 
Good Offices Committee would meanwhile continue its tasks of assistance and 
observance. Unless the Dutch, with the State Department’s help, could be persuaded 
to accept this plan, Graham believed, the present situation could not be saved “from a 
finish which will have lasting and dangerous repercussions for all parties 
concerned.”528 Secretary of State George Marshall responded by saying that he 
approved of this approach as “eminently fair and manifestly practical.” He also again 
underlined the need for the Good Offices Committee to take “an unequivocal 	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position.” Although officials in Washington were now in direct and informal 
discussions with the Netherlands embassy, the Secretary warned, Graham should 
present the principles as a Committee proposal, not as one emanating from the State 
Department.529 
 One of those informal meetings between Dutch and American policymakers 
nevertheless proved essential. On January 8, officials told Netherlands ambassador 
Eelco N. van Kleffens that in their opinion, the latest proposals contained all the 
points the Dutch had insisted on. They moreover noted almost off-handedly that the 
acceptance of the plan by the Dutch delegation would “decisively affect” not only 
American consideration of assistance to the Netherlands under the Marshall Plan, but 
also interim aid to the Indonesian archipelago. No one in the United States, Van 
Kleffens afterwards reported to the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, would 
understand “further bickering” in Indonesia. Congress was due to discuss the 
European Recovery Program’s financial aid to the Netherlands within a week, he 
warned, and in order to maintain goodwill and support in the United States, it was 
essential that the government in The Hague instruct the delegation in Jakarta to accept 
the proposals that, in the ambassador’s view, represented the maximum they could 
achieve.530   
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The importance of Southeast Asia to the success of the European Recovery 
Program and the interconnectedness of Indonesian reconstruction and trade and the 
rehabilitation of the Dutch economy has already been explored in Chapter 5. Over the 
course of 1946 and 1947, the United States used potential financial assistance as an 
incentive for both parties to reach an agreement. In the year 1948, policymakers in 
Washington continued to view the conflict in the archipelago through that same lens. 
Under the Marshall Plan, the American government was scheduled to allocate almost 
$500 million in aid to the Netherlands (the highest per capita aid of all of Europe in 
that year), one-fifth of which was to be used in the Indies. In the absence of a political 
agreement, however, it would be difficult for the United States to avoid the criticism 
that American dollars were assisting the Dutch in a war of colonial reconquest. At the 
same time, the deepening Cold War added two more fears; ongoing discussions for 
European integration and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) meant it 
was unwise to upset the Dutch, but a breakdown in negotiations in Indonesia might 
lead Republican politicians to look towards Moscow for support. A successfully 
implemented agreement might ensure continued Dutch influence in the archipelago 
while at the same time establishing a pro-western United States of Indonesia. 
As it had done before, the rattling of the American moneybag put pressure on 
those in The Hague and Jakarta to see the situation in a different light. Although 
Dutch officials believed that decision makers Washington had not seriously suggested 
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that failure to reach a swift agreement would endanger American financial assistance, 
their warning had made clear that the Netherlands and Netherlands Indies 
governments could not ignore the State Department as readily as it could the Good 
Offices Committee. Despite lingering objections, both the Lieutenant Governor-
General and the Prime Minister felt the additional principles must be accepted. The 
last six months had, after all, seen great improvements in the Dutch position in the 
Indies, Beel noted satisfied. If the Republic rejected or sabotaged the agreement, the 
United States would be squarely on the side of the Dutch, he predicted.531 
 During the second week of January, the Good Offices Committee traveled to 
Yogyakarta to induce the Indonesian leadership to accept the comprehensive final 
program. It found itself attempting to clarify the proposals to a skeptical audience; the 
Republicans wanted to avoid a repetition of their experience with the divergent 
interpretations of the Linggadjati Agreement. The Committee met with President 
Sukarno, Vice-President Hatta, Prime Minister Sjariduffin and others on January 12 
and 13. Sutan Sjahrir, only recently returned to Indonesia after having spent almost six 
months abroad advocating the Republican cause, was unsure about the plans.532 The 
Committee members tried to answer the probing questions as best they could, 
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stressing that their elucidations represented only their personal views and 
understanding of the words on the page.533 
 The fears of the leadership in Yogyakarta centered on the first principle in the 
political program, which concerned the status of the Republic of Indonesia. Would 
the recognition of the Republic as a state immediately follow the signing of the 
political agreement, or would it come only after the ratification of the constitution of 
the proposed United States of Indonesia? Would its current status be unaffected, or 
did the political agreement signify a diminishment of the Republic’s internal powers 
during the transition period? Would politicians in Yogyakarta be allowed to continue 
to foster foreign relations, and keep an army? Van Zeeland explained that the 
agreement only concerned the status of the Republic after the creation of the 
federation, and had no bearing on its present status. Graham, while pointing out that 
he was in no position to arbitrate between the parties’ conflicting claims regarding the 
Republic’s status, assured the Republican cabinet that acceptance of the principles 
could not in itself alter the status of either party.534  
 The first part of the agreement included a truce on the basis of the Van Mook 
line, and did not include Dutch withdrawals but rather outlined the evacuation of 
remaining Republican troops from pockets of resistance throughout Java. The 
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political section of the agreement promised plebiscites which could prove 
overwhelming support for the Republican cause among Indonesians. Republican 
officials, therefore, were weighing certain short-term military losses against possible 
long-term political gains. They had been left, too, with the impression that the 
Republic’s status would be unaffected, and that the United States and Australia would 
not allow the Dutch to diminish its status until after it had secured fair representation 
in a federal government. McMahon, Kahin, Reid, and others are united in their 
argument that Graham’s promises and pressure were decisive in securing the 
Republic’s reluctant acceptance of the agreement. The American delegate himself 
admitted shortly afterward that the atmosphere during the meetings had been 
“extremely tense,” with the fate of the program “hanging in the balance most of the 
time.” Kirby agreed, remarking to the Australian government that Graham had made 
“a quite oratorical and frenzied appeal with much table thumping,” arguing that the 
Republic would be foolish to reject this agreement. The Australian himself believed 
that the Republic had been bullied into an unjust agreement that went against its 
principle interests.535 
 The Republican government decided to accept the proposals, and the “Renville 
Agreement” was signed by both the Dutch and Indonesian delegation on board the 
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ship that lent it its name on the afternoon of January 17. The agreement consisted of a 
military truce and a political program, made up of the twelve principles drawn up by 
the Dutch and the six supplemental articles proposed by the Good Offices 
Committee. It was a painful concession for politicians in Yogyakarta, for in the 
recognition of the Van Mook line the Renville Agreement legitimized the Dutch 
police action of July 1947. It moreover ordered the cessation of Republican military 
activity within Dutch-occupied areas, and clearly gave the Netherlands government 
sovereignty over the entire archipelago until such time as the federative United States 
of Indonesia came into being. On the other hand, the accords had prevented for the 
time being an expansion of Dutch military operations, stated that the administration 
of all territory would eventually come only with the consent of its population, and so 
given the Republic hope of attaining independence through peaceful means. It 
moreover ensured continued international concern about the Republic’s survival. The 
basis of his acceptance of the principles, Sjarifuddin explained, lay in “the strength of 
the conceptions and clarifications” given by the Good Offices Committee to the 
Republican delegation during the bilateral meetings.536 Like the Linggadjati accords, 
however, the language of the Renville Agreement was vague, and basic issues were left 
unresolved. 
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In Yogyakarta, the signing of the agreement provoked the cabinet crisis Kirby 
had predicted; two major political parties, the Islamic Masyumi and the Partai Nasional 
Indonesia, withdrew their support from the Prime Minister. Mirroring Sutan Sjahrir’s 
sacking after concessions mere weeks before the start of the Dutch military offensive, 
Amir Sjarifuddin’s compromises led to his downfall. He resigned his post on January 
23. Before the end of the month and at the urging of President Sukarno, Mohammad 
Hatta announced the formation of a new national emergency cabinet of which he 
himself became Prime Minister. He committed his government to the prompt and just 
implementation of the Renville Agreement, continued negotiations with the Dutch 
delegation under the auspices of the Good Offices Committee, the reconstruction of 
the economy, and an accelerated formation of the United States of Indonesia.537 He 
immediately ordered all Republican army commanders to tell their troops to avoid 
provocation and incidents with Dutch forces, and warned them about their upcoming 
withdrawal from Dutch-occupied territory. A January radio speech featured Sukarno 
asking the population to observe the ceasefire, and similarly underlined a careful 
Republican optimism.538 
 In Jakarta, meanwhile, the Lieutenant Governor-General bemoaned the last-
minute interference by officials in Washington, arguing that American opportunism 
had again restricted Dutch policymaking in the Indonesian archipelago. The 
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Australian delegation to the Good Offices Committee, Van Mook added, consisted 
mostly of jealous dilettantes with a back-yard mentality. Graham was unsuitable and 
dangerous, could not distinguish fact from fiction, and was controlled by “typically 
American […] simplistic and almost childlike sentiments.” His “scrupulous 
impartiality,” in Van Mook’s opinion, often masked his notion of the Republic as “the 
beleaguered champion of freedom.” In North Carolina, he scoffed, Graham had no 
doubt been an “obedient and diligent little man,” but he was distinctly out of place in 
the Indies. Even Van Zeeland, the representative chosen from friendly Belgium, the 
Lieutenant Governor-General characterized as “vain.” In sum, he complained, foreign 
interference and political “burrowing” had continually hindered the Dutch in solving 
the Indonesian problem.539  
Within only two days of the signing of the agreement, Graham’s promise to the 
Republic, “you are what you are,” was recognized by the Dutch as a phrase that could 
be exploited by the regime in Yogyakarta.540 By late January, the American delegate 
himself was forced to explain that “erroneous press reports” alleged him to have 
assured Republican leaders that they could maintain the right to an army, a financial 
policy, and foreign relations. Graham admitted, however, that he had guaranteed the 
Indonesian delegation that the agreement would not touch the present status of the 
Republic, “whatever that [might] be.” In early February, British Consul-General 	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Shepherd dryly remarked on the problematic “clarifications” to the Foreign Office in 
London: “the less said about [them], the better.”541  
The Renville Agreement being in harmony with broad American foreign policy 
goals, Department officials advised Secretary of State Marshall that the United States 
must do what it could to ensure maximum cooperation and swift implementation by 
both parties. The Dutch should be made to realize that their superior bargaining 
position in the archipelago would have to come with “more than average restraint” in 
their dealings with the Republic; “more than [a] halfway effort” would be required of 
the Netherlands government, officials warned.542 Officials in Washington, in other 
words, interpreted the agreement as strengthening the position of the Dutch in 
Indonesia, and a comparison to the Linggadjati Agreement evidenced this; the 
Republic could “point to no immediate gains” in the Renville accords, a State 
Department report summarized in mid February, except the assurance of the Good 
Offices Committee’s continued presence in the archipelago. In the coming months, 
experts further predicted, the Dutch might try to bring about the disintegration of the 
Republic, and would undoubtedly attempt to consolidate their influence and expedite 
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the organization of the future federation’s component states. The Republican 
leadership, on the other hand, would likely insist on maintaining its separate national 
powers and status, and try to foster pro-Republican sentiment throughout the 
archipelago. For these reasons, and owing to the already diverging interpretations of 
the Republic’s official status, Washington anticipated that Dutch-Indonesian 
negotiations would continue to be difficult.543  
 
Planners in The Hague and Jakarta had been less than happy with Graham’s 
performance during the previous four months. Van Mook, especially, continually 
complained that he had had enough of “professors” interfering in his affairs.544 When 
the American delegate tended his resignation to President Truman in order to return 
to the University of North Carolina, then, the Dutch were hopeful. Graham’s 
replacement was to be Coert DuBois, who had been Consul-General to the 
Netherlands East Indies from 1927 until 1930. Van Kleffens reported from 
Washington that DuBois had made on him an excellent impression, and was in many 
ways Graham’s antitype; the ambassador described him as realistic, experienced with 
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the mentality of “Asiatics,” and decidedly pro-Dutch. In some ways, he added, he had 
reminded him of Walter Foote.545 
 The heads of the Belgian and Australian delegations to the Good Offices 
Committee were replaced also: Raymond Herremans took Van Zeeland’s seat, and 
Thomas K. Critchley succeeded Kirby. The change was made effective after the 
original members’ progress report to the UN Security Council in February. From New 
York, Kirby told his superiors that the State Department was resolved to secure an 
early political settlement of the conflict in Indonesia on the basis of the Renville 
Agreement, and was moreover prepared to put financial pressure on the Dutch. 
American assistance was all that kept the Netherlands floating, officials in Washington 
had told the Australian; they would tolerate “no nonsense.” Kirby suggested that the 
Republic’s best policy might therefore be to emphasize settlement rather than dispute, 
and to cooperate actively in a quick and practical implementation of the agreement.546 
 Prime Minister Hatta was indeed making haste with the withdrawals of regular 
troops of the TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or Indonesian National Army), as had 
been laid out in the truce agreement. By late February, some 35,000 men had been 
evacuated from significant pockets of resistance behind Dutch lines and moved back 
to the now much smaller Republican territory. Thousands of “irregular” troops, who 
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were not under the control of the TNI but fought as local militias, had refused to be 
withdrawn and remained behind in Dutch territory.547 From what informants told 
Dutch police officers in Jakarta, it was clear that the focus of the Republican 
government in Yogyakarta had shifted from the bullet to the ballot. Instead of 
choosing to fight a full-scale guerilla war against Dutch troops and administrators, 
Republicans had embraced diplomacy as the only alternative policy. The government 
set out to pardon rather than punish “traitorous” Indonesians who had collaborated 
with the enemy’s regime, and the population in Dutch-occupied territories was 
encouraged to participate in conferences and elections organized by the Netherlands 
Indies administration. In mid February, Republican officials established the Gerakan 
Plebisciet Indonesia (“Plebiscite Movement of Indonesia”). The organization prepared 
the Indonesian population for the upcoming all-important plebiscites, and tried to 
show the people it was in their interest to choose the side of the Republic. The final 
pillar of this “pénétration pacifique,” as the Dutch labeled it, was the strengthening of ties 
between the Republic and other future federative states; in its official recognition of 
the Dutch-controlled state of East Indonesia, for example, the Republic hoped to 
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prove that it was the “champion of freedom” not only in Java and Sumatra but in all 
parts of the archipelago.548 
 On February 3, in a parallel Dutch publicity campaign in the shape of an 
English-language broadcast to the United States and Britain, Queen Wilhelmina 
declared: “colonialism is dead.” She hinted at the coming change in the relationship 
between the Netherlands and Indonesia, and stated she was happy that the people of 
Indonesia were on the verge of forming a federal state. In a sweeping statement that 
hardly rang true for the entire archipelago she stressed, however, that the “common 
man” in the archipelago was still “far from being free from fear and want,” something 
she claimed was caused by acts of terrorism and anarchism.549 But Dutch actions after 
the signing of the Renville Agreement did little to illustrate the Queen’s 
pronouncement of the end of an era. When Soviet delegate to the United Nations 
Andrei Gromyko referenced the line in a Security Council’s debate in late February, 
he added that the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands were in fact “injecting 
medicine” into the institution of colonialism to try and keep it alive. The Renville 
accords aimed at suppressing the Indonesian struggle for freedom and had been 
forced on the Republic, Gromyko argued, under threat of renewed attacks; he 
considered it a shameful document that betrayed the national interests of Indonesians 
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and “deserved to be preserved in [a museum] as an illustration of the activity of the 
United Nations, bearing witness of the fact that member states [promoted] their own 
colonial interests.”550  
 If Gromyko had warned that the Indonesian struggle for freedom could be 
suppressed but not be stopped, Dutch officials in Jakarta and The Hague were doing 
their best to quell it. The Dutch put off appointing new representatives for the 
upcoming round of negotiations, so the resumption of political discussions with 
Republicans was delayed until mid-March. In the meantime, however, Netherlands 
Indies civil servants continued their efforts to unilaterally create pro-Dutch states in 
territory previously administered from Yogyakarta. Republican protests that the 
timing and lack of supervision of this process violated the Renville Agreement, which 
after all had called for plebiscites, not conferences, no sooner than six months after 
the signing of a political agreement and even then under international observation, 
were shot down with the argument that the new negaras were “provisional.”551 
  
An illuminating example of the Dutch push for the swift creation of states that 
could serve as counterweights to the Republic was the third West Java Conference, 
which took place in Bandung from February 23 until March 5. Lieutenant Governor-
General Van Mook was anxious to stress that its entire organization had been in 
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Indonesian hands. He was also eager to interpret its results as proof that anti-
Republican sentiment ran high and that the new negaras were not Dutch marionettes. 
A closer look at the proceedings shows, however, that after the broadcasting of the 
Renville Agreement it became increasingly difficult for the Dutch to keep the 
Indonesian population and its aspirations under control. The task of electing the 
conference’s one hundred delegates fell to a Preparatory Commission that worked 
with the region’s administrative officer, who was directly responsible to Van Mook. 
Because the inhabitants of some of the villages in West Java had fled the Dutch police 
action and a “floating population” on the run occupied various other towns, direct 
elections of candidates had often not been possible. This led to Netherlands Indies 
officials, who had already disqualified two elected pro-Republican delegates because 
of their alleged criminal past, undemocratically appointing a significant number of 
representatives. As with the second Bandung conference in December, civil servants 
attempted to anticipate the outcome, again predicting a majority vote for negara status 
even before the assembly got underway.   
Owing to the timely circulation of a speech by Hatta in which the Prime 
Minister called upon the delegates to prevent the secession of West Java from the 
Republic, the conference started in considerable turmoil. Pro-Republican 
representatives attempted to change the agenda of the meeting, introducing a motion 
that called for a supervised plebiscite six months from February as referred to in the 
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Renville Agreement. Panicking about this postponement, the Dutch official 
overseeing the conference behind the scenes adjourned the meeting. When the 
conference met again the following morning, the pro-Dutch and carefully instructed 
Indonesian chairman instead stated that the two prior conferences in October and 
December 1947 meant that West Java was already in the process of becoming a negara, 
and that a discussion about whether it should be one at all was therefore moot. The 
conference leaders then actively blocked the freedom of speech of those 
representatives wishing to object to this course of events. In a swift vote 62 delegates 
showed their support for West Java’s negara status. During the week of discussions 
that followed these chaotic first days, representatives did manage to propose that 
West Java should not be a presidential democracy but instead have a parliament, 
thereby ensuring that the population of the region could be heard more directly. 
Delegates also chose the pro-Republican R.A.A. Wiranatakusumah as the state’s 
leader. Nevertheless, negara status had been extended to West Java. With similar votes 
and meetings having taken place in Madura off the coast of east Java, and in Medan 
and Deli in north-east Sumatra, these faits accomplis further increased Republican 
suspicion about the true intentions of the Dutch.552 
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Republican politicians in Yogyakarta followed these events with wary eyes. In a 
policy statement on February 14, Prime Minister Hatta declared the Republic ready to 
join an interim federal government. His cabinet was moreover willing, he stated, to 
relinquish a number of its powers to it. The Netherlands government similarly would 
have to transfer some of its authority to the provisional government of the United 
States of Indonesia, Hatta noted. Van Mook turned down this open proposal for joint 
cooperation, stating bluntly that the Republic could not be admitted to an interim 
body until the Dutch and Indonesian delegations signed a final political agreement.553 
 At the same time, however, the Netherlands delegation, being “in no mood to 
compromise,” as Critchley reported to Canberra in early March, systematically delayed 
negotiations. It was preoccupied with alleged Indonesian violations of the recent truce 
agreement, the Australian argued, and regarded angrily and with contempt “any 
expression of opinion contrary to [its] own.” At the same time, Republican officials 
heard from their representative at the UN in New York that the Dutch were waging a 
“whisper campaign” to convince American policymakers that the government in 
Yogyakarta was too weak and unstable to implement the Renville Agreement. Van 
Mook and his aides, meanwhile, put increased pressure on the Republic through the 
use of propaganda, an economic blockade, intimidation, and “political warfare,” 
meaning the well-orchestrated fragmentation of Indonesia into small states. The 
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American government and its delegate DuBois, Critchley somberly summarized, 
meanwhile seemed anxious to reach a solution in the conflict “no matter how bad or 
temporary.” The chances of the Good Offices Committee furthering a fair 
implementation of the Renville Agreement, in other words, were bleak.554 
 On March 9, during a ceremony at the Lieutenant Governor-General’s palace 
in Jakarta, Van Mook announced the unilateral establishment of an interim federal 
government for the proposed United States of Indonesia. It was to function until the 
formal birth of the United States of Indonesia, still scheduled for January 1, 1949. A 
Dutch creation set up independently from the Republic, this provisional senate-like 
body comprised twelve “Secretaries of State:” six of them anti-Republican 
Indonesians, the other six the Dutch department heads of the former Netherlands 
Indies government. All would work under the direction of and in cooperation with 
the Lieutenant Governor-General, who would occupy the position of president 
during the transitional period. If Van Mook differed with the advice of an absolute 
majority of the secretaries in matters related to the interests of the Netherlands or 
constituent states, an appeal could be made to the Dutch crown. This interim 
government, the Dutch hoped, would encourage the cooperation of other federal 
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states with the central government in Jakarta. Indeed, this new institution was, as 
Kahin and others suggest, “merely the old Netherlands Indies regime in new dress.”555  
 The Lieutenant Governor-General remarked to the gathered press that the 
principles behind the installation of the interim federal government were democracy, 
federalism, and “cooperation with Holland.” Belying his earlier dismissal, he also 
insisted “the door was open to the Republic to participate [in the provisional 
government] as a state.”556 Van Mook’s swift and decisive action left the Netherlands 
government in The Hague bemused and, as some ministers noted, once more without 
sufficient time to carefully deliberate an important decision. Other policymakers in the 
Dutch political capital believed the changes in the governmental structure in the 
Indonesian archipelago merely superficial; after all, they said during an internal cabinet 
meeting, the members of the interim federal government had not been given “a single 
responsibility.”557 
 The new head of the Indonesian delegation was 
Mohammad Roem, an Indonesian diplomat and former 
Minister of the Interior under Sjahrir, who was born in 
central Java in 1908, and who, by the spring of 1948, was 
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walking with a permanent limp; a trigger-happy Dutch soldier had shot him in the leg 
while searching his house in November 1945.558 Roem professed the creation of the 
provisional government a disappointing and humiliating act of rebuff that had 
moreover been unnecessary. Had not Prime Minister Hatta expressed his willingness 
to cooperate with the Dutch in its formation? Why were the Dutch delaying the 
resumption of negotiations if, as Van Mook had stated, a political accord had to 
precede the joint creation of the body? While the Netherlands government and the 
Lieutenant Governor-General had been dragging their feet appointing negotiators, 
Roem argued, the Republican representatives had been ready and waiting.559   
In hindsight it is clear that one of the main problems of the Renville accords 
was that they did not stipulate whether a provisional government was to be 
established before or after a political agreement. As such, its recognition of Dutch 
sovereignty during the interim period left the Republic without legal safeguards in the 
absence of that agreement. The leadership in Yogyakarta nevertheless lodged a formal 
protest with the Good Offices Committee on March 16. The unilateral formation of 
the interim government was “contrary to the spirit as well as the letter” of the Renville 
Agreement, it charged. At a minimum, the accords stated that a political settlement 
was to be approached along the way of mutual cooperation.560   
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 Negotiations between the Dutch and Indonesian delegations under the 
auspices of the Good Offices Committee finally resumed on March 18. Discussions 
should start, DuBois, Critchley, and Herremans decided, on the basis of working 
papers submitted by the two parties themselves.561 It soon became clear that the 
dividing issues and divergent interpretations of the two parties were the same as those 
that had plagued the delegations in the aftermath of the Linggadjati Agreement. The 
most important disagreement lay in the status and sovereignty of the Republic during 
the transition period. Roem insisted that the government in Yogyakarta could 
maintain its de facto authority and the powers that came with it until they were 
transferred to the United States of Indonesia. Van Vredenburch disagreed, and 
demanded that the Republic reduce itself to a federal state equal to East Indonesia, 
Borneo, and the other newly created negaras.562 
Coert DuBois tended to agree with the Dutch on this point, and urged the 
Republican delegation to accept the terms offered them. During two meetings with  
Roem on April 5 and 8, DuBois attempted to “make clear once and for all” that in the 
minds of American foreign policymakers, there could be no doubt where sovereignty 
resided during the interim period. The Republic, he warned, had no right to its own 
army or foreign representation, and its insistence could only delay a Dutch transfer of 
sovereignty to a provisional government. The Netherlands government “could 	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scarcely be expected” to turn over sovereignty except to an organized and operating 
federal government. When Roem reminded DuBois of his predecessor’s January 
promises to the contrary, the American simply and rather undiplomatically stated his 
regret that the Republic “had been misled.” When asked point blank if he believed the 
Dutch could be trusted, DuBois argued that they had made far-reaching concessions. 
They could be trusted, he believed, to carry out the Renville Agreement.563    
  
As DuBois came upon his third month in the Indonesian archipelago, however, 
negotiations for a permanent political settlement still showed no progress, and the 
American began to doubt the sincerity of Dutch intentions. In late April Critchley, 
who had hoped to convince his subdued colleagues in the Good Offices Committee 
to take more initiative, warned the Australian government that the discussions were 
“likely to blow up at any time.”564 In early May, the two representatives made a three-
day tour of Republican territory in the company of President Sukarno and Prime 
Minister Hatta, visiting Magelang, Wonosobo, and the Dieng plateau region in central 
Java where many evacuees from Dutch-occupied territory had gathered. What DuBois 
saw and heard here led directly to his May 10 telegram to Secretary Marshall.565   
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 The strength of the Republic lay in several factors, the American delegate 
began. He had first of all detected in Indonesians a “nearly universal passion for 
national liberty.” He had witnessed both the “political finesse” of Hatta and become 
acquainted with Sukarno’s “winning personality.” The discipline, loyalty, and esprit de 
corps of the Indonesian troops he had encountered was excellent, and the common 
deprivations suffered under the Dutch economic blockade were a binding force. The 
feeling was clearly that the Republic was working for the freedom of the entire 
archipelago; it represented the “spearhead of the independence drive” for Indonesian 
nationalists everywhere. Over the past few months, DuBois continued, the Dutch 
record had certainly not been unassailable. Although he had tried in vain to interest 
Netherlands and Netherlands Indies officials in their precarious position in the UN 
Security Council, he suspected that they expected any “showdown” in New York to 
be covered by the United States. The essential fallacy of Dutch policy, he summarized, 
was a “consistent underestimation” of the strength of Republican support throughout 
much of Indonesia, and an “unshakeable determination” to view the Dutch-
supported anti-Republican movements as similar to the regime in Yogyakarta in force 
and appeal. The Dutch were foolhardily “living in a dream” if they believed that the 
Republic would not dominate an independent Indonesia. If a political agreement 
between the Netherlands and the Republic remained elusive, DuBois concluded, a 
settlement by force appeared inevitable.566 	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 Netherlands Indies officials admitted to their colleagues in The Hague they had 
“an unpleasant feeling” about DuBois’ trip to the Republican interior, as they 
suspected the American delegate had begun to believe that the Republic was the most 
important or even the only representative of the Indonesian independence 
movement.567 He had moreover voiced the opinion, Van Vredenburch reported 
warily, that if the Dutch wished to restore Republican trust in their intentions, they 
must make concessions and announce, for example, a “target date” for the transfer of 
sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia.568 The Republican representatives, 
Prime Minister Beel concluded on the basis of these communications from Jakarta, 
were becoming more unmanageable by the day.569 
 After the purported success of the Third West Java Conference, meanwhile, the 
Lieutenant Governor-General had continued to work on his federal program. On 
May 1 he announced, in name of the interim federal government, a “federal 
conference” in Bandung. To this set of meetings Van Mook invited representatives of 
thirteen Indonesian “states” and recently created negaras, but no Republican delegates. 
A circulating preliminary list of topics showed that at the gathering planned for late 
May, participants were to discuss the gradual establishment of the United States of 
Indonesia’s federal organizations, the formation of the its representative body and the 
creation of its constitution, the division of powers and responsibilities between the 	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federation and its constituent states, and such matters as common defense and 
internal security.570 The latter did not merely refer to crime control, but was a 
convenient umbrella term that could be explained to include a host of issues. 
 Alarmed by another unilateral Dutch initiative, the Republican delegation again 
lodged a formal protest with the Good Offices Committee. Van Mook’s Bandung 
conference was widely regarded as the forerunner of an Indonesian constituent 
assembly, Roem charged, and Republican officials had been deliberately shut out. 
Because the Renville Agreement had called for a democratically elected assembly and 
the delegations at the upcoming Bandung conference could not possibly be regarded 
as representative of the people of Indonesia, the Lieutenant Governor-General’s 
scheme constituted, once more, a contravention of the accords. The Netherlands 
government was clearly preparing to present the Republic with yet another fait 
accompli, the head of the Republican delegation summarized.571 
 Critchley was similarly concerned. Over the course of 1947, the Dutch 
delegation had become increasingly unwilling to make any concessions to reach a 
political settlement, the Australian stated, and had customarily voiced its demands to 
the Republic on a “take it or leave it” basis. The Netherlands government was 
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planning to present the breakdown of discussions as the result of a Republican refusal 
to accept Dutch sovereignty, and so attempt to withdraw the conflict in the 
archipelago from the limelight of the world stage. After pressure from the Australian, 
the Republican delegation urged President Sukarno to do everything in his power to 
see that the ceasefire was carried out without violations. “The people of Indonesia 
and of the Netherlands, and the peoples of other countries as well,” they argued in the 
third week of May, “are hopeful that an end of strife has been reached […] so that 
Indonesia can prepare for the future. Do not disappoint these hopes.” In the Dutch 
request for the Republic to essentially “abolish itself,” however, the leadership in 
Yogyakarta saw parallels between the present situation and events leading up to the 
police action almost a year previous. His colleagues in the Good Offices Committee, 
Critchley complained, seemed to believe they could not even exert moral pressure on 
the Dutch.572 
 Critchley nevertheless saw a ray of hope after a journey through Republican 
territory with DuBois. And indeed, the American delegate was coming to the 
realization that the Dutch were trying to confine the Indonesian nationalist spirit. On 
May 21, he cabled the Secretary of State in Washington a long telegram. He expressed 
his increasing concern and stated that while the current Dutch position was not 
technically incorrect, it was “by no means the only correct position.” The same 	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question had been at the heart of the dispute from the start, DuBois argued: who are 
the real representatives of the Indonesian people? In his opinion, the Republic 
enjoyed confidence with the population. The Dutch-controlled interim government, 
in contrast, was “an unnatural organization” that could ultimately only be maintained 
by Dutch arms. DuBois moreover believed that fair representation in the provisional 
federal government, as envisaged in the Renville Agreement, meant direct elections. 
These would return the majority of seats in that government to pro-Republican 
candidates. The Dutch were pressing for the swift formation of the United States of 
Indonesia so that the Republic would either “be forced to enter strictly on 
Netherlands terms,” or be left out, after which “the resultant conflict [could] be 
presented to the world” as an internal Indonesian dispute. The State Department’s 
views, DuBois ended, at a loss for ideas about what the Good Offices Committee 
might still do to stave off a complete deadlock, were “earnestly solicited.”573 
A few days later, and in sharp contrast to his earlier reassurances to Roem, 
DuBois again underlined that there was “ample justification” for Republican fears 
about Dutch intentions. Besides the United States of Indonesia, the Netherlands-
Indonesia Union, in which the federation was to partner the Netherlands, also proved 
problematic. The Netherlands government proposed that the constitution of the 
United States of Indonesia was to be subordinate to a “union statute,” for example. 
DuBois again asked his colleagues in the State Department for their comments, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
573  Livengood to Secretary of State, 21 May 1948, in: FRUS, 1948, VI, 178-183. 
 
   
   
318 
noting that “in absence of contrary instructions” from Washington, the Good Offices 
Committee would endeavor to draft its own comprehensive proposal and present it to 
both parties.574 
 In his telegrams of early June, the American delegate moreover began placing 
more emphasis on the argument that the Dutch policy in Indonesia would endanger 
the long-term economic interests of the United States. Netherlands plans for the 
Union envisaged severe restraints on not only the political but also the economic 
freedom of an Indonesian federation, DuBois stated, which would leave the door shut 
for American investors and enterprise. This was an exaggeration, but it was true that 
failure to rehabilitate the archipelago’s economy would endanger the recovery of 
Western Europe, which in turn threatened the interests of the United States. The 
Republican leadership, DuBois maintained, currently had a “Western orientation” and 
exhibited the express intention to look to the United States for assistance. Restrictions 
on the sovereignty of the United States of Indonesia, he ended, could only work to 
America’s long-term disadvantage. State Department experts summarized DuBois’ 
recent communications as having carried the warning that a breakdown in 
negotiations was likely, and that present Dutch policy was increasing the receptivity of 
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moderate politicians in Yogyakarta as well as the Indonesian people in general to 
“extremist and communist agitation.”575 
 When Dutch officials heard about DuBois’ intentions for an independent plan, 
they were alarmed and dismayed. Surely, they asked the staff of the American embassy 
in The Hague, DuBois and his critical Australian colleague Critchley realized that the 
Netherlands delegation was continuing negotiations, and that a compromise proposal 
from the Good Offices Committee could only serve to make the Republican 
delegation even more uncooperative?576 In Jakarta, the Lieutenant Governor-General 
complained as well. DuBois had claimed that the State Department would support 
any Committee proposal that could solve the stalemate, and the Belgian representative 
was rumored not to be involved with the draft at all. Realizing he needed to win time, 
Van Mook sent a personal letter to Prime Minister Hatta to invite him for direct talks, 
and on June 4 urged the government in The Hague to instruct Ambassador Van 
Kleffens to intervene with the Americans.577 This, combined with the Lieutenant 
Governor-General’s rather frantic reassurance to DuBois that the Dutch did not 
intend a new military action, adding that a “sudden and drastic move” on the 
Committee’s part would interfere with Dutch proposals and could make it responsible 
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for an “irreparable deadlock in the negotiations,” made the American delegate only 
more suspicious of Dutch intentions to try to ease the Good Offices Committee out 
of the dispute.578 
 The very next day, in a meeting with Undersecretary of State Lovett, William 
S.B. Lacy from the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs, and Frederick E. Nolting 
from the Office of Northern European Affairs, Van Kleffens underlined that 
although the Netherlands government was fully committed to achieving a settlement 
based squarely on the Renville Agreement, the Republic was “recalcitran[t]” and 
unwilling to carry out the “obligations imposed upon it.” Most Dutch officials 
considered DuBois “somewhat off the beam,” Van Kleffens brashly observed. He 
implored the State Department to reemphasize to the American delegate in Jakarta 
the need to stick more closely to the principles agreed upon in January. Lovett in turn 
professed that although he had formerly viewed the Indonesian dispute in black and 
white and had believed the Netherlands position to be correct, he now saw “a large 
element of gray injected into the picture.”579 
 DuBois submitted his comprehensive new plan to the State Department on 
June 5. There were two alternatives, he argued, mirroring Graham’s suggestions of 
late December. The first was the creation of the United States of Indonesia according 
to his draft proposal. This involved, he explained, direct elections and full internal 	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powers of self-government to an interim government that included Republicans. The 
second was the establishment of that federation according to the existing unrealistic 
Dutch plan, which in essence left full authority over the entire archipelago in the 
hands of a Netherlands Indies government in cooperation with what was really a 
minority group of Indonesian federalists. This second course would likely include the 
suppression of all dissidents by Dutch forces. The arguments the Dutch advanced for 
their plan were “in part consciously misleading and in part [the result of] 
autointoxication,” DuBois said, referring to what he viewed as a tendency on the part 
of Netherlands Indies officials to be obstinate, close-minded, self-aggrandizing, and 
therefore blind to reality. Since the actual government of Indonesia must be in the 
hands of either the Dutch or Indonesians, he warned, again echoing his predecessor, 
there was no compromise possible between the two alternatives. The Dutch plan 
would prove the Netherlands “a sink without stopper” so far as American financial 
assistance was concerned, whereas his own plan, DuBois argued, would result in “the 
speedy formation [of an] orderly and by no means incompetent Indonesian 
government” that would exert “strong pro-Western influence throughout Southeast 
Asia.” If the State Department did not subscribe to the essentials of the new plan, the 
American delegate ended somewhat threateningly, it practically nullified his 
usefulness.580  
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Critchley, who had long believed that the Committee must take a more active 
role in breaking the impasse, enthusiastically agreed to DuBois’ draft plan for an 
overall political settlement. Their suggestions included closely supervised elections 
throughout the archipelago for delegates to a constituent assembly, which would in 
turn form an interim government that was responsible to it and would attain control 
of all internal and external affairs, including matters relating to the armed forces, 
foreign relations, and trade. The Netherlands would retain ultimate authority until it 
officially transferred it to the United States of Indonesia.581 On June 8, without giving 
specific comments on the content of this plan, Secretary of State Marshall let DuBois 
know that the Department wished him to “continue to regard [himself] as a free agent 
in making such choices on the spot as [he believed would] lead to an agreement 
between the parties and in accordance with the larger interests of the United States.” 
The American delegate was authorized, in other words, to try and avert a second 
Dutch military offensive by acting “in whatever manner [he] deemed appropriate.”582  
 On June 10, after discussing the new proposal once more amongst themselves 
and finding that the Belgian delegate wished to reserve his position, DuBois and 
Critchley informally submitted their working paper directly to Van Mook and Hatta. 
No significant progress toward a political settlement had been made since the Renville 
Agreement, they observed in its introduction, and only by coming forward with this 
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initiative could the members of the Good Offices Committee “acquit [themselves] of 
[their] obligation and justify the 7,5 months [the Committee had] spent in Indonesia.” 
The enclosed paper was to be regarded as “tentative and subject to reconsideration in 
light of discussions, questions, or objections.” The presentation of this proposal, 
drafted at DuBois’ initiative, further showed that although the American government 
wished to remain “neutral” in the Indonesian conflict, as the third and supposedly 
impartial member of the Good Offices Committee the United States inevitably played 
a central role.583 
 
When American Consul-General in Jakarta Livengood called on DuBois the 
next day, the latter explained he had decided to “[follow] his conscience […] after 
most earnest deliberation” and would have presented the plan to the two parties even 
had Critchley refrained from signing it. The Dutch delegation in Jakarta was confused, 
Livengood told Washington, and had chosen to assume that the American delegate 
had acted in a purely personal capacity.584 In The Hague, Dutch officials told the staff 
of the American embassy that DuBois had “created havoc in all respects;” there had 
been no justification for his actions, they argued, seemingly more irritated by the 
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procedure followed to present the working paper than its contents.585 Embassy 
officials in turn charged that the lack of progress to date “hardly [justified] the 
rejection of any carefully worked out proposal without a most detailed 
examination.”586 And indeed, what the Netherlands government feared most was that 
free elections as proposed by the working paper would illustrate the popularity of the 
Republic, and expose Van Mook’s federal program for a modern colonial state as an 
illusion. 
 DuBois defended his “rash action” to the Secretary of State by arguing that he 
had undertaken it only after reluctantly concluding that the Dutch plan was “based on 
fictitious premises,” “unworkable,” and likely to have disastrous consequences not 
only for the Indonesian archipelago and the Netherlands, but also and moreover for 
the United States. The future of Indonesia, he told Marshall on June 12, “[belonged] 
necessarily to the Indonesians.” The working paper was, in DuBois’ words, “at least 
one gesture from the United States of [its] belief and confidence in the ability and 
right of Indonesians to govern themselves.” Voicing his hope that Washington would 
help put pressure on the Dutch to accept the plan, he ended: “this is all we can do. 
The rest is up to the [State] Department.”587 
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 During this crisis moment in Dutch-American relations, the State Department’s 
course of action was a curious one. Despite the recent flurry of detailed telegraphic 
exchanges between Jakarta and Washington containing DuBois’ views and vision, 
clearly uneasy policymakers indicated in discussions with Dutch officials on June 12 
and 14 that they had not yet received the full airmailed text of the proposals. The 
Department was “obviously somewhat in the dark as to exactly what had occurred,” 
they apologized. When Van Kleffens notified American officials that a Time 
correspondent in Jakarta seemed to have gotten hold of the secret details of the 
proposal, matters became even worse.588 
 In a stern telegram to DuBois, Secretary Marshall underlined that it was of “the 
utmost importance” that his working paper maintained “a personal, confidential, and 
informal character.” At the urging of the Dutch, he moreover stated his “unalterable 
opposition” to the inclusion of the paper, or even references thereto, in the upcoming 
Good Offices Committee’s progress report to the UN Security Council. A final 
matter on which the Department held a strong opinion, the Secretary ended in a 
statement contradictory to his earlier reassurances, was that the Committee should in 
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no way constitute itself as an arbitral body, but limit itself to assisting the Dutch and 
Indonesian delegations only “as and when needed.” DuBois had been rebuked.589 
 A disgruntled Dutch delegation abruptly broke off negotiations with the 
Republic on June 16, stating that the leak of the DuBois-Critchley proposal to the 
press necessitated new instructions from the Netherlands government in The Hague. 
Unofficially intimating he believed DuBois responsible for the publication of a 
confidential document, Van Vredenburch suggested to the American Consul-General 
that it might be helpful if the discussions were taken over by new negotiators and the 
current ranking delegates “[disappeared] from the scene.”590 Most observers pointed 
to Netherlands Indies officials themselves as the distributors of the plan to news 
reporters, however; DuBois denied the accusations and argued that the journalist’s 
source was “almost certainly Dutch.” In his defense, the American delegate also 
referred to his recent telegrams as indicators that he had endeavored to give his 
colleagues in Washington a full picture of the dangerous situation that had evolved in 
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the archipelago. His plan was eminently impartial and in the best interests of the 
Netherlands, he noted, and his personal impressions of the policy and conduct of the 
Dutch were shared by all neutral eyewitnesses. If decision makers in Washington did 
not accept his analysis and could not support the plan, “the situation [called] for a new 
United States delegation.”591 
When his personal meetings with Hatta failed, Van Mook bitterly stated that 
DuBois’ “unacceptable and impracticable” initiative had destroyed the last chance of 
an agreement. He felt shocked that the international delegates had ignored his furious 
attempts to create a federal state, and believed that the leadership in Yogyakarta would 
now reject whatever the Dutch might offer, knowing that it could count on the 
support of a majority in the Good Offices Committee. Head of the Republican 
delegation Roem objected to the Dutch withdrawal from negotiations, however, 
labeling it an “unwarranted and untimely” move that further deteriorated the 
atmosphere. In contrast to the Dutch delegation, Republican representatives had 
accepted the DuBois-Critchley proposals as constituting one of the best means with 
which to achieve a settlement.592 When the Dutch agreed to resume negotiations on 
June 23, Roem therefore called for a discussion of the working paper. Van 
Vredenburch flatly refused to take the carefully drafted working paper in 
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consideration, and returned all his copies to the Good Offices Committee. 
Discussions had once again reached a deep impasse.593 
 
In early July, high-ranking official from the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs Hendrik N. Boon wrote Lieutenant Governor-General van Mook an honest 
letter from The Hague, and it nicely sums up some of the themes of this chapter. The 
Dutch, he remarked, had complicated illusions about their relation with the Indies 
that had little to do with reality. Instead of demanding that the Republic commit 
suicide, Boon went on, the Netherlands and Netherlands Indies governments must 
work on the basis of facts, however hard those facts might be to accept. Dreams of 
the Republic succumbing to internal weaknesses constituted wishful thinking. In their 
promise of ultimate Indonesian sovereignty, the Netherlands government had already 
defined the end point of the journey, and whining, worrying, and waiting along the 
way would do little good. It was remarkable, Boon observed perceptively, that every 
carefully selected foreign observer within months of moving to Jakarta turned enemy 
to the Netherlands; the scolding of those expressing opposition to or disagreement 
with the Dutch had clearly only served to antagonize these bystanders. Perhaps, Boon 
concluded, a new Netherlands government would have the courage to change 
course.594 
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 This new Netherlands government would come into being after the general 
elections on July 7, which were held because the creation of a Netherlands-Indonesia 
Union required amendments to the constitution and a broad parliamentary majority. 
They resulted in a slight shift to the right that could largely be attributed, American 
officials in the Dutch capital said, to the people’s desire for a firmer policy toward the 
Indonesian Republic.595 The left-wing labor party PvdA, which had advocated a more 
liberal policy in the archipelago, lost two seats to its more conservative Catholic 
coalition partner KVP, which had argued that the government should adopt a tougher 
attitude toward the Republic. The Catholics therefore held the initiative in forming a 
new cabinet. This task fell to former Prime Minister Beel, who also had to take into 
account the growing new VVD Party for Freedom and Democracy, a center-right 
party without a religious base whose members desired a radical change in Indonesian 
policy on the basis of mostly pragmatic financial-economic arguments.  
 The conflict in the colony had been an important topic during the election 
campaigns. The Dutch Communist Party CPN (which had won 10% of the vote in 
1946), for instance, supported the Indonesian nationalists and demanded the abolition 
of what it labeled “the colonial system.” The escalation of international tensions since 
the last elections, however, caused the party to become increasingly isolated; it lost a 
fifth of its seats. The Catholics had unsuccessfully tried to win one third of the seats 
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in parliament so that it could block any major changes in Dutch Indonesia policy that 
required a two-thirds majority. After a number of weeks without progress, the 
formation of a new coalition cabinet gathered speed towards the end of July, when 
labor party leader Willem Drees, the former Minister of Social Affairs, agreed to 
become Prime Minister. The Catholic Party was promised the majority of important 
minister posts, however. Staunch conservative Emmanuel M.J.A. Sassen thus became 
the new Minister of the Colonies, while VVD-leader Dirk U. Stikker obtained the 
influential post of Minister of Foreign Affairs.  
One stumbling block during the negotiations was the option of a second police 
action in the Indonesian archipelago, something the Catholics refused to rule out and 
wanted anchored into the new government’s program. This went too far for Drees, 
however, who insisted that another military campaign was to be avoided. Another 
difficult question was the replacement of Van Mook, upon which both the Catholic 
Party and Stikker’s VVD insisted, arguing that the current Lieutenant Governor-
General had over the last few years acted too independently too often, and that The 
Hague needed an official in Jakarta whom they could trust to carry out the Dutch 
government’s policy. It was agreed that former Prime Minister Beel would eventually 
take Van Mook’s place, with the latter being offered a post as ambassador, possibly in 
the United States. As a career administrator without clear connections to any one 
political party, and a tendency to berate many of his colleagues in the Netherlands to 
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boot, by the late summer of 1948 the Lieutenant Governor-General could count on 
the support of only a few politicians in The Hague. No decision had been made about 
the exact timing of Van Mook’s transfer and replacement, however, when the new 
center-right leaning cabinet under Prime Minister Drees was installed on August 7.596  
 Coert DuBois, whose health had been deteriorating while in Indonesia, was 
also replaced; a career foreign service officer with no experience in the Indonesian 
archipelago by the name of H. Merle Cochran would take his place on the Good 
Offices Committee. The Dutch were disappointed with Cochran’s small caliber. Van 
Kleffens informed The Hague the diplomat was somewhat of a “dark horse” to him, 
although after having met him for the first time, he found Cochran a pleasant and 
fairly well-prepared man with much common sense.597 
 The State Department in Washington intended for Cochran to arrive in Jakarta 
with detailed and workable proposals supported by the American government. He 
was to study fresh approaches to the conflict on the basis of a new version of the ill-
fated DuBois-Critchley plan, which had been “modified to meet insurmountable 
Dutch objections.”598 These revisions had been made in consultation with the Offices 
of Northern European Affairs, Far Eastern Affairs, and United Nations Affairs, with 
experts in these divisions concluding that the only viable course was the resumption 	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of constructive negotiations under the auspices of the Good Offices Committee. The 
Netherlands government would be required to accept further compromise with the 
Republic. For any new plan to be acceptable to both parties, it would have to originate 
with the Good Offices Committee, these officials believed, and be firmly supported 
by the American government. There was therefore no question that a Dutch plan for 
a settlement, in which the function of the Committee had been diminished to that of a 
simple salesman to the Republic, could be effective.599 
 The summer of 1948, then, was a period of relative calm in Dutch-Indonesian 
relations, as both parties awaited new developments. Elsewhere in South and 
Southeast Asia, decolonization processes were proving no less complex or violent 
than the one in the archipelago. The partition of India into two independent states in 
August 1947 and the migration of millions of people across the newly drawn borders 
had resulted in communal strife that killed hundreds of thousands. The princely state 
of Kashmir and Jammu, effectively split between India and Pakistan, had become the 
site of armed conflict. In Malaya, amid an atmosphere of rising tension and strikes, 
the murder of three European overseers on a rubber plantation by members of the 
Malayan Communist Party led to the British colonial government declaring a state of 
emergency in June. In Indochina, unsuccessful military expeditions against the Viet 
Minh had made the French realize the need to oppose Ho Chi Minh’s forces 	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politically; by mid 1948, negotiations with moderate nationalists and former emperor 
of Vietnam Bao Dai for an “autonomous” government within the French Union were 
ongoing. 
The Dutch, meanwhile, hoped that the new American delegate on the Good 
Offices Committee would see that any proposal for a final settlement in Indonesia 
would have to be based on the preservation of Netherlands sovereignty during the 
interim period. While awaiting Cochran’s arrival in Jakarta, and after having had 
virtually no word from the State Department for almost a month, the other members 
of the American delegation sent a stern telegram to their superiors. While time was 
growing dangerously short, they warned, “one way or another, Indonesians [would] 
achieve independence.”600 
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Chapter 6 
 
Combat and Capitulation: August 1948 - May 1949 
 
“Together with the federalists, and relying on our military success, we 
could have defied the United States, the Commonwealth, the Asiatic 
world and the Republic. […] Now that the federalists have joined 
that front […] we must realize that the entire foundation of our 
policy has been erased. With the disappearance of the federalist trump 
from our game, we can merely play poker.”601 
   
J.H. van Roijen, March 1949 
 
 
“It is the intention of this ministry to replace the representative of the Dutch Crown 
in Indonesia. The cabinet therefore urgently asks you to accept a new and of course 
very important position elsewhere.”602 Recently installed Minister of the Colonies 
Emmanuel M.J.A. Sassen sent Lieutenant Governor-General Hubertus van Mook this 
missive, the first official exchange of communication between the two, in August 
1948 to thank the latter for decades of service. An infuriated Van Mook intimated to a 
close aide that he had never before been treated this crudely.603 What hurt most, the 
bitterly disappointed Lieutenant Governor-General admitted, was that his unsolicited 
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dismissal meant he was to transfer his affairs and office to a successor without having 
been allowed to “finish the job.”604  
 This job, Van Mook would have said, was to establish a federal United States of 
Indonesia under a firm and efficient administration run by Indonesians but overseen, 
at least for the foreseeable future, by the Dutch. Throughout his career as a colonial 
administrator, Van Mook’s primary criticism of policymakers in The Hague had been 
that his colleagues there viewed relations with the Indies with an eye towards financial 
and economic interests. He, in contrast, worked from a standpoint not only of moral 
duty but also of genuine attachment to “his” Netherlands Indies.  
In the eyes of cabinet members in the Dutch political capital, Van Mook’s roots 
in the archipelago and lack of interest in The Hague’s point of view had led to his 
disregard for what they considered the all-important future Netherlands-Indonesian 
Union, which would look after “common interests” such as foreign affairs, defense, 
and economic and cultural matters and so safeguard, in the shape of a “voluntary and 
permanent bond,” continued Dutch involvement in Indonesia. The Lieutenant 
Governor-General’s successor, former Prime Minister and soon to be High 
Commissioner of the Crown Louis J.M. Beel, believed this union should have strong 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
604  Netherlands Prime Minister Willem Drees to Delegate Chief Administration Netherlands Indies L. 
Neher, 23 September 1948, in: NIB, XV, no. 99; Van Mook to General Secretary Netherlands Indies 
Government K. Verboeket, 16 September 1948, in: NIB, XV, no. 59. 
 
   
   
336 
powers and go beyond mere cooperation.605 Dirk U. Stikker, a former banker and 
industrialist and the newly instated Minister of Foreign Affairs, was one of those 
planners in the Netherlands that Van Mook accused of viewing the dispute in 
Indonesia from a financial and economic perspective. Instead of focusing on stuffy 
principles of constitutional law, Stikker held, the Dutch must be pragmatic and focus 
on attracting the financial aid and foreign capital to the archipelago that would further 
the economic rehabilitation of both Indonesia and the Netherlands.606 
As a new Dutch government took seat in The Hague during the late summer of 
1948, however, the American administration that was to provide the bulk of that aid 
and capital was developing a fresh perspective of its own. This chapter investigates 
that shift in Washington, and examines the Dutch and Republican reactions to it. It 
moreover looks at the role of the new Netherlands representative in Jakarta, and 
explains why, yet again, the Dutch resorted to force in its attempt to subjugate the 
Indonesian Republic. Finally, it details the deteriorating military situation in the 
archipelago and the height of international involvement in the conflict, and concludes 
with what in hindsight we can see was the Dutch capitulation. 
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August 1948 had seen the return to Indonesia of communist leader Musso, the 
former leader of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI or Indonesian Communist Party) 
and its failed revolt of 1926. He had spent much of the previous two decades in the 
Soviet Union as a loyal follower of Joseph Stalin. Within three weeks of his arrival in 
Yogyakarta, Musso had taken command of the left-wing resistance to Prime Minister 
Mohammad Hatta’s relatively conservative government, giving interviews and 
attending meetings and mass rallies throughout Java. In his political program titled “A 
new path for the Republic of Indonesia,” Musso called for drastic economic changes 
and an overhaul of society. He repudiated the Linggadjati and Renville agreements for 
not having envisioned real Indonesian independence, and advocated a harder line 
against the Dutch who he bitterly insisted were supported by the capitalist United 
States in joint efforts to strangle the Republic. The West, Musso not unconvincingly 
argued, had betrayed Indonesians.607 
 Although the real influence and strength of the estimated 2,000 to 3,000 PKI 
members was minimal, this minority rapidly began to grow more vocal. The 
population was pessimistic about the outcome of negotiations with the Netherlands 
delegation and increasingly discontent due to the deteriorating situation in the 
archipelago. Shortages of food, clothing, and medicine caused by the Dutch economic 	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blockade of the Republic worsened the daily conditions of life for almost all 
Indonesians. As a consequence, a U.S. State Department report argued, Hatta’s 
government was experiencing “increasing difficulty in maintaining its position against 
the pressures from the left and the agitation of communists.” If no progress was made 
in the settlement of the Indonesian dispute and the Republican cabinet fell, analysts 
prophesized, communist influence would expand rapidly.608   
On August 31, a concerned Secretary of State 
George Marshall cabled new Consul-General Charles 
Livengood and Good Offices Committee member 
Merle Cochran in Jakarta to warn them that the stiff 
Netherlands attitude and continued deadlock in 
discussions was increasing the popularity of 
communism among disillusioned Indonesians and so 
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hastening the fall of Hatta’s moderate government. At present, sentiment within the 
Republic was pro-Western, but a new Indonesian cabinet, experts concluded 
ominously, was likely to be “strongly left-wing if not communist controlled.” It is 
clear in hindsight that the risk that communists would achieve full power in Indonesia 
and replace the evermore-popular Sukarno was miniscule. In an atmosphere of 
growing fear and paranoia, however (the first televised congressional hearings by the 
House Un-American Activities Committee was aired on August 25), Marshall 
nevertheless believed that to prevent this scenario, all possible steps must be taken to 
resume political negotiations between the Dutch and Republican delegations. He 
therefore ordered Cochran to formulate a working paper that could be submitted first 
to his Australian and Belgian colleagues on the Good Offices Committee, the latter of 
whom had proved to be a cipher of little support to the Dutch, and then to the two 
parties.609    
  
The first week of September was taken up with Dutch Queen Wilhelmina’s 
golden jubilee and abdication; after fifty years on the throne, she stepped down for 
her daughter Juliana to be crowned. In Jakarta, the celebrations took place “in a 
dignified manner and without incident” in the 18th century Palace Rijswijk. It was the 	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Lieutenant Governor-General’s last formal function, already having been informed 
that his successor Beel was to arrive in Indonesia by the end of the month.610 
 On September 7, Cochran transmitted to Washington his draft proposal for an 
overall political settlement between the Dutch and Republicans. Recent developments 
had convinced him, too, that Indonesian communists had been “using nationalism as 
a cloak” and were gaining strength as time passed. Prime Minister Hatta, however, 
seemed prepared to take strong action against these “intransigent elements.” If the 
State Department allowed him to present his paper before the Netherlands delegation 
submitted a likely unacceptable plan of their own, Indonesian leaders would not, the 
diplomat argued, “quibble over details.”611  
After having received Marshall’s blessing, Cochran informally presented his 
confidential draft to the Dutch and Republican delegations on September 10. 
Cochran’s plan was in many ways similar to the one his predecessor Dubois had 
proposed in June, and was chiefly concerned with the structure and powers of a 
federal interim government for the proposed United States of Indonesia. It called for 
swift general elections for a provisional parliament that would also function as a 
constitutional convention. The American scheme lay down a timetable for the transfer 	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of powers to the United States of Indonesia as well, but by suggesting that the 
Republic provide no more than one-third of the provisional government’s 
representatives also ensured against Republican domination of that body. The right to 
veto legislation moreover increased the authority of the representative of the Dutch 
crown in the interim federal government.612  
As usual, the Republican delegation welcomed the plan as a suitable basis for 
the resumption of negotiations while Netherlands representatives voiced objections. 
The Dutch declared Cochran’s actions as “wholly contrary to procedure;” they 
believed the initiative for a fresh proposal lay with them, and that in any case they 
should have been separately consulted about the American draft prior to its 
presentation to the parties. The negotiators complained (for more than two hours, an 
exasperated Cochran noted), that the unexpected move left them with no hope for 
the adoption of their own upcoming proposals.613 
During a cabinet meeting in The Hague on September 13, Prime Minister 
Willem Drees remarked that there was a good deal in Cochran’s plan that was 
acceptable, but that some parts would surely have to be rejected. Minister of the 
Colonies Sassen more forcefully opined that the American’s suggestion for general 
elections throughout the archipelago were “entirely premature,” the powers of the 	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Dutch head of the interim federal government insufficient, and a fixed date for the 
transfer of sovereignty unreasonable. The government decided to send Foreign 
Minister Stikker to Washington; he was to inform the State Department that without 
extensive revision, Cochran’s plan would not gain a majority in Dutch parliament and 
could not be accepted as a basis for discussion.614   
Stikker and Netherlands ambassador in Washington Eelco N. van Kleffens, 
both of whom understood that the attitude of the United States to the conflict in 
Indonesia was decisive for the scope of action available to the Dutch, met with 
Marshall a few days later. During a discussion that lasted less than one hour, they 
attempted to convince him of their point of view. The Secretary held firm, however, 
and pointed out that “all the elements of the American government concerned [with 
the problem in Indonesia] were unanimous in regarding [Cochran’s] proposals as 
fair.”615 When Stikker bluntly asked him if he really believed that the advice of the few 
Americans who had been in Indonesia for only three months at a time was “of more 
value than all the experience [the Dutch had] gained over more than three centuries,” 
he received no reply. Marshall then dismissed the Netherlands delegation and noted 
that further contact about the details of the proposed political settlement would take 
place through Undersecretary Robert A. Lovett. Although it was agreed that some of 	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the Dutch objections might be erased through “clarifications” of the plan, the 
Undersecretary insisted he could not unilaterally negotiate changes to the delegate’s 
proposal in Washington, and confirmed the Department’s support of Cochran’s 
opinion that only Hatta’s government could meet the grave communist threat. His 
cool reception and unsatisfactory visit, a disappointed Stikker soberly noted, made 
clear that “[the Dutch] were expected to get on with the task at hand.”616 
  
This task became significantly more complex after a communist revolt led by 
Musso took place in the east Javanese city of Madiun on September 18. Although 
brief and ultimately unsuccessful, the rebellion further strengthened the Department’s 
belief that the United States must support the moderate Hatta government at all cost. 
The Indonesian Prime Minister, who had declared that a social revolution might break 
the united front needed for the national rebellion against the Dutch, quickly moved 
Republican troops from the TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or Indonesian National 
Army) to the area to suppress the uprising. President Sukarno moreover held an 
emotional radio speech, in which he stressed that the whole of Indonesia was facing a 
great ordeal and called on the people to show solidarity with the government at this 
critical moment. Musso’s Communist Party, the President warned, was trying to create 	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unrest and disorder and would obstruct the attainment of independence. In staging 
the revolt, the PKI had counted on the support from both TNI troops and the 
Indonesian people. When it received neither, no general uprising materialized; 
Indonesians clearly recognized Sukarno as their leader and remained loyal to him. 
After government soldiers acted swiftly and effectively against the premature bid for 
power, Musso fled Madiun.617  
High Commissioner Beel, who had arrived in the archipelago on September 15, 
saw in the communist rising a chance for the Netherlands Indies Army to once and 
for all eliminate the Republic. “It [was] now or never,” he warned after the outbreak 
in east Java; it would be fatal if the Dutch did not seize this “God-given opportunity.” 
A mere five days after his appearance in Jakarta, Beel informed Sassen that he had 
discovered a basic mistake in Netherlands policymaking. Indies administrators and 
Van Mook in particular, he had found, did not really feel Dutch. As such, their goals 
and those of planners in The Hague did not run parallel. He, on the other hand, was 
resolved to take a harder line against the Republic, and asked the Netherlands 
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government to authorize him to take deliberate and forceful action not only in 
troubled areas like Madiun, but against Yogyakarta as well.618 
The Dutch cabinet, however, was unwilling to grant Beel such extensive 
powers of decision. Prime Minister Drees in particular had misgivings about a march 
on the Republican capital. He had been privately informed that the High 
Commissioner’s performance in the Indonesian archipelago was already marked by “a 
desire for and pleasure in a position of power,” a “partly real and partly elevated sense 
of responsibility,” and a nervousness and hasty urge to “do something.” Drees 
therefore underlined the fact that Van Mook was still, for some more weeks, 
Lieutenant Governor-General, and ordered Beel to delay any operation he had been 
planning. The High Commissioner could merely offer Hatta Dutch support in 
restoring law and order and fighting communism in the Republic.619 
But the Republican Prime Minister, fearing Netherlands interference in what he 
considered internal affairs, did not want this help. Hatta told the Indonesian press 
bureau ANTARA that the Republican government in Yogyakarta would apply its own 
powers to quell the revolt. Consul-General Livengood noted the government’s strong 
anti-communist measures, remarking that if they were successful, Hatta’s cabinet 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
618  L.J.M. Beel to Sassen, 20 September 1948, in: NIB, XV, no. 76; Minutes meeting at home of Army 
Commander S.H. Spoor, 20 September 1948, in: NIB, XV, no. 73; Gase, 200-202. 
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would be in a much stronger position both towards its opposition and in negotiations 
with the Dutch delegation.620    
Dutch unhappiness about Cochran’s decision to present his plan without a 
further exchange of views with the Netherlands delegation, then, did little to convince 
the U.S. State Department, nor did the argument of Netherlands Indies administrators 
that elections in a disorganized community such as the Republic would generate 
extremist agitation rather than a clear expression of popular opinion. It was clear to 
decision makers in Washington that behind the Netherlands objection to elections 
throughout the archipelago lay the fear that these would show widespread support for 
the Republican government. At the same time, that government’s energetic and swift 
reaction to the Madiun rebellion in the eyes of American planners proved its 
staunchly anti-communist attitude and made it worthy of assistance. From 
Washington, Van Kleffens began to observe marked differences between the United 
States and the Netherlands about the recommended tactics to reach Indonesian 
independence. An “iciness in the general atmosphere” between American and Dutch 
officials was becoming increasingly noticeable, as Cochran also remarked from 
Jakarta.621  
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In late September, the Netherlands government in The Hague and Netherlands 
Indies authorities in Jakarta were weighing their options. How should the Dutch 
respond to Cochran’s proposal for a settlement, given the fact that the American 
delegate had refused to amend his plan before the start of negotiations? Van Mook, 
still awaiting his formal dismissal, suggested that they might accept the draft 
agreement as a basis for new discussions with the Republic, but advised his colleagues 
to include in their formal response amendments to the objectionable provisions in the 
original proposal.622 
 This Dutch reply was drafted during the first half of October. When it was 
shown to State Department planners, Van Kleffens was told that no objective critic 
could expect even for a moment that this “brutal” note would be acceptable to 
Republicans. As it stood, they noted, the Dutch answer was “tantamount to a 
rejection” of Cochran’s plan. Noting once again that the Department stood squarely 
behind the American delegate, they urged the Netherlands government to revise its 
standpoint. Van Kleffens himself stated to Minister Stikker and the head of the Dutch 
delegation in Jakarta that he believed the reply ill-suited to raise sympathy for the 
difficult position in which the Netherlands found itself. The Americans deemed it 
most important, he warned, that Dutch-Indonesian negotiations were resumed.623 
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 Dutch ministers, however, believed they had already conceded much, and 
remained convinced that they could not allow a further weakening of the Dutch 
position in the archipelago. “Circumstances may arise,” Sassen undiplomatically 
informed Cochran, that would make “immediate action to cope with the intolerable 
conditions unavoidable.”624 In its eventual response to the proposals, delivered a full 
month after their presentation, the Netherlands delegation stated that it accepted the 
plan as a basis for discussion, but insisted that there were parts of the agreement “to 
which objections of such a serious nature [existed] that they [could not] be 
incorporated in the political agreement.” Dutch views on how these objections should 
be met were expressed in the form of lengthy amendments.625 
 A close look at these amendments to the Cochran plan reveals they were so 
sweeping they amounted to counterproposals. Whereas both the original and the 
amended plan underlined the de jure sovereignty of the Dutch in Indonesia during the 
transition period, Cochran’s draft agreement limited the de facto sovereignty of the 
Netherlands in its outline of a progressive transfer of authority and powers to the 
provisional federal government of the United States in Indonesia. In the Dutch 
amendments, however, the Netherlands retained ultimate responsibility in that body. 
In the original September 10 proposal, the Republic had been safeguarded through 
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the exclusion of Netherlands Indies troops in the federal armed forces that were to 
function throughout the United States of Indonesia. In the October counterproposal, 
these troops were made part of the army. Where Cochran’s plan had called for the 
establishment of strong federal organs, the Netherlands delegation insisted on a 
centralization of powers in the hands of the Dutch representative of the crown. In 
essence, as Alistair Taylor also argues, the counterproposals called for “the 
progressive liquidation of the Republic as a constitutional entity.”626 
 Irritated U.S. State Department officials were certain the government in 
Yogyakarta would not accept the new plans. Hatta’s impression of the Dutch 
response, as outlined in a personal letter to Cochran, was that the leadership in the 
Netherlands “did not actually want to come to an agreement that [was] not in line 
with [its] preconceived design.” Instead, its primary aim was to divide Indonesia, 
render it weak, and “annihilate the Republic which [was] the mainstay in the struggle 
for freedom,” the Prime Minister argued to the American. The Dutch unwillingness 
to abandon their colonial ideas, Hatta warned, illustrated their underestimation of the 
Indonesian people’s desire for freedom.627 By late October, then, the two parties were 
at a grave impasse. Unless the situation improved, the British ambassador in The 
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Hague reported to London, the Dutch would see no alternative in the archipelago 
“except either to fight or get out.”628 
 
On November 4, Lieutenant Governor-General Van Mook turned over his 
authority to High Commissioner of the Crown Beel and said goodbye to the country 
where he had been born, raised, and worked for more than three decades. 
Netherlands Indies officials waved as he boarded a plane. Van Mook was bitter about 
the treatment he had received from policymakers in The Hague and frustrated 
because he had not been allowed to “finish the job.” In his final speech, the last 
Dutch Lieutenant Governor-General spoke of the convictions and ideals that had 
inspired his work. Although disappointed in Republicans for seeking unity through 
common resistance to the Dutch, he underlined his belief that many people in both 
camps desired peace, and expressed the hope that cooperation between Indonesia and 
the Netherlands would continue indefinitely. “We survived the doctoring of the 
Indonesian case by no fewer than fifteen foreign physicians, not all of whom 
contributed to her healing,” Van Mook said not without pride and in a slighting 
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reference to the meddling of those whom he considered amateurs in Indonesian 
affairs. “We have not yet reached the Promised Land, but we can see it before us.”629   
Two weeks after the presentation of the Dutch counterproposals to the 
Cochran plan to the Republic, the Netherlands government sent Minister Stikker to 
the Indonesian archipelago for direct negotiations with Prime Minister Hatta. This 
circumvention of the Good Offices Committee meant that neither the American draft 
nor the Netherlands plan was ever discussed in detail. Cochran, although increasingly 
concerned about the sincerity of the Dutch and convinced that the Netherlands 
government was preparing for a 
second military offensive against the 
Republic, was anxious to get the two 
politicians together for one-on-one 
negotiations. It was crucial, the 
American delegate underlined in a 
personal meeting with Stikker, that 
the Netherlands reveal better faith. 
The Dutchman in turn assured Cochran that although there were divisions within his 
government and rightist Catholic elements advocated military action, he himself was 
“from the center” and had come to seek a peaceful solution.630  	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 Cochran’s faith in and admiration of Stikker grew when the latter volunteered 
to go to Yogyakarta and make “as friendly an approach to Republican leaders as the 
situation allowed.” Indonesian sources show us that Mohammad Roem was wary, 
however. In his notes on the upcoming talks between the Netherlands Foreign 
Minister and Hatta, he observed that the Dutch reluctance to engage in substantive 
discussions unless Republican troops strictly observed the ceasefire betrayed the 
Dutch unwillingness to break a vicious cycle of violence. Cochran himself had 
intimated, Roem said, that the Netherlands delegation wanted to “torpedo” his 
proposal. The American diplomat in his cables to Washington moreover rightly 
observed that Stikker’s attitude was markedly different from that of other Netherlands 
officials.631  
High Commissioner Beel, for example, believed that renewed military action 
was unavoidable. He somberly spoke of a “drifting process” across the board; 
militarily, economically, and socially, he argued, the conditions in the archipelago were 
deteriorating. Cochran could not be trusted. The present Republican government 
lacked authority, he claimed, and was unable and unwilling to restore law and order by 
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taking strong measures against the increasing number of violations of the truce 
agreement. The situation was becoming untenable, Beel concluded.632  
Under the direction of Army Commander S.H. Spoor and Vice-Admiral A.S. 
Pinke, the Dutch military top in Jakarta spent the month of October preparing a large 
operation. The demobilization of Netherlands troops had been postponed; Dutch 
troops now totaled some 130,000 troops. These soldiers, airmen, and marines were to 
destruct the Republic through the swift capture of the city of Yogyakarta followed by 
the seizure of all territory in Java and Sumatra not yet under Dutch control. After 
disorganizing the enemy and securing the cooperation of the Indonesian people, the 
plan said, the troops were to “sanitize” and “pacify” the newly occupied areas. 
Although these proposals included some references to expected levels of resistance, 
they lacked a detailed analysis of the power and plans of Republican forces and their 
leadership; all was aimed at the quick, successful, and permanent elimination of the 
Republic.633 
 First, however, diplomacy was to be given another chance. Cochran believed 
this would be its last. “No one could have come to Batavia with a more friendly 	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attitude toward the Netherlands than I did,” he wrote to Washington in early 
November. It had nevertheless become clear to him that the Dutch government was 
determined to settle the Indonesian question on its own terms, and that renewed 
conflict was perhaps inevitable. In order to prevent this, he argued, the United States 
might have to consider cutting off financial assistance to the Netherlands. “We have 
the responsibility,” he noted, “not to put funds into [a Dutch] colonial enterprise 
involving military suppression of truly nationalistic aspirations.” This type of pressure 
would be more effective than moral persuasion, Cochran concluded.634 
 But it seemed that Stikker and Hatta were making headway in their direct 
discussions. Back in Jakarta to inform Beel and his aides, the Foreign Minister 
underlined that the Republican Prime Minister had made significant political 
concessions. His government had also agreed to do what it could to curb the 
continuing violent incidents and hostile infiltrations that the Dutch cabinet in The 
Hague and administrators and military officers in Jakarta were laying such emphasis 
on. The remaining disagreements, Stikker wrote, were related to the role and powers 
of the High Commissioner during the interim period, the position of the Republican 
army within the proposed organization of federal forces, and the status of the 
Republic vis-à-vis the other members of the federative United States of Indonesia. 
The Foreign Minister privately added that his own position between the powerful 
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uneasy; he was living “on a razor’s edge.” In The Hague, Sassen whispered he 
believed Stikker “too perfect a gentleman.”635  
 Stikker’s discussions with Hatta had led him to conclude that military action 
was as yet premature. Beel, Spoor, Pinke, and head of the Dutch delegation T. Elink 
Schuurman, in contrast, were reserved and pessimistic, and did no longer believe a 
mutually acceptable agreement could be reached. The Republic desired a dominant 
position in the interim federal government and eventual United States of Indonesia, 
they charged. Spoor, wedded to the idea that use of force was the only way to solve 
the “Indonesian problem,” complained that making more concessions meant that the 
interests of the Netherlands would disappear into the background. Beel confessed he 
could not see any evidence that Stikker’s bilateral talks had had satisfactory results. 
Only with difficulty did the Foreign Minister convince his colleagues on November 10 
that the Netherlands government must be advised to negotiate further. A guardedly 
hopeful Stikker then left for The Hague to talk matters over personally with the 
Dutch cabinet.636 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
635  Verslag Stikker about journey to Indonesia, 10 November 1948, in: NIB, XV, no. 313; Note by Chief 
Division Political Affairs of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Hendrik N. Boon, in: NIB, XV, p. 692, note 1. The 
views of the Republican government on their negotiations with the Dutch Foreign Minister become clear in 
an aide-mémoire printed in: Stikker to Sassen, 10 November 1948, in: NIB, XV, no. 311. In his memoirs, 
Stikker characterized these discussions with Hatta as frank and direct. He appreciated the Indonesian Prime 
Minister as a serious, kind, and intelligent man whose line of thinking, he argued, corresponded closely with 
his own. “We viewed ourselves,” he later wrote, “as engaged as equals in finding solutions to serious 
problems.” They could only do so by being honest and pragmatic and guided by the interests of their peoples; 
no sentiments or resentments should influence them. After initial reservations and hopelessness, their 
meetings grew friendlier, although Stikker also became aware of “the hostile determination” of Republicans 
to “defend what [they] believed they had achieved.” See: Stikker, 122-131. 
636  Brief report meeting, 10 November 1948, in: NIB, XV, no. 312.  
 
   
   
356 
 In Washington, American planners breathed a small sigh of relieve. Lovett told 
Ambassador Herman B. Baruch in the Netherlands that the Department felt 
encouraged by Stikker’s “forthright attitude […] and apparent intention and ability to 
cut through preliminaries to the essentials of the problem.”637 If a voluntary 
agreement could be reached on a conference level without assistance of the Good 
Offices Committee, the Undersecretary of State told Cochran, the Department 
“would of course be delighted.”638 The American delegate admitted that Stikker’s 
approach offered the greatest possibility for a settlement, but repeated that the 
strongest argument the United States could bring up against those influential 
Dutchmen who preferred military action was the financial one.639  
 With the Foreign Minister en route back to The Hague, Beel cabled his 
colleagues in the city to ensure his dissenting opinion was heard. He had just had a 
meeting with the Indonesian leaders who represented the Dutch-created federal 
states, he noted.640 Their growing frustration and impatience with Netherlands 
administrators had made clear to the High Commissioner that, contrary to the advice 
that the Foreign Minister was to give the cabinet, only immediate armed action could 
prevent disaster.641 Three days after this telegram, he went as far as saying that 
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Stikker’s travels to Yogyakarta had increased unrest and insecurity among pro-Dutch 
federalists in the archipelago. The population of the Dutch-created negaras West Java, 
East Sumatra, South Borneo, and East Indonesia feared Republican domination and 
felt betrayed by the Netherlands government, Beel stated. He also maintained that an 
atmosphere of dispiritedness had become sensible among increasingly defeatist Dutch 
troops and officers. The attitude of the weak Republican government was 
irreconcilable with Dutch demands for order and security, the High Commissioner 
concluded.642 
 The Netherlands government proved divided. Stikker argued it was still 
possible to come to a peaceful solution. Minister of the Colonies Sassen asked 
sarcastically if the Foreign Minister had perhaps forgotten to insist with Hatta on the 
need for the Republic to put a stop to ceasefire infringements. Drees stressed that the 
Prime Minister had made concessions and seemed to want to come to an agreement. 
The ministers eventually agreed to make another attempt at attaining an accord; 
Sassen and Stikker would receive strict instructions, travel to the archipelago 
accompanied by a group of advisers, and outline certain minimum principles and 
demands that the Republican government was to swiftly and unconditionally accept in 
order for negotiations to resume.643  
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 In the third week of November, a full-fledged Netherlands delegation thus 
arrived in Indonesia to enter into substantive discussions guided by a directive from 
The Hague. Before the talks had even started, however, Stikker realized that subtle 
and informal meetings without stringent preconditions, like those he had had with 
Hatta, offered a better chance of success. The more conservative new delegation had 
less freedom to maneuver and was soon more concerned with the observation of the 
truce than with the need to find a solution to political points. When by the end of the 
month the Dutch politicians had failed to obtain from the Republican Prime Minister 
the binding declaration they sought, this second series of discussions broke down.644 
 
Representatives in Yogyakarta admitted that the Dutch Foreign Minister had 
shown “courageous statesmanship and strength in seeking a fair solution.” Profound 
talks had nevertheless been unable to erase fundamental differences between the two 
parties. Sassen blamed Hatta for the failure, and accused him of receding from 
concessions made in earlier discussions with Stikker. The Dutch demands, the 
Minister insisted stubbornly, were entirely reasonable.645 British Consul-General 
Francis Shepherd was closer on the mark, however, when he observed that the 
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Republic refused to accept the subordinate position Netherlands planners had devised 
for it.646 
 On December 2, Stikker informed the Good Offices Committee that despite 
the excellent atmosphere in which the discussions had taken place and his impression 
that both parties sincerely wished to come to a settlement, a deadlock had been the 
result. Cochran immediately inquired into the possibility of a second police action, not 
only giving the Dutch Foreign Minister “broad hints” about the likely negative 
reaction of the American public to such a course of action, but even stating bluntly 
that “[his] people would hit the ceiling.” The American diplomat admitted to 
Washington that Hatta’s reluctance to confirm the tentative agreements he had 
previously reached with Stikker had put the Dutch Foreign Minister in an 
embarrassing position, but underlined that it had been Sassen who had pushed the 
Republicans too far. The Indonesian Prime Minister had made considerable 
concessions, Cochran argued, while the Dutch had gone into the talks with 
“absolutely fixed positions.” He nevertheless still held hope that discussions might 
succeed, and asked the Department for help bringing the Dutch back to the 
negotiation table.647  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
646  British Consul-General in Jakarta Sir. Francis M. Shepherd to Foreign Office, 26 November 1948, 
CO 537/3342, BNA. 
647  Stikker and Sassen to Drees, 1 December 1948, in: NIB, XVI, no. 3; Verslag meetings Stikker with 
Good Offices Committee, 2 December 1948, in: NIB, XVI, no. 7; Livengood to Secretary of State, 2 
December 1948, in: FRUS, 1948, VI, 506-509; Livengood to Secretary of State, 5 December 1948, in: FRUS, 
1948, VI, 523-526. 
 
   
   
360 
 Under pressure from the United States, then, the Dutch delegation of ministers 
invited Hatta to Jakarta for further discussion. The Prime Minister explained that the 
demands of the Netherlands government would be unacceptable to his cabinet. The 
Republic was prepared to accept the sovereignty of the Netherlands and large 
executive powers for the High Commissioner in theory, but required safeguards in the 
form of a protocol or “gentlemen’s agreement” that in practice limited this authority. 
The High Commissioner, for example, should be allowed to use federal forces in 
emergency situations only with the agreement of the federal government. Sassen and 
Stikker in response stressed that the sovereignty of the Netherlands over Indonesia 
could not merely be theoretical. They concluded that it was impossible to come to an 
agreement with Hatta’s government. Although they did not tell the Prime Minister, 
their minds had been made up; military action against the Republic had become 
inevitable. Visibly touched, the delegation reported to The Hague, Hatta said goodbye 
and left.648 
 Upon the Dutch ministry delegation’s arrival in the archipelago in late 
November, a large but remarkably short meeting had taken place between the visitors, 
High Commissioner Beel, and Indonesian federalist leaders. The heads of the various 
negaras, among whom the East Indonesian Prime Minister, Ide Anak Agung Gde 	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Agung, Tengku Mansur from East Sumatra, and Sultan Hamid II from West Borneo, 
had asked to be allowed to become directly involved in negotiations with the 
Republic. When the Dutch refused this request, the Indonesian political leaders had 
warned that they were facing growing pro-Republican sentiment among the 
populations they were representing, and would be forced to resign their positions if 
the proposed interim federal government would not include representatives from 
Yogyakarta. They had moreover expressed their strong objection to a second Dutch 
police action. Federalists in the Dutch-created negaras, in short, were starting to believe 
that any provisional government in which the Republic did not participate was 
doomed. When the Dutch ministers left Jakarta for The Hague on December 5, 
however, they had only minimally informed these Indonesian leaders on whom they 
leaned for support of the latest developments and failure to reach an agreement. The 
Netherlands representatives had merely stated that it would be “inopportune” to talk 
about matters that had yet to be discussed with policymakers in The Hague. It was 
enough to inform the federalists, they believed, that the results of the negotiations 
were unsatisfactory.649 
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On December 7, the Netherlands government received an unexpected surprise 
in the form of an aide-mémoire from the State Department in Washington. At 
Cochran’s urging, the paper expressed deep disappointment about the unilateral 
suspension of conversations with the Republicans. Given the extreme costliness of 
failure and Hatta’s sincere desire to cooperate towards a solution, officials said, it was 
imperative that bona fide negotiations were resumed. “Successive American 
representatives on the Good Offices Committee and other neutral observers [had] 
come to identical conclusions,” the paper stated; the “preponderant desire of the 
Indonesian people to govern themselves [found] its chief expression in the Republic, 
which must be considered not as a geographical concept but as a political force.” If 
the Dutch resorted to force, the American people would be profoundly shocked, the 
goodwill of the Indonesian people would be replaced by bitterness and enmity, and 
“the nationalist movement [would come] under the sway of leaders with whom no 
truce or common understanding would be possible.” In that case, the aide-mémoire 
sternly warned, the United States would have no choice but to take the Indonesian 
dispute before the Security Council, resign from the Good Offices Committee, and 
“consider itself free to take such measures as the changed circumstances might 
require.”650 
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 The reaction of the Dutchman who was handed this American paper was one 
of “pained and angry surprise,” an embassy official noted. The Netherlands 
government believed that the aide-mémoire illustrated how little appreciation the 
leadership in Washington had for the length to which the Dutch delegation had gone 
to reach a settlement. Embittered by its harsh language, Stikker went as far as labeling 
the document an “unfriendly act.”651  
The Dutch cabinet, however, chose to obstinately disregard the carefully 
prepared paper. Van Kleffens’s dissenting voice, and his argument that renewed 
military action would result in “serious and prolonged loss of prestige” for the Dutch, 
was barely heard. Although the ambassador underlined that Americans believed 
another offensive could not possibly be successful, and warned that “the Netherlands 
government, as a government of a nation that [did not] wish to go under, could not 
afford to keep rowing against the strong tide that [moved] the world,” the Dutch 
cabinet spent little time discussing the aide-mémoire.652  
It is therefore no surprise, perhaps, that the official Netherlands reply to the 
paper on December 10 boldly argued that the views and recommendations it 
contained were based on “an insufficient understanding of the circumstances which 
[had] led to the present situation.” The Dutch delegation had in fact made scrupulous 	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attempts to come to an agreement, officials in The Hague argued to their colleagues in 
Washington, but believed that further concessions from the Netherlands government 
rather than strengthening Hatta’s cabinet would “inevitably lead to increased demands 
by irresponsible extremist[s],” and in effect qualify as surrender. The Dutch 
government saw two alternatives. Either the Republicans confirmed their willingness 
to “recognize Netherlands sovereignty during the interim period in principle and 
practice,” or the cabinet would be “obliged to make a final decision concerning the 
matter in which it could best implement its formal pledges to the people of the 
Netherlands and Indonesia.”653 
 In early December, a disappointed Prime Minister Drees said he believed 
military action would be “catastrophic,” but at the same time admitted he did not 
think it could be avoided; further concessions would be equivalent to an 
abandonment of the archipelago, and this he believed ran contrary to the 
responsibilities of the Netherlands.654 Reports from Jakarta, meanwhile, added cause 
for concern. The lack of a clear declaration by the Netherlands government had led to 
unrest, unease, and distrust in the east of the archipelago, Beel reported, where a 	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Republican “goodwill mission” was about to arrive at the express invitation of Ide 
Anak Agung Gde Agung.655 General Spoor warned that the number of violent 
incidents was steadily increasing and that Republican troop movements alarmed him, 
but assured the Netherlands government that his forces could handle a Yogyakarta-
inspired guerilla war. During a momentous cabinet meeting on December 13, the 
Netherlands government unanimously decided to authorize the High Commissioner 
to finalize preparations and execute the planned police action. The UN Security 
Council would start their Christmas recess on the 15th or 16th of the month, and by 
the time it reconvened in mid January, Netherlands officials predicted, everything 
would be “passé.”656 
 On the same day that fateful decision was made, and at Cochran’s suggestion, 
Prime Minister Hatta hastily wrote a conciliatory letter containing further 
compromises. The Republic accepted “fully and without qualification” the principles 
of the Renville Agreement, he noted, including Netherlands sovereignty during the 
interim period. His cabinet maintained its request that the Dutch self-impose 
restraints and limitations on the exercise of their powers, however. This was in full 
accord, Hatta stated, “with the manner in which sovereignty [found] expression in the 
modern democratic states of Europe and America.” The Prime Minister further 
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argued that the Republic was ready to resume negotiations. In effect, Australian Good 
Offices Committee delegate and staunchly pro-Republican Thomas K. Critchley 
reported to Canberra, this letter met the Dutch insistence on legal sovereignty 
“without giving way on the practical need of safeguards against its abuse.” Van 
Kleffens immediately informed Stikker that the State Department had labeled Hatta’s 
urgent missive “an excellent piece” that offered “adequate and practical grounds” on 
which discussions should be resumed.657 
 For the Dutch Prime Minister and his labor party colleagues, the letter was 
indeed enough reason to overturn their decision from the previous day. The Catholic 
ministers disagreed, however; they did not think Hatta had satisfied Dutch demands 
or that his note should lead to the postponement of military action. On December 14, 
this difference in opinion between the two factions led to a cabinet crisis. Minister of 
the Colonies Sassen argued that Hatta’s letter contained “escape clauses” that clearly 
showed his government’s unwillingness to concede to the Dutch on the most 
important points. For Drees and Stikker, the very fact that the letter had been sent at 
all was reason to delay the military offensive; the international community would 
surely state that the Netherlands government was not at this point justified to resort 
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to force, they responded. The Prime Minister in particular believed Hatta’s effort 
afforded the Dutch a last opportunity to reach a peaceful solution.   
Dissension inside the Netherlands cabinet was marked. While the Catholics 
pressed for strong action, Drees, who the British ambassador in The Hague reported 
looked “more tired and grey” than ever before, weakened in his resistance. Stikker, 
the ambassador observed, had “more courage and imagination that the others” and 
“still some fight left in him.” Officials in London voiced the prevailing sentiment of 
the international community when they expressed their hope that the Netherlands 
government would “on no account fail to grasp this opportunity of achieving an 
eleventh-hour settlement.”658 
 The crisis was sworn off the following day, when the cabinet decided to ask the 
Republican Prime Minister for further clarifications. Hatta was to explain whether his 
letter had been a personal and informal one, or whether it had reflected the opinion 
and carried the approval of his entire government. Minister Sassen drew up a stern 
and unconciliatory draft response that warned Republicans that “the Netherlands 
government could only reconsider its point of view that the continuation of 
negotiations [was] futile if a binding declaration [from them] would be received 
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forthwith.” This reply was cabled to Jakarta, where it was to be handed to Cochran 
for submission to Hatta without delay.659 
 High Commissioner Beel reluctantly agreed to postpone the start of the police 
action for twenty-four hours, but he did not send the Netherlands ultimatum to the 
American delegate until the next day.660 This left the Indonesian Prime Minister less 
than twenty hours for a reply. Warning that federalists in West Java and East 
Indonesia were stirring at the anticipated outbreak of hostilities, and that he had 
already had to declare a state of emergency in South Borneo, Beel moreover asked the 
government in The Hague to grant him the sole authority of judging whether the 
Republican response was satisfactory.661 
 After refusing Beel this power of decision, the Dutch council of ministers met 
at the crack of dawn on December 18, waiting to hear if Hatta’s reply indicated that 
his earlier letter had been a formal expression of the position of his government. 
Washington officials again urged the Netherlands cabinet to exercise restraint; it 
seemed incredible, a Department official noted, that the Dutch could resort to force 
because of this “self-generated emergency.”662 Cochran, meanwhile, was 
understandably furious. He told the head of the Netherlands delegation in Jakarta that 	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he could not “in justice press Hatta for an immediate reply which [called] not for a 
mere expression of willingness to resume negotiations, but rather for surrender to the 
position of [the Dutch] government on every material point.”663 When Beel 
announced the lack of a Republican response to The Hague, Prime Ministers Drees 
decided the military offensive would commence the following morning.664 
 In his explanation to policymakers in the American capital, Cochran stated that 
he had been in serious doubt as to whether he should even deliver the Dutch 
ultimatum to the Indonesian Prime Minister or try to “extract from [him] in a few 
hours the basic settlement that [the Netherlands delegation] had failed to obtain.” The 
more adamant and threatening the Dutch became, the diplomat remarked, “the more 
guarded [he would] have to become in handling or meeting their unreasonable 
ultimata and running their erratic errands.”665 At the eve of the renewed outbreak of 
hostilities in Indonesia, American officials warned their colleagues in the Netherlands 
one last time that they were doing themselves “a grave disservice” and that “very 
unhappy times [would be] in store for many.”666 Undersecretary Lovett cabled Acting 
U.S. representative to the Security Council Philip C. Jessup, currently in Paris, that a 	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Foreign Office, 20 December 1948, Foreign Office Files (FO) 810/11, BNA. 
666  Memorandum of conversation by Butterworth, 18 December 1948, in: FRUS, 1948, VI, 578-579. 
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new campaign would make it necessary for the Council to meet in an emergency 
session.667 
 
Despite the numerous British and American warnings that the Dutch military 
strategy made long-term success in the Indonesian archipelago highly doubtful if not 
impossible, the second offensive, codenamed Operation Crow, started expeditiously. 
The main objective, in contrast to the first police action seventeen months previous, 
was the occupation of Yogyakarta and elimination of the Republican leadership. An 
air raid by the Dutch in American B-25 Mitchell bombers and the dropping of almost 
a thousand paratroopers on nearby airport Maguwo left troops only a short march to 
the presidential palace in the center of the capital. To their surprise, they found almost 
the entire cabinet in an emergency meeting. The Republican leadership, who had 
expected the United States to prevent an attack and who considered it dishonorable to 
be captured in flight, had decided not to evacuate. President Sukarno, Prime Minister 
Hatta, Foreign Minister Haji Agus Salim, adviser Sutan Sjahrir, and many others were 
arrested and placed under house arrest on December 19. In the days that followed, 
Sukarno, Salim, and Sjahrir were flown to Prapat, an isolated community on Lake 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
667  Lovett to Acting United States Representative at the United Nations Philip C. Jessup, 18 December 
1948, in: FRUS, 1948, VI, 577-578. 
 
   
   
371 
Toba in north Sumatra, and Hatta was transported to the island of Bangka off 
Sumatra’s east coast.668 
 General Sudirman, commander of the Indonesian forces but seriously ill with 
tuberculosis, managed to broadcast an order to Republican troops to continue their 
resistance just before the radio station was bombed by Dutch airplanes, and then left 
the city. Dutch commander Spoor did not expect to meet much resistance, nor fear 
guerilla warfare; he had argued to Beel and the Netherlands government that taking 
out Yogyakarta would signal the end of organized Republican operations and 
resistance, and that the morale of Indonesian forces would be low. Once Dutch 
troops could offer “permanent security” from Republican terror in newly occupied 
territory, the population would moreover openly demonstrate its support, Spoor 
predicted optimistically.669 Sources from the Republican Ministry of Information, 
however, hint that the commander was likely to be proven wrong; in the report 
Republicans drew up about George Kahin’s travels through Republican territory near 
Magelang in early December, the relations between TNI forces and the Indonesian 
people are described as “like between fish and water.”670  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
668  Bernard Dahm, History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century (London: Pall Mall Press, 1971), 136-137; 
Salim Said, Genesis of power: General Sudirman and the Indonesian military in politics, 1945-49 (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), 96-101; Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 336-339. Note that George Kahin 
was himself in Yogyakarta at the start of the second military offensive. The commander of the airplane that 
was to take the Republican leaders to their places of internment was only allowed to open his very secret 
orders once in the air. He learned he was to drop off Hatta and a few others on Bangka, and fly Sukarno, 
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669  Groen, 173-179; Gase, 284-286. 
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During the week that followed the start of the offensive, Netherlands forces 
indeed reached and seized control of the remaining Republican cities on Java and 
Sumatra.671 Beel soon recommended to Sassen that the Dutch cabinet no longer use 
the terms “Republic” or “Republican territory;” the military campaign, the High 
Commissioner reasoned, had terminated the Republic as a party in the conflict. On 
that same ground, the government could and should forcefully reject any outside 
meddling in the Indonesian dispute as “unacceptable and unjustified.”672 
 Acting Head of the Indonesian delegation to the UN Sumitro 
Djojohadikusumo, however, held a contrary opinion. He told American officials that 
the Netherlands action was “a fragrant violation” of international agreements and 
obligations in general, and of the Renville Agreement in particular. The Republic 
sincerely desired to reach an amicable settlement, he argued, and had been able to 
maintain itself, despite constant Dutch attacks, due to the wide popular support it 
enjoyed. The present offensive, Sumitro warned Secretary Marshall, would spark 
widespread social unrest, and the Republic was “grimly and firmly determined to 
defend [its] freedom with all the means available to [it].” The prominent Indonesian 
economist and later Minister of Finance also requested that the United States 
government render its full political and economic support to the Republic. The 
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1948, in: NIB, XVI, no. 156; Beel to Sassen, 22 December 1948, in: NIB, XVI, no. 210; Beel to Sassen, 20 
December 1948, in: NIB, XVI, no. 175. 
 
   
   
373 
Netherlands was diverting American aid dollars to the archipelago “for the purpose of 
waging a colonial war against freedom loving people,” he argued, echoing Cochran’s 
sentiments. Undersecretary Lovett responded that his government “profoundly 
regretted the turn of events” and said that although the cessation of financial aid to 
the Netherlands was a difficult issue, the matter of continuing the assistance that was 
flowing through the Netherlands to the Indies “was receiving [his] utmost 
attention.”673 
 Department officials, although critical of the Dutch decision to resume military 
action, made clear to Jessup that he should make every effort to prevent having to act 
unilaterally in the Security Council.674 President Truman agreed that the United States 
should avoid taking any action that would “involve [the country] subsequently.”675 
“We do not desire,” Lovett cabled to Paris, where the Council was meeting for a UN 
conference, “that the United States assume a position of outstanding and solitary 
leadership in dealing with this case.” Jessup was encouraged to associate with, for 
example, the Australian and Belgian delegates in considering possible courses of 
action. The main objective for the emergency meeting was to express concern at the 
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December 1948, in: FRUS, 1948, VI, 590-592. The Netherlands had at this point received almost $300 
million in aid, and Indonesia just over $60 million. See also: “Indonesians Urge U.S. Halt Dutch Aid,” New 
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violation of the Council’s ceasefire order and to issue a warning to the two parties the 
fighting should stop at once.676  
 Dean Rusk, then working at the State Department’s Office of United Nations 
Affairs, summarized the difficulties of the American position. The resumption of 
hostilities in Indonesia brought into conflict a number of important interests, he set 
off. “On one hand we are deeply interested in political and economic stability of 
Western European countries and in the solidarity of Western Europe as a whole. On 
the other hand, we have a long established policy favoring the rapid development of 
non-self-governing people toward self-government and independence.” The Dutch 
police action, he went on, constituted a “serious blow” to the prospect of self-
government in Indonesia “under moderate nationalist elements.” Although the United 
States did not desire to support UN sanctions against the Netherlands or bring about 
a break with the Dutch over the Indonesian question, it must not be seen to support 
“either directly or indirectly Dutch military action” and be cautious to “act in good 
faith” as a member of the United Nations. “We must avoid,” Rusk warned Jessup, 
“putting ourselves in such a position that any wrong committed anywhere in the 
world and left unpunished constitutes a diplomatic defeat and humiliation for the 
United States.” Instead, he suggested, a “clear and full exposition of the course of 	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events” in the Security Council might create the pressure needed for the Dutch to 
resume their seats at the negotiating table.677   
 Jessup followed instructions, and during the Security Council meeting on 
December 22 denounced the Dutch offensive by stating that his government “[failed] 
to find any justification for the renewal of military operations in Indonesia.” He called 
for an order to both parties to cease hostilities immediately.678 Dutch representative to 
the United Nations J.H. van Roijen countered with allegations against the Republic 
and emphasized the importance of the federalists in the Indonesian question. The 
police action had not, he argued, altered the political aim of his government, which 
was to establish a sovereign and independent Indonesia.679 A draft resolution filed by 
Jessup and signed by the Colombian and Syrian representatives called for the 
immediate withdrawal of armed forces to the truce lines stipulated in the Renville 
Agreement, but did not receive enough support to be passed.680 On that same day, 
however, the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), which oversaw Marshall 
Plan aid, did suspend financial assistance to the Netherlands Indies. At the urgent 
request of the Dutch, however, this decision was expressly motivated as “dictated by 
economic considerations” rather than political ones; “pending the clarification of the 	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situation” in Indonesia, an ECA spokesman declared, there was no reasonable 
assurance that the aid could be distributed efficiently among people and contribute to 
the area’s economic recovery.681   
 
The international reaction to the Dutch offensive was one of outrage. Indian 
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru labeled it “contrary to the principles of the United 
Nations Charter,” warned the Dutch they could not possibly achieve their objectives, 
and pledged to end the alien domination of Asia. The age of imperialism, he said, was 
over.682 The New York Times, taking a stiffer line than the previous year in an 
atmosphere of hardening public opinion, argued that the renewed outbreak of 
violence constituted the shocking and tragic breaking of a promise by a people for 
whom “the whole western world [had] deep admiration and affection.”683 Most of the 
Dutch press described the step as a bitter necessity and stressed the need for national 
unity.684 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
681  Administrator Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) Paul. G. Hoffman to Van Kleffens, 22 
December 1948, in: NIB, XVI, no. 223. In a press conference that same day, however, Undersecretary Lovett 
did intimate that some aspect of the decision to cut financial assistance to the Indonesian archipelago had also 
been political. Prime Minister Drees personally ordered Beel not to make any announcements about the 
cessation of Marshall Aid to Indonesia; the Netherlands government expressly desired to keep publicity 
regarding this sensitive decision in hand. See: NIB, XVI, p. 299, note 1; Drees to Beel, 22 December 1948, in: 
NIB, XVI, no. 224. 
682  “Nehru Denounces Dutch Java Action,” New York Times, 20 December 1948, 1. See also: Aide-
Mémoire Government of India to United States State Department, 21 December 1948, RG59, 856D.00/12-
2148, NARA.  
683  “The Broken Promise,” New York Times, 23 December 1948, 18. 
684  Nichols to Foreign Office, 22 December 1948, CO 537/3343, BNA. 
 
   
   
377 
 When the Security Council met again on December 24 it passed a compromise 
resolution that no longer called for a withdrawal of forces, but still ordered the parties 
to cease hostilities. It moreover required the Dutch to release political prisoners.685 
American officials urged the Dutch to abide by it. In conversations with their British 
colleagues, State Department officials expressed the hope that these immediate, 
multilateral, “reasonable and moderate measures” would reduce pressure on the 
United States to take “more extreme measures ultimately.” In the same vein, financial 
aid to Indonesia had been suspended in the hope that it might reduce pressure to halt 
the still unrestricted assistance to the Netherlands.686 
 The Indonesian delegation in the UN was bitterly disappointed about the latest 
resolution, calling it “meaningless and completely inadequate.” It would allow Dutch 
“mopping-up” operations to continue, representatives charged.687 In Jakarta, High 
Commissioner Beel was equally dissatisfied, and argued that the Netherlands 
government must reject the Security Council’s demands. The federalists in the 
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archipelago, he warned wildly, would only be willing to continue cooperating with 
Netherlands officials if The Hague held firm in the face of opposition to its policy.688 
Not having fully realized that the Security Council was concerned not only with 
the fate of the Republic, but also with its own prestige and dignity in the aftermath of 
the second military offensive in the archipelago, Dutch ministers admitted they had 
not expected the Council to convene in an emergency meeting and openly condemn 
their decision to resort to force. In a cabinet meeting on December 27, Foreign 
Minister Stikker explained it would be unwise to follow Beel’s suggestion of publicly 
declaring the Republic no longer to exist. Prime Minister Drees agreed, noting that 
although its territory and leaders had been seized, the Republic was clearly still a 
“political idea” in the international community. Both believed that the Netherlands 
could not terminate military operations before the goals of the police action were met, 
however. Other ministers dryly commented that they had replaced Van Mook so that 
important decisions could be made in The Hague rather than Jakarta, but that High 
Commissioner Beel was acting more independently than the Lieutenant Governor-
General had ever done.689  
 When the Security Council next took up the Indonesian question, Netherlands 
representative Van Roijen, under strict instructions, did little more than declare that 
the Dutch were giving the December 24 resolution “serious attention.” He reiterated 
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the familiar argument that the dispute lay outside the competence of the United 
Nations. The Dutch delegate also contended that the military offensive had not 
generally led to “hostilities on a large scale,” and stated that its operational phase was 
in the process of being completed. The goal of the government in The Hague, Van 
Roijen concluded, remained the earliest possible formation of a federal interim 
government, the creation of a representative body, and the transfer of sovereignty to a 
United States of Indonesia within the framework of a Netherlands-Indonesia 
Union.690  
This statement did not satisfy the Security Council, and made clear that the 
Netherlands government had not taken any positive steps to fulfill the provisions of 
its previous resolution. The general impression was, Jessup cabled from Paris, that the 
Dutch were “getting away with” deliberately snubbing the Council. Further action was 
called for to save the prestige of the UN, he said. The State Department agreed.691  
On December 28, during the last meeting of the year before it was to adjourn 
until the second week of January 1949, the Security Council passed two more 
resolutions. The first was a Chinese sponsored resolution that ordered the immediate 
release of the Republican leaders. The second was introduced by Colombia, and called 
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for an investigation of the observation of the Council’s ceasefire order.692 Both 
resolutions were accepted, but importantly, neither demanded a withdrawal of 
Netherlands troops. The following day Van Roijen nevertheless expressed his acute 
disappointment with the resolutions. He said that Netherlands Indies authorities were 
about to lift the restrictions on the political prisoners’ freedom of movement, 
although they had to promise not to engage in “subversive action.” He also again 
stated that the military offensive would soon be terminated, but warned that the 
Netherlands government considered itself authorized to undertake additional 
measures against what Van Roijen labeled “disturbing elements,” a convenient term 
that in effect covered continuing operations against those Indonesians loyal to the 
Republic.693 What these statements in the Security Council in late December illustrate 
is that Dutch fears centered on others forcing the pace towards independence for the 
Indonesian archipelago, stealing the initiative from the Netherlands planners, and 
preventing them from carrying out their original program. 
  
During the last days of the year, the military progress reports officers sent from 
the archipelago became increasingly gloomy. The offensive had gone more or less 
according to plan; troops had faced little resistance from or contact with Indonesian 	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soldiers and easily occupied what little Republican territory remained. Enemy forces, 
however, had efficiently employed scorched earth tactics and left utter destruction in 
the wake of their strategic retreat from the main centers on Java and Sumatra. It 
slowly became clear that Spoor had underestimated the Republican preparations for a 
prolonged guerilla war. The Dutch faced constant attacks upon their positions in the 
form of nightly shootings, raids on convoys, the sabotaging of bridges and roads, and 
campaigns of terror and infiltration. The “terrorist army,” as Netherlands military 
leaders called it, had an unexpectedly high morale, and had seemingly come out of the 
fight without a scratch. Observers began to speak of “orgies of destruction” and 
informed Beel that it was dangerous to draw “premature conclusions” from the 
Dutch Indies army’s swift occupation of enemy territory. Netherlands Indies officials 
noted that the population of the areas formerly under Yogyakarta’s administration was 
fearful of cooperation with Dutch forces, and although they had driven out 
Republican troops, “complete suppression of political awareness” among Indonesians 
appeared impossible.694 
Among Indonesians, the military offensive destroyed all remaining trust in 
Dutch honorable intentions. Some Republican leaders had not wanted to believe the 
Netherlands government capable of going to war when it did; with the eyes of the 
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international community upon them, one official had asked Prime Minister Hatta, 
“would this not mean that they had gone mad?”695 Although High Commissioner Beel 
and General Spoor were firmly convinced that a large majority of the people in the 
archipelago would support the Dutch measures, federalists in Sumatra, Java, Borneo, 
and East Indonesia were angry; they had not been sufficiently consulted or sometimes 
even communicated with regarding the military operation. In the wake of the second 
police action, many found themselves in a conflict of conscience: should they stand by 
Netherlands and Netherlands Indies officials in the hope that the government and 
army were strong enough to suppress Republican resistance, or should they hedge 
their bets with the crumbling leadership in Yogyakarta that had aroused the sympathy 
of the international community?696 Republicans, finally, held the opinion that the 
United States might again have stopped the Dutch by taking a firmer stand in support 
of their government.697 Judging by the relatively mild and ineffective UN Security 
Council resolutions, the world’s most powerful nations were assisting the Dutch and 
betraying Indonesian aspirations for freedom. 
The American “man in the street,” Van Kleffens reported from Washington in 
the final days of 1948, did not possess even a superficial understanding of the 
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situation in the archipelago, and instead reacted emotionally. A large majority of the 
population felt sorry for Indonesians, the ambassador observed. The undertone in the 
press and radio, dependent on the public for their ratings and sales figures, was also 
overwhelmingly negative towards the Dutch. Church leaders had decried the shocking 
resort to force in the week before Christmas. In Congress, isolationist representatives 
already distrustful of economic entanglements with the European continent were 
calling for a halt to all Marshall Plan aid to the Netherlands.698  
The State Department, meanwhile, viewed the Dutch military offensive as the 
failure of the Renville Agreement. With its intent to eliminate the Republic, it also 
boded ill for the U.S.’s general policy in Southeast Asia, which rested on cooperation 
with moderate nationalists. By the end of 1948, policymakers in Washington began to 
reevaluate their options. The United States was very concerned, Lovett cabled to 
officials abroad, that the Netherlands action might have undone “much of the 
postwar efforts of [American] diplomacy.” The objective had been to prevent a 
“division of the world along the lines of Asia versus the west” and the simultaneous 
attainment of the “confidence and support of political movements through which the 
aspirations and convictions of Asiatic peoples were expressed.” In resorting to force 
the government in The Hague was likely to destroy “the last bridge between the West 
and Indonesian nationalists,” leading to “lasting bitterness and unforgiving resentment 
on the part of politically conscious Indonesians.” There was little the United States 	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could do at the moment, the Undersecretary somberly summarized, “but fix the 
responsibility on the Dutch” and strongly oppose the actions of the Netherlands 
government.699  
A Central Intelligence Agency report similarly illustrated the dilemma in which 
American planners found themselves at the turn of the year. The military action 
commenced by the Netherlands on December 19 “raised a number of interlocked 
security problems” and would have “repercussions far beyond the particular situation 
it was designed to settle.” The essence of the colonial problem from the American 
point of view, it summarized, had been “how to satisfy the nationalist aspirations of 
colonial peoples while at the same time maintaining the economic and political 
stability of European colonial powers.” The Dutch offensive had pushed this problem 
to a critical point, as “security interests in Europe and the Far East [were] in danger of 
appearing as mutually exclusive” at the exact point in time that “the power position of 
the United States vis-à-vis the Soviet Union [required] that they be pursued 
concurrently.” Washington was concerned, in other words, that Moscow would 
exploit the colonial issue. The prolongation of the struggle in Indonesia and similar 
struggles throughout the region would permit the communists to “join in and 
manipulate them to their own advantage,” the report went on. Nationalists might 
moreover jump to the conclusion that their aspirations could be most quickly realized 
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through a communist social order. In the eyes of American officials, neither the 
stabilization of European special interests in the colonies by use of force, nor the 
formation of a pan-Asian and anti-Western bloc was desirable. In any of these 
scenarios, the cost of continued upheaval in Indonesia was high. The analysis ended 
with a central question: could the Netherlands government stabilize its position in 
Indonesia in the near future at a readily recoverable cost? The CIA’s answer was that 
it could not.700 
 The last week of the year, too, had proven untrue Beel’s prediction that the 
Republic had ceased to exist. Indeed, widespread condemnation and public outcries 
about the military operations confirmed it as the clear victim of Dutch aggression. 
Balancing on the edge of a government crisis, the doves and hawks in The Hague had 
argued about the advisability of continued negotiations with the regime in Yogyakarta. 
With Indonesian policymaking firmly in Catholic hands, Beel and Sassen had 
overturned Stikker and Drees’s objections to action. By mid December, the latter in 
any case had themselves seen no other way out of the impasse. Through a second 
military offensive the Netherlands government aimed to present the world with a final 
fait accompli. Decision makers in The Hague and Jakarta hoped that the demise of the 
Republic would be swift, virtually silent, and complete, and they had no intention of 
being deflected from their course by international criticism. There would no longer be 
a place for Republican voluntary participation in the upcoming interim federal 	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government; rather, Dutch politicians envisaged the forced incorporation of the areas 
the Republic had once held into that system. Like his leaders, the average Dutchman 
believed his country was acting “from the highest motives,” a sense of trusteeship and 
responsibility to the Indonesian people, and in order to fulfill promises made to the 
archipelago’s federalists. But neither Republicans, nor the international community, 
nor, as would soon turn out, Indonesian federalists, accepted this course of events.701  
 
In early January 1949, H. Merle Cochran was reconsidering his role as member 
of the Good Offices Committee in Indonesia. He was unsure the Dutch offensive left 
him any appropriate role, but he was eager to use the confidence he had won with the 
Republicans over the last few months to, in his words, “salvage something from the 
situation.” This he could only do, he stipulated to Washington, if the United States 
clearly and publicly disassociated itself from the present Netherlands policy, and if the 
Dutch ceased hostilities and released the imprisoned Republican leaders forthwith. If 
this was impossible, he argued, the Committee should be dissolved. His Belgian and 
Australian colleagues, British Consul-General Francis Shepherd wrote to London, 
shared Cochran’s defeatist attitude.702 
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 When Indian Prime Minister Nehru announced an Asiatic conference to 
discuss the Indonesian situation in early January, this did little to ease the troubled 
minds of the American leadership. Indeed, it confirmed fears that the East might 
divide irreparably from the West. Undersecretary Lovett informed Ambassador Loy 
W. Henderson in New Delhi that the State Department wished to pursue two 
objectives: contributing to a solution for the conflict in Indonesia, and “making the 
best possible record with Asiatic and Islamic countries.”703 Director of Policy 
Planning George F. Kennan added that, as a world power with “vital interests and 
therefore responsibilities on all of the globe,” the nation was deeply concerned over 
the long-term implications of the situation in the Indonesian archipelago. It 
aggravated, he explained, the polarization between the Atlantic community and 
Asia.704 Henderson responded with the warning that the “pan-Asiatic movement” had 
gained momentum as a result of Dutch military action on Java and Sumatra, and that 
it fed the growing feeling in the region that the United States was immersed with 
Western Europe to the point of ignoring Asiatic countries. He and his aides would do 
everything they could, he tried to reassure Washington, to “dispel the idea [among 
conference delegates] that the Western world [was] sticking together against Asia.”705 
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 On January 7, the Security Council reconvened in Lake Success, New York. In 
yet another long speech, Dutch representative Van Roijen underlined that the 
Netherlands government had undertaken the second police action reluctantly. “The 
incapacity of both the Republican government and Good Offices Committee to 
achieve effective measures to end [the] bloodshed” caused by Yogyakarta-inspired 
ceasefire violations, he stated, had directly led to the Dutch government’s decision 
that the situation in Indonesia was untenable. It had been its right as the sovereignty 
authority, he added in a belligerent tone, “to purge the Republic by armed action in 
order to stamp out terror and disorder.” The past three years had shown that the only 
obstacle to the rapid creation of a United States of Indonesia in a union with the 
Netherlands, Van Roijen concluded, had been the lack of willingness and ability on 
the part of successive Republican governments to carry out agreements.706  
American delegate Philip C. Jessup exemplified the Security Council’s 
dissatisfaction and disagreement with these statements when four days later, he 
repeated that the United States could find no adequate justification for the Dutch 
decision. He also noted that the continuation of military operations into 1949 
constituted “an act of defiance,” and that, despite assurances by Van Roijen to the 
contrary, Netherlands forces had not yet released Republican political prisoners. “No 
excuses offered [by the Dutch can] conceal the fact that [they] have failed to comply 
with the Council’s demands,” he sternly observed. The American government, in fact, 	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could “not but recall a history of non-cooperation on the part of the Netherlands in 
the work of the Good Office Committee.” Although Dutch troops had achieved 
quick military successes, their actions were unlikely to contribute to a long-term 
solution of the conflict in the archipelago. The United States, Jessup ended, could 
only consider a political settlement valid if it was based on bona fide negotiations rather 
than coercion and duress.707 
 In the wake of the resumption of Security Council discussions on the conflict, 
Ambassador Van Kleffens called on Washington planners to discuss his fear that in a 
“desperate move,” a strict draft resolution ordering the withdrawal of Dutch troops 
from former Republican territory would be introduced by the Soviet Union or 
Ukraine, for instance. He made it clear that the Netherlands government, “determined 
to carry through its obligation to launch a free and independent United States of 
Indonesia under conditions [that] would give it the best chance of success,” would not 
accept such a resolution. Lovett in return warned the statesman that the military 
offensive had “blown up” the problem, and that if they wished to avoid an 
unwelcome resolution, the Dutch must immediately give evidence of their good 
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intentions by releasing the Republican leaders and announcing a fixed date for the 
transfer of sovereignty.708 
 The Netherlands government was told, in other words, that its ill-considered 
action had aroused international opinion to the point of active intervention, and that 
it had short time to prove that its words were more than lip-service. In early January, 
Prime Minister Drees traveled to Indonesia to show the world that the Netherlands 
was willing to come to an agreement. In the Prime Minister’s first meeting with the 
High Commissioner, Beel contended that the Republican government could under no 
circumstances be allowed to resume the administration of its former territory. He 
moreover agued that Van Roijen should “go into the offensive” in the Security 
Council, and vehemently disagreed with the demand that Sukarno, Hatta, and the 
others must be released and allowed to return to Yogyakarta. During meetings 
between Drees and Indonesian federalists from the negaras, however, the latter 
convinced the Prime Minister of the need to establish informal contact with 
prominent Republicans in order to move ahead with the formation of an interim 
federal government. They also stated it was essential for the Republican government 
to be restored.709  
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 Netherlands ministers in The Hague, fully aware that Security Council meetings 
would continue, were pressing officials in Jakarta to take action. Stikker emphasized 
the firm position the United States had been taking with him, and Sassen stressed the 
need to avoid the passing of a resolution that was unacceptable to the Dutch. Van 
Roijen had publicly announced that political prisoners were about to be released, yet 
the Republican leadership remained under house arrest on Bangka and in Prapat. 
Sukarno, Sjahrir, and Salim had been granted increased freedom of movement in 
return for their reluctant promise not to engage in political activities, but were still 
interned, albeit in the rather luxurious bungalow of the top official in the region, 
which Rudolf Mrázek brilliantly described as likely furnished with “turn-of-the-
century rattan rocking chairs, oriental curiosities on small tables, a lot of standing 
lamps, and […] faded photographs of prewar horse races.” Hatta and others, in 
contrast, were kept in a poorly maintained, sparsely furnished, and barbed-wired 
building. As the Good Offices Committee was about to visit the prisoners and inform 
the Council on the conditions of their continued imprisonment, the cabinet urged 
Drees and Beel to reconsider the problem.710   	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Drees returned to the Netherlands on January 19. During his stay in the 
archipelago, the Prime Minister had become convinced that pacification of Indonesia 
was possible only with the cooperation of leading Republican figures. “We have to 
cross the threshold,” he wisely told his cabinet of ministers upon his arrival back in 
The Hague. As a result of the police action, the federalists had come to believe that 
the Republic should join the interim federal government on the same basis as other 
constituent states. The growing understanding of both Republicans and federalists of 
the need for agreement and cooperation between them was an important 
development. If the two parties established contact and became partners in 
negotiations, it might no longer look to the outside world like the Dutch were 
coordinating the process towards independence, but the Netherlands government 
would at the same time have to show more flexibility in taking into account the wishes 
of both groups.711 
 In mid January, too, the State Department in Washington and Jessup in New 
York were working on a new and more effective Security Council resolution. 
“Maintenance of Netherlands forces in continued occupation throughout the territory 
of the Republic of Indonesia,” stated the draft, was “incompatible with the 
achievement of a just and lasting settlement.” The proposal called upon the 
Netherlands government to discontinue all military operations, immediately and 
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unconditionally release all political prisoners arrested since the start of the offensive, 
and allow the government of the Republic to return to Yogyakarta. It moreover 
recommended the resumption of negotiations under the auspices of a transformed 
and more powerful Good Offices Committee, to be called the United Nations 
Security Council Commission for Indonesia. This commission would act by majority 
vote, make recommendations not only upon request of the parties but also on its own 
initiative, report regularly to the Security Council, and observe the return of Dutch-
occupied areas to the administration of the Republic.712 
 This draft resolution greatly alarmed the Netherlands government. Stikker 
noted that it expanded international interference to such an extent that it would be 
unacceptable to the Dutch even in an amended form; it practically forced the 
Netherlands government to put her powers of authority at the disposal of the wishes 
of the Security Council and its new Commission. It left the Netherlands no time to 
pursue her own “constructive program” currently underway in Indonesia, the Foreign 
Minister explained, which now included an approximate schedule that showed when 
various stages should be reached: an interim government by the end of the month, 
free elections by the third quarter of the year, and the transfer of sovereignty at a yet 
to be decided date in 1950.713 
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 Jessup and his colleagues in Washington continued their work on the 
resolution. After further revisions, it called on the Republican government, too, to 
instruct its forces to cooperate in the restoration of peace, but it still ordered the 
Dutch to permit that government to be reinstated. It also expressly called for the 
establishment of an interim federal government before March 15, elections for a 
constitutional assembly by October 1, and a transfer of sovereignty in 1950 on a date 
to be fixed before January 1 of that year. At the persistent urging of Netherlands 
officials that Indonesian federalists from areas other than the former Republic were a 
force to be taken into account, the resolution also stipulated that the new UN 
Commission would have the authority to consult with these leaders.714 
  The State Department instructed Jessup once again to seek general agreement 
on a draft resolution among a majority of Council members, since the United States 
“did not wish to carry the banner and make [itself] solely responsible for whatever 
action was taken.” When Jessup asked if he could introduce the draft at the next 
Security Council meeting if he found there was support for it, Rusk reluctantly said 
yes. There was considerable merit, he nevertheless told Jessup, in deferring the 
submission of the resolution, and it was particularly important to work with Britain 
and France, who might veto any resolution they deemed too strongly worded.715 
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 When China, Cuba, Norway, and the United States jointly submitted the plan 
for review on January 21, the Republican leadership was disheartened to find out that 
it did not call directly for the withdrawal of Dutch troops from Republican territory, 
but allowed them to remain in areas technically turned back to the Republic. Van 
Roijen laid out the Dutch objections to the resolution. His government, he explained 
to the members of the Council, could not agree to the reinstallation of the Republican 
government. It rejected the empowering of a UN Commission to deal with the 
establishment of an interim government, the return of territory to the Republic, the 
holding of elections, and the transfer of sovereignty. This would require The Hague to 
surrender vital rights and in essence “put the Netherlands under the guardianship of 
the United Nations.” The Dutch had not earned this treatment, and had not “guided 
the development of Indonesia for three-hundred and fifty years,” he concluded, “to 
surrender their responsibility at the last minute before the final consummation of that 
development: the achievement of statehood for Indonesia.” If it was adopted, the 
Netherlands government could only carry out the resolution “to the extent which it 
[was] compatible with [its] responsibility for the maintenance of real freedom and 
order in Indonesia.” Despite these ominous warnings, the groundbreaking resolution 
was accepted on January 28 without a single dissenting vote.716  
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On that same day, High Commissioner Beel proposed to his colleagues in The 
Hague that the Dutch radically change course. He warned his colleagues that as the 
trust of Indonesian federalists was seeping away, Republicans were visibly gaining in 
significance. Convinced of broad federalist sympathy for long-term cooperation with 
the Netherlands, and desperate to attempt to save what he believed could be saved, 
Beel proposed shortening the interim period and accelerating the transfer of authority 
to a United States of Indonesia. The High Commissioner believed that this would 
leave Republicans unlikely to voice objections, and willing to similarly transfer to the 
federation their “pretense” powers, as Beel labeled them. Free elections to form a 
constitutional body and simultaneous negotiations on continued cooperation in 
matters concerning the economy, finance, and defense would allow for the 
establishment of the Netherlands-Indonesia Union by July 1, 1950. To implement his 
plan, Beel called for direct discussions first between the federalists and Republican 
leaders, then between their delegations and himself. The last stage of the negotiations 
could take place in The Hague.717  
After the unanimous acceptance of the Security Council resolution, the Dutch 
cabinet regrettably concluded that the State Department in Washington, as a result of 
the military offensive and at the urging of Cochran, had started pursuing a more active 
and stern policy. This left the Netherlands in a weak position and at the mercy of the 
UN Commission, several minister pointed out. Beel’s plan, however, envisioned the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
717  Beel to Sassen, 28 January 1949, in: NIB, XVII, no. 171. 
 
   
   
397 
Dutch government transferring power on its own terms. At the same time, it would 
not give the transformed Good Offices Committee a chance to interfere; the High 
Commissioner went as far as predicting that his proposal would allow for the 
disappearance of the Republic from the agenda of the UN.718 
But Beel’s plan left the Minister of the Colonies bemused. In a heated 
telephone conversation between the two on January 29, Sassen sarcastically said that it 
seemed the Netherlands did not have anything to do with the solution of the dispute 
in Indonesia anymore. He urged the High Commissioner not to discuss his plan with 
anyone in the archipelago before the government in The Hague had had a chance to 
look at it. Beel responded by saying that he could not afford a delay and had already 
invited the federalist leaders for a discussion. In any case, he warned, the members of 
the UN Commission were keeping a close eye on him and would soon learn of the 
new Dutch initiative.719  
During two cabinet meeting on the last days of January, Sassen argued against 
the acceptance of Beel’s proposal. He found many parts of it questionable, and feared 
that a swift transfer of sovereignty to an independent United States of Indonesia prior 
to an agreement on the Netherlands-Indonesia Union left no hope for permanent and 
meaningful cooperation between the two nations. Although unhappy about the early 
leak of the plan and doubtful about its practicability, Prime Minister Drees advocated 
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its acceptance. The federalists and Republicans together might be able to form a front 
against UN involvement, he noted. Stikker suggested winning time with the 
international organization by informing American policymakers about a “fresh and 
progressive plan” without divulging its content. All ministers with the exception of 
Sassen agreed that the Netherlands must be allowed some leeway for these bilateral 
discussions to take place. Only if the Dutch plan failed should the government 
consider the Security Council resolution of January 28 and the extent to which it 
might be implemented. The cabinet thus decided to authorize Beel to see if a 
preliminary agreement between the federalists and Republicans could be reached.720 
 
Cochran, however, was putting severe pressure on The Hague to take measures 
towards the implementation of the resolution. The American stopped in the 
Netherlands on his way back to Indonesia to resume his work on the UN 	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Commission. After his arrival in the Dutch political capital on February 6, Cochran 
spoke with Drees, Sassen, Stikker, and Queen Juliana. The Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, although aware of the Netherlands’ weak international position, insisted that 
the current deep divisions in the cabinet made a full acceptance of the resolution 
impossible. When Sassen attempted to justify the police action as a means of 
combating communism, Cochran replied that its resulting unrest had had exactly the 
opposite effect. The Queen asked the American delegate why he stood up for the 
Republicans rather than the federalists, who, she opined, “after all represented the 
majority of Indonesians.” To this, Cochran replied he well realized the need to bring 
the two parties together to consolidate their desires and efforts, but stressed that 
Republicans were only willing to enter into conversations with federalists if those took 
place under the auspices of the new Commission. None of the people the American 
spoke with, in other words, were spared details about “how bad [the Dutch] 
predicament was, and how much worse it might become unless the Netherlands 
government implemented the Security Council resolution.” To the surprise of all, 
Cochran refrained from approving the new short-cut plan. Although he did not yet 
know the details, a first examination had led policymakers in Washington to believe 
Beel’s scheme would allow the Dutch to circumvent international interference. But it 
was impossible, Cochran explained, to make headway until and unless the initial 
conditions of the resolution were put into force. The new plan in any case, 
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Department planners rightly surmised, still left Indonesians “little choice in the 
matter.”721 
 The man behind the plan meanwhile urged his government to officially declare 
the UN resolution unacceptable. Beel believed that his proposal could only work if 
international “interference” was eliminated from the archipelago. He had been waiting 
for a strong statement from The Hague for more than two weeks, he complained, and 
would resign if no decision were made. The imprisoned Republicans continued to 
insist on being returned to Yogyakarta, he told Sassen on the phone, and he was 
losing control over the federalists. Drees told the High Commissioner that he had 
informed Cochran the Netherlands could not accept the more powerful UN 
Commission, but also said that they could not reject the resolution in its entirety. 
When the Prime Minister notified Beel about the increasing tensions within the Dutch 
cabinet, the latter merely replied that he would wait only until the end of the week for 
an announcement.722 
 During two confused cabinet meetings, Minister of the Colonies Sassen made a 
radical suggestion. Instead of bowing to American pressure, he proposed that the 
government send a mission to Washington in order to inform policymakers there that 
unless they changed the course of their Southeast Asia policy the Dutch would be 	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forced to abandon the Indies. When this plan found no support from any of his 
colleagues, Sassen, too, warned that he was considering leaving his post. Prime 
Minister Drees, attempting to hold together his only six-month old government, 
recommended carefully asking Cochran not to let the Commission interfere while 
informal discussions between federalist leaders and Republicans were underway. 
Sassen did not think this went far enough and resigned on February 11.723 
 The Commission, meanwhile, visited the yet to be released Republican 
leadership. Sukarno and Hatta again insisted they would have formal negotiations with 
federalists only under the auspices of the Commission and after the restoration of 
their government to Yogyakarta. This was the only way, they argued, they could 
implement their part of the resolution and order an effective ceasefire. Cochran in 
turn emphasized that a prolonged guerilla war was unlikely to rouse the sympathies of 
the American public, and that the Republicans must go as far as they could in their 
discussions with the federalists. Convinced however of the truth of Sukarno’s 
statement, the American told the head of the Dutch delegation that it was imperative 
the Dutch restore Hatta’s government if they were to make any progress.724 
 Without much optimism, Elink Schuurman cabled this request to The Hague. 
Beel had just arrived there to be able to communicate directly with the Netherlands 	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government and further outline his scheme. Although the ministers still argued that a 
Republican return to Yogyakarta could lead to nothing but chaos and destruction, 
they agreed the imprisoned politicians should be granted the limited freedom they 
required to conduct negotiations. The cabinet also decided that the final stage of 
discussions should be held at a Round Table Conference in The Hague, where 
Republican, federalist, and Dutch delegations would settle the accelerated transfer of 
sovereignty as well as the simultaneous formation of the Netherlands-Indonesia 
Union. They rather optimistically scheduled this series of meetings for mid March. 
Satisfied with the acceptance of his plan, Beel withdrew his resignation.725 
The preliminary American reaction to the latest Dutch proposals, however, was 
one of concerned skepticism. Cochran frankly told Elink Schuurman that he believed 
the plan was vague and unlikely to go far enough to constitute compliance with the 
Security Council resolution. Although planners in Washington told Van Kleffens they 
were, of course, “as ready now as always to help obtain a settlement on whatever basis 
voluntarily acceptable to both parties,” they, too, voiced doubts and objections. The 
Department foresaw an impasse looming on the point of a Republican restoration to 
Yogyakarta. When the Netherlands ambassador pointed out that Dutch police forces 
were firmly in control, law and order was being rapidly re-established, and the return 
of the government would “undo constructive work already near completion,” Rusk 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
725  Elink Schuurman to Van Maarseveen, 20 February 1949, in: NIB, XVII, no. 338; Minutes meeting 
Council of Ministers, 17 February 1949, in: NIB, XVII, no. 326; Minutes meeting Council of Ministers, 21 
February 1949, in: NIB, XVII, no. 342. 
 
   
   
403 
pointed out that this interpretation was “somewhat at variance” with his own, and 
much more accurate, information about the situation in the archipelago.726 
 When a Netherlands official traveled to the Republicans’ sites of internment to 
formally invite them to the Round Table Conference, Sukarno in particular, so 
reported the civil servant, showed “little inclination” to understand the Netherlands 
point of view. The President wondered how the Dutch government could expect his 
help after its second military offensive against the Republic. Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Haji Agus Salim and head of the Republican delegation Mohammad Roem 
pointed out that a government that had no recognized authority could not form an 
official delegation to attend a conference. Hatta, who had spoken to a foreign press 
correspondent and claimed that the Dutch were employing a “trick” to “befuddle 
world opinion,” expressed doubt about a Netherlands-Indonesia Union with 
extensive powers, and echoed the cries of the other prisoners when he underlined that 
nothing could be done until his government was restored. The administrator’s report 
on the meeting ended with a short observation: “it was not a pleasant conversation.” 
Shepherd went as far as informing London that the invitation to the conference had 
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been submitted to the Republican leadership “with the ineptitude that [seemed] 
inevitable the moment the Dutch [undertook] any delicate mission.”727 
  
By late February, then, the Netherlands government had come to the 
realization that if it refused to implement the Security Council resolution, it had to 
take a bold political initiative to avoid further international interference in the 
Indonesian conflict. In the face of a cabinet crisis, High Commissioner Beel had 
forced his colleagues in The Hague, including Sassen’s more liberal Catholic successor 
J.H. van Maarseveen, to adopt a new policy. Federalists hesitantly accepted the Dutch 
invitation, aware that although the Republic’s position within Indonesia was one 
without official status, its international position was strong. The Republican refusal to 
accept the conference proposal, however, did not deter Netherlands planners from 
determinedly going ahead with their plans, believing Sukarno and Hatta’s stances 
merely “tactical,” and counting on the continued support of Indonesian federalists.728  
  Beel formally introduced his plan in a press conference on March 1, during 
which he expressly stated that the Round Table Conference would go ahead with or 
without the Republicans.729 The following day, a delegation of federalists traveled to 
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Bangka to talk with Sukarno and other Republican politicians about the latest Dutch 
scheme. The Republican leadership insisted again that under the current 
circumstances it could not accept it. This firm political stance greatly impressed 
federalist leaders. The continued strong resistance of Republican forces to Dutch 
military efforts, too, helped to convince them that any future Indonesian government 
without Sukarno and Hatta’s participation would fail. East Indonesian Prime Minister 
Anak Agung suggested asking Beel to concede to the Republican demands, and other 
influential federalists agreed.730  
The High Commissioner was disappointed, angry, and frustrated. He accused 
the federalists of having delivered a “stab in the back,” and informed them that if they 
withdrew their acceptance of the Dutch plan, sided with the Republicans, and let 
down the Netherlands government, an accelerated transfer of sovereignty would be 
out of the question. Sukarno’s official negative reply to the Dutch invitation, which 
came on March 5, left Beel even bitterer.731 
Before notifying the High Commissioner of the results of its discussions with 
the Republican leadership, Beel moreover found out, the federalist delegation had met 
with Cochran. Anak Agung had told the American he was aware of the danger of a 
political crisis in The Hague, but maintained that the Netherlands government must 	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squarely face the dilemma of the Republican government’s restoration. “If the 
Netherlands was genuinely sincere in promising to yield complete sovereignty” within 
a matter of months, the East Indonesian logically stated, it could have “no valid 
objection” to this restoration for the purpose of permitting the Republican 
government to carry out its obligations under the Security Council resolution. 
Although Beel made sure to tell Cochran that the discussions on Bangka had merely 
been informal and would have no political consequences, the American hastened to 
inform Washington that the Indonesian federalists had formed a front with the 
Republicans against the Dutch.732 
 The altered situation caused a flurry of telegrams from the Netherlands 
representative in the Security Council, Van Roijen, to Foreign Minister Stikker in The 
Hague. If the federalists refused to participate in a Round Table Conference unless 
the demands of the Republicans were met, he warned, then the Dutch had “no leg to 
stand on” in the United Nations. The Dutch counteroffensive to the January 28 
resolution and subsequent international pressure to implement it was based on the 
unilateral solution contained in Beel’s plan, Van Roijen emphasized. If this failed, as it 
now seemed it had, the government in The Hague would need to realize that no 
settlement could be found without the Republicans and make concessions 	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accordingly. “Together with the federalists and relying on our military success,” Van 
Roijen argued, the Dutch “could have defied the United States, the Commonwealth, 
the Asiatic world and the Republic.” But now that the federalists had joined that front 
his colleagues must understand that the entire foundation of their policy had been 
erased. “With the disappearance of the federalist trump from our game,” the Dutch 
could merely “play poker,” he stated somberly but firmly. The cabinet might consider, 
he suggested, moving toward a partial implementation of the resolution by asking the 
UN Commission for Indonesia to organize a preliminary conference in the 
archipelago itself. These exploratory talks could provide a means to conditionally 
return Republicans to Yogyakarta and so might still pave the way for a Round Table 
Conference in the Netherlands.733 
 This compromised but face-saving proposal was introduced as a directive in the 
Security Council and adopted on March 23. It called on the Commission for 
Indonesia to assist, in accord with the Council’s previous resolutions, in the 
preparations for the Round Table Conference by holding preliminary meetings in 
Indonesia. During a cabinet meeting in The Hague the following day, ministers 
worried about the ruling’s references to the still unacceptable resolution of January 28. 
Believing, however, that the initiative would permit them to make the restoration of 
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the Republican government contingent upon an truce agreement, that it would allow 
difficulties to be overcome in Jakarta rather than in the hostile Security Council, and 
that it gave Beel’s plan a chance to succeed, the Netherlands government accepted it. 
Van Roijen, it was decided, would head the new Dutch delegation in Jakarta.734   
 
As politicians in The Hague thus slowly began to show more pragmatism, an 
influential Dutch administrator in the archipelago was arguing for the High 
Commissioner, too, to truly face reality. The coverage of the military situation since 
the start of the second police action in December, a perceptive P.J. Koets told Beel, 
had been more romantic than factual. General Spoor in particular was guilty of 
underestimating and understating the scope, depth, and meaning of the Republican 
national feeling. There was little Indonesian cooperation with Dutch troops and 
officials, really, and building a policy on anything but a sober appreciation of the facts 
was misleading and dangerous, Koets argued.735 
The truth was that by early 1949, undefeated Republican forces had become 
increasingly better organized. On March 1, a few thousand soldiers led by later 
President and then Lieutenant-Colonel Suharto administered a sensitive blow to 
Dutch morale when they temporarily occupied the city of Yogyakarta. It made 	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painfully clear that Netherlands forces, despite claims to the contrary, had not pacified 
the Indonesian archipelago.736 In response to often brutal Dutch “mopping up” 
operations, Republican troops attacked convoys and supply trucks, kidnapped or 
murdered Netherlands Indies administrators and Indonesians cooperating with them, 
laid mines, destroyed roads and bridges, and set fire to factories and offices. This total 
guerilla war left parts of Java and Sumatra practically ungovernable. Dutch forces, 
their number too small for the vast archipelago, continued to carry out “mopping up” 
operations with little effect. The number of casualties, meanwhile, was rising steadily. 
As many Netherlands soldiers had died since the start of the second police action as 
were killed in three years prior to it. Imprecise aerial bombardments and the capture 
of entire villages suspected of subversive activities caused the estimated number of 
victims among the Indonesian population to rise as high as 150,000. A dirty war of 
terror and contra-terror meant no prisoners were taken on either side; people were 
shot on the spot.737  
Among the population in the Netherlands, little was known of these horrors. 
The image of the war in Indonesia among the Dutch was one of two relatively 
successful offensives followed by mostly efficient pacification efforts. Eruptions of 
violence were portrayed as sporadic violations of the ceasefire. The reality, a 	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prolonged revolutionary war, was much worse. Netherlands soldiers tortured captured 
Republicans for information. Prisoners were water boarded, flogged with canes, hung 
upside down, and subjected to electrical surges. Women were raped. When these 
excesses came to light in early 1949, the Minister for the Colonies told Spoor that the 
disgraceful practices had to end. These Gestapo-like methods were completely 
unacceptable, he said, not only from a humanitarian point of view, but also because 
they could lead to serious repercussions both nationally and internationally; it would 
give those in the Netherlands who opposed military intervention in Indonesia more 
ammunition, and might damage the Dutch reputation abroad.738 
 
In the late spring of 1949, the U.S. State Department prepared an in-depth 
study for the National Security Council. NSC-51, as the paper became known, 
identified basic policy objectives in Southeast Asia. The region had become “the 
target of a coordinated offensive plainly directed by the Kremlin,” George F. Kennan 
summarized. Its strategic and economic importance to the United States made it 
essential that “relations between [it] and the Atlantic Community be rationalized.” 
“The heart of the problem,” the study went on, lay “within the Atlantic Community 
itself, specifically in the policies […] being pursued by the Netherlands and France.” 
In the Indonesian archipelago, the Republic represented “the most virile expression” 
of nationalist sentiment, but its essentially moderate leadership could only hope to 	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survive if a swift peaceful agreement was reached with the “recalcitrant” Dutch. 
Guerilla warfare would do nothing, the paper warned, but aid the voices of 
communist and pan-Asian extremism. At the same time, the Netherlands could not 
continue to bear the burden of its military and economic expenditures; “the ultimate 
economic and military cost of this piece of adventurism [would] be transferred to the 
United States, if not directly in aid to the Indies, then indirectly through European 
Recovery Program and military aid to Holland.”739    
As the absence of a political settlement in the archipelago thus threatened the 
survival of both the recovery program and the North Atlantic Treaty that was about 
to be signed, a quick and orderly transfer of authority from the Netherlands to 
Indonesia became imperative. In late March and early April, therefore, a series of 
urgent meetings took place between the new American Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson, who had succeeded George Marshall in January after the latter’s resignation 
due to ill health, and the Dutch Foreign Minister. President Truman, newly reelected 
in November after a campaign that had barely touched on foreign policy matters, 
“never knew or learned much about Asia” and thus left a great deal in the hands of 
State Department officials. Nevertheless, when Acheson entered office he had no idea 
how many headaches Asia would cause him in the years to come; as Robert Beisner 
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notes, the new Secretary of State had “bigger fish to fry in Europe.”740 James Chace 
agrees, arguing that Acheson’s most pressing task in early 1949 was to conclude a 
military security treaty with the Western European powers.741 
With Europe thus first and foremost on the Secretary’s mind, and determined 
to avoid another repetition of the familiar cycle of negotiations and ultimatums 
followed by an ineffectual agreement and then a stalemate in Indonesia, Acheson was 
firm with Stikker. He forcefully presented him with the reasons why the situation in 
the archipelago required immediate action, and why the United States might find it 
necessary to refuse the Netherlands assistance under any military aid program. The 
Secretary underlined the reaction in Washington to the second military offensive: “the 
Dutch were wrong [and] guilty of aggression.” The “hard political facts,” Acheson 
stated emphatically, meant that the only means of remedying the situation lay in the 
Netherlands government promptly reaching an equitable settlement with 
Republicans.742 
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 A few days after this first discussion, Acheson again expressed his hope that 
the Dutch would “really set about settling [the] situation.” He explained to Stikker the 
points on which the State Department believed the Dutch needed to compromise. It 
was necessary that the Netherlands delegation lead by Van Roijen could work with 
broad authority and show a “generous and sincere attitude.” It must moreover move 
at once toward genuine implementation of the January resolution. In particular it 
should allow the Republican government to return to Yogyakarta and ensure that 
Netherlands forces withdraw from that area. Republican troops were to carry the 
responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in the capital, political prisoners 
were to be released, and the Dutch government was to divulge at once the detailed 
plans for the Round Table Conference. Cochran had assured him, Acheson stated to 
Stikker, that in return for the Dutch taking “the initiative in practical statesmanship,” 
he would lend his assistance in persuading the Republican delegation to cooperate.743  
The Netherlands signed the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, and American 
reconsideration of financial assistance to the Netherlands was a warning Stikker 
understood. Acheson’s threat had made clear, he later summarized, that the United 
States would refuse to aid allies “so long as they had not solved their colonial 
difficulties.”744 In the wake of his bilateral meetings with the Netherlands Foreign 
Minister, Acheson remarked to his British colleague Ernest Bevin that the Dutch had 	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“stupidly delayed many obvious decisions,” and told the British ambassador in 
Washington Sir Oliver Franks that they had been “very pig-headed and […] always 
made their concessions too late.” Much later, the Secretary of State would make the 
brief, and rather simplistic, observation in his autobiography that after stubbornly 
resisting American efforts to move the Netherlands government toward preparations 
for Indonesian independence, “the Dutch capitulated under pressure.”745 
Stikker’s meetings closely coincided with the appearance of another bleak 
report on the position of the Dutch in Indonesia, which landed on Van Roijen’s desk 
in Jakarta after he arrived there in the second week of April. It bluntly stated that the 
situation in the archipelago resembled a vicious circle. The policy of the Netherlands 
government in its stance against the Republic had been to seek the support of 
cooperative Indonesians, but those in turn had depended on The Hague’s attitude 
toward the government in Yogyakarta. It was “absurd” to even consider the 
possibility of a United States of Indonesia without the Republic, the report continued, 
unless Netherlands troops could permanently eliminate that Republic. This had 
proved impossible. The second police action had failed to bring law, order, and 
security to large areas of the archipelago. The Indonesian people, fearful of being 
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branded bad nationalists by a Republic they increasingly realized had real power and 
authority, resisted cooperation with Netherlands troops and officials.746 
 On April 14, negotiations between the Dutch and Republican delegations 
resumed under the auspices of the United 
Nations Commission for Indonesia. 
Cochran opened the first meeting by 
expressing his hope that the two parties 
would “go as far as their authority 
[would] permit them toward clearing up 
[…] the contentious points [that had] to 
date separated them.” The opening 
statements made by Van Roijen and 
Mohammad Roem, who had been released from exile to represent the Republicans, 
made clear that the biggest obstacle was formed by the terms under which Hatta’s 
government would return to Yogyakarta.747 The Republican delegation knew that the 
position of the Netherlands was weak, and showed itself unwilling to compromise on 
this essential point. The Dutch delegation was willing to agree to the return of the 
Republican leadership to the capital in principle, but attached conditions; Sukarno and 
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Hatta would have to make a binding commitment to ensure a halt to guerilla warfare 
and promise to participate in the Round Table Conference in The Hague.748  
When after ten days of informal meetings no agreement had been formulated, 
Cochran, who like the Dutch did not wish to see the dispute return to the Security 
Council, suggested the impasse might be broken if Hatta agreed to come to Jakarta 
for direct discussions with Van Roijen. When the Prime Minister arrived in the city, 
the American delegate organized a small lunch meeting, during which he stressed once 
more that failure to find a solution would only aid extremist elements in the 
archipelago. He then left the two men to their private conversation. At the end of 
their meeting, a cautiously optimistic Hatta and Van Roijen informed Cochran that 
they believed an agreement could be reached.749 
Van Roijen reported to The Hague that the general atmosphere during his 
conversations with Republicans was favorable. He did not think much of Spoor’s 
continuous attempts to “pull the wool over his eyes” regarding the dismal military 
situation, however, and was coming to resent the general’s attitude against the 
restoration of the Republican government. Spoor had warned him, Van Roijen told 
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Stikker, that he could not be held responsible for what he predicted would be the 
“disastrous consequences” of this course of action, and seemed to believe that if only 
the Netherlands government had done as he desired from the start, everything would 
have ended well. He was getting along fairly well with the High Commissioner, Van 
Roijen noted, although it had been difficult to convince Beel of the need to delay the 
formal recognition of any additional negaras in former Republican territory. The 
continuation of this Dutch policy to encourage the fragmentation of the archipelago 
into numerous federal states, Van Roijen warned, would surely erase the little faith 
Republicans had in the Netherlands government and so torpedo the ongoing 
negotiations. Although the High Commissioner reluctantly agreed, he indicated his 
dissatisfaction with and concern about Van Roijen’s “misguided belief” to The 
Hague.750   
 
Despite the objections the High Commissioner and the Army Commander 
continued to voice about the direction the discussions between the Republicans and 
the Dutch were heading in, by late April, the two parties were inching toward an 
understanding. Van Roijen said his government would accept the return of 
Yogyakarta and the area immediately surrounding the city to the Republicans, if Roem 
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agreed that Sukarno and Hatta in turn would order a ceasefire and send a delegation 
to The Hague for further negotiations.751  
The series of desperate telegrams Beel sent to the Netherlands in early May, in 
which he warned that the shift in the government’s Indonesia policy was approaching 
the limits of what he believed he could be responsible for, had no effect. On May 6, 
Van Roijen asked his colleagues in The Hague to authorize him to make an official 
declaration. The two delegations had drafted two statements, one for each, to be 
made simultaneously. They were not, he admonished, open for amendments. “Nearly 
every word of [their] content,” he stated emphatically, “[had] a history,” and if the 
Dutch were committed to the Round Table Conference, an accelerated transfer of 
sovereignty, and the formation of the Netherlands-Indonesia Union, these 
declarations represented the maximum that could be achieved under the current 
circumstances.752   
 During a momentous cabinet meeting that same day, the Dutch ministers 
decided that the military situation in Indonesia was increasingly unsatisfactory and, 
with no end to guerilla warfare in sight, becoming untenable. Van Maarseveen noted 
that he took Beel’s objections to the proposed statements seriously, but underlined 
the fact that the High Commissioner had failed to suggest any alternative course of 	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action. Stikker emphasized that this was the time to find a solution. Drees observed 
that if his government rejected Van Roijen’s advise, the entire world would turn 
against the Dutch.753 Putting off their acceptance of the inevitable for years left much 
for planners in The Hague to digest in the space of mere weeks. Believing 
nevertheless that the declarations were a last chance for a satisfactory settlement and a 
meaningful future bond between the Netherlands and Indonesia, the cabinet 
unanimously chose to support its delegate in Jakarta. Upon being informed of this 
result, Beel gave notice. 
 
On May 7, the agreement was made official when the two heads of delegation 
read out their declarations. Roem stated that immediately after the restoration of the 
Republican government to Yogyakarta, Sukarno and Hatta would issue the order to 
cease guerilla 
warfare, and 
cooperate in 
the 
restoration of 
peace and 
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maintenance of law and order. Representatives of the Republic would moreover 
participate in the Round Table Conference “with a view to accelerate the 
unconditional transfer of real and complete sovereignty to the United States of 
Indonesia.” Van Roijen in turn declared that the Netherlands government agreed to 
the return of the Republican leaders to Yogyakarta, would discontinue all military 
operations, release all political prisoners, and refrain from the establishment or 
recognition of new federal states in former Republican territory. Noting the “excellent 
spirit in which the chairmen and their delegations had worked,” Cochran warmly 
congratulated the two parties on what was to be known as the Van Roijen - Roem 
Agreement.754 
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Conclusion 
 
“We do not honestly know how the final step will be taken. […] We have no measure by which to look 
that far into the future […]. We don’t know, for instance, but that the Dutch might in the last instance 
come to the realization that it would be better if their colonial rule were brought to an end peaceably. […] 
At present we only know there is no independence without nationalism; therefore, we promote nationalism. 
There is no independence without a united people; therefore, we work to unify our people. There is no 
independence without power; therefore, we organize their power. There is no independence without the 
consciousness of power; therefore, we awaken their consciousness of power. […] Indonesia will be free. 
About this problem […], about the fact that Indonesia will be released from the Netherlands some time in 
the future […] there is no longer any riddle. And there is no riddle concerning the future freedom of our 
country for anybody with an understanding of history, not for any Indonesian or Dutchman who is honest 
with himself. The entire history of the world, the entire history of mankind over dozens of centuries offers not 
a single case of a people who have been ruled forever. On the contrary, time and again it has shown the 
liberation of enshackled peoples and nations. […] But the way in which Indonesia will attain her freedom, 
how the colonial ties will  be broken,  depends entirely on  the intentions  of imperialists  themselves; it  is 
entirely in their own hands.”755 
 
                    Sukarno, 1930 
  
 
 
“We shall be with you shortly,” the Lieutenant Governor-General had confidently 
reassured the population of the Netherlands East Indies when he spoke to them via 
an Australian radio broadcast on the eve of the return of Dutch officials to the 
archipelago in August 1945.756 By the time a bitterly disappointed Hubertus van Mook 
left for good the country where he had been born, raised, and worked for more than 
three decades three years later in November 1948, these Indonesian islands had been 
the scene of a triumphant declaration of independence, and the site of an invasion of 
British and Indian troops liberating the islands in the name of the Netherlands 
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authorities. It had also been the subject of increasing international concern, and the 
stage for virtually continual violent clashes and military offenses reminiscent of 
colonial wars of conquest. “All signs point to Indonesians wanting to break with the 
past completely,” the last Dutch High Commissioner in the archipelago, A.H.J. 
Lovink, lamented another twelve months later.757 
  “Tearing down the past,” Lovink admitted, “is a depressing occupation.”758 
This dismantling of the Dutch colonial administration in Indonesia took on an almost 
frantic pace in the last months of 1949. After a final series of negotiations at the 
Round Table Conference in August, September, and October of that year, during 
which more than one impasse between the delegations nearly resulted in the complete 
breakdown of discussions, 
the transfer of sovereignty 
from the Netherlands to 
the United States of 
Indonesia was formalized 
in simultaneous ceremonies 
in Amsterdam and Jakarta 
on December 27. They 
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symbolized the Dutch recognition, more than five years overdue, that Indonesia was 
independent.759 
 The subject matter of this dissertation is the Indonesian war of independence: 
the painful and drawn-out process by which the archipelago formerly known as the 
Netherlands East Indies decolonized between 1945 and 1949. This study has 
investigated that topic through the lenses of Indonesians, both Republican and 
federalist, Dutch foreign policymakers in The Hague, Netherlands-Indies officials in 
Jakarta, and British, Australian, and American planners in London, Canberra, 
Washington, and New York. This broad view has allowed us to examine crucial 
questions about the nature of this particular case of decolonization as well as issues 
relating to identity, legitimacy, and power.  
The attention of Western scholars looking at the Indonesian war of 
independence in an international perspective has focused on the shift in American 
foreign policymaking from a so-called “hands-off” policy towards the conflict until 
the second half of 1948 to a grand strategy, informed by increasing Cold War 
tensions, that insisted the Dutch government rapidly transfer genuine sovereignty. 
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Washington’s threat to cease Marshall Plan aid to the Netherlands features 
prominently in these explanations of what ultimately caused policymakers in The 
Hague to “capitulate under pressure,” to use Dean Acheson’s phrase. What has 
received much less attention in the English-language historiography of the period are 
the factors besides and beyond these austere financial and economic considerations 
that drove Netherlands policymaking with regard to Indonesia: the conservative 
decades leading up to the Second World War, when the Dutch sowed the seeds of 
their own demise; the swift and crushing defeat of Netherlands forces in 1942 and the 
years of Japanese occupation of the Indies that followed, which hid important 
developments in Indonesian nationalism from view; and the difficult to capture but 
material influence of the Dutch mindset, motives, and miscalculations on the course 
of events between 1945 and 1949. It is these gaps that the dissertation attempts to fill, 
and to explicate.  
  
It has been maintained in this dissertation that in order explain the postwar 
demise of the Dutch empire in Southeast Asia, we cannot merely focus on the rise of 
the Indonesian nationalist movement and conclude that after a long struggle it 
succeeded in driving out the Dutch. What features in the story as well is the domestic 
arena, in which party and electoral politics, public opinion, and national prestige play a 
role. Finally, we must look at the changing international system, the influence and 
 
   
   
425 
status of the United Nations, and the global impact of rising tensions between the 
United States and Soviet Union. Only by adopting this wider lens can we begin to find 
answers to questions such as why the leadership in Yogyakarta ultimately opted for a 
policy that combined perjuangan (“struggle”) with diplomasi, why the British 
government first pushed for swift negotiations with Indonesian leaders the Dutch 
deemed collaborators and later were relieved to retreat from the conflict, why 
American policymakers over the course of 1948 grew increasingly concerned with 
events in Indonesia, and why, perhaps most importantly, experienced and 
inexperienced Dutch and Netherlands-Indies officials and military leaders alike 
continually overestimated their own abilities while underestimating the force, appeal, 
and weight of both their Indonesian adversaries and international opposition.  
 We have looked at the framework within which these actors’ actions were 
confined. We have seen that their behavior was led by the norms and expectations 
delivered to them from the prewar past, inadequate though these were to meet the 
current challenge. Their experiences during the war made it difficult, but not 
impossible, for Netherlands policymakers to appreciate that realities were being 
transformed, that the postwar world order would reconstitute national identities and 
political systems, that the retreat of the West from Asia was imminent and inevitable.   
Dutch and Netherlands-Indies officials and troops were too optimistic about 
what might be achieved through military means and unprepared for the depth and 
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intensity of the modern guerilla warfare Republicans unleashed upon them, because 
the image that men like General Spoor had of the enemy was one of gullible 
Indonesians having been incited by the propaganda and terrorism of a small group of 
extremists in the capital. Van Mook, unable to truly understand Indonesians and 
Indonesian nationalism, sincerely believed that although it signified no genuine change 
of course in The Hague’s policy, his federal solution would appeal to the population 
of the islands. Moreover, the Dutch legacy of a strictly neutral foreign policy during 
the first decades of the 20th century led to the belief among policymakers that neither 
international affairs nor the competency of United Nations could extend to the 
“internal” Indonesian case. Before commencing both military offenses, planners in 
The Hague and Jakarta were convinced that they could achieve their objectives and 
present the world with a fait accompli before any question of foreign intervention would 
materialize. In these ways, Dutch policymakers operated within a narrowly confined 
space, influenced by old colonial ideologies and experiences from which they might 
have, but did not want to extricate themselves. As Edmund Burke observed, and as 
Dean Acheson quoted, “not the least of the arts of diplomacy is to grant graciously 
what one no longer has the power to withhold.” This dissertation has shown that the 
Dutch did not master this art of diplomacy; Netherlands policy in the Indonesian 
archipelago between 1945 and 1949 was aimed instead at keeping, by force if 
necessary, what had never been a rightful possession.       
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When Netherlands-Indies administrators returned to their jobs in the 
Indonesian archipelago after the Japanese surrender, they continued their pre-war 
policy of attempting to separate “the wheat from the chaff,” distinguishing among 
Indonesian nationalists the extremists and collaborators such as Sukarno with whom 
discussions were out of the question, and the “moderates” like Sutan Sjahrir with 
whom negotiations might be fruitful. This distinction overlooked the fact that the 
entire leadership of the Republic desired official recognition and complete 
independence from the Netherlands. Van Mook’s federal policy in which that 
Republic would be merely one of many component states within a United States of 
Indonesia, in turn forming a permanent bond of cooperation with the Netherlands in 
a Union at the head of which would stand the Dutch crown, therefore, was doomed 
from its inception; it was conceived of within the framework of colonialism and 
clearly presupposed and prolonged the superiority of one partner over the other. 
Although the Linggadjati Agreement of November 1946 and the Renville Agreement 
of January 1948 seemingly brought the two parties close to compromise, the divergent 
interpretations of those accords and the subsequent problems in their implementation 
shows that the Dutch vision of a modern colonial state failed to enthuse Indonesians. 
Two large-scale military offenses calculated to annihilate the Republic unsurprisingly 
achieved only the opposite effect, destroying what little trust still existed between the 
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two delegations. When in the spring of 1949 Dutch military problems escalated and 
the federalist Indonesians who had hesitatingly backed The Hague’s policy withdrew 
their support, Netherlands officials finally stood alone and were forced to accept that 
only through an almost immediate transfer of sovereignty might they still salvage 
something from the situation.  
 Both during and after the Indonesian struggle for independence the Dutch 
complained that their British and American allies had abandoned them. To objective 
observers, however, it is clear that at the outset of the conflict especially, and even 
after it had become apparent that an influential nationalist movement had declared the 
archipelago independent, the governments in London and Washington were in favor 
of a restoration of Dutch authority in the Indies and committed to helping reestablish 
what had been even before the Japanese occupation a fragile and vulnerable order; 
neither British nor American, nor even Australian policymakers questioned 
Netherlands’ sovereignty in Indonesia in that critical period.  
Having had thrust upon them the task of liberating the vast Indonesian 
archipelago at the eleventh hour, the Labour government in London did not possess 
the manpower or materials needed to swiftly reoccupy the islands. With outstanding 
commitments in other parts of Southeast Asia such as Singapore, Malaya, and parts of 
Burma, British forces did not arrive in the Dutch colony until late September of 1945. 
Both Mountbatten and his superiors in London soon realized that the Indonesian 
 
   
   
429 
independence movement was widespread and more broadly supported than they had 
thought. When it became obvious that there could be no British-enforced military 
solution to what was a Dutch-Indonesian political problem, and that London’s 
security interests were directly involved in the conflict, Whitehall policymakers were 
relieved to hand back responsibility over the islands to the Dutch in November of 
1946. In subsequent years, British diplomatic warnings to their Netherlands’ 
colleagues that experience had taught them that the time was long past when 
European countries could dominate any part of Southeast Asia fell on deaf ears.   
Australia’s relations with Indonesia were close and cordial from 1945 until 
1949, with a majority of the population and its politicians in Canberra sympathetic to 
the struggle of the Republic. As the weakness of not only the Dutch colonial 
administration but also of the British in India became apparent, however, Australian 
policymakers began asserting their independent interests, not seldom to the 
aggravation of planners in The Hague, London, and Washington. Prime Minister 
Chifley’s government condemned the Dutch police actions and defended the views of 
the Republican leadership in Yogyakarta on the United Nations Good Offices 
Committee. Although Australian support was genuine, the official attitude remained 
ambivalent -- the government did not, for instance, extend even de facto recognition to 
the Republic until July 1947. After the transfer of sovereignty in 1949, relations 
between Australia and Indonesia soured over the issue of West Papua (known 
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previously as New Guinea and West Irian Jaya), in which Canberra officials supported 
Dutch claims.   
And what, then, of the United States and its role? On the 50th anniversary of 
the Indonesian Republic’s proclamation of independence, President Bill Clinton 
congratulated President Suharto, stating that “strong diplomatic support for [the 
Indonesian] struggle for freedom came from President Truman and the United States 
Congress as [the] nation was being born.”760 This dissertation has emphasized that 
that message perpetuates a myth. The Truman administration did not from the start 
of the Indonesian revolution support the fight, even if it did in principle embrace the 
right to self-determination for the peoples of Southeast Asia. A preoccupation with 
Europe and increasing communist tensions muddled the view of policymakers in 
Washington. Although the United States saw self-rule as ultimately inevitable, it 
agreed with the Dutch government that this was a development for the future, to be 
stretched out over years if not decades. Until late 1948, American planners continually 
sided with their European ally in the Indonesian conflict, lending it military equipment 
from which American insignia were to be removed, attempting to keep the case out of 
the United Nations Security Council, and appointing pro-Dutch diplomats to fill the 
important third seat on the Good Offices Committee. Only when upon arrival in the 
archipelago one representative after another began to question Dutch policy, after 
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Hatta’s government put down the communist-inspired Madiun revolt, and after the 
second military offensive caused universal condemnation did United States officials 
bring effective pressure to bear on their colleagues in the Netherlands. They saw that 
even 50,000 British troops were hard-pressed to end the guerilla war in Malaya, 
realized that only through an uncompromising attitude and protracted campaigns the 
French in Indochina were “succeeding,” for the time being, in suppressing Ho Chi 
Minh’s forces, and looked on as Burma plunged into a state of anarchy. The 
Indonesian Republic, Washington came to understand in late 1948, had at least 
demonstrated the ability to provide a coherent, moderate, and relatively effective 
administration. By 1949, then, the Dutch themselves had emerged as the greatest 
threat to American postwar grand strategy.761 
  
A final glimpse at the last few months of 1949 illuminates some of the themes 
of this dissertation. The practical implementation of the Van Roijen - Roem 
declarations of May 1949 proved problematic. In Indonesia as well as in the 
Netherlands, people felt a sense of betrayal. Many Republicans viewed the pragmatic 
compromise as a dangerous defeat; guerilla warfare would have to end in return for 
only a fraction of the territory the Republic had previously held, and the political 
leadership had moreover agreed to become only one of more than a dozen 
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component states, most of which artificially created by the Dutch, in the United States 
of Indonesia. Federalists in the archipelago had every reason to expect that the 
Republic would nevertheless attempt to become the dominant force in that 
federation. In the Netherlands, many feared that the Indies would soon be lost 
forever. 
 During the summer, rapid and sometimes unexpected changes took place. 
General Spoor, the die-hard who until the end believed that the Republic could and 
should be eliminated through decisive Dutch action, died of a sudden heart attack on 
May 25. A week later, the conservative career diplomat A.H.J. Lovink replaced High 
Commissioner Beel, whom even his aides said still felt like a stranger in a strange 
land.762 Five days after that, head of the Dutch delegation in Jakarta J.H. van Roijen 
argued forcefully that the military situation of Netherlands troops was so dismal that 
genuine authority existed only in small pockets. He suggested controversially that his 
colleagues in The Hague recognize the hard facts and allow Republican administrators 
and forces to operate and maintain law and order in those areas they already 
controlled. The Dutch government had no option but to accept this 
recommendation.763 
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 In late June, the Dutch withdrew from Yogyakarta. In early July, Sukarno and 
Hatta triumphantly returned to the city, waved on by cheering crowds carrying red 
and white flags. Although military leaders were reluctant to cease hostilities before the 
completion of negotiations with the Dutch, General Sudirman agreed to meet with 
the President.764 By the end of the month, two Inter-Indonesia Conferences saw 
Republicans and federalists reaching major compromises in their discussions on the 
future of the United States of Indonesia and their preparations for the Round Table 
Conference. A frustrated High Commissioner Lovink grew increasingly alarmed at 
what he perceived to be unauthorized infiltrations that took place as the Republican 
army and administration took over areas previously held by the Dutch. He described 
the situation in the archipelago as explosive and highly dangerous, and accused the 
Republican leadership of demonstrating bad faith. Some of his military advisers even 
argued that a third police action would strengthen the Dutch position. By now firmly 
set on its new course, however, Prime Minister Drees’s cabinet ruled out this course 
of action, and urged Lovink to remain cool-headed and practice self-restraint. A 	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ceasefire between Dutch and Republican forces finally became effective in mid 
August.765  
In the run-up to the Round Table Conference set to open in The Hague on 
August 23, Netherlands policymakers worked towards the earliest possible creation of 
a sovereign United States of Indonesia and Netherlands-Indonesia Union. During the 
ten weeks that followed the start of negotiations, the Dutch, Republican, and 
federalist delegations were more than once assisted by the American head of the 
United Nations Commission for Indonesia H. Merle Cochran in breaking through 
dangerous deadlocks.766 
Three major issues kept the parties from reaching an agreement quickly. The 
first was the character and scope of the Union, the second the amount of debt the 
United States of Indonesia was to assume from the Netherlands, and the third the 
problem posed by the territory then known as New Guinea in the far east of the 
archipelago. Despite the Dutch arguments for a tightly knit relationship embodied by 
a Netherlands-Indonesia Union with real responsibilities and genuine authority, it was 	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eventually decided that the crown would merely symbolize and personify a voluntary 
bond between the two nations.767 Netherlands politicians further insisted that the 
Indonesians take on the debt resulting from the military expenditures that had been 
designed to suppress the Republic: both Indonesian delegations categorically refused. 
Under heavy pressure from Cochran to reach a compromise, the government in The 
Hague finally consented to remit 2 billion guilders, leaving the United States of 
Indonesia with a still enormous 4 billion guilders of combined internal and external 
debt.768 Finally, the Dutch delegation was adamant that New Guinea must be excluded 
from the transfer of sovereignty, noting that as the territory was markedly different 
from the rest of the archipelago and much less developed, a newly independent nation 
could not possibly become responsible for it. Already having had to swallow two 
bitter pills, Drees and his colleagues viewed this thorny issue as a matter of prestige. 
New Guinea constituted the last Dutch foothold and a sort of pied-à-terre in 
Southeast Asia. In the “uplifting” of New Guinea’s population, Netherlands 
politicians not unsurprisingly argued, a splendid task still remained to be fulfilled. For 
the federalist delegates, especially, the future status of the area was no less important. 	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Supported by the Republicans, they maintained that all previous agreements with the 
Dutch had envisioned the transfer of true and complete sovereignty of the entire 
territory formerly the Netherlands East Indies to the United States of Indonesia. With 
Cochran’s help, the sides reached an eleventh-hour agreement: New Guinea was to be 
excluded from the transfer but remain under dispute, and the issue would be revisited 
through renewed negotiations within one year. When the conference closed on 
November 2, the overarching goal of outlining the structure, powers, and 
responsibilities of the United States of Indonesia and Netherlands-Indonesia Union 
had been narrowly achieved.769  
*             *             * 
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As Hubertus Van Mook retreated from public life, occasionally giving guest lectures 
in the United States such as one at Cornell University’s McGraw Hall (!) in November 
1953, the Cold War intensified.770 The detonation of a Soviet atom bomb in the late 
summer of 1949, the communist victory in China a few months later, and the start of 
the Korean War the following year contributed to an increasingly bipolar and 
militarized international system, and to the institutionalization of the American global 
commitment. In that sense, Indonesia completed its decolonization process and 
emerged victorious from its struggle for independence just before the closing of a 
window, and henceforth would pursue a policy of non-alignment.  
Within months of the official transfer of sovereignty, the archipelago’s federal 
structure began to collapse, and on the fifth anniversary of the proclamation of 
independence the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia was created. National 
troops put down separatist movements in areas such as West Java and the Maluku 
islands in the east. In late 1950, renewed Dutch-Indonesian negotiations over New 
Guinea proved fruitless. After yet another round of discussions about the future of 
the territory failed in late 1955 and early 1956, Sukarno unilaterally denounced the 
Round Table Conference accords and withdrew his nation from the Netherlands-
Indonesia Union. Around the same time, the Indonesian president put into place the 
political system of “Guided Democracy.” The resulting authoritarian state of affairs 
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led to Mohammad Hatta’s resignation from the Vice Presidency. When Sukarno 
broke all ties with the Netherlands in 1960, the Dutch government made one last 
unsuccessful attempt to keep New Guinea out of Indonesian hands. Under the 
auspices of United States mediator Ellsworth Bunker, the two parties finally agreed to 
temporarily transfer sovereignty over the territory to the United Nations in August 
1962. In May 1963, the area was incorporated into the Indonesian Republic. With 
Sukarno’s demise and Suharto’s ascent to power in the mid 1960s, it might be argued 
that Indonesian post-1949 regimes inherited the Dutch prewar legacy of autocracy. 
Relations between the Netherlands and Indonesia remained difficult for several 
decades. Although they normalized over the course of the 1990s and 2000s, old scars 
from the period 1945-1949 are still periodically reopened, most recently through court 
cases connected to the Rawagede massacre in West Java committed by Dutch forces 
in 1947.   
 
Might events in the Indonesian archipelago have taken a difference course? To 
what extent were the years 1945-1949 marked by missed opportunities? The passage 
of more than half a century grants us the hindsight that the inflexible Dutch attitude 
made the decolonization of Indonesia, from the Netherlands point of view, at least, a 
costly fiasco. For what means, to borrow J.R. Seeley’s poignant question and answer 
from his defense of the British Empire, could the Netherlands possess to resist the 
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rebellion of seventy million subjects? Some voices said that the Dutch had conquered 
the Indies once before, and could conquer it again. But over the course of centuries 
Netherlands administrators had hardly conquered the hearts of the Indonesian people; 
quite the contrary.771 Dutch supreme authority was vested in the feudal aristocracy, in 
bureaucrats and puppet leaders who smothered the voices of nationalists and 
disempowered the archipelago’s population. A sense of national identity nevertheless 
formed among Indonesians. It was fostered by both Japanese occupiers and Dutch 
smugness, and grew into an active desire to drive out oppressive foreigners. 
 Though few things in history are inevitable, it is difficult to see how things 
might have gone otherwise. The motto of the Netherlands, Je Maintiendrai, meaning “I 
will maintain” or “I stand steadfast,” aptly summarizes the attitude of Dutch 
policymakers to the conflict in Indonesia. Convinced that they were doing what was 
right for not only the Netherlands and Indonesia but also the world, they remained 
unimaginative even in the face of international pressure to be generous and 
Indonesian confidence that the fragile Republic would endure. Even relatively 
progressive politicians such as Schermerhorn and Van Mook were convinced that the 
Dutch had a right to their place in the Indies and a duty to fulfill, and argued merely 
for reconstruction, for a new Indonesia after a Netherlands model. In the eyes of their 
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colleagues in The Hague they went too far, in the eyes of their Indonesian opponents, 
not far enough.   
In 1930, an-about-to-be-imprisoned Sukarno prophesized that although there 
was no question that Indonesia would one day be free, the way in which colonial ties 
would be broken depended entirely on the intentions of the Dutch. As their unstable 
authority in Indonesia came crashing down, the latter continued living in a dream 
world bound by prewar prejudices. Even as that dream turned into a nightmare that 
took the lives of tens of thousands, each successive point on which the Netherlands 
government ungraciously gave way over the course of the late 1940s was regarded as a 
regrettable necessity. Although the Dutch finally resigned to the inevitable outcome of 
the conflict, the way in which Indonesia gained its independence long remained a 
source of mournful sentiment. 
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Appendix I: 
Allied re-occupation, August 1945 - March 1946772 
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Appendix II: 
17 August 1945: the declaration of independence 
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Appendix III: 
Java 
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Appendix IV: 
Republican military units on Java, 1946-1947 
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Appendix V:  
Federal Indonesia as proposed in the Linggadjati Agreement 
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Appendix VI: 
First Dutch “police action” on Java, July-August 1947 
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Appendix VII: 
First Dutch “police action” on Sumatra, July-August 1947 
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Appendix VIII: 
Second “police action” and its aftermath, 1948-1949 
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Appendix IX: 
Federal Indonesia, 1949-1950 
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